The Power of Powerlessness

Philosophers should forget what they think they know about divine assistance, power, control, up‐to‐usness, freedom‐from and free will, when it comes to alcoholism, given what Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) says. Alcoholics will never be free of their alcoholism; although it is up to them to acknowledge their powerlessness over alcohol, often that is not possible until they hit bottom, and even then they might not acquire the power of powerlessness without help from a Higher Power. After explaining and defending these insights of AA, the unwarranted assumptions behind how philosophers (and others) criticise them are identified.     

The Powerlessness of Necessity

This paper concerns anti‐Humean intuitions about connections in nature. It argues for the existence of a de re link that is not necessity. Some anti‐Humeans tacitly assume that metaphysical necessity can be used for all sorts of anti‐Humean desires. Metaphysical necessity is thought to stick together whatever would be loose and separate in a Hume world, as if it were a kind of universal superglue. I argue that this is not feasible. Metaphysical necessity might connect synchronically co‐existent properties—kinds and their essential features, for example—but it is difficult to see how it could also serve as the binding force for successions of events. That is, metaphysical necessity seems not to be fit for diachronic, causal affairs in which causal laws, causation, or dispositions are involved. A different anti‐Humean connection in nature has to do that job. My arguments focus mainly on a debate which has been the battleground for Humean vs. anti‐Humean intuitions for many decades—namely, the analysis of dispositional predicates—yet I believe (but do not argue here) that the arguments generalise to causation and causal laws straightforwardly.     

Hope,religiosity, and subjective well-being

This study explored the relationship between religiosity, hope, and subjective well-being among 430 South African university students (n = 324) and their family members (n = 104) (70.2% female; 88.4% black; 8.4% white). Data were gathered utilising measures of religiosity, hope, satisfaction with life, and affect balance. We applied structural equation modelling to examine both the direct effects of religiosity on hope, as well as the indirect effects of religiosity on life satisfaction and positive and negative affect via hope as mediator. Findings suggest pathway and agency hope to mediate the relationships between religiosity and life satisfaction, positive affect, and negative affect. Specifically, religiosity predicted higher levels of life satisfaction and positive affect, and lower levels of negative affect via agency hope. The results suggest agency hope to mediate the relationship between religiosity and subjective well-being.     

Conceptualizing,Measuring, and Nurturing Hope

Hope is defined as the process of thinking about one's goals, along with the motivation to move toward (agency) and the ways to achieve (pathways) those goals. After discussing other related concepts, the scale for measuring hope is introduced, and the role of hope in the counseling process is described.     

Hope,Self-Transcendence and Environmental Ethics

Environmental ethicists often hold that organisms, species, ecosystems, and the like have goods of their own. But, even given that such goods exist, whether we ought to value them is controversial. Hence an environmental philosophy needs, in addition to an account of what sorts of values there are, an explanation what, how and why we morally ought to value—that is, an account of moral valuing. This paper presents one such an account. Specifically, I aim to show that unless there are eternal goods (and maybe even if there are), we have a duty of self-transcendence toward nature—that is, a duty to value nature's goods as ends. This duty is owed, however, not to nature, but to ourselves. It is grounded in what I call an imperative of hope. The argument, in a nutshell, is that we have a duty to ourselves to (in a certain sense) optimize hope. This optimization requires self-transcendence toward entities whose goods are more diverse and enduring than any human goods. But unless there are eternal goods, such goods occur only in nature.     

Agency,Signification, and Temporality

This paper examines the temporality of agency in Judith Butler's and Saba Mahmood's writing. I argue that Mahmood moves away from a performative understanding of agency, which focuses on relations of signification, to a corporeal understanding, which focuses on desire and sensation. Drawing on Gilles Deleuze's reading of Henri Bergson, I show how this move involves a changed model of becoming: whereas Butler imagines movement as a series of discontinuous beings, in Mahmood's case, we get an understanding of becoming.     

Agency, authorship, and illusion

Daniel Wegner argues that conscious will is an illusion. I examine the adequacy of his theory of apparent mental causation and whether, if accurate, it suggests that our experience of agency and authorship should be considered illusory. I examine various interpretations of this claim and raise problems for each interpretation. I also distinguish between the experiences of agency and authorship.     

Freedom, Responsibility, and Agency

This paper first distinguishes three alternative views that adherents to both incompatibilism and PAP may take as to what constitutes an agent's determining or controlling her action (if it's not the action's being deterministically caused by antecedent events): the indeterministic-causation view, the agent-causation view, and "simple indeterminism." The bulk of the paper focusses on the dispute between simple indeterminism - the view that the occurrence of a simple mental event is determined by its subject if it possesses the "actish" phenomenal quality and is undetermined by antecedent events - and Timothy O'Connor's agent-causation view. It defends simple indeterminism against O'Connor's objections to it and offers objections to O'Connor's view.     

Optimism,Agency, and Success

Does optimism lead to success? Friends of optimism argue that positive beliefs about ourselves and our future contribute to our fitness and mental health, and are correlated with good functioning, productivity, resilience, and pro-social behaviour. Sceptics, instead, claim that when we are optimistic we fail to react constructively to negative feedback, and put ourselves at risk because we underestimate threats. Thus, it is controversial whether optimistic beliefs are conducive to success, intended as the fulfilment of our goals in a given domain. According to the traditional view, optimistic beliefs lead to success when they do not involve any distortion of reality, and according to the trade-off view, they lead to success when they involve a distortion of reality, but a small one. Based on the literature about positive illusions in the perception of romantic partners and in the assessment of future health prospects, I suggest that optimistic beliefs lead to goal attainment when they support agency by contributing to the sense that we are competent and efficacious agents and that our goals are both desirable and attainable.     

Agency,communion and entitlement

In this study, the relationship between agency, communion, and the active, passive, and revenge forms of entitlement is examined. Results indicate that active entitlement was positively related to agency, negatively to communion (Study 1), and unrelated to unmitigated agency and communion (Study 2). Passive entitlement was positively related to communion (in regular and unmitigated forms) and negatively related to agency (in both forms). Revenge entitlement was positively related to agency (unmitigated and regular), and negatively related to both regular and unmitigated communal orientations. Detected relationships were independent from self‐esteem (Study 1). The findings are discussed in relation to distinctions between narcissistic and healthy entitlement, and within the context of the three‐dimensional model of entitlement.     

Agency, properties and causation

The paper argues against the very commonly held view that whenever a substance may be said to be the cause of something, a fuller and metaphysically more accurate understanding of the situation can always be obtained by looking to the properties in virtue of which that substance was able to bring about the effect in question. Paul Humphreys’ argument that when a substance is said to have produced an effect, it always turns out to be an aspect or property of that substance which brought about the effect in question is examined and criticized; it is argued that it is based on an illegitimate application of Mill’s Methods of Difference and Agreement to the case. Mill’s methods, it is suggested, are methods of empirical, not of ontological enquiry. The paper then turns to examine an argument by Mele which appears to depend on a structurally rather similar assumption that if there is nothing about a subject which could explain why she does one thing rather than another, it cannot really be up to that subject which thing occurs. It is suggested that, too, the inference is faulty, and that once it is rejected, one common objection to libertarianism—the argument from luck—might be more readily met.     

现代性、主体性、限制性

本文试图在现代性的背景下讨论当代文化之大义。首先,当代文化的本质与内涵是回归,它肩负着解放人类主体性的使命登场;其次,当代文化回归的主旨,是重申和强化人的主体性,寻求释放并确立人的主体性文化之内容及形式;再次,当代文化回归趋向的另一展示,是对于形而上的追索,并确立主体间性的立场,这是对现代化的一种平衡和拯救。最后,回归乃人类认识的极限(制)性所致。这也是人类的限制性——主体性边界。这一不无悲观色彩的实在,恰恰是主体性的保障。一切,均是相对于人而言的,是人择的。人类的主体性因此才不断地被周期性重申。主体性的追求与实现,是人类(多次现代性问题)的唯一永恒主题。     

Markets,Choice and Agency

John Tomasi’s Free Market Fairness (2012) introduces several powerful arguments in favour of a novel and surprising thesis: the best way to realize Rawls’s principles of justice is a free market society, rather than the arrangements that Rawls himself believed would best promote justice. In this paper, I adduce three arguments against Tomasi. First, I suggest that his view rests on a faulty understanding of what constitutes conventional property rights. Second, I argue that many market solutions generate choices which are not valuable ones for the agent to have to make. Third, I show that many choices created by the market systems Tomasi favours create the illusion that citizens are making their own choices when in fact they are not. I suggest that taken together these three arguments are sufficient to defend Rawlsian institutional arrangements against Tomasi’s challenge.