Investigating the Appraisal Patterns of Regret and Disappointment

Regret and disappointment are the two emotions that are most closely linked to decision making. This study compares the appraisal patterns of the two emotions. This is done in the context of the related negative emotions anger and sadness. The results show clear differences between regret and disappointment in this respect while replicating prior findings concerning the appraisal patterns of anger and sadness. The results are of interest for emotion researchers and decision researchers.     

Technology from the Standpoint of Sunyata

Keiji Nishitani's critique of technology as a dehumanizing force is objected to by showing that it is possible to establish a relationship with technology characterized by the standpoint of sunyata. In order to support my claim, I offer an interpretation of sunyata as a lived experience in which knowing and being are unified. One method used to experience the identity of knowing and being is the method of negatio negationis. I argue that technology embodies this method, and that thus has a built-in process that allows users of technology to achieve a samadhi experience in the use of tools and machines. Hubert Dreyfus’ theory of embodiment is offered in support of this claim. If it is possible to establish an intimate relation with certain technologies, then the nature of technology cannot be reduced to its most obvious dehumanizing and destructive effects.     

诺贝尔医学奖与俄罗斯的遗憾

通过对1901～2004年诺贝尔医学奖的复习分析,发现俄罗斯(前苏联)这个大国,在整个20世纪里102次的医学奖颁发中,只获得2人次,与它的大国地位很不相称.试图分析其获奖特少的历史原因并汲取教训.     

Rhetoric and Dialectic from the Standpoint of Normative Pragmatics

Normative pragmatics can bridge the differences between dialectical and rhetorical theories in a way that saves the central insights of both. Normative pragmatics calls attention to how the manifest strategic design of a message produces interpretive effects and interactional consequences. Argumentative analysis of messages should begin with the manifest persuasive rationale they communicate. But not all persuasive inducements should be treated as arguments. Arguments express with a special pragmatic force propositions where those propositions stand in particular inferential relations to one another. Normative pragmatics provides a framework within which varieties of propositional inference and pragmatic force may be kept straight. Normative pragmatics conceptualizes argumentative effectiveness in a way that integrates notions of rhetorical strategy and rhetorical situation with dialectical norms and procedures for reasonable deliberation. Strategic effectiveness should be seen in terms of maximizing the chances that claims and arguments will be reasonably evaluated, whether or not they are accepted. Procedural rationality should be seen in terms of adjustment to the demands of concrete circumstances. Two types of adjustment are illustrated: rhetorical strategies for framing the conditions for dialectical deliberation and rhetorical strategies for making do with limitations to dialectical deliberation.     

Regret and instability in causal decision theory

Andy Egan has recently produced a set of alleged counterexamples to causal decision theory (CDT) in which agents are forced to decide among causally unratifiable options, thereby making choices they know they will regret. I show that, far from being counterexamples, CDT gets Egan??s cases exactly right. Egan thinks otherwise because he has misapplied CDT by requiring agents to make binding choices before they have processed all available information about the causal consequences of their acts. I elucidate CDT in a way that makes it clear where Egan goes wrong, and which explains why his examples pose no threat to the theory. My approach has similarities to a modification of CDT proposed by Frank Arntzenius, but it differs in the significance that it assigns to potential regrets. I maintain, contrary to Arntzenius, that an agent facing Egan??s decisions can rationally choose actions that she knows she will later regret. All rationality demands of agents it that they maximize unconditional causal expected utility from an epistemic perspective that accurately reflects all the available evidence about what their acts are likely to cause. This yields correct answers even in outlandish cases in which one is sure to regret whatever one does.     

Reactance, Compliance, and Anticipated Regret

The current work explored the relations among reactance, regret, and behavioral choice. A possible mechanism for reactance in opposition to persuasion attempts involves people anticipating greater regret for negative outcomes after complying with an agent of persuasion than for negative outcomes after reacting against an agent of persuasion. Some participants were asked to anticipate regret prior to making a behavioral choice in the face of an influence attempt. These participants anticipated greater regret for negative outcomes that would be experienced after reacting against rather than complying with the influence attempt. Accordingly, these participants subsequently exhibited behavioral compliance. On the other hand, participants who made choices without explicitly being asked to anticipate possible future regret showed far greater reactance. Interestingly, in all cases compliance led to significantly greater regret than did reactance once a negative outcome actually occurred. These data indicate that people do not spontaneously anticipate the regret that they may experience in an influence situation. Furthermore, when asked to anticipate such regret, they misanticipate their future feelings. The implications of complying with and reacting against the demands of others are discussed.     

Regret in pursuit of change and maintenance goals

Three experiments were conducted investigating feelings of regret following poor decisions involving behaviors that were either typical for the decision-maker or atypical. Using a retrospection paradigm, the present research found that typical behaviors were more regrettable when decisions were in the context of goals to change whereas atypical behaviors were more regrettable in the context of maintenance goals. We ruled out explanations of these effects based on the temporal distance of the decision, behavioral typicality per se, the severity of the decision-outcomes and the ease of recalling the events. Results were discussed from a consistency-fit analysis of regret and decision-making.     

Regret and the negative evaluation of decision outcomes in major depression

Disruption of normal emotional experience is central to the phenomenology of depression. Twenty-three depressed outpatients and 23 control subjects performed a computerized decision-making task, during which affective ratings were assessed online to identify various dimensions of emotional experience. We sought to contrast regret (the comparison of the outcomes of selected and nonselected options) with the general negative appraisal of task events. The experience of regret was reduced in depressed patients, an effect that was particularly related to self-reported apathy scores. In an exploratory analysis, we observed that females had a general downward shift in their ratings, as compared with males, but disappointment and regret effects were of similar magnitude. The possible contribution of the orbitofrontal cortex to the phenomenology of regret is discussed. Supplemental materials for this article may be downloaded from http://cabn.psychonomic-journals.org/content/ supplemental.     

Reactive Attitudes,Forgiveness, and the Second-Person Standpoint

Philosophers discussing forgiveness have usually been split between those who think that forgiveness is typically virtuous, even when the wrongdoer doesn’t repent, and those who think that, for forgiveness to be virtuous, certain pre-conditions must be satisfied. I argue that Darwall’s second-personal account of morality offers significant theoretical support for the latter view. I argue that if, as Darwall claims, reactive attitudes issue a demand, this demand needs to be adequately answered for forgiveness to be warranted. It follows that we should reject the thesis that unconditional forgiveness is appropriate in the absence of repentance.     

The Role of Regret in Medical Decision-making

In this paper, I explore the role that regret does and should play in medical decision-making. Specifically, I consider whether the possibility of a patient experiencing post-treatment regret is a good reason for a clinician to counsel against that treatment or to withhold it. Currently, the belief that a patient may experience post-treatment regret is sometimes taken as a sufficiently strong reason to withhold it, even when the patient makes an explicit, informed request. Relatedly, medical researchers and practitioners often understand a patient’s post-treatment regret to be a significant problem, one that reveals a mistake or flaw in the decision-making process. Contrary to these views, I argue that the possibility of post-treatment regret is not necessarily a good reason for withholding the treatment. This claim is justified by appealing to respect for patient autonomy. Furthermore, there are occasions when the very reference to post-treatment regret during medical decision-making is inappropriate. This, I suggest, is the case when the decision concerns a “personally transformative treatment”. This is a treatment that alters a person’s identity. Because the treatment is transformative, neither clinicians nor the patient him/herself can ascertain whether post-treatment regret will occur. Consequently, I suggest, what matters in determining whether to offer a personally transformative treatment is whether the patient has sufficiently good reasons for wanting the treatment at the time the decision is made. What does not matter is how the patient may subsequently be changed by undergoing the treatment.     

Outcome Knowledge,Regret, and Omission Bias

Subjects made or evaluated decisions in hypothetical scenarios. We manipulated knowledge about the outcome and act vs omission in four cases. In case 1 (production processes), acts (changing the process) were considered better than omissions when the decision maker did not know the outcome or knew that it was better than the status quo. Acts were considered worse than omissions once the decision maker learned that the foregone option would have led to an even better outcome. In case 2 (medical treatment), act vs omission again interacted with gain vs loss (relative to the status quo) unless the outcome of the foregone option was known, in which case act vs omission interacted with better vs worse (of the two options). In case 3 (fetal testing), subjects tolerated less risk of miscarriage when a potential for regret was present (because the test with the risk of miscarriage, although better, might miss disorders that another test would detect). This effect was greater for actions than omissions. In case 4 (vaccination), subjects showed less tolerance of vaccine risk when the decision maker would know about the outcome of vaccination or nonvaccination. Thus, the bias toward omission (not vaccinating) is greater when potential regret is present, and potential regret is greater when knowledge of outcomes is expected.     

Regret resolution, aging, and adapting to loss

Both theory and empirical evidence suggest that people who have unresolved regrets experience lower levels of well-being than do those who resolve their regrets. In this study, the authors examined the role of regret resolution during bereavement by assessing whether (a) regret resolution would aid in adapting to the death of a loved one and (b) older adults would be more successful at resolving their bereavement-related regrets than would younger adults. Mixed models were run with longitudinal data from an age-heterogeneous sample of 147 men and women who were eventually bereaved after providing care for a loved one through a hospice. As expected, regret resolution contributed to adjustment as indicated by postloss patterns of depressive symptoms, well-being, and rumination; further, older adults were more likely to resolve their regrets than were younger adults. Implications for encouraging regret resolution early in bereavement are discussed.     

Intelligence From the Standpoint of a (Pragmatic) Behaviorist

Intelligence is defined as a phenotypic behavioral trait. It is the size of the intellectual repertoire measured at a particular point in time. Circularity is avoided by defining intellectual by consensus among persons doing research in the area. Information about the intercorrelations of elements in the intellectual repertoire is used to delineate further the construct. When assumptions about human development are added, the resulting theory allows testable predictions to be made about the trait. The theory is, however, one of small scale. It provides no theorems about how problems are solved, and it is not antithetical to research that leads to understanding the anatomical and biochemical mechanisms underlying the behavioral trait. The latter is assumed to have both genetic and environmental substrates. Intelligence so defined has many important correlates that are congruent with the theory.