Politicizing Brandom's Pragmatism: Normativity and the Agonal Character of Social Practice

This paper provides an agonistic interpretation of Robert Brandom's social‐pragmatic account of normativity. I argue that social practice, on this approach, should be seen not just as cooperative, but also as contestatory. This aspect, which has so far remained implicit, helps to illuminate Brandom's claim that normative statuses are ‘instituted’ by social practices: normative statuses are brought into play in mutual engagement, and are only in play from an engaged social perspective among others. Moreover, in contrast to a positivist or conventionalist understanding of Brandom's work, it shows that the possibility of a critical stance toward existing practices is not only compatible with, but already implicit in this form of pragmatism. This can be made explicit with the notion of farcical practices: practices that are treated merely as if they institute genuine commitments and entitlements. Interpreting a practice as farcical is taking a critical stance toward it, and this possibility is inherent in Brandom's theoretical framework. This opens the way for a fruitful appropriation of Brandom's pragmatism for social and political philosophy.     

Social Construction and Achieving Reference1

One influential view is that at least some putatively natural human kinds are actually social constructions, understood as some real kind of thing that is produced or sustained by our social and conceptual practices. Category constructionists share two commitments: they hold that human category terms like “race” (and racial terms) and “sex” (and sexual terms) and “homosexuality” and “perversion” actually refer to constructed categories, and they hold that these categories are widely but mistakenly taken to be natural kinds. But it is far from clear that these two commitments are consistent. The sort of mismatch between belief and underlying nature constructionists’ suppose is often taken to indicate a failure of reference. Reliance on a causal‐historical account of reference allows the preservation of reference, but unfortunately, constructionists' appropriation of causal historical accounts of reference is beset by difficulties that do not attend natural kind theorists’ appeals to such accounts. Here, I set out these difficulties, but argue that they can be answered, allowing terms for apparently natural human kinds refer to some sort of social construction about which there is massive error.     

Oppressive Things*

In analyzing oppressive systems like racism, social theorists have articulated accounts of the dynamic interaction and mutual dependence between psychological components, such as individuals’ patterns of thought and action, and social components, such as formal institutions and informal interactions. We argue for the further inclusion of physical components, such as material artifacts and spatial environments. Drawing on socially situated and ecologically embedded approaches in the cognitive sciences, we argue that physical components of racism are not only shaped by, but also shape psychological and social components of racism. Indeed, while our initial focus is on racism and racist things, we contend that our framework is also applicable to other oppressive systems, including sexism, classism, and ableism. This is because racist things are part of a broader class of oppressive things, which are material artifacts and spatial environments that are in congruence with an oppressive system.     

Psychological Essentialism at the Explicit and Implicit Levels: The Unique Status of Social Categories

Psychological essentialism refers to a naive theory concerning fundamental elements that bring a category into its existence. The present study examined the structure of this lay theory as well as its implicitness, with a special focus on social categories. In Study 1, Japanese college students rated a number of categories that were natural‐kind, social, or human artifacts, in terms of different elements of essentialist beliefs. A factor analysis revealed that entitativity and naturalness are the common underlying dimensions across these category domains. We also identified some natural‐kind and human artifact categories that can be used as two extreme referent points for the examination of naturalness perceived in a whole array of social categories. Study 2 assessed implicit and automatic judgments on naturalness using a go/no‐go task, and compared them to explicit judgments. Unlike natural kinds and artifacts, social categories were essentialized to a greater extent at the implicit level. These results suggest a dual process of intuitive and deliberate cognition, particularly involving social categories, with implications concerning the bases of stereotypes and prejudices.     

“A Part of Who I Am”: Material Objects as “Plot Devices” in the Formation of Religious Selves

What role do material objects play in the formation of religious subjects? Drawing from an ethnographic investigation of the evolving relationships between a group of Eastern Orthodox converts and their religious icons, this article develops a theoretical approach to this question that conceptualizes material artifacts as “plot devices” in the formation of religious identity narratives. Integrating insights from studies of material religious culture with narrative theories of identity, this article argues that religious artifacts become significant to religious identity construction to the extent they act as resources for the configuration of a narrative structure in which transcendent or sacred others play a part. As the empirical details of this study demonstrate, attending to how religious objects’ symbolic meanings (i.e., who or what they represent) are mediated by their unique material characteristics (how they make meanings physically present to social actors in embodied social interaction) is of vital importance for explaining the significant role material artifacts play in the religious emplotment of action and experience.     

Solidarity and Social Moral Rules

The value of solidarity, which is exemplified in noble groups like the Civil Rights Movement along with more mundane teams, families and marriages, is distinctive in part because people are in solidarity over, for or with regard to something, such as common sympathies, interests, values, etc. I use this special feature of solidarity to resolve a longstanding puzzle about enacted social moral rules, which is, aren’t these things just heuristics, rules of thumb or means of coordination that we ‘fetishize’ or ‘worship’ if we stubbornly insist on sticking to them when we can do more good by breaking them? I argue that when we are in a certain kind of solidarity with others, united by social moral rules that we have established among ourselves, the rules we have developed and maintain are a constitutive part of our solidary relationships with one another; and it is part of being in this sort of solidarity with our comrades that we are presumptively required to follow the social moral rules that join us together. Those in the Polish Revolution, for example, were bound by informally enforced rules about publicity, free speech and the use of violence, so following their own rules became a way of standing in a valuable sort of solidarity with one another. I explain why we can have non-instrumental reasons to follow the social moral rules that exist in our own society, improve our rules and even sometimes to break the otherwise good rules that help to unite us.     

创造性思维的社会文化基础

创造性思维作为创造性的内核, 是个体在一定社会文化背景上产生新颖独特且实用观点或产品的思维形式。文章基于社会文化的三层次模型, 分别从文化观念、文化活动或经历以及文化工具三个层面, 围绕人性价值观、中庸取向、非价值性文化传统、海外旅居、多语种学习、以及文化工具所涵盖的文化规则、符号和实物七个方面阐述了社会文化对创造性思维的影响。未来研究有必要在此基础上继续从文化与社会因素的依存性、个体差异控制、文化和创造性思维的类型差异以及多重研究取向协作四方面深入。     

The logic of causal methods in social science

Two kinds of causal inference rules which are widely used by social scientists are investigated. Two conceptions of causation also widely used are explicated — the INUS and probabilistic conceptions of causation. It is shown that the causal inference rules which link correlation, a kind of partial correlation, and a conception of causation areinvalid. It is concluded anew methodology is required for causal inference.     

Dupes of Patriarchy: Feminist Strong Substantive Autonomy's Epistemological Weaknesses

Feminist strong substantive autonomy (FSSA), as presented by Natalie Stoljar and Anita Superson, pronounces judgment on the autonomy status of certain women living under oppression. These women act on deformed desires, Superson explains, and as deformed desires cannot be the agent's own, the women are heteronomous. Stoljar argues that some women's choices violate the Feminist Intuition; by acting on false and oppressive values, these women render themselves heteronomous. I argue against Stoljar and Superson on epistemological grounds. I present six different ways in which agents' choices can be related to deformed desires, with varying results for their autonomy statuses. I show that Stoljar and Superson are not able to distinguish properly among the differing autonomy statuses in these six cases, because doing so requires attention to agents' inner processes of decision‐making, as those processes are enacted in the agents' social and temporal contexts. Stoljar and Superson judge others' autonomy statuses based on abstract generalizations rather than via empirical attention to agents' actual decision‐making processes. Consequently, their judgments are not adequate to the lived self‐direction of real persons. Assessing others' autonomy status requires consideration of agents' inner choice‐making in sociotemporal context, which favors a procedural or weak substantive account of autonomy.     

Revisiting the effects of Parkinson's disease and frontal lobe lesions on task switching: The role of rule reconfiguration

This study investigated the hypothesis that rule reconfiguration in task switching can isolate aspects of intact and impaired control at different stages of Parkinson's disease (PD) by comparing switches between concrete naming rules pertaining to stimulus selection, to switches between abstract rules which allocate categorization responses to these stimuli. Based on previous findings, it was hypothesized that attentional switches, where task set competition emerges at the stimulus but not response set level, highlights striatal dopaminergic function. Conversely, increasing the degree of task set competition to encompass reconfiguration of response set when switching between abstract rules, represents a condition which engages the prefrontal cortex (PFC) and renders this manipulation sensitive to frontal damage. To this end, we investigated task switching with concrete and abstract rules in unilaterally (Hoehn & Yahr stage I) and bilaterally (Hoehn & Yahr stage II) affected PD patients, as well as striatally intact frontal lesion patients. As predicted, frontal lesion patients demonstrated switching deficits only with abstract categorization rules, where switching engendered complete task set reconfiguration and a new response, as did stage II PD patients with presumed frontal cortical pathology. Replicating previous findings, stage I PD patients with relatively circumscribed striatal pathology demonstrated no such impairment. Disease severity also impacted on attentional switching indexed by naming rules, since medicated stage II but not stage I patients demonstrated switching deficits emerging from stimulus set reconfiguration, suggesting that the ameliorative efficacy of dopaminergic medication is inversely related to the severity of the striatal deficit. These findings illustrate that the nature of the rules that are switched, and its implication in terms of reconfiguring different task set elements, highlights different neural characters of cognitive flexibility. These manipulations may help decipher the differential effects of progressive neurodegeneration on parkinsonian cognition, and provide a framework in which to conceptualize the contributions of cortical and subcortical regions to cognitive control.     

Knowledge and society

The question of the nature of our knowledge of society has recently been raised in an interesting form by Peter Winch in his monograph, The Idea of a Social Science, and debated in recent issues of Inquiry by A. R. Louch and Winch himself. In this paper I attempt to contribute to this discussion by attacking the problem of the nature of the empirical bases of social scientific knowledge, the main point in dispute between Winch and Louch. I try to construct an argument to show that in specifying the ‘data’ of social science, we have to introduce an element of ‘interpretive understanding’ which radically alters the meaning of the term ‘empirical base’ in social scientific contexts, thus supplementing Winch's argument in his reply to Louch. At the same time, my argument shows, I believe, that this view of the nature of social science does not lead to any arbitrary restrictions on the methods of research pursued by social scientists, as is sometimes imagined. What the argument leads to is the conclusion that our knowledge of society involves distinctive epistemological features that differentiate this kind of knowledge from the kind of knowledge we have in the natural sciences.     

Identity status and perceived parenting style in adolescents living in central South Africa

This study investigated the relationship between black South African adolescents’ identity statuses and their perceived parenting styles. Participants (n = 188; 66% = females) were from central South Africa. They completed the Objective Measure of Ego Identity Status and the Parental Authority Questionnaire in addition to a biographic survey that included questions on their family structures (nuclear, extended, other types). Findings suggest that diffused and achieved identity statuses relate to perceived authoritative and permissive parenting styles respectively. Results bring into question the universality of Western identity development and parenting style theories.     

There are Intentionalia of Which it is True that Such Objects Do Not Exist

Abstract

According to Crane’s schematicity thesis (ST) about intentional objects, intentionalia have no particular metaphysical nature qua thought-of entities; moreover, the real metaphysical nature of intentionalia is various, insofar as it is settled independently of the fact that intentionalia are targets of one’s thought. As I will point out, ST has the ontological consequence that the intentionalia that really belong to the general inventory of what there is, the overall domain, are those that fall under a good metaphysical kind, i.e., a kind such that its members figure (for independent reasons) in such an inventory. Negatively put, if there are no things of a certain metaphysical kind, thoughts about things of that kind are not really committed to such things. Pace Crane, however, this does not mean that the intentionalia that are really there are only those that exist. For existence, qua first-order property, is no metaphysical kind. Thus, there may really be intentionalia that do not exist, provided that they belong to good metaphysical kinds.     

Constitutive Rules, Language, and Ontology

It is a commonplace within philosophy that the ontology of institutions can be captured in terms of constitutive rules. What exactly such rules are, however, is not well understood. They are usually contrasted to regulative rules: constitutive rules (such as the rules of chess) make institutional actions possible, whereas regulative rules (such as the rules of etiquette) pertain to actions that can be performed independently of such rules. Some, however, maintain that the distinction between regulative and constitutive rules is merely a linguistic one. In this paper I present the status account of constitutive rules in order to address this criticism. According to the status account constitutive rules pertain to institutional statuses and statuses are to be understood in terms of status rules. Status rules concern the enabling and constraining roles of institutions, and constitutive rules specify the preconditions that have to be met in order for them to play these roles. Even though I end up endorsing the claim that the distinction mentioned is a linguistic one, I go on to argue that there is an underlying reality that constitutive rules serve to make apparent.

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Social influence matters: We follow pandemic guidelines most when our close circle does

Why do we adopt new rules, such as social distancing? Although human sciences research stresses the key role of social influence in behaviour change, most COVID-19 campaigns emphasize the disease’s medical threat. In a global data set (n = 6,675), we investigated how social influences predict people’s adherence to distancing rules during the pandemic. Bayesian regression analyses controlling for stringency of local measures showed that people distanced most when they thought their close social circle did. Such social influence mattered more than people thinking distancing was the right thing to do. People’s adherence also aligned with their fellow citizens, but only if they felt deeply bonded with their country. Self-vulnerability to the disease predicted distancing more for people with larger social circles. Collective efficacy and collectivism also significantly predicted distancing. To achieve behavioural change during crises, policymakers must emphasize shared values and harness the social influence of close friends and family.     

“Social Separation” Among Women Under 40 Years of Age Diagnosed with Breast Cancer and Carrying a BRCA1 or BRCA2 Mutation

We conducted an exploratory, qualitative study investigating experiences of women who had developed breast cancer under the age of 40 and who were identified as BRCA1 or BRCA2 mutation carriers. These germline mutation carriers face an increased lifetime risk of a second primary breast cancer and an increased risk for a primary ovarian cancer. Thirteen women who fit this criteria participated in three focus groups conducted at a major cancer center in the UK during Spring 2003. We asked broad, open-ended questions that allowed for a wide range of responses about their cancer and genetic testing experiences, physical and psycho-social concerns, family and partner reactions and their need for social support. The women expressed feelings of devastation, loneliness, feeling different and isolation, ambivalence about having to support family members, worries about partner’s anxiety and depression, and anxiety about talking to family members, especially children. These feelings were stronger after the cancer diagnosis and compounded by the genetic test results that occurred at a later time. We also found that, at least temporarily, the women experienced what we call “social separation”—emotional distance from, or dissonance with groups they interact with or are part of, e.g., family and friends, frequently leading to a reduction in communication or a change in previously unstated, but accepted normal interaction. We concentrate on a few characteristics of social separation—feelings of aloneness, isolation and separation, use of silence and verbal discretion, the relationship between estrangement and kinship interaction and norm disruption, and are looking at social patterns of interpersonal relationships that may occur when risk and illness statuses are new and framing and feeling rules have not as yet been clearly developed due to a cultural lag.     

Covenants and Commands

Robert Adams’s account of divine command theory argues that moral obligations are idealized versions of everyday social requirements. One type of social requirement is the ordinary demand one person makes of one another. Its idealized version is the perfect command a perfect God makes of those he loves. This paper extends Adams’s account of moral obligation by considering another kind of social requirement: promises. It argues that we can understand a divine covenant as an idealized version of a promise. Promisers take on social requirements to promisees when they make promises. Analogously, God takes on obligations to humans when God makes covenants with them. Divine command theorists might fear that this makes God subject to moral rules not of his own choosing. This paper considers these fears and argues that they are unwarranted.     

Taking As: Experience & Judgment in the Life of Agents

Although appearances may deceive them, agents are capable of achieving their ends; this success is frequently explained by the fact that the agents may, for example, see a stick in water as bent without believing that it is actually bent. Although the notion of ‘seeing as’ is supposed to both bridge the gap between experience and action and explain our reaction to illusions, such accounts break down because of their exclusive focus on visual episodes and their tendency to interpret the metaphysics of agency in a psychologistic fashion. This paper shows that ‘seeing as’ needs to be understood as a species of the genus ‘taking as.’ The genus admits a wider array of expression, in terms of the kinds of attitudes, actions, and epistemological statuses involved. Such an analysis allows us to avoid the problems of ‘seeing as’ accounts and deepens our understanding of the relationship between practical and theoretical reason.     

不同情境中幼儿情绪表达规则认知发展的追踪研究

用追踪研究方法,对60名幼儿在高兴、惊讶与害怕情境中的情绪表达规则认知两年的发展进行探讨,并考察情绪情境、性别和人际背景对其发展的影响。结果表明：(1)幼儿的情绪表达规则知识、目标和策略水平均随年龄增长显著提升;(2)幼儿在害怕情境中为自我保护而较多使用掩饰策略,在惊讶情境中较多使用掩饰和夸大策略,在高兴情境中综合运用掩饰、弱化和夸大策略;(3)性别和人际背景均对幼儿情绪表达规则认知发展有显著影响。