When mechanistic models explain

Not all models are explanatory. Some models are data summaries. Some models sketch explanations but leave crucial details unspecified or hidden behind filler terms. Some models are used to conjecture a how-possibly explanation without regard to whether it is a how-actually explanation. I use the Hodgkin and Huxley model of the action potential to illustrate these ways that models can be useful without explaining. I then use the subsequent development of the explanation of the action potential to show what is required of an adequate mechanistic model. Mechanistic models are explanatory.     

How cognitive modeling can benefit from hierarchical Bayesian models

Hierarchical Bayesian modeling provides a flexible and interpretable way of extending simple models of cognitive processes. To introduce this special issue, we discuss four of the most important potential hierarchical Bayesian contributions. The first involves the development of more complete theories, including accounting for variation coming from sources like individual differences in cognition. The second involves the capability to account for observed behavior in terms of the combination of multiple different cognitive processes. The third involves using a few key psychological variables to explain behavior on a wide range of cognitive tasks. The fourth involves the conceptual unification and integration of disparate cognitive models. For all of these potential contributions, we outline an appropriate general hierarchical Bayesian modeling structure. We also highlight current models that already use the hierarchical Bayesian approach, as well as identifying research areas that could benefit from its adoption.     

When scientific models represent

Scientific models represent aspects of the empirical world. I explore to what extent this representational relationship, given the specific properties of models, can be analysed in terms of propositions to which truth or falsity can be attributed. For example, models frequently entail false propositions despite the fact that they are intended to say something "truthful" about phenomena. I argue that the representational relationship is constituted by model users "agreeing" on the function of a model, on the fit with data and on the aspects of a phenomenon that are modelled. Model users weigh the propositions entailed by a model and from this decide which of these propositions are crucial to the acceptance and continued use of the model. Thus, models represent phenomena when certain propositions they entail are true, but this alone does not exhaust the representational relationship. Therefore, the constraints that produce the choice of the relevant propositions in a model must also be examined and their analysis contributes to understanding the relationship between models and phenomena.     

How physicalists can avoid reductionism

Kim maintains that a physicalist has only two genuine options, eliminativism and reductionism. But physicalists can reject both by using the Strict Implication thesis (SI). Discussing his arguments will help to show what useful work SI can do.(1) His discussion of anomalous monism depends on an unexamined assumption to the effect that SI is false.(2) His conclusion on multiple realizability is much stronger than his reasoning warrants.(3) In discussing supervenience, he is wrong to assume that the only approach to explaining why physical truths determine all the truths must be via psychophysical laws.(4) His general argument rests on a mistaken assumption that the only alternative to psychophysical identity theses is to accept supervenient causal relations.     

How people explain actions performed by groups and individuals.

The authors explore whether people explain intentional actions performed by groups differently from actions performed by individuals, A theoretical framework is offered that distinguishes between 2 modes of explanation: the agent's reasons (beliefs or desires in light of which the agent decided to act) and causal histories of reasons (CHRs; factors that preceded and brought about the agent's reasons). The authors develop the hypothesis that people use more CHR explanations when explaining group actions than when explaining individual actions. Study 1 demonstrates this asymmetry. Studies 2 and 3 explore 2 necessary conditions for the asymmetry: that the group be perceived as an aggregate of individual actors rather thin as a jointly acting group and that explainers have general information available about the group. Discussion focuses on people's perception of groups as entities and agents.     

How Dispositions can be Causally Relevant

The problem this paper deals with is the problem of how dispositional properties can have causal relevance. In particular, the paper is focused on the question of how dispositions can have causal relevance given that the categorial bases that realise them seem to be sufficient to bring about the effects that dispositions explain. I show first that this problem of exclusion has no general solution. Then, I discuss some particular cases in which dispositions are causally relevant, despite of this exclusion problem. My claim is that dispositions have causal relevance in selection or recruitment processes, when they are converted into teleological functions.     

"宗教乡愁"如何可能?

宗教乡愁(religious nostalgia)是伊利亚德表述的一个重要概念.它意指对神圣的渴望,渴望回归于起源性的时间,也就是渴望回归于众神的临在,而存在于"彼时"(illo tempore)的世界里.本文沿着"宗教乡愁如何可能"的追问,试着探讨宗教认知方式的本体论根源.本文认为人的有死与有限的生存方式成就了这种本体性的根源,此外,正是宗教乡愁使人成为完全的人,获得宗教与文化意义上的生命.     

五台山怎么搞才能“火”起来

众所周知,佛教圣地五台山近年来大刀阔斧,锐意开拓,旅游事业蓬勃发展。无论在基础设施完善方面,还是在旅游管理、接待、服务方面都表明五台山已跨入全国一流风景名胜区的行列,成为誉满三晋乃至神州大地的一颗璀璨明珠。但是,与全国其它兄弟风景名胜区相比,还有很多差距。虽位居佛教四大名山之首,佛教文化却挖掘得不够深广;旅游景点开发利用不够充分,如五个台顶的开发宣传;     

An agent-based conception of models and scientific representation

I argue for an intentional conception of representation in science that requires bringing scientific agents and their intentions into the picture. So the formula is: Agents (1) intend; (2) to use model, M; (3) to represent a part of the world, W; (4) for some purpose, P. This conception legitimates using similarity as the basic relationship between models and the world. Moreover, since just about anything can be used to represent anything else, there can be no unified ontology of models. This whole approach is further supported by a brief exposition of some recent work in cognitive, or usage-based, linguistics. Finally, with all the above as background, I criticize the recently much discussed idea that claims involving scientific models are really fictions.     

How to measure the internationality of scientific publications

Although the term "internationality" has never been defined by consensus, it is commonly used as a synonym of quality. Even though its meaning has never been established, internationality is frequently used to evaluate scientists, publications, or universities in many different countries. The present investigation is based on the opinion about the meaning of the concept "internationality" of the members of scientific community, represented by a broad sample of 16,056 scientists from 109 countries working in all the fields of knowledge defined by UNESCO. The sample was randomly selected from the Web of Science database from the scientists who have published at least one article in one of the journals indexed by the database. A questionnaire based on eleven criteria was designed for the purpose of the study. As a result, the first measure of internationality has been obtained. The most important criteria of internationality are: the publication language, online access, and international publication standards. There are significant differences among geographic zones and fields of knowledge.     

How Humeans can make normative beliefs motivating

Philosophical Studies - Normative realism faces a problem concerning the practicality of normative judgment, the presumptive view that normative judgments are motivational states. Normative...     

What do computer models of cognition explain: a reply to Gobet

The differences between Gobet’s views and ours call attention to some points concerning the argumentative status of computational models. If we have two fundamentally different models which reasonably accurately simulate a phenomenon, we must ask, what is the argumentative status of the models in psychological terms. Moreover, if it is possible to present different models of same phenomena, what is the general argumentative power of models in psychology? As the kind of differences between our views and the ones of Gobet’s are common in modelling, we briefly call attention to these foundational issues in our paper.     

How genealogies can affect the space of reasons

Synthese - Can genealogical explanations affect the space of reasons? Those who think so commonly face two objections. The first objection maintains that attempts to derive reasons from claims...     

How undistorted spatial memories can produce distorted responses

Reproducing the location of an object from the contents of spatial working memory requires the translation of a noisy representation into an action at a single location—for instance, a mouse click or a mark with a writing utensil. In many studies, these kinds of actions result in biased responses that suggest distortions in spatial working memory. We sought to investigate the possibility of one mechanism by which distortions could arise, involving an interaction between undistorted memories and nonuniformities in attention. Specifically, the resolution of attention is finer below than above fixation, which led us to predict that bias could arise if participants tend to respond in locations below as opposed to above fixation. In Experiment 1 we found such a bias to respond below the true position of an object. Experiment 2 demonstrated with eye-tracking that fixations during response were unbiased and centered on the remembered object’s true position. Experiment 3 further evidenced a dependency on attention relative to fixation, by shifting the effect horizontally when participants were required to tilt their heads. Together, these results highlight the complex pathway involved in translating probabilistic memories into discrete actions, and they present a new attentional mechanism by which undistorted spatial memories can lead to distorted reproduction responses.