Moral Self-Licensing: When Being Good Frees Us to Be Bad

Past good deeds can liberate individuals to engage in behaviors that are immoral, unethical, or otherwise problematic, behaviors that they would otherwise avoid for fear of feeling or appearing immoral. We review research on this moral self-licensing effect in the domains of political correctness, prosocial behavior, and consumer choice. We also discuss remaining theoretical tensions in the literature: Do good deeds reframe bad deeds (moral credentials) or merely balance them out (moral credits)? When does past behavior liberate and when does it constrain? Is self-licensing primarily for others’ benefit (self-presentational) or is it also a way for people to reassure themselves that they are moral people? Finally, we propose avenues for future research that could begin to address these unanswered questions.     

Protest Petitions

ABSTRACT This paper is concerned with the question of whether an individual has a moral obligation to sign a protest petition which has been initiated on moral grounds. It is argued that there is such an obligation when the petition represents a viewpoint with which one broadly agrees.
This is a general dury which may lapse with changed circumstances or which may be redeemed by some alternative action. It is argued that the duty to initiate a protest petition is, on the other hand, supererogatory as far as an individual is concerned, but may be a duty for a community or group. Finally it is argued that protest petitions are essentially protests, not against evil deeds as such, but against evil deeds done in one's own name, and are therefore a vital aspect of democracy.     

Human Enhancement and Communication: On Meaning and Shared Understanding

Our technologies have enabled us to change both the world and our perceptions of the world, as well as to change ourselves and to find new ways to fulfil the human desire for improvement and for having new capacities. The debate around using technology for human enhancement has already raised many ethical concerns, however little research has been done in how human enhancement can affect human communication. The purpose of this paper is to explore whether some human enhancements could change our shared lifeworld so radically that human communication as we know it would not be possible any longer. After exploring the kinds of communication problems we are concerned with as well as mentioning some possible enhancement interventions that could bring about such problems, we will address some of the ethical implications that follow from these potential communication problems. We argue that because of the role that communication plays in human society, this issue deserves attention.     

The Mandate of Empathy

Confucian thinkers seem to have had something like our present concept of empathy long before that notion was self-consciously available in the West. Wang Yang-Ming’s talk of forming one body with others and similar ideas in the writings of Cheng Hao and, much earlier, of Mengzi make it clear that the Confucian traditions not only had the idea of empathy but saw its essential relation to phenomena like compassion, benevolence, and sympathy that are constitutive of the altruistic side of morality. Nowadays, there is increasing interest among Western psychologists and philosophers in the phenomenon of empathy, and it would be lovely and welcome if, having originated these ideas, Chinese philosophers would now take up and help develop what has recently been said and done about empathy, and its relation to altruism, in the West.     

Misuse,abuse, overuse,and unuse of on-line computer facilities by psychologists

This, then, is a very personal and informal view of some of the peculiar trends of computer application in experimental psychology. If there is any single point on which I would prefer to end, it would be a reiteration of my belief that, on the whole, the positive attributes and contributions to our science of on-line computers have far outweighed some of these nagging aggravations. Regardless of what has been done and in what way it has been done, it is certainly better to have done something than never to have done anything at all. Our science, like a computer program, is also contingent and self-adapting, and most minor strategic errors are quickly corrected. But no one can debug a computer program or a major technological movement without at least having pushed the startbutton.     

Doing Our Work: Words,Deeds, and Presence

Group leadership is an art, with relational tools of words, deeds, and presence. We aim to take our groups to creative places that they—and we ourselves—have never been before. Something needs to happen, fresh experience needs to emerge that becomes relevant to the growth of the members, including the therapist. The therapist's work is done while we are also doing something else. It entails a dual focus, or “binocular vision,” directed to personal discovery, while also focused on the group’s realities and growth potentials. Three case examples illustrate how the work happens to us: we evolve as a person as we do the work.     

The wisdom of hindsight and the limits of Humean constructivism

Ordinary normative discourse includes talk about the reasons for action we had in the past but only came to discover in hindsight. In some cases, we come to discover these reasons not because new information has come to light, but because our values have changed. Contemporary metaethical views, namely Street's Humean constructivism and Blackburn's and Gibbard's quasi-realism, have some difficulty accounting for these reasons and the claims we make about them. This difficulty hinges on the diachronic complexity of these reasons and claims. It cannot be the case that these reasons were constructed by the perspective we had in the past before our values changed. If there were no extant reasons in the past, then it would seem that our claims about them in the present cannot be true. Quasi-realists can account for the way in which reason claims purport to be true by appealing to a deflationary sense of truth and so can remain agnostic on the actual existence of these reasons. Nevertheless, Street argues that this agnosticism is inconsistent with the quasi-realists' naturalism that should have them reject the existence of such reasons. I argue that Street would suffer from an even more acute form of this inconsistency were she to account for reasons only discovered in hindsight. At best her view does no better than the view of her chosen rivals. At worst, it discounts reasons that are so central to our moral development that it fails to be plausible.     

一种对存在不惑的形而上学

从理解世界到理解意识,再到理解语言,形而上学的线索走的是一条唯心论道路。胡塞尔试图论证的不仅是主观性能够构造出客观性,而且只有在主观性之中才能够构造出客观性;于是,存在的客     

Therapy efficacy in chronic aphasia

There is good evidence that aphasia therapy is effective if sufficiently prolonged or intensive and that chronic aphasic individuals can also benefit from therapy, but data on chronic aphasia are scanty. The aim of this retrospective study was to investigate whether chronic aphasia benefits from a very intensive therapeutic regimen. We revised the files (January 2000 to December 2008) of the chronic subjects whom we suggested have periodic sessions in our Unit (generally once a week) and 2-3 hours daily of homework with the help of a family member, supervised and controlled by the speech-therapist. Treatment would go on as long as amelioration is evident. Results for 23 chronic aphasic subjects are reported. All subjects had undergone previous therapy and 10 had been dismissed because no further recovery was expected. Recovery was significant in oral and written nouns and actions naming, oral and written sentence production and Token Test scores. Only 4 subjects did not improve. Severity of the disorder did not predict success or failure. We conclude that recovery was due to the intense work done. Further, we believe such a regimen could be successful in a number of patients for whom a less intensive regimen would not be effective.     

AN APT PUNISHMENT FOR TOM JOAD: (RE)IDENTIFYING TOM JOAD FOR A MORAL JUDGMENT BASED ON THE PRA

Our basic intuition seems to suggest that the moral biography of an individual matters in our treatment of the individual. We do keep criminal records on file, and we do care about the moral progress of individuals. At times our desire to fix responsibility seems too strong, and in our zeal we invent a definite, metaphysical character on which to pin crimes. However, some moral philosophers have tried to redirect our attention to affix responsibility in a way that attends to actions, deeds done. Two ways to affix responsibility have been reviewed—the SR and the PRA. In the case of Tom Joad we could arrive at the conviction that Tom was responsible through use of either the SR or the PRA. In the end the difference was not that one method held Tom culpable and one exculpated him. The difference was seen in the way the PRA included the earlier commission of the same crime in its evaluation of responsibility. To include in the evaluation of Tom's murder of George the earlier murder of Herb is to entertain a definite theory about the relation of Herb's murderer to George's murderer. I have suggested one possible candidate for that theory, Derek Parfit's theory of person stages.     

思想考古方法与中国哲学史研究

中国哲学史研究中长期运用的主要方法是经典的解读及理论的分析,但这种方法并不是惟一的、完全没有问题或缺陷的,所以,必须引入一些新的方法如思想考古的方法予以补充。所谓思想考古,即是借鉴历史学和人类文化学等学科的田野调查方法,去思想家生活、求学、家居、从业的地方进行详细的实地考察,以感受和体验研究对象的情感、思绪,把思想家的思想还原为在具体情境中的思想,找到其思想学说或行为的外在根据,并进而印证或质疑某些史书中对思想家的言行记载,对某些语焉不详的史料或有争议的问题做出分析与考辨。     

Fairness heuristic theory is an empirical framework: a reply to Arnadóttir

In this article on fairness heuristic theory, we point out some important flaws in Arnadóttir's (2002) claim that fairness heuristic theory is "not empirical," by which Arnadóttir meant that theory's predictions are knowable a priori, and are not contingent upon circumstances. To this end, we demonstrate that empirically testing effects predicted by fairness heuristic theory was and is important because this showed that the theory's propositions are not necessarily knowable a priori and are contingent upon circumstances. This implies that, according to Arnadóttir's definition, fairness heuristic theory clearly is an empirical framework. It would have been helpful if Arnadóttir had studied the fairness literature more thoroughly (as this would have easily revealed fairness heuristic theory to be not knowable a priori and to be contingent upon circumstances) and also if she had pointed out which of our studies fail to follow her line of reasoning. Our reply was written not as an attempt to defend fairness heuristic theory as we applaud, indeed are honored by, attempts to scrutinize our work in progress. Our only aim here was to point at some important flaws in the Arnadóttir article, because we think these will hamper rather than advance the science of psychology of justice.     

On the Value and Scope of Freedom

We have a practical, not merely theoretical interest in freedom. The question that is considered in this paper, is what it is that we value about freedom. It is proposed that what we value is being able to get what we most want (or value), because that is what we most want (or value). This account is compatible with determinism. Certain accounts opposed to determinism are considered and rejected. On these accounts freedom requires either a particular sort of indeterminism, or requires a special form of causation, agent-causation, or requires that the agent be a certain sort of self-constituting entity. It is argued that even if these accounts were less metaphysically problematic than they are, they would not give us a 'freedom' that we would value, nor would they secure conditions under which an action would be praise – or blameworthy. It is also argued, that a certain sort of capacity to control ourselves is not a precondition for freedom, though such a capacity would add to the scope of our freedom     

Psychological Laws

John McDowell claims that the propositional attitudes, and our conceptual abilities in general, are not appropriate topics for inquiry of the sort that is done in natural science. He characterizes the natural sciences as making phenomena intelligible in terms of their place in the realm of laws of nature. He claims that this way of making phenomena intelligible contrasts crucially with essential features of our understanding of propositional attitudes and conceptual abilities. In this article I show that scientific work of the sort McDowell claims cannot be done is in fact being done, and that this work presents strong evidence that there are psychological laws. The research I discuss is that by the psychologist Norman H. Anderson and his colleagues. I also argue that the considerations McDowell presents in defense of his claims do not constitute a significant challenge to the research that Anderson and his colleagues have done. It will be noted in the article that Anderson's work is relevant not just to McDowell's writings, but also to several much discussed issues in philosophy of cognitive science: the above two issues of whether there can be a science of ordinary psychological phenomena, higher cognition, comparable to that of the natural sciences and whether such a science would present laws, and also the issue of whether in such a science, and its laws, notions of folk psychology would play crucial constitutive roles. Anderson's work presents strong grounds for affirmative answers to all of these questions.     

Making sense of the libertarian’s semantic claim about agential phenomenology

Libertarians about free will sometimes argue for their position on the grounds that our phenomenology of action is such that determinism would need to be false for it to be veridical. Many, however, have thought that it would be impossible for us to have an experience that is in contradiction with determinism, since this would require us to have perceptual experience of metaphysical facts. In this paper I show how the libertarian claim is possible. In particular, if experience depicts the world such that there is more than one physically possible future, then determinism would need to be false for that experience to be veridical. I show that we have experiences, or perceptual episodes, of this kind on the basis of recent work in the study of perception. Theorists in this area have argued that we have vision-for-action, and that what we visually perceive are not just objects but also possibilities for action. If we experience that it is possible that we ?, then we also experience that it is possible that we not ?. Furthermore, we probably experience more than one possibility for action at any one moment. I argue that these are physical possibilities, and therefore that we experience the world such that there is more than one physically possible future. So the libertarian claim about the semantics of agential phenomenology is highly plausible, even if this does not entail libertarianism.     

An integrated approach to estimating suicide risk

It is ironic that if we had a perfect predictive instrument we would not be able to recognize it because it could never be validated by its critical outcome criterion. Though some exceptions could occur, we would be obliged to take all available measures to prevent a suicidal outcome in cases where suicide was predicted. After the crisis we could have no way of knowing with certainty whether the person would have suicided or not. Even if we accepted the reality that people are not either 0% or 100% likely to suicide, and developed a perfect scale to estimate degree of risk, we would still be unable to validate it in individual cases. If it indicated "moderate" risk of 2.5-5.0%, for example, and no intervention were offered, we would have to observe one suicide in every 20-40 persons assessed at this level of risk to demonstrate its validity. The key to assessment is obtaining information, primarily regarding present or anticipated pain and the threshold of pain tolerance in the individual involved. Since different persons communicate in a variety of ways--verbal, nonverbal, symbolic, metaphoric, etc., eclecticism in approach is essential. For some clinicians communication will be facilitated most by one style; for others, a different method would be most effective. Thus, the "best" approach is the one that works best given the unique characteristics of the persons involved and under the conditions existing at the time. My own bias is that every assessment, whatever the approach, must include some form of direct inquiry regarding suicidal intent, and that the final decision in this regard must be a subjective and intuitive judgment. Contrary to possible assumptions in the legal world, accurate assessment does not necessarily mean safety. It can serve as a guide to the degree of risk that may be involved in a treatment program, but even low risk management measures may have an adverse outcome without implications of negligence or carelessness. There has been no mention here of biological markers of suicide, which are of much current interest but still in an investigational stage. Similarly, rational suicide has not been mentioned, though our aging population and the status of AIDS are making this issue progressively more important. The principles involved in assessment of risk are the same as with other forms of suicide, however. Finally, we can only presume that more precise assessment will operate to reduce suicidal deaths.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 400 WORDS)     

Minding Animals, Minding Earth: Old Brains, New Bottlenecks

Abstract. I emphasize the importance of broadening behavioral, ecological, and conservation science into a more integrative, interdisciplinary, socially responsible, compassionate, spiritual, and holistic endeavor. I stress the significance of studies of animal behavior, especially ethological research concerned with animal emotions in which individuals are named and recognized for their own personalities, for helping us to learn not only about the nonhuman animal beings with whom we share Earth but also about who we are and our place in nature. We are best understood in relationship with others. To this end I develop the notions of “minding animals” and “deep ethology.” Animals are sources of wisdom, a way of knowing. We are all citizens of Earth, members of a global community in which intimate reciprocal and beneficent peaceful relationships are mandatory. A world without cruelty and with boundless compassion, respect, grace, humility, spirituality, and love would be a better world in which to live. We have compelling responsibilities for making Earth a better and more peaceful habitat for all beings. It is essential that we do better than our ancestors. We must reflect and step lightly as we “redecorate” nature. Time is not on our side. I plead for the development of heartfelt and holistic science that allows for joy and play. Science need not be suspicious of things it cannot fully understand. We must not avert our eyes or other senses from the eyes and voices of other beings who urgently need our uncompromising and unconditional aid and love. We can do much more than we have done for animals and the Earth.     

The explanatory power of local miracle compatibilism

Local miracle compatibilists claim that we are sometimes able to do otherwise than we actually do, even if causal determinism obtains. When we can do otherwise, it will often be true that if we were to do otherwise, then an actual law of nature would not have been a law of nature. Nevertheless, it is a compatibilist principle that we cannot do anything that would be or cause an event that violates the laws of nature. Carl Ginet challenges this nomological principle, arguing that it is not always capable of explaining our inability to do otherwise. In response to this challenge, I point out that this principle is part of a defense against the charge that local miracle compatibilists are committed to outlandish claims. Thus it is not surprising that the principle, by itself, will often fail to explain our inability to do otherwise. I then suggest that in many situations in which we are unable to do otherwise, this can be explained by the compatibilist’s analysis of ability, or his criteria for the truth of ability claims. Thus, the failure of his nomological principle to explain the falsity of certain ability claims is no strike against local miracle compatibilism.     

A Moral Argument Against Moral Realism

If what is morally right or wrong were ultimately a function of our opinions, then even such reprehensible actions as genocide and slavery would be morally right, had we approved of them. Many moral philosophers find this conclusion objectionably permissive, and to avoid it they posit a moral reality that exists independently of what anyone thinks. The notion of an independent moral reality has been subjected to meticulous metaphysical, epistemological and semantic criticism, but it is hardly ever examined from a moral point of view. In this essay I offer such a critique. I argue that the appeal to an independent moral reality as a ground for moral obligations constitutes a substantive moral mistake. However, I do not conclude from this that we must therefore embrace the opposite view that moral truths are ultimately dependent on our attitudes. Rather, I suggest that we reject both of these views and answer the classic meta-ethical question “Is what we morally ought to do ultimately a function of our actual attitudes, or determined independently of them?” with Neither.     

Toward the globalization of behavior analysis

Globalization could facilitate the long-term growth of behavior analysis, and although progress has been made, much yet needs to be done. Given the scarcity of resources, it is suggested that we draw from successes in the development of behavior analysis and establish behavioral programs around the world that embrace research, education, and practice as a focus of systematic globalization efforts. The strategy would require the implementation of cultural contingencies that support initiation and long-term program expansion. For program initiation, contingencies are needed to place pioneer behavior analysts in university units that would be unlikely to start a behavioral program otherwise. The task of these pioneers would be to build a critical mass that would multiply behavior-analytic repertoires, obtain research funding, conduct publishable research, and establish applied settings. For long-term program development, the field should expand internationally as it continues building the infrastructure needed to accelerate the demand for behavioral programs in higher education, scholarly work in behavior analysis, behavior analysts in existing jobs, and behavioral technology in the market place.