New approaches to understanding unconscious processes: Implicit and explicit memory systems

Abstract

Freud viewed the unconscious as being roughly equivalent to dynamically repressed wishes, needs, and motivations. Findings from developmental psychology, cognitive psychology, psychoanalysis, and neuroscience over the past 40 years have dramatically changed our views of unconscious processes and the human mind. It is now clear that Freud's dynamic unconscious is only a minor segment of information that is processed at subsymbolic, implicit, and automatic levels. Only a fraction of this information is further processed at explicit conscious levels. Moreover, the vast majority of the information that remains nonconscious is adaptive and has major consequences for development. We examine some clinical implications of these views.     

The relational unconscious: a core element of intersubjectivity, thirdness, and clinical process

The relational unconscious is the fundamental structuring property of each interpersonal relation; it permits, as well as constrains, modes of engagement specific to that dyad and influences individual subjective experience within the dyad. Three usages of the concept of thirdness are delineated and contrasted with the concept of the relational unconscious, which, it is suggested, has the advantage of being both consistent with existing views of unconscious processes and more directly applicable to therapeutic concerns. Enactments and intersubjective resistances are viewed as clinical manifestations of the relational unconscious, and the therapeutic action of psychoanalysis results, in part, from altering the structure of the relational unconscious that binds analysand and analyst.     

Subjectivity and unconsciousness

Concepts of the unconscious were crucial to both Jung's and Freud's thinking. Psychoanalytic and analytical psychological views of the unconscious are compared and contrasted, and both are critically reviewed. It is suggested that we need to revise our conceptualization so as to take better account of the role of the analyst's expectations and inferences, and therefore of his or her subjectivity, whenever he or she makes a clinical judgement that unconscious mental processes are in operation. Some technical implications of a revised definition of unconsciousness are considered, especially indications for self-disclosure by an analyst of his or her own experience of events within the treatment.     

Clinical Relevance of Social Character and Social Unconscious

The author discusses his recollection of Erich Fromm's views on psychoanalytic work with patients, including the author's treatment of a patient. The remembrance involves Fromm's clinical thinking on social character and the social unconscious, and its relevance to present-day clinical work. The author presents, in detail, his treatment of a 37-year old successful woman which addresses certain of today's clinical views on gender differences that resonate and differ with Fromm's thinking on the treatment of the marketing personality.     

Neural synchronization as a hypothetical explanation of the psychoanalytic unconscious

Cognitive scientists have tried to explain the neural mechanisms of unconscious mental states such as coma, epileptic seizures, and anesthesia-induced unconsciousness. However these types of unconscious states are different from the psychoanalytic unconscious. In this review, we aim to present our hypothesis about the neural correlates underlying psychoanalytic unconscious. To fulfill this aim, we firstly review the previous explanations about the neural correlates of conscious and unconscious mental states, such as brain oscillations, synchronicity of neural networks, and cognitive binding. By doing so, we hope to lay a neuroscientific ground for our hypothesis about neural correlates of psychoanalytic unconscious; parallel but unsynchronized neural networks between different layers of consciousness and unconsciousness. Next, we propose a neuroscientific mechanism about how the repressed mental events reach the conscious awareness; the lock of neural synchronization between two mental layers of conscious and unconscious. At the last section, we will discuss the data about schizophrenia as a clinical example of our proposed hypothesis.     

Consciousness and Criterion: On Block's Case for Unconscious Seeing

Block ( 2012 ) highlights two experimental studies of neglect patients which, he contends, provide ‘dramatic evidence’ for unconscious seeing. In Block's hands this is the highly non‐trivial thesis that seeing of the same fundamental kind as ordinary conscious seeing can occur outside of phenomenal consciousness. Block's case for it provides an excellent opportunity to consider a large body of research on clinical syndromes widely held to evidence unconscious perception. I begin by considering in detail the two studies of neglect to which Block appeals. I show why their interpretation as evidence of unconscious seeing faces a series of local difficulties. I then explain how, even bracketing these issues, a long‐standing but overlooked problem concerning our criterion for consciousness problematizes the appeal to both studies. I explain why this problem is especially pressing for Block given his view that phenomenal consciousness overflows access consciousness. I further show that it is epidemic—not only affecting all report‐based studies of unconscious seeing in neglect, but also analogous studies of the condition most often alleged to show unconscious seeing, namely blindsight.     

From analytic surface to analytic space.

Utilizing a clinical illustration, the concept of the surface of the patient's mind, which arose early in analytic history, is reexamined in relation to the analytic space, the unique affective and communicative dyadic context of the analytic process. The shift from analytic surface to analytic space reflects in clinical theory the metapsychological shift from early structural views to current appreciation of compromise formation. Also, this approach permits broadening of consideration of active unconscious forces in both the patient and the analyst.     

Is the Self other to the self? Why does the numinosum feel like another? The relevance of Matte Blanco to our understanding of the unconscious

Using Ignacio Matte Blanco’s approach to the unconscious, this paper attempts to explain why the experience of the Self or the unconscious, for example in dreams, is difficult for the ego to understand. Matte Blanco believes that the logic of the unconscious is radically different from the logic of consciousness. The unconscious uses processes that Matte Blanco refers to as symmetry and generalization. Symmetry means that the converse of any relationship is identical to it, so that asymmetrical relationships are treated as if they were symmetrical. Generalization means that the unconscious treats any object as belonging to a larger class of objects that is a subset of an even larger class which is in turn a subset of a wider class ad infinitum. Hence Matte Blanco’s idea of the unconscious as infinite sets. These unconscious mechanisms, combined with the possibility that the unconscious has more dimensions than consciousness, contribute to the difficulty of understanding dreams, and help to explain why the Self is experienced as other to the ego.     

From Freud’s dream-work to Bion’s work of dreaming: The changing conception of dreaming in psychoanalytic theory

Bion moved psychoanalytic theory from Freud's theory of dream-work to a concept of dreaming in which dreaming is the central aspect of all emotional functioning. In this paper, I first review historical, theoretical, and clinical aspects of dreaming as seen by Freud and Bion. I then propose two interconnected ideas that I believe reflect Bion’s split from Freud regarding the understanding of dreaming. Bion believed that all dreams are psychological works in progress and at one point suggested that all dreams contain elements that are akin to visual hallucinations. I explore and elaborate Bion’s ideas that all dreams contain aspects of emotional experience that are too disturbing to be dreamt, and that, in analysis, the patient brings a dream with the hope of receiving the analyst’s help in completing the unconscious work that was entirely or partially too disturbing for the patient to dream on his own. Freud views dreams as mental phenomena with which to understand how the mind functions, but believes that dreams are solely the ‘guardians of sleep,’ and not, in themselves, vehicles for unconscious psychological work and growth until they are interpreted by the analyst. Bion extends Freud's ideas, but also departs from Freud and re-conceives of dreaming as synonymous with unconscious emotional thinking – a process that continues both while we are awake and while we are asleep. From another somewhat puzzling perspective, he views dreams solely as manifestations of what the dreamer is unable to think.     

Robust,unconscious self-deception: Strategic and flexible

In recent years deflationary accounts of self-deception, under the banner of motivationalism, have proven popular. On these views the deception at work is simply a motivated bias. In contrast, we argue for an account of self-deception that involves more robustly deceptive unconscious processes. These processes are strategic, flexible, and demand some retention of the truth. We offer substantial empirical support for unconscious deceptive processes that run counter to certain philosophical and psychological claims that the unconscious is rigid, ballistic, and of limited cognitive sophistication.     

Unconscious sensations

D. M. Armstrong proposes to explain the possibility of unconscious sensations by means of a distinction between the perceptual consciousness, which is essentially involved in sensations, and our introspective consciousness of sensations. He holds that unconscious sensations are instances of perceptual consciousness of which we are not introspectively conscious. I contend that, although Armstrong's distinction is plausible and significant, it fails to explain his own examples of unconscious sensation. I argue that the puzzle of how unconscious sensations are possible arises at the level of perceptual consciousness and does not concern our introspective awareness of mental states.This paper grew out of research supported by the National Endowment for the Humanities at Cornell University in 1985. I would like to express my gratitude to the National Endowment, to Cornell, and to Sydney Shoemaker.     

The Most Human of All People

This is a meditation upon a puzzling incident of unconscious communication involving a remark of Harry Stack Sullivan's. The essay explores some of Sullivan's views on unconscious communication and the nature of client pathology and then relates them to the theoretical issue of whether (as Hanna and others have recently contended) therapists ought aim at helping clients construct a complex intersubjective reality, rather than hierarchically offering to replace client's views with the therapist's truth. Relying upon the work of Searles, Casement, and Schafer, I side cautiously with the intersubjectivist position, while acknowledging its potential romanticism and concomitant dangers of sentimentality and irrationalism.     

The analytic third: implications for psychoanalytic theory and technique

The author views the analytic enterprise as centrally involving an effort on the part of the analyst to track the dialectical movement of individual subjectivity (of analyst and analysand) and intersubjectivity (the jointly created unconscious life of the analytic pair--the analytic third). In Part I of this paper, the author discusses clinical material in which he relies heavily on his reverie experiences to recognize and verbally symbolize what is occurring in the analytic relationship at an unconscious level. In Part II, the author conceives of projective identification as a form of the analytic third in which the individual subjectivities of analyst and analysand are subjugated to a co-created third subject of analysis. Successful analytic work involves a superseding of the subjugating third by means of mutual recognition of analyst and analysand as separate subjects and a reap-propriation of their (transformed) individual subjectivities.     

The significance of Jacques Lacan.

The contemporary French psychoanalyst, Jacques Lacan, has offered a reinterpretation of basic Freudian concepts that is to a great extent based on the structural linguistics of F. de Saussure. Certain fundamental ideas of Lacan, such as his views that "the unconscious is structured like a language" and that "the unconscious is the discourse of the Other" are examined here, and an attempt is made to place them in perspective in psychoanalysis.     

A matter of time: actual time and the production of the past

In psychoanalytic theory, space metaphors are frequently used to describe the psychic apparatus. As for time, it is traditionally invoked under the heading of timelessness of the unconscious, more aptly described as the resistance of the repressed to wearing away with time. This paper examines how the insertion of time into psychic events and structural differentiation form a single process. After looking into the parallelism between phenomenological and psychoanalytic views of time and differentiation, the author draws a distinction between two time categories: chronological versus actual. A clinical example is presented.     

INTUITING THE TRUTH OF WHAT'S HAPPENING: ON BION'S “NOTES ON MEMORY AND DESIRE”

Bion's “Notes on Memory and Desire” (1967a) is an impossible paper that this article's author has struggled with for decades. He views the paper, only two and a half pages in length, as a landmark contribution. Despite its title—and its infamous dictates to resist the impulse to remember past sessions and desire for “results”—the paper is not, most importantly, about memory and desire. It proposes a new analytic methodology that supplants awareness from its central role in the analytic process and, in its place, instates the analyst's (largely unconscious) work of intuiting the (unconscious) psychic reality of the present moment by becoming at one with it. This article's clinical examples, provided from the author's own work, illustrate something of his ways of talking with his patients.     

Commentary on Paper by Lawrence J. Brown

Brown's historical overview of post-Kleinian psychoanalysis traces key steps in the evolving and diverse practice of working in the psychoanalytic situation while regarding it as a two-person field. The Barangers' “The Analytic Situation as a Dynamic Field” is central to his narrative. I develop my understanding of the originality of their contribution in theorizing a situational unconscious, and of their continuing relevance for thinking about analytic listening and intersubjective collaboration. Brown presents a countertransference dream of his own along with the dream of a patient as an example of the Barangers' concept of the “shared unconscious fantasy” of the analytic couple. A detailed alternative reading of Brown's clinical vignette reveals an absence of fit with the Barangers' views on collaboration in the analytic situation. Some uses of Bion's “dreaming” and “becoming” are implicitly questioned as they risk encouraging the idealization of special states over process.     

Depression: A Discussion of Jung''s Ideas

Depression is differentiated into normal and pathological. Pathological depression is further divided into simple and melancholic. The characteristics of each disordered form are described. Jung's ideas on depression are described in terms of this theoretical standpoint. The concepts used by Jung to explain depression are derived from his libido theory. Through introversion unconscious contents necessary to compensate a one-sided attitude of the ego are made conscious. Introversion depletes the ego of its energy. Depression is the depleted ego's experience of itself. Jung's theory is useful to explain normal depression associated to the process of transformation. It has also been extended to explain disorders of depression via the concept of involuntary or forced introversion in the service of compensation. His therapeutic approach consisted of rectifying the imbalance of psychic energy by helping the ego to integrate unconscious contents. The subsequent accrual of psychic energy redresses the problem of the ego's depletion and depression eases. In the discussion, Jung's contributions to the understanding of depression are recognised, especially his insight into the relationship between normal depression and the process of transformation. The explanatory limitations of Jung's ideas for depressive disorder are also recognised and discussed in relation to aetiology, introversion-extraversion, aggression and psychotherapy. Current clinical information suggests that a theory of depression needs to integrate and also to reformulate some of Jung's ideas.     

Changes in psychoanalytic ideas: transference interpretation

Interpretation of the transference is central to all psychoanalytic models. Definitions of transference and transference interpretation have changed greatly during the past half-century, influenced by major movements in philosophy, advances in psychoanalytic research and theory, and changes in our understanding of Freud. This paper suggests that historical, relatively simple, concepts of the transference as the reproduction in the present of significant relationships from the past do not adequately meet current clinical and theoretical demands. Modernist views of the transference emphasize as additional sources of transference responses, the role of the analytic background of safety, the constant modification of unconscious fantasy and internal representations, and the interactive nature of transference responses, with important interpersonal and intersubjective components. It is suggested that the evolving modernist views of transference and transference interpretation permit a fuller accounting for transference phenomena and open the way for better informed interventions. A brief discussion of the issue of psychological "truth" and "distortion" as applied to transference phenomena is presented. The themes are illustrated with clinical vignettes.     

Recurring thoughts on unconscious ego resistances.

Analysis of the unconscious ego resistances is one of those clinical concepts more honored in the breach than in the observance. This same point has been made periodically over the past fifty years. It has not been sufficiently realized that a true psychoanalytic understanding of resistance analysis could only begin with Freud's second theory of anxiety. Freud himself never fully embraced this theory, and clinical contributions since then have varied in their ability to use the techniques inherent in the second theory of anxiety. Recent contributions to the literature have not eliminated the espousal of theories of resistance based on earlier views of anxiety. Reasons cited for this include: the ambiguities in Freud's writing, the direction of the early ego theorists, and proclivities toward deeper interpretations.