The moral limits of Feinberg's liberalism

This essay explores Joel Feinberg's conception of liberalism and the moral limits of the criminal law. Feinberg identifies liberty with the absence of law. He defends a strong liberal presumption against law, except where it is necessary to prevent wrongful harm or offense to others. Drawing on Rawlsian, Marxian, and feminist standpoints, I argue that there are injuries to individual liberty rooted not in law, but in civil society. Against Feinberg, I defend a richer account of liberalism and liberty, linking them to human dignity, and a more positive role for law. Feinberg justifies liberty as an instrumental welfare‐interest, valuable in virtue of the way it serves the individual's ulterior goals. Drawing on the example of racism and civil rights, I argue that the value of equal liberty stems from its social role in constituting persons’ sense of their own worth and dignity. Against Feinberg, I claim that liberty's value is grounded in a shared historical ideal of personhood, not in the individual's goals or desires. Feinberg also links liberalism with an extreme anti‐paternalist position, on which individuals should be at liberty to alienate their very own right of personal autonomy. Drawing on the examples of slavery and drug addiction, I argue against this liberty, and the conception of liberalism and paternalism in Feinberg which leads to it. A liberalism founded upon an ideal of human dignity allows, even requires, a use of law to prevent persons from destroying the very conditions of their own autonomy and dignity.     

Human Nature and Moral Sprouts: Mencius on the Pollyanna Problem

This article responds to a common criticism of Aristotelian naturalism known as the Pollyanna Problem, the objection that Aristotelian naturalism, when combined with recent empirical research, generates morally unacceptable conclusions. In developing a reply to this objection, I draw upon the conception of human nature developed by the ancient Chinese philosopher Mencius, and build up an account of ethical naturalism that provides a satisfying response to the Pollyanna Problem while also preserving what is most attractive about Aristotelian naturalism.     

What is the Accordion Effect?

In "Action and Responsibility,' Joel Feinberg pointed to an important idea to which he gave the label "the accordion effect.' Feinberg's discussion of this idea is of interest on its own, but it is also of interest because of its interaction with his critique, in his "Causing Voluntary Actions,' of a much discussed view of H. L. A. Hart and A. M. Honoré that Feinberg labels the "voluntary intervention principle.' In this essay I reflect on what the accordion effect is supposed by Feinberg to be, on differences between Feinberg's understanding of this idea and that of Donald Davidson, and on the interaction between Feinberg's discussion of the accordion effect and his critique of the voluntary intervention principle.     

Toward a more inclusive understanding of the “brain drain”

I argue in this paper that the proposals developed by Gillian Brock in Debating the Brain Drain: May Governments Restrict Emigration? should not only be applied to so-called “highly skilled” emigrants. I contend that Brock’s proposals, in order to be implemented justly, must be re-framed such that they are inclusive of so-called “low-skilled” or “unskilled” migrants. I argue for a more inclusive understanding of the “brain drain” in immigration policy – one that can make use of Brock’s important proposals in an expanded fashion – and I provide an account of what this more inclusive understanding should look like.     

Recasting Analytic Philosophy on the Problem of Evil

In his recent book, A Frightening Love: Recasting the Problem of Evil, Andrew Gleeson challenges a certain conception of justification assumed in mainstream analytic philosophy and argues that analytic philosophy is ill-suited to deal with the most pressing, existential, form of the problem of evil. In this article I examine some aspects of that challenge.     

Ideology and the problem of knowledge

The purpose of this article is to deal with certain problems stemming from the concept of Ideology. It begins by describing some aspects of the ‘ordinary notion’ of ideology, and goes on to criticize a standard (the economic determinist) interpretation of Marx's position. It then deals with a problem traditionally connected with ideology, the so‐called Problem of Knowledge, and argues that it is a pseudo‐problem. The article concludes by proposing a conception of ideology as synecdoche which, it is claimed, helps us to avoid some of the mistakes imbedded in the Problem of Knowledge and the economic determinist interpretation of Marxism.     

Feinberg on the Criterion of Moral Personhood

In a very influential paper, Abortion, Joel Feinberg offers a series of arguments against four popular proposals for the criterion of moral personhood and defends a fifth proposal. In this paper, I demonstrate that two widely-accepted arguments employed by Feinberg against the modified species criterion and the strict potentiality criterion, respectively, are unsound. Moreover, I argue that there is a general feature of his inquiry into the criteria for moral personhood which undermines his efforts to argue convincingly either in favour of his own candidate or against other candidates.     

Book Reviews

Book Reviews in this Article: The Grounds of Professional Ethics Daryl Koehn . Zoos and Animal Rights: The Ethics of Keeping Animals Stephen St. C. Bostock . How Are We to Live? Peter Singer . Freedom and Fulfilment: philosophical essays Joel Feinberg . In Harm's Way: Essays in honor of Joel Feinberg Jules Coleman and Allen Buchanan . Religion and Morality, Value Inquiry Book Series, Vol. 26 Avi Sagi and Daniel Statman .     

Why the Negation Problem Is Not a Problem for Expressivism

The Negation Problem states that expressivism has insufficient structure to account for the various ways in which a moral sentence can be negated. We argue that the Negation Problem does not arise for expressivist accounts of all normative language but arises only for the specific examples on which expressivists usually focus. In support of this claim, we argue for the following three theses: 1) a problem that is structurally identical to the Negation Problem arises in non‐normative cases, and this problem is solved once the hidden quantificational structure involved in such cases is uncovered; 2) the terms ‘required’, ‘permissible’, and ‘forbidden’ can also be analyzed in terms of hidden quantificational structure, and the Negation Problem disappears once this hidden structure is uncovered; 3) the Negation Problem does not arise for normative language that has no hidden quantificational structure. We conclude that the Negation Problem is not really a problem about expressivism at all but is rather a feature of the quantificational structure of the required, permitted, and forbidden.     

Abortion,Property, and Liberty

In “Abortion and Ownership” John Martin Fischer argues that in Judith Jarvis Thomson’s violinist case you have a moral obligation not to unplug yourself from the violinist. Fischer comes to this conclusion by comparing the case with Joel Feinberg’s cabin case, in which he contends a stranger is justified in using your cabin to stay alive. I argue that the relevant difference between these cases is that while the stranger’s right to life trumps your right to property in the cabin case, the violinist’s right to life does not trump your right to liberty in the violinist case.     

Emigration and community

In this paper I consider Gillian Brock’s and Michael Blake’s discussion of emigration in Debating Brain Drain in relation to the particular case of South Africa, and explore whether skilled white people have a duty to remain in the country. Focusing on the role of community in this debate, I argue that communities and allegiances in South Africa are still too divided and antagonistic for them to play the duty-grounding role that Brock requires.     

Merciful Justice

I offer a solution to an old puzzle about how God can be both just and merciful at the same time—a feat which seems required of God, but at the same time seems impossible since showing mercy involves being more lenient than justice demands. Inspired by two of Jesus’ parables and work by Feinberg, Johnson and Smart, I suggest that following a “principle of merciful justice”—that persons ought to receive what they deserve or better—delivers mercy and justice simultaneously, certainly in cases of distributions of goods, and even in cases of distribution of harms as well, if we can accept some qualifications.     

The Cards that are Dealt You

Various philosophers have argued that in order to be morally responsible, we need to be the "ultimate sources' of our choices and behavior. Although there are different versions of this sort of argument, I identify a "picture' that lies behind them, and I contend that this picture is misleading. Joel Feinberg helpfully suggested that we scale down what might initially be thought to be legitimate demands on "self-creation,' rather than jettison the idea that we are truly and robustly responsible. I follow Feinberg in rejecting various "inflated' demands on "origination,' "initiation,' or ultimate sourcehood.     

Reverse migration,brain drain and global justice

This paper contributes to the discussion of the ethics of brain drain against the background of the book Debating Brain Drain co-authored by Gillian Brock and Michael Blake. Whereas Gillian Brock argued in this book that a plausible response of global justice would, under certain conditions, permit that developing countries impose taxes or demand compulsory service from their professionals who emigrate, Michael Blake rejects such claims in his defence of the right to emigrate. Extending this debate to the context of reverse immigration, I attempt in this paper to establish if the arguments provided by both scholars are capable of accounting for the cogency or otherwise of preference in reverse immigration. My proposal is that the arguments provided by both Brock and Blake require further contextualisation to make them capable of deciding the question of preference in reverse immigration.     

The ethics and politics of the brain drain: A communal alternative to liberal perspectives

In Debating Brain Drain, Gillian Brock and Michael Blake both draw on a liberal moral-political foundation to address the issue, but they come to different conclusions about it. Despite the commonly held value of free and equal persons having a dignity that grounds human rights, Brock concludes that many medical professionals who leave a developing country soon after having received training there are wrong to do so (if they do not provide compensation) and that the state may place some limits on their ability to exit, whereas Blake infers that there is neither any wrongdoing on their part, nor rightful restrictions placed on them. In this article, rather than sort out which has the better interpretation of what liberalism entails, I consider the medical brain drain in the light of an alternative normative framework, one informed by ideals of communion salient in the sub-Saharan moral tradition. I argue that a principle of prizing communal relationships more naturally entails Brock’s conclusions than does her appeal to liberalism.     

Debating brain drain: Three objections that complicate the picture

In my contribution to this brain drain debate sparked by Brock and Blake’s book, Debating Brain Drain, I respond only to Brock’s position, and raise three objections which I suggest complicate the picture that she sketches. First, I take issue with the way in which she frames the moral question, namely by limiting her focus to what home countries may legitimately do to address the problems associated with the brain drain. I argue that the way in which she frames the question has important ideological consequences, because she does not adequately account for the larger context, in particular, by leaving out the moral obligations of the host countries who are the main beneficiaries of the brain drain. My second objection is rooted in the distinction between technical knowledge and practical knowledge found in the work of Habermas – an important distinction which gets obscured in Brock’s analysis in precisely the kind of ideological ways that Habermas was concerned about. She namely attempts to solve what are mainly practical (political) problems through purely instrumental, technical means. Several distortions accompany this fundamental confusion. My third point of critique has to do with the problem that an ethics of care (an ethics of responsibility and obligation) encounters within a liberal paradigm strongly shaped by an ethics of rights. Drawing on the work of Kroeger-Mappes, I argue that Brock arbitrarily singles out a group of people and holds them to an ethics of care which is strictly supererogatory within her own liberal paradigm.     

Review Essay on the Roots of Evil

I consider two essays by Joel Feinberg: his treatment of the moral obligation to obey the law, and his exploration of the evils of the Holocaust.     

Interpreting Surrogate Consent using Counterfactuals

Philosophers such as Dan Brock believe that surrogates who make health care decisions on behalf of previously competent patients, in the absence of an advance directive, should make these decisions based upon a substituted judgment principle. Brock favours substituted judgment over a best interests standard. However, Edward Wierenga claims that the substituted judgment principle ought to be abandoned in favour of a best interests standard, because of an inherent problem with the substituted judgment principle. Wierenga's version of the substituted judgment principle and his counterexample to the principle's successful interpretation of valid surrogate consent is presented. A new version of what is meant by the substituted judgment principle is advanced. The new version is not beset with the problems Wierenga initially ascribed to the substituted judgment principle.     

Justice, health care, and the elderly

Concern over rising health costs in the United States has led to an intensifying policy debate over health care for the elderly and a rethinking of questions on intergenerational justice and the claims of the aged on social resources. Major contributions to this debate have been made by Daniel Callahan in his Setting Limits (Simon & Schuster; 1987) and by Norman Daniels in his Am I My Parents' Keeper? (Oxford University Press; 1988). Brock reviews Callahan's and Daniels' work, identifying the central focus of both as the age-group problem of resource allocation. He sees Callahan as calling upon a communitarian political philosophy and Daniels as arguing from a tradition of political liberalism. While disagreeing in part with both authors, Brock identifies compatible elements in their arguments that contribute significantly to the public debate over health care and the aged.     

Truth and consequences

In his 1987 paper “Truth or Consequences,” Dan Brock describes a deep conflict between the goals and virtues of philosophical scholarship and public policymaking: whereas the former is concerned with the search for truth, the latter must primarily be concerned with promoting good consequences. When philosophers are engaged in policymaking, he argues, they must shift their primary goal from truth to consequences—but this has both moral and methodological costs. Brock’s argument exemplifies a pessimistic, but not uncommon, view of the possible shape and nature of applied philosophy. The present paper paints a richer and more optimistic picture. It argues that the difference between theoretical philosophy and applied philosophy is not best understood as a choice between truth and consequences. On the contrary, applied philosophers engage in forms of truth-seeking that are properly concerned with consequences—including the consequences of philosophical practice itself.