We Were,We Are,Will We Be? The Social Psychology of Collective Angst

Not all social groups survive the passage of time. Groups once in existence are now but memories of the past. If history is any indication, other social groups are likely to experience a similar fate and join the list of groups that once were. The concern that one’s group might one day join such a list is the focus of this paper. Specifically, we examine the social psychology of collective angst – a group‐based emotion that stems from concern for the future vitality of one’s social group. We begin by discussing the anatomy of collective angst and how it differs from other collective emotions. We then outline factors that foster collective angst. Importantly, we provide a novel theoretical framework outlining both constructive and destructive means by which members may defend against a future that does not include their group. For example, we examine collective angst as a facilitator of, among other things, ingroup cohesion and outgroup aggression. Finally, we discuss how collective angst has manifested on the world stage as well as implications for relations within and between groups.     

Where Have We Been, How Did We Get There, and Where Shall We Go?

Commentators expressed a wide variety of views on my evaluation of the state of assessment center (AC) research and practice. In this response, I first trace the evolution of the construct validity paradox "urban legend." Next, I consider the commentators' comments as they relate to (a) my recommendation to abandon dimension-based ACs in lieu of task- or role-based structures (b) my recommendation to discontinue design fix attempts toward making ACs conform to multitrait–multimethod construct validity criteria, and (c) considerations of construct validity and validation evidence. Finally, I offer some directions for future AC research and practice.     

How,in Our Time,Can We Learn about Spirituality?

A rule of thinking which would absolutely prevent me from acknowledging certain kinds of truth, if those kinds of truth were really there, would be an irrational rule.     

Why Are We Certain that We Exist?

Descartes was certain that he was thinking and he was accordingly certain that he existed. Like Descartes, we seem to be more certain of our thoughts and our existence than of anything else. What is less clear is the reason why we are thus certain. Philosophers throughout history have provided different interpretations of the cogito, disagreeing both on the kind of thoughts it characterizes and on the reasons for its cogency. According to what we may call the empiricist interpretation of the cogito, I can only claim to be certain of having experiences, and this certainty, as well as that of my own existence, stems from their phenomenal and subjective character. According to rationalist interpretations, on the other hand, I am certain of having some self‐reflexive propositional attitudes, and this certainty derives from their rational features. Psychiatric patients suffering from acute forms of depersonalization or of the Cotard syndrome often doubt that they think and exist, and might even believe that they don't. I argue that their study allows us to favor the empiricist interpretation of the cogito.     

We have a prejudice against ourselves—Sentiment,ethics, and reason

Briefly stated my point is that the well-being of each person in a community conceived abstractly may be all too easily sacrificed for the sake of the abstraction. Physicians may offer critically ill patients places in programs of experimental treatment, but there is commonly a catch to the offer. To take part in a program of clinical experiment a patient must not only risk a possible failure of a fresh drug and the chance of destructive side effects from the drug, but the patients must risk only getting the traditional treatment along with a placebo rather than the experimental drug. Placebo control, double blind critical protocols for testing effects of fresh drugs on critically ill patients are a commonplace. I question the scientific objectivity of the protocols and the underlying ethic, and suggest use of alternate protocols. Experimental tests in the treatment gram-negative bacteria blood infections, muscular dystrophy, and AIDS and AIDS-related diseases are examples.     

Awareness of Infants: What Do They,and We,Seek?

I study the biological foundations of human cultural intelligence, and how they are supported. I observe the development of human motives for agency, the emotions that evaluate what is discovered, and the ways interests and discoveries and feelings may be shared with others. Ed Tronick and I have been privileged to study infants closely over several decades in which ideas of the dynamic powers of the human mind have been transformed, principally by recording how infants act in intimate companionship with their mothers in the first year or two. Here I try to clarify the ways we have, for different purposes and in different environments, taken complementary routes to understanding the meaning of infant life. His responsibilities are clinical and occupied with supporting the mental health of both the infant and the mother, and the building of a strong affectionate trust for life with others. My task has been trying to understand the subtle creativity and aesthetic and moral principles that animate a widening circle of relationships for a child, and that lead to cultural learning that is rich and playful. Ed and I are lucky to be discovering what every infant wants, and privileged to be supporting pride in good company, while striving to guard against causes of despair and shame in young children and their families.     

‘We Are All One,We Are All Gods’: Negotiating Spirituality in the Conscious Partying Movement

Research literature has been growing over the past five years which explores the religious significance of electronic dance music cultures. This article adds to this work by offering an analysis of spiritual discourses used within a particular underground dance scene in the UK, the ‘conscious partying’ movement. An ethnographic account is given of a typical dance night within this scene, which demonstrates how these spiritual discourses are embedded within a range of musical, artistic, therapeutic, and political networks and practices. The use and salience of spiritual discourses of oneness, energy, and immediatism within this scene are then analysed. It is argued that the conscious partying scene in the UK reflects spiritual ideas and practices within the wider global psy-trance music scene and that this study demonstrates the importance of ethnographic research for examining the complex ways in which such broader spiritual discourses may be negotiated within specific groups. The article concludes by identifying possible future research that explores in more depth the relationships between spiritual discourses, the aural properties of electronic dance music, and embodied practices of dance.     

What Kind of Empirical Research Should We Publish, Fund, and Reward?

ABSTRACT— When evaluating empirical papers for publication, grant proposals, or individual contributions (e.g., awarding tenure), the basic question one should ask is how much the contribution adds to understanding in psychology and not whether the contribution takes a particular form or represents one particular model of how to do empirical studies. Academic psychology has flourished with its mastery of the hypothesis–experiment model of science and its expertise in generating and eliminating alternative hypotheses and isolating causation. These accomplishments are a critical part of psychology, and they are well and appropriately taught by psychologists. However, they are only a part of science and should not comprise the almost exclusive criteria for evaluating research. In particular, discovery of fundamental phenomena, such as functional relations that apply to the real world and have generality, should have a higher priority in psychology. Such findings have been the basis for theoretical advances in other natural sciences.     

What Do We See When We See Total Darkness?

Seeing total darkness is a peculiar perceptual state: in it, the subject is visually aware of something while seeming to fail to be aware of anything. Recent treatments of the topic (Sorensen 2008 , Soteriou 2000 ) leave this particular puzzle unsolved. Here, I attempt a solution. Following Dretske, I begin by suggesting that the perceptual report ‘S sees (total) darkness’ is ambiguous between two distinct kinds of perceptual states: epistemic and non‐epistemic. This will lead to an examination of the metaphysics of what is supposed to be seen. I show, on the one hand, the difficulty of reducing the perception of total darkness to the perception of a particular instantiation of a property, and on the other, that it has important similarities with the perception of (non‐particular) ‘stuff’. I propose, finally, that the solution to the puzzle might involve postulating a novel ontological status for total darkness: that of a ‘concrete universal’. Potential implications of interest for particularism and for naïve realism are suggested.     

Can We Be Self‐Deceived about What We Believe? Self‐Knowledge,Self‐Deception,and Rational Agency

Abstract: This paper considers the question of whether it is possible to be mistaken about the content of our first‐order intentional states. For proponents of the rational agency model of self‐knowledge, such failures might seem very difficult to explain. On this model, the authority of self‐knowledge is not based on inference from evidence, but rather originates in our capacity, as rational agents, to shape our beliefs and other intentional states. To believe that one believes that p, on this view, constitutes one's belief that p and so self‐knowledge involves a constitutive relation between first‐ and second‐order beliefs. If this is true, it is hard to see how those second‐order beliefs could ever be false. I develop two counter‐examples which show that despite the constitutive relation between first‐ and second‐order beliefs in standard cases of self‐knowledge, it is possible to be mistaken, and even self‐deceived, about the content of one's own beliefs. These counter‐examples do not show that the rational agency model is mistaken—rather, they show that the possibility of estrangement from one's own mental life means that, even within the rational agency model, it is possible to have false second‐order beliefs about the content of one's first‐order beliefs. The authority of self‐knowledge does not entail that to believe that one believes that p suffices to make it the case that one believes that p.     

Stephen Hawking,Morality, ETI,and How We’ve Evolved Past a Murderous Past

I disagree with Hawking, arguing that there are some good reasons to believe that ETI would not be out to harm us.     

How Much of What Matters Can We Redistribute? Love,Justice, and Luck

By meeting needs for individualized love and relatedness, the care we receive deeply shapes our social and economic chances and therefore represents a form of luck. Hence, distributive justice requires a fair distribution of care in society. I look at different ways of ensuring this and argue that full redistribution of care is beyond our reach. I conclude that a strong individual morality informed by an ethics of care is a necessary complement of well‐designed institutions.