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1.
A. D. Smith 《Philosophical Studies》2008,140(2):197-212
This paper considers the claim that perceptual experience is “transparent”, in the sense that nothing other than the apparent
public objects of perception are available to introspection by the subject of such experience. I revive and strengthen the
objection that blurred vision constitutes an insuperable objection to the claim, and counter recent responses to the general
objection. Finally the bearing of this issue on representationalist accounts of the mind is considered.
相似文献
A. D. SmithEmail: |
2.
Stewart Cohen 《Philosophical Studies》2009,144(1):121-125
I raise several objections to Sosa’s account of knowledge as aptness. I argue that aptness is neither necessary nor sufficient
for knowledge. I also raise some objection to Sosa’s treatment of dreaming skepticism.
相似文献
Stewart CohenEmail: |
3.
Glen A. Hoffmann 《Philosophia》2007,35(2):161-170
According to Field’s influential incompleteness objection, Tarski’s semantic theory of truth is unsatisfactory since the definition
that forms its basis is incomplete in two distinct senses: (1) it is physicalistically inadequate, and for this reason, (2)
it is conceptually deficient. In this paper, I defend the semantic theory of truth against the incompleteness objection by
conceding (1) but rejecting (2). After arguing that Davidson and McDowell’s reply to the incompleteness objection fails to
pass muster, I argue that, within the constraints of a non-reductive physicalism and a holism concerning the concepts of truth,
reference and meaning, conceding Field’s physicalistic inadequacy conclusion while rejecting his conceptual deficiency conclusion
is a promising reply to the incompleteness objection.
相似文献
Glen A. HoffmannEmail: |
4.
Varelius J 《Science and engineering ethics》2009,15(1):39-50
It has been suggested that, in addition to individual level decision-making, informed consent procedures could be used in
collective decision-making too. One of the main criticisms directed at this suggestion concerns decision-making power. It
is maintained that consent is a veto power concept and that, as such, it is not appropriate for collective decision-making.
This paper examines this objection to collective informed consent. It argues that veto power informed consent can have some
uses in the collective level and that when it is not appropriate the decision power a concerned party ought to have in connection
with an arrangement should be made relative to the interest she has at stake in it. It concludes that the objection examined
does not undermine collective informed consent.
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Jukka VareliusEmail: |
5.
Nathan Salmon 《Philosophical Studies》2008,141(2):263-280
Jeffrey King’s principal objection to the direct-reference theory of demonstratives is analyzed and criticized. King has responded
with a modified version of his original argument aimed at establishing the weaker conclusion that the direct-reference theory
of demonstratives is either incomplete or incorrect. It is argued that this fallback argument also fails.
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Nathan SalmonEmail: |
6.
Victoria S. Harrison 《Philosophia》2008,36(1):97-110
Internalist pluralism is an attractive and elegant theory. However, there are two apparently powerful objections to this approach
that prevent its widespread adoption. According to the first objection, the resulting analysis of religious belief systems
is intrinsically atheistic; while according to the second objection, the analysis is unsatisfactory because it allows religious
objects simply to be defined into existence. In this article, I demonstrate that an adherent of internalist pluralism can
deflect both of these objections, and in the course of so arguing, I deploy a distinction between “conceptual-scheme targetability”
and “successful conceptual-scheme targeting”.
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Victoria S. HarrisonEmail: |
7.
Rolf Loeber Dustin A. Pardini Alison Hipwell Magda Stouthamer-Loeber Kate Keenan Mark A. Sembower 《Journal of abnormal child psychology》2009,37(6):777-791
Relatively little is known about the factor structure of disruptive behavior among preadolescent girls. The present study
reports on exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses of disruptive girl behavior over four successive data waves as rated
by parents and teachers in a large, representative community sample of girls (N = 2,451). Five factors were identified from parent ratings (oppositional behavior/conduct problems, inattention, hyperactivity/impulsivity,
relational aggression, and callous-unemotional behaviors), and four factors were identified derived from teacher ratings (oppositional
behavior/conduct problems/callous-unemotional behaviors, inattention, hyperactivityimpulsivity, and relational aggression).
There was a high degree of consistency of items loading on equivalent factors across parent and teacher ratings. Year-to-year
stability of factors between ages five and 12 was high for parent ratings (ICC = 0.70 to 0.88), and slightly lower for teacher
ratings (ICC = 0.56 to 0.83). These findings are discussed in terms of possible adjustment to the criteria for children's
disruptive behavior disorders found in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for Mental Disorders.
相似文献
Rolf Loeber (Corresponding author)Email: |
Dustin A. PardiniEmail: |
Alison HipwellEmail: |
Magda Stouthamer-LoeberEmail: |
Kate KeenanEmail: |
Mark A. SembowerEmail: |
8.
Timothy Chappell 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2007,10(3):255-265
I discuss Bernard Williams’ ‘integrity objection’ – his version of the demandingness objection to unreasonably demanding ‘extremist’
moral theories such as consequentialism – and argue that it is best understood as presupposing the internal reasons thesis.
However, since the internal reasons thesis is questionable, so is Williams’ integrity objection. I propose an alternative
way of bringing out the unreasonableness of extremism, based on the notion of the agent’s autonomy, and show how an objection
to this proposal can be outflanked by a strategy that also outflanks the ‘paradox of deontology.’
相似文献
Timothy ChappellEmail: |
9.
Manuel Vargas 《Philosophical Studies》2009,144(1):45-62
This article summarizes and extends the moderate revisionist position I put forth in Four Views on Free Will and responds to objections to it from Robert Kane, John Martin Fischer, Derk Pereboom, and Michael McKenna. Among the principle
topics of the article are (1) motivations for revisionism, what it is, and how it is different from compatibilism and hard
incompatibilism, (2) an objection to libertarianism based on the moral costs of its current epistemic status, (3) an objection
to the distinctiveness of semicompatibilism against conventional forms of compatibilism, and (4) whether moderate revisionism
is committed to realism about moral responsibility.
相似文献
Manuel VargasEmail: |
10.
Relativism and disagreement 总被引:6,自引:2,他引:4
John MacFarlane 《Philosophical Studies》2007,132(1):17-31
The relativist's central objection to contextualism is that it fails to account for the disagreement we perceive in discourse
about "subjective" matters, such as whether stewed prunes are delicious. If we are to adjudicate between contextualism and
relativism, then, we must first get clear about what it is for two people to disagree. This question turns out to be surprisingly
difficult to answer. A partial answer is given here; although it is incomplete, it does help shape what the relativist must
say if she is to do better than the contextualist in securing genuine disagreement.
相似文献
John MacFarlaneEmail: |
11.
Samuel Scheffler has recently argued that some relationships are non-instrumentally valuable; that such relationships give
rise to “underived” special responsibilities; that there is a genuine tension between cosmopolitan egalitarianism and special
responsibilities; and that we must consequently strike a balance between the two. We argue that there is no such tension and
propose an alternative approach to the relation between cosmopolitan egalitarianism and special responsibilities. First, while
some relationships are non-instrumentally valuable, no relationship is unconditionally valuable. Second, whether such relationships
give rise to special responsibilities is conditional on those relationships not violating certain moral constraints. Third, these moral constraints arise from within cosmopolitan
egalitarianism itself. Thus the value of relationships and the special responsibilities to which they give rise arise within
the parameters of cosmopolitan egalitarianism itself. The real tension is not between cosmopolitan equality and special responsibilities,
but between special responsibilities and the various general duties that arise from the recognition, demanded by cosmopolitan
egalitarianism, of a multiplicity of other basic goods. Indeed, even the recognition of special relationships itself gives
rise to general duties that may condition and/or weigh against putative special responsibilities.
相似文献
Pablo GilabertEmail: |
12.
Seahwa Kim 《Erkenntnis》2009,70(3):419-426
In his 2003 paper, “Does the Existence of Mathematical Objects Make a Difference?”, Alan Baker criticizes what he terms the
‘Makes No Difference’ (MND) argument by arguing that it does not succeed in undermining platonism. In this paper, I raise
two objections. The first objection is that Baker is wrong in claiming that the premise of the MND argument lacks a truth-value.
The second objection is that the theory of counterlegals which he appeals to in his argument is incompatible with actual scientific
practice. I conclude that we ought not to accept Baker’s claim.
相似文献
Seahwa KimEmail: Email: |
13.
Peter Gan Chong Beng 《Sophia》2009,48(1):43-57
This paper intends to append the frame of dialectic upon St. John of the Cross’ delineation of mysticism. Its underlying hypothesis
is that the dialectical structuring of St. John’s mystical theology promises to unravel the web of relational concepts embedded
within his immense writings on this unique phenomenon. It is hoped that as a consequence of this undertaking, relevant pairs
of correlative opposites that figure prominently in mysticism can be elucidated and perhaps come to some form of resolution.
相似文献
Peter Gan Chong BengEmail: |
14.
Kristin Voigt 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2007,10(4):389-407
According to luck egalitarianism, inequalities are justified if and only if they arise from choices for which it is reasonable
to hold agents responsible. This position has been criticised for its purported harshness in responding to the plight of individuals
who, through their own choices, end up destitute. This paper aims to assess the Harshness Objection. I put forward a version
of the objection that has been qualified to take into account some of the more subtle elements of the luck egalitarian approach.
Revising the objection in this way suggests that the Harshness Objection has been overstated by its proponents: because luck
egalitarians are sensitive to the influence of unequal brute luck on individuals’ choices, it is unlikely that there will
be any real world cases in which the luck egalitarian would not have to provide at least partial compensation. However, the
Harshness Objection still poses problems for the luck egalitarian. First, it is not clear that partial compensation will be
sufficient to avoid catastrophic outcomes. Second, the Harshness Objection raises a theoretical problem in that a consistent
luck egalitarian will have to regard it as unjust if any assistance is provided to the victim of pure option luck, even if
such assistance could be provided at no cost. I consider three strategies the luck egalitarian could pursue to accommodate
these concerns and conclude that none of these strategies can be maintained without either violating basic luck egalitarian
principles or infringing upon individual liberty.
相似文献
Kristin VoigtEmail: |
15.
Kelly Trogdon 《Philosophical Studies》2009,143(2):147-165
A major stumbling block for non-reductive physicalism is Kim’s disjunctive property objection. In this paper I bring certain
issues in sparse ontology to bear on the objection, in particular the theses of priority monism and priority pluralism. Priority pluralism (or something close to it, anyway) is a common ontological background assumption, so in the first part
of the paper I consider whether the disjunctive property objection applies with equal force to non-reductive physicalism on
the assumption that priority monism is instead true. I ultimately conclude that non-reductive physicalism still faces a comparable
problem. In the second part, I argue, surprisingly enough, that what I call ‘fine-grained reductionism’, a particular version
of which Kim proposes as an alternative to non-reductive physicalism, may work better in the monist framework than the pluralist
one. I conclude that issues in sparse ontology, therefore, are more relevant to the debate about physicalism than one may
have thought.
相似文献
Kelly TrogdonEmail: |
16.
Anna Mahtani 《Philosophical Studies》2008,139(2):171-180
Timothy Williamson claims that margin for error principles govern all cases of inexact knowledge. I show that this claim is
unfounded: there are cases of inexact knowledge where Williamson’s argument for margin for error principles does not go through.
The problematic cases are those where the value of the relevant parameter is fixed across close cases. I explore and reject
two responses to my objection, before concluding that Williamson’s account of inexact knowledge is not compelling.
相似文献
Anna MahtaniEmail: |
17.
Valeriano Iranzo 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》2008,39(1):115-120
According to the “no-miracles argument” (NMA), truth is the best explanation of the predictive-instrumental success of scientific
theories. A standard objection against NMA is that it is viciously circular. In Scientific Realism: How Science Tracks Truth Stathis Psillos has claimed that the circularity objection can be met when NMA is supplemented with a reliabilist approach
to justification. I will try to show, however, that scientific realists cannot take much comfort from this policy: if reliabilism
makes no qualifications about the domain where inference to the best explanation is reliable, scientific realists flagrantly
beg the question. A qualified version of reliabilism, on the other side, does not entitle us to infer the realist conclusion.
I conclude, then, that Psillos’s proposal does not make any significant progress for scientific realism.
相似文献
Valeriano IranzoEmail: |
18.
Joshua Gert 《Philosophical Studies》2008,140(3):437-445
Jason Stanley has criticized a contextualist solution to the sorites paradox that treats vagueness as a kind of indexicality.
His objection rests on a feature of indexicals that seems plausible: that their reference remains fixed in verb phrase ellipsis.
But the force of Stanley’s criticism depends on the undefended assumption that vague terms, if they are a special sort of
indexical, must function in the same way that more paradigmatic indexicals do. This paper argues that there can be more than
one sort of indexicality, that one term might easily have both sorts, and that therefore, and despite Stanley’s worries, vagueness
might easily be assimilated to one form.
相似文献
Joshua GertEmail: |
19.
In this introduction we discuss the motivation behind the workshop “Towards a New Epistemology of Mathematics” of which this
special issue constitutes the proceedings. We elaborate on historical and empirical aspects of the desired new epistemology,
connect it to the public image of mathematics, and give a summary and an introduction to the contributions to this issue.
相似文献
Bernd BuldtEmail: |
Benedikt L?we (Corresponding author)Email: |
Thomas MüllerEmail: |
20.
Leo Iacono 《Philosophical Studies》2008,140(3):423-436
In Beyond Rigidity, Soames attempts to defend Millianism by articulating a novel account of the semantics and pragmatics of sentences containing
names. Soames uses this account both to respond to the objection that Millianism unintuitively allows the unrestricted substitution
of coreferential names in propositional attitude contexts, and to generate a positive argument for Millianism. I argue that
the positive argument fails, and that Soames’s account of the semantics and pragmatics of sentences containing names is inconsistent
with Millianism.
相似文献
Leo IaconoEmail: |