Epistemic deontology and the Revelatory View of responsibility

According to Universal Epistemic Deontology, all of our doxastic attitudes are open to deontological evaluations of obligation and permissibility. This view thus implies that we are responsible for all of our doxastic attitudes. But many philosophers have puzzled over whether we could be so responsible. This paper explores whether this puzzle can be resolved, and Universal Epistemic Deontology defended, by appealing to a view of responsibility it calls the Revelatory View. On that view, an agent is responsible for something when it reveals the kind of person the agent is. The paper explores four ways of developing the Revelatory View and argues that none of the views ultimately defends Universal Epistemic Deontology.     

Regret and the Consciousness of the Past

This paper offers a phenomenological analysis of (1) the relationship between regret and episodic memory, (2) the temporal structure of ‘regretful memory’, (3) the affective and evaluative dimension of regretful memory and (4) the counterfactual dimension of regretful memory. Based on Husserl’s phenomenology, I offer an analysis of regret’s complex structures of intentionality and time-consciousness. Husserl held that episodic memory requires two temporal orientations on one’s own experience: the past now that one relives and the present now in which one does the reliving. If memory generally entails two temporal perspectives, regretful memory brings in a third point of temporal reference: that now that could have been. Drawing on Hoerl and McCormack, I give an account of regret as a mnemic and counterfactual form of intentional consciousness that confronts an alternative past and attempts to negotiate between two essential yet conflicting features of its actual past: its contingency and its irreversibility. On this basis, I then draw on Bagnoli to offer a phenomenological theory of regretful memory as an emotional mode of valuing possibilities that belong to the past.     

Regret,Remorse and the Twilight Perspective

I examine the ‘momentous’ choices that one makes early in life – about career or spouse, for example – and I ask what it means to regret such choices at the end of one’s life (in one’s twilight). I argue that such regrets are almost meaningless because of the difficulty of imaginatively accessing a much earlier self. I then contrast long-term regret to remorse, and argue that the two are qualitatively different experiences because remorse involves another person as victim.     

Reconsidering the Relation between Regret and Responsibility

Recently Connolly, Ordóñez, and Coughlan challenged the view that regret is partly determined by perceived responsibility for the regretted outcome [Connolly, T. Ordóñez, L. D., & Coughlan, R. (1997). Regret and responsibility in the evaluation of decision outcomes.Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 70, 73–85]. In a series of experiments they manipulated whether actors arrived at an outcome through their own decision or through a “computer assignment” over which they had no influence. This decision agency manipulation did not affect their “regret measure.” We show in two experiments that this null-effect is due to the fact that regret was measured by means of a general happiness assessment. In the present research we replicated the basic design of their experiments and also found no effects of decision agency on the happiness assessment. However, the results showed the predicted effects of decision agency when regret was directly measured. Moreover, a measure of disappointment seemed to indicate the opposite effect: People are more disappointed when a negative outcome is caused by a computer assignment than when caused by their own choice. The role of regret and disappointment in decision making is discussed.     

Investigating the Appraisal Patterns of Regret and Disappointment

Regret and disappointment are the two emotions that are most closely linked to decision making. This study compares the appraisal patterns of the two emotions. This is done in the context of the related negative emotions anger and sadness. The results show clear differences between regret and disappointment in this respect while replicating prior findings concerning the appraisal patterns of anger and sadness. The results are of interest for emotion researchers and decision researchers.     

Technology from the Standpoint of Sunyata

Keiji Nishitani's critique of technology as a dehumanizing force is objected to by showing that it is possible to establish a relationship with technology characterized by the standpoint of sunyata. In order to support my claim, I offer an interpretation of sunyata as a lived experience in which knowing and being are unified. One method used to experience the identity of knowing and being is the method of negatio negationis. I argue that technology embodies this method, and that thus has a built-in process that allows users of technology to achieve a samadhi experience in the use of tools and machines. Hubert Dreyfus’ theory of embodiment is offered in support of this claim. If it is possible to establish an intimate relation with certain technologies, then the nature of technology cannot be reduced to its most obvious dehumanizing and destructive effects.     

Justification,Attachments and Regret

Abstract: In The View From Here, Jay Wallace emphasises that an agent's capacity to regret a past decision is conditioned by the attachments that she may have developed as a result. Those attachments shape the point of view from which she retrospectively deliberates. Wallace stresses, however, that not every normative aspect of her decision is affected by this change in perspective, because her decision will remain as unjustified as it was in the past. I will argue, however, that this approach to justification is inconsistent with the normative import that Wallace ascribes to the actual dynamics of our attachments in his defence of the rationale of regret. If I am right, Wallace's approach is caught in the following dilemma: Either he renounces a nonperspectival approach to justification or he revises his view about the normative import of the actual dynamics of our attachments.     

The Experience of Regret and Disappointment

Regret and disappointment have in common the fact that they are experienced when the outcome of a decision is unfavourable: They both concern “what might have been”, had things been different. However, some regret and disappointment theorists regard the differences between these emotions as important, arguing that they differ with respect to the conditions under which they are felt, and how they affect decision making. The goal of the present research was to examine whether and how these emotions also differ with respect to the way in which they are experienced. Participants were asked torecall aninstance of intense regret or disappointment andto indicate what they felt, thought, felt like doing, did, and were motivated to do during this experience (cf. Roseman, Wiest, & Swartz, 1994). Significant differences between regret and disappointment were found in every category. These differences were most pronounced for “action tendencies” (what participants felt like doing) and “emotivations” (what they were motivated to do). These results suggest that the two emotions have differential implications for future behaviour.     

诺贝尔医学奖与俄罗斯的遗憾

通过对1901～2004年诺贝尔医学奖的复习分析,发现俄罗斯(前苏联)这个大国,在整个20世纪里102次的医学奖颁发中,只获得2人次,与它的大国地位很不相称.试图分析其获奖特少的历史原因并汲取教训.     

后悔的认知机制和神经基础

后悔是基于对不利或相对不利行为结果的反事实思维诱发的一种复杂的负性社会情绪,对我们日常生活的决策和身心健康具有重大的影响。与失望情绪相比,后悔在现象学、产生条件以及评价方式等方面具有明显的差异。后悔不仅会受到个体的行为方式、人格特征、归因等因素的影响,而且还会受到结果信息属性的影响。后悔的预期和体验涉及的功能性脑区主要包括：眶额皮层、扣带前回、海马、杏仁核。研究后悔的实验方法和技术手段有待于进一步拓展,后悔的认知机制和神经基础还有待于进一步探讨和完善     

Rhetoric and Dialectic from the Standpoint of Normative Pragmatics

Normative pragmatics can bridge the differences between dialectical and rhetorical theories in a way that saves the central insights of both. Normative pragmatics calls attention to how the manifest strategic design of a message produces interpretive effects and interactional consequences. Argumentative analysis of messages should begin with the manifest persuasive rationale they communicate. But not all persuasive inducements should be treated as arguments. Arguments express with a special pragmatic force propositions where those propositions stand in particular inferential relations to one another. Normative pragmatics provides a framework within which varieties of propositional inference and pragmatic force may be kept straight. Normative pragmatics conceptualizes argumentative effectiveness in a way that integrates notions of rhetorical strategy and rhetorical situation with dialectical norms and procedures for reasonable deliberation. Strategic effectiveness should be seen in terms of maximizing the chances that claims and arguments will be reasonably evaluated, whether or not they are accepted. Procedural rationality should be seen in terms of adjustment to the demands of concrete circumstances. Two types of adjustment are illustrated: rhetorical strategies for framing the conditions for dialectical deliberation and rhetorical strategies for making do with limitations to dialectical deliberation.     

Regret in pursuit of change and maintenance goals

Three experiments were conducted investigating feelings of regret following poor decisions involving behaviors that were either typical for the decision-maker or atypical. Using a retrospection paradigm, the present research found that typical behaviors were more regrettable when decisions were in the context of goals to change whereas atypical behaviors were more regrettable in the context of maintenance goals. We ruled out explanations of these effects based on the temporal distance of the decision, behavioral typicality per se, the severity of the decision-outcomes and the ease of recalling the events. Results were discussed from a consistency-fit analysis of regret and decision-making.     

A Theory of Regret Regulation 1.1

We use this opportunity to respond to the issues raised by Inman (2007), and Roese, Summerville, and Fessel (2007) by addressing four broad topics that embrace the most important comments on our regret regulation theory. These topics are the feeling‐is‐for‐doing approach on which regret regulation theory rests, the importance of emotion specificity, factors that modulate the intensity of regret, and the focus on action, inaction and choice in the elicitation of regret. Together this results in a first update, version 1.1.     

Regret, Valuation, and Inaction Inertia

In three experiments we sought to determine the cause of the “inaction inertia” effect, which occurs when bypassing an initial opportunity decreases the likelihood that a subsequent similar action will be taken. Experiment 1 required some participants to estimate their likelihood of buying shoes as a function of the magnitude and geographical location of an earlier forsaken bargain; others estimated their amount of regret over failing to take advantage of the bargain. The inverse relation between regret and propensity to buy strongly implicated regret as the cause of inaction inertia. In Experiment 2 we found evidence that experienced regret over having missed an earlier bargain rather than anticipated regret over paying too much for the subsequent purchase was the source of our participants' inaction inertia. In Experiment 3 we demonstrated through a mediational analysis that those who had missed a large bargain placed a significantly lower value on the subsequent purchase opportunity than those who earlier had missed a more modest bargain. This difference in valuation, along with experienced regret, are two factors which play a significant mediational role in the inaction inertia effect.     

Anticipated Regret and Precautionary Sexual Behavior1

This study investigated the impact of anticipated regret on precautionary sexual behavior. Results show that anticipated regret predicts a significant and independent proportion of variance in expectations about future contraceptive behavior. A simple model combining attitudes, subjective norms, perceived behavioral control, and anticipated regret explained 65% of the variance in behavioral expectations. Behavioral expectations explained 34% of the variance in contraceptive behavior of respondents who had casual sex in the 4 weeks following the first session of the study. Implications for our understanding of precautionary sexual behavior and for campaigns aiming to increase safer sexual practices are discussed.     

Regret and instability in causal decision theory

Andy Egan has recently produced a set of alleged counterexamples to causal decision theory (CDT) in which agents are forced to decide among causally unratifiable options, thereby making choices they know they will regret. I show that, far from being counterexamples, CDT gets Egan??s cases exactly right. Egan thinks otherwise because he has misapplied CDT by requiring agents to make binding choices before they have processed all available information about the causal consequences of their acts. I elucidate CDT in a way that makes it clear where Egan goes wrong, and which explains why his examples pose no threat to the theory. My approach has similarities to a modification of CDT proposed by Frank Arntzenius, but it differs in the significance that it assigns to potential regrets. I maintain, contrary to Arntzenius, that an agent facing Egan??s decisions can rationally choose actions that she knows she will later regret. All rationality demands of agents it that they maximize unconditional causal expected utility from an epistemic perspective that accurately reflects all the available evidence about what their acts are likely to cause. This yields correct answers even in outlandish cases in which one is sure to regret whatever one does.