Abstract construals make the emotional rewards of prosocial behavior more salient

Although previous research has shown that helping others leads to higher happiness than helping oneself, people frequently predict that self-serving behavior will make them happier than prosocial behavior. Here, we explore whether abstract construal – thinking about an event from a higher level, distanced perspective – influences predictions about how rewarding prosocial actions will be for people’s own well-being. In Experiment 1, Hurricane Katrina volunteers who adopted an abstract construal predicted that their efforts would be more rewarding than did volunteers who adopted a concrete construal. Experiment 2 provided a conceptual replication with a hypothetical donation scenario; people who adopted an abstract rather than concrete construal predicted that giving more money would be more rewarding than giving less. These findings suggest that people are more likely to appreciate the emotional benefits of prosocial actions when they adopt high-level construals than when they adopt low-level construals.     

What affects strategy selection in arithmetic? The example of parity and five effects on product verification

The parity effect in arithmetic problem verification tasks refers to faster and more accurate judgments for false equations when the odd/even status of the proposed answer mismatches that of the correct answer. In two experiments, we examined whether the proportion of incorrect answers that violated parity or the number of even operands in the problem affected the magnitude of these effects. Experiment 1 showed larger parity effects for problems with two even operands and larger parity effects during the second half of the experiment. Experiment 2 replicated the results of Experiment 1 and varied the proportion of problems violating parity. Larger parity effects were obtained when more of the false problems violated parity. Moreover, all three effects combined to show the greatest parity effects in conditions with a high proportion of parity violations in problems containing two even operands that were solved during the second half of the experiment. Experiment 3 generalized the findings to the case of five rule (i.e., checking whether a false product ends in 5 or 0), another procedure for solving and verifying multiplication problems quickly. These results (1) delineate further constraints for inclusion in models of arithmetic processing when thinking about how people select among verification strategies, (2) show combined effects of variables that traditionally have been shown to have separate effects on people's strategy selection, and (3) are consistent with a view of strategy selection that suggests a bias either in the allocation of cognitive resources in the execution of strategies or in the order of execution of these strategies; they argue against a simple, unbiased competition among strategies.     

People's hypercorrection of high-confidence errors: did they know it all along?

This study investigated the "knew it all along" explanation of the hypercorrection effect. The hypercorrection effect refers to the finding that when people are given corrective feedback, errors that are committed with high confidence are easier to correct than low-confidence errors. Experiment 1 showed that people were more likely to claim that they knew it all along when they were given the answers to high-confidence errors as compared with low-confidence errors. Experiments 2 and 3 investigated whether people really did know the correct answers before being told or whether the claim in Experiment 1 was mere hindsight bias. Experiment 2 showed that (a) participants were more likely to choose the correct answer in a 2nd guess multiple-choice test when they had expressed an error with high rather than low confidence and (b) that they were more likely to generate the correct answers to high-confidence as compared with low-confidence errors after being told they were wrong and to try again. Experiment 3 showed that (c) people were more likely to produce the correct answer when given a 2-letter cue to high- rather than low-confidence errors and that (d) when feedback was scaffolded by presenting the target letters 1 by 1, people needed fewer such letter prompts to reach the correct answers when they had committed high- rather than low-confidence errors. These results converge on the conclusion that when people said that they knew it all along, they were right. This knowledge, no doubt, contributes to why they are able to correct those high-confidence errors so easily.     

Naive physics: the curvilinear impetus principle and its role in interactions with moving objects

Several recent studies in which subjects solved pencil-and-paper problems concerning the behavior of moving objects have shown that many people have incorrect beliefs about motion. The present study considers the question of whether these naive beliefs are manifested in situations where people observe and interact with moving objects. Several findings in the problem-solving literature suggest that abstract or unrealistic tasks may fail to tap knowledge and reasoning abilities that are routinely used in more concrete or realistic situations. Thus, most people may have accurate knowledge about the behavior of moving objects, knowledge that they use in their everyday interactions with objects in motion. However, this knowledge may not be activated in the context of abstract, static problems, and as a result people attempting to solve such problems may resort to naive beliefs. Three experiments examine this possibility in the context of one specific naive belief, the curvilinear impetus belief. Contrary to expectations, results suggest that the curvilinear impetus belief is used not only on pencil-and-paper problems but also in situations where people observe and interact with moving objects. Implications of these findings are discussed.     

Category size and judgments of variability: The effects of seeing the trees in the forest1

Abstract: Competing predictions about the effects of category size on judgments of category variability were examined in two studies involving the presentation of exemplars of two artificial social groups. In contrast to predictions of some exemplar-based models, Experiment 1 demonstrated that a numerically smaller group was perceived to be more variable than a larger group on the standard deviation measure of frequency distribution estimates. The result was interpreted to be an effect of differential information load. Experiment 2 revealed that variability judgments were influenced by prior expectations about the central tendencies as well as by practice in retrieving information about category exemplars. When frequency distribution estimates were made subsequent to abstract tasks, expectations about the numerical majority reduced perceived variability, while this influence was mitigated when memory measures preceded the frequency estimates.     

Naïve predictions of motion and orientation in mirrors: From what we see to what we expect reflections to do

The study aimed to investigate naïve beliefs regarding the dynamic and static behavior of reflections. In the first three experiments, participants in the study made predictions about the correspondence between real and reflected movements or about the orientation of the reflection of a static object placed in front of a mirror. In Experiments 1 and 2, paper-and-pencil tasks were used and in Experiment 3 participants were asked to make their predictions while imagining that they were facing a mirror. Results revealed that a percentage of undergraduates (ranging from 25% to 35%) were unable to make correct predictions. We classified the errors into types and found that responses either conform to the belief that reflections do the same or that they do the opposite. This suggests an oversimplification of the geometry of mirror reflections in two directions: participants either generalize what they see when movements are parallel to the mirror or what they see when movements are orthogonal to the mirror. Findings from Experiment 4 confirmed that these two expectations fit in with what people perceive in mirrors. Findings from Experiment 5 confirmed that this is also in agreement with the relationship perceived when looking at similar movements and orientations “outside” mirrors.     

Simultaneous utilization of multiple cues in judgments of learning

There is much evidence that metacognitive judgments, such as people’s predictions of their future memory performance (judgments of learning, JOLs), are inferences based on cues and heuristics. However, relatively little is known about whether and when people integrate multiple cues in one metacognitive judgment or focus on a single cue without integrating further information. The current set of experiments systematically addressed whether and to what degree people integrate multiple extrinsic and intrinsic cues in JOLs. Experiment 1 varied two cues: number of study presentations (1 vs. 2) and font size (18 point vs. 48 point). Results revealed that people integrated both cues in their JOLs. Experiment 2 demonstrated that the two word characteristics concreteness (abstract vs. concrete) and emotionality (neutral vs. emotional) were integrated in JOLs. Experiment 3 showed that people integrated all four cues in their JOLs when manipulated simultaneously. Finally, Experiment 4 confirmed integration of three cues that varied on a continuum rather than in two easily distinguishable levels. These results demonstrate that people have a remarkable capacity to integrate multiple cues in metacognitive judgments. In addition, our findings render an explanation of cue effects on JOLs in terms of demand characteristics implausible.     

To What Extent Do Pragmatic Reasoning Schemas Affect Performance on Wason's Selection Task?

Cheng and Holyoak's (1985) most persuasive evidence for pragmatic reasoning schema theory has been the finding that an abstract permission version of Wason's selection task yields higher rates of solution than a nonpragmatic control. Experiment 1 presented two problem sets, one modelled after Cheng and Holyoak's abstract permission problem, which is relativley rich in extraneous features, and one after Wason's, relatively impoverished, standard problem. Each problem set varied type of rule (permission, obligation, or nonpragmatic) and task type (to reason from or about a rule). Results revealed that enriched problems were solved more often than impoverished ones, that reasoning-from problems were solved more often than reasoning-about problems, and that there was a beneficial interaction between enriching features and the permission rule. Experiment 2 demonstrated that although explicit negatives were crucial for solution of reasoning-from permission problems, they played no role in solution of enriched nonpragmatic-rule problems. Experiment 3 provided a replication of the enriched reasoning-from permission problem, again revealed no beneficial effect for obligation-rule problems, and further revealed no influence of instructions to provide brief written justifications. We argue that the results show that the scope of pragmatic reasoning schema theory needs to be narrowed, that although a permission rule does have an effect, an obligation rule does not, and that some beneficial task features are independent of anything explained by pragmatic reasoning schema theory.     

Artifacts and natural kinds: children's judgments about whether objects are owned

People's behavior in relation to objects depends on whether they are owned. But how do people judge whether objects are owned? We propose that people expect human-made objects (artifacts) to be more likely to be owned than naturally occurring objects (natural kinds), and we examine the development of these expectations in young children. Experiment 1 found that when shown pictures of familiar kinds of objects, 3-year-olds expected artifacts to be owned and inanimate natural kinds to be non-owned. In Experiments 2A and 2B, 3-6-year-olds likewise had different expectations about the ownership of unfamiliar artifacts and natural kinds. Children at all ages viewed unfamiliar natural kinds as non-owned, but children younger than 6 years of age only endorsed artifacts as owned at chance rates. In Experiment 3, children saw the same pictures but were also told whether objects were human-made. With this information provided, even 3-year-olds viewed unfamiliar artifacts as owned. Finally, in Experiment 4, 4- and 5-year-olds chose unfamiliar artifacts over natural kinds when judging which object in a pair belongs to a person, but not when judging which the person prefers. These experiments provide first evidence about how children judge whether objects are owned. In contrast to claims that children think about natural kinds as being similar to artifacts, the current findings reveal that children have differing expectations about whether they are owned.     

Facilitation in Wason’s selection task: Content and instructions

Two experiments investigated the influence of rule content and instructions on subjects’ ability to reason about conditional rules. Experiment 1 had subjects determine whether two rules were “true or false” or whether two rules were being “violated.” Subjects had direct experience with one rule and indirect experience with the other. Performance was superior with direct experiential rules and with violation instructions. Experiment 2 was conducted to determine whether violation instructions could facilitate correct selections with content for which subjects had no experience. Subjects were presented with a familiar and unfamiliar rule. The results were consistent with those of Experiment 1. The possibility of a cognitive trade-off between rule familiarity and instructions is discussed.     

Improving metacognitive accuracy: How failing to retrieve practice items reduces overconfidence

People often exhibit inaccurate metacognitive monitoring. For example, overconfidence occurs when people judge that they will remember more information on a future test then they actually do. The present experiments examined whether a small number of retrieval practice opportunities would improve participants’ metacognitive accuracy by reducing overconfidence. Participants studied Lithuanian–English paired associates and predicted their performance on an upcoming memory test. Then they attempted to retrieve one or more practice items (or none in the control condition) and made a second prediction. Experiment 1 showed that failing to retrieve a single practice item lead to improved subsequent performance predictions – participants became less overconfident. Experiment 2 directly manipulated retrieval failure and showed that again failure to retrieve a single practice item significantly improved subsequent predictions, relative to when participants successfully retrieved the practice item. Finally, Experiment 3 showed that additional retrieval practice opportunities reduced overconfidence and improved prediction accuracy.     

The nature of gestures' beneficial role in spatial problem solving

Co-thought gestures are hand movements produced in silent, noncommunicative, problem-solving situations. In the study, we investigated whether and how such gestures enhance performance in spatial visualization tasks such as a mental rotation task and a paper folding task. We found that participants gestured more often when they had difficulties solving mental rotation problems (Experiment 1). The gesture-encouraged group solved more mental rotation problems correctly than did the gesture-allowed and gesture-prohibited groups (Experiment 2). Gestures produced by the gesture-encouraged group enhanced performance in the very trials in which they were produced (Experiments 2 & 3). Furthermore, gesture frequency decreased as the participants in the gesture-encouraged group solved more problems (Experiments 2 & 3). In addition, the advantage of the gesture-encouraged group persisted into subsequent spatial visualization problems in which gesturing was prohibited: another mental rotation block (Experiment 2) and a newly introduced paper folding task (Experiment 3). The results indicate that when people have difficulty in solving spatial visualization problems, they spontaneously produce gestures to help them, and gestures can indeed improve performance. As they solve more problems, the spatial computation supported by gestures becomes internalized, and the gesture frequency decreases. The benefit of gestures persists even in subsequent spatial visualization problems in which gesture is prohibited. Moreover, the beneficial effect of gesturing can be generalized to a different spatial visualization task when two tasks require similar spatial transformation processes. We concluded that gestures enhance performance on spatial visualization tasks by improving the internal computation of spatial transformations. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved).     

Hot dogs and zavy cats: preschoolers' and adults' expectations about familiar and novel adjectives

In recent years, a growing body of research has begun to examine the processes that underlie young children's acquisition of adjectival meanings. In the present studies, we examined whether preschoolers' willingness to extend adjectives was influenced by the type of property labeled by familiar adjectives (Experiment 1) and by semantic information conveyed in the sentence used to introduce novel adjectives (Experiment 2). In Experiment 1, we examined preschoolers' and adults' expectations about the generalizability of familiar adjectives of three different types: emotional state terms, physiological state terms, and stable trait terms. On each trial, we labeled a target animal with one of the three different types of adjectives and asked whether these terms could apply to a subordinate-level match, a basic-level match, a superordinate-level match, or an inanimate object. Results indicated that 4-year-olds and adults extended the trait terms, but not the emotional or physiological terms, to members of the same basic-level category. In Experiment 2, we presented 4-year-olds and adults with novel adjectives in one of two verb frames: stable ("This X is very daxy") or transient ("This X feels very daxy"). Participants were more likely to extend the novel adjective to subordinate matches if they were in the Stable frame group than if they were in the Transient frame group. These findings are discussed in terms of implications for young children's expectations about familiar and novel adjectives.     

The Influence of Confirmation Bias on Memory and Source Monitoring

Two experiments were conducted to examine whether recognition memory for information and/or its source are influenced by confirmation bias. During Phase 1, subjects were shown a summary about the issue of gun control and asked to indicate a position on the issue. During Phase 2, 12 abstracts (Experiment 1) or social media posts (Experiment 2) were shown, one at a time. Posts in Experiment 2 were associated with either friends or strangers. Participants indicated whether they wanted to read a more extensive version of each abstract (Experiment 1) or post (Experiment 2). Phase 3 was the memory phase. Thirty-two abstract titles (Experiment 1) or posts (Experiment 2) were shown one at a time. Participants indicated yes or no, and whether they recognized the titles/posts from the last phase. Recognition memory for information that supported the participants' viewpoint was higher than that for opposing information.     

The effects of realism on Wason's THOG problem

Summary In this series of experiments the effects of phrasing Wason's THOG problem in realistic terms were investigated. Experiments 1 and 2 used realistic materials of very different kinds, but neither version of the problem produced any facilitation compared with the original abstract version. Experiment 3 used a version of the problem in which the correct answer was cued in by the realistic material, and a significant improvement was found. Experiment 4 used a version of the problem similar to that used in Experiment 3 and again improved performance was found; since the subjects in this experiment were eight- and nine-year-old children, the facilitation almost certainly was not the result of improved logical ability. The results of Experiment 5, however, suggested that it was difficult to cue in adults to give the logically incorrect answer. It is concluded that realism improves performance on this problem only when the realistic material cues in the correct answer from memory. A review of the research that makes use of other reasoning paradigms suggests that this conclusion may hold true for these as well.     

Change blindness blindness: beliefs about the roles of intention and scene complexity in change detection

Observers have difficulty detecting visual changes. However, they are unaware of this inability, suggesting that people do not have an accurate understanding of visual processes. We explored whether this error is related to participants' beliefs about the roles of intention and scene complexity in detecting changes. In Experiment 1 participants had a higher failure rate for detecting changes in an incidental change detection task than an intentional change detection task. This effect of intention was greatest for complex scenes. However, participants predicted equal levels of change detection for both types of changes across scene complexity. In Experiment 2, emphasizing the differences between intentional and incidental tasks allowed participants to make predictions that were less inaccurate. In Experiment 3, using more sensitive measures and accounting for individual differences did not further improve predictions. These findings suggest that adults do not fully understand the role of intention and scene complexity in change detection.     

Can People Identify “Deceptive” or “Misleading” Items that Tend to Produce Mostly Wrong Answers?

In many domains, two‐alternative forced‐choice questions produce more correct responses than wrong responses across participants. However, some items, dubbed “deceptive” or “misleading”, produce mostly wrong answers. These items yield poor calibration and poor resolution because the dominant, erroneous response tends to be endorsed with great confidence, even greater than that of the correct response. In addition, for deceptive items, group discussion amplifies rather than mitigates error while enhancing confidence in the erroneous response. Can participants identify deceptive items when they are warned about their existence? It is argued that people's ability to discriminate between deceptive and non‐deceptive items is poor when the erroneous responses are based on the same process assumed to underlie correct responses. Indeed, participants failed to discriminate between deceptive and non‐deceptive perceptual items when they were warned that some of the items (Experiment 1) or exactly half of the items (Experiment 2) were deceptive. A similar failure was observed for general‐knowledge questions (Experiment 3) except when participants were informed about the correct answer (Experiment 4). Possibly, for these tasks, people cannot escape the dangers lurking in deceptive items. In contrast, the results suggest that participants can identify deceptive problems for which the wrong answer stems from reliance on a fast, intuitive process that differs from the analytic mode that is likely to yield correct answers (Experiment 5). The practical and theoretical implications of the results were discussed. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Metacognitive monitoring during category learning: how success affects future behaviour

The purpose of this study was to see how people perceive their own learning during a category learning task, and whether their perceptions matched their performance. In two experiments, participants were asked to learn natural categories, of both high and low variability, and make category learning judgements (CLJs). Variability was manipulated by varying the number of exemplars and the number of times each exemplar was presented within each category. Experiment 1 showed that participants were generally overconfident in their knowledge of low variability families, suggesting that they considered repetition to be more useful for learning than it actually was. Also, a correct trial, for a particular category, was more likely to occur if the previous trial was correct. CLJs had the largest increase when a trial was correct following an incorrect trial and the largest decrease when an incorrect trial followed a correct trial. Experiment 2 replicated these results, but also demonstrated that global CLJ ratings showed the same bias towards repetition. These results indicate that we generally identify success as being the biggest determinant of learning, but do not always recognise cues, such as variability, that enhance learning.