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Moran on Self-Knowledge 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Sydney Shoemaker 《European Journal of Philosophy》2003,11(3):391-401
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Thomas Spitzley 《Erkenntnis》2009,71(1):73-88
The topic of this article is the dependency or, maybe, the interdependency of rationality and self-knowledge. Here two questions
may be distinguished, viz. (1) whether being rational is a necessary condition for a creature to have self-knowledge, and
(2) whether having self-knowledge is a necessary condition for a creature to be rational. After a brief explication of what
I mean by self-knowledge, I deal with the first question. There I defend the Davidsonian position, according to which rationality
is, indeed, a necessary condition for self-knowledge. In addition, I distinguish two aspects of rationality which I call basic
and local rationality. After that I concentrate on the second question for the remaining larger part of this article. Here
I proceed in two stages: first I examine whether self-knowledge is necessary for basic rationality, and then whether it is
necessary for local rationality.
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Thomas SpitzleyEmail: |
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BARON REED 《Philosophy and phenomenological research》2010,80(1):164-181
There have been several recent attempts to account for the special authority of self-knowledge by grounding it in a constitutive relation between an agent's intentional states and her judgments about those intentional states. This constitutive relation is said to hold in virtue of the rationality of the subject. I argue, however, that there are two ways in which we have self-knowledge without there being such a constitutive relation between first-order intentional states and the second-order judgments about them. Recognition of this fact thus represents a significant challenge to the rational agency view. 相似文献
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Introspection and Authoritative Self-Knowledge 总被引:1,自引:1,他引:0
Cynthia Macdonald 《Erkenntnis》2007,67(2):355-372
In this paper I outline and defend an introspectionist account of authoritative self-knowledge for a certain class of cases,
ones in which a subject is both thinking and thinking about a current, conscious thought. My account is distinctive in a number
of ways, one of which is that it is compatible with the truth of externalism—the view that the contents of subjects’ intentional
states are individuation-dependent on factors external to their minds. It is thus decidedly anti-Cartesian, despite being
introspectionist. My argument proceeds in three stages. A virtue of the position I develop is that the epistemic features
on which it is based also apply to sensations and to non-episodic intentional states, to the extent that one has authoritative
knowledge of them. However, despite the appeal to analogies with observable properties of objects of perception, the account
is not a ‘perceptual’ model of such knowledge in the sense that those such as Shoemaker, Burge and others have in mind. Because
the features on which the analogy is based are abstract and general, they are not tied to cases of observation alone. Those
who appeal to such phenomena as ‘intellectual experience’ (Burge, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 96, 91–116, 1996) or ‘intellectual intuition’ (Bealer, Philosophical perspectives, Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, 29–55, 1999) in their accounts of authoritative self-knowledge may well appeal to such features. This, amongst other factors, distinguishes
the position from other introspectionist ones in a way that makes it immune to standard objections to perceptual models of
self-knowledge.
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Cynthia MacdonaldEmail: |
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Berislav Marušić 《Synthese》2013,190(12):1977-1999
If we hold that perceiving is sufficient for knowing, we can raise a powerful objection to dreaming skepticism: Skeptics assume the implausible KK-principle, because they hold that if we don’t know whether we are dreaming or perceiving p, we don’t know whether p. The rejection of the KK-principle thus suggests an anti-skeptical strategy: We can sacrifice some of our self-knowledge—our second-order knowledge—and thereby save our knowledge of the external world. I call this strategy the Self-Knowledge Gambit. I argue that the Self-Knowledge Gambit is not satisfactory, because the dreaming skeptic can avail herself of a normative counterpart to the KK-principle: When we lack second-order knowledge, we should suspend our first-order beliefs and thereby give up any first-order knowledge we might have had. The skeptical challenge is essentially a normative challenge, and one can raise it even if one rejects the KK-Principle. 相似文献
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本文从语义记忆-情景记忆角度综合了孤独症的记忆研究,探讨了孤独症个体的记忆特性。研究结果表明,孤独症个体的情景记忆(episodic memory)存在选择性损伤,特别是高机能孤独症个体的情景记忆测验的成绩会依材料的呈现方式和意义相关程度等表现出不同程度的损伤。同时,他们的语义记忆(semantic memory)相对完好,但和正常对照组语义记忆成绩之间的差异会随材料的性质而变化,这种差异并不显著。根据自我知识的存储方式以及孤独症的记忆特性,孤独症个体情景记忆中的自我知识丧失,语义记忆中所存储的自我知识则保存完好。孤独症个体虽然不能回忆与个人特质有关的个人行为,但是能回忆基于这些行为的关于自我的概括性知识。孤独症个体理解别人心理的能力严重受损,然而他们反映自己心理特性和状态的能力保持完好。 相似文献
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T. Parent 《Philosophical Studies》2007,133(3):411-424
Descartes held the view that a subject has infallible beliefs about the contents of her thoughts. Here, I first examine a
popular contermporary defense of this claim, given by Burge, and find it lacking. I then offer my own defense appealing to
a minimal thesis about the compositionality of thoughts. The argument has the virtue of refraining from claims about whether
thoughts are “in the head;” thus, it is congenial to both internalists and externalists. The considerations here also illuminate
how a subject may have epistemicially priviledged and a priori beliefs about her own thoughts. 相似文献
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MICHAEL MCGHEE 《Journal of applied philosophy》1995,12(3):293-296
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Quassim Cassam 《Erkenntnis》2009,71(1):3-18
I discuss the claim what makes self-knowledge epistemologically distinctive is the fact that it is baseless or groundless.
I draw a distinction between evidential and explanatory baselessness and argue that self-knowledge is only baseless in the
first of these senses. Since evidential baselessness is a relatively widespread phenomenon the evidential baselessness of
self-knowledge does not make it epistemologically distinctive and does not call for any special explanation. I do not deny
that self-knowledge is epistemologically distinctive. My claim is only that talk of its evidential baselessness is insufficient
to account for its epistemological distinctiveness.
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Quassim CassamEmail: |