The Notion of Pseudo-Argument in Perelman’s Thought

According to Perelman (Rhétoriques, Presses Universitaires de Bruxelles, 1989: 80), a pseudo-argument is an argument that is supposed to be convincing from a given audience viewpoint, while it is not from another audience viewpoint. Such a claim raises the traditional problem of the boundaries between the well known “convince versus persuade” dichotomy. This paper aims at investigating it from a contemporary rhetorical and argumentative perspective which will take into account the fictional dimension of persuasion. In this perspective, it will be claimed that the notion of an “as if” argument better fits to some rhetorical phenomena.

The indexicality of ‘knowledge’

Epistemic contextualism—the view that the content of the predicate ‘know’ can change with the context of utterance—has fallen into considerable disrepute recently. Many theorists have raised doubts as to whether ‘know’ is context-sensitive, typically basing their arguments on data suggesting that ‘know’ behaves semantically and syntactically in a way quite different from recognised indexicals such as ‘I’ and ‘here’ or ‘flat’ and ‘empty’. This paper takes a closer look at three pertinent objections of this kind, viz. at what I call the Error-Theory Objection, the Gradability Objection and the Clarification-Technique Objection. The paper concludes that none of these objections can provide decisive evidence against contextualism.     

‘The Echo of a Thought in Sight’: Property Perception,Universals and Wittgenstein

Contemporary philosophers of perception, even those with otherwise widely differing beliefs, often hold that universals enter into the content of perceptual experience. This doctrine can even be seen as a trivial inference from the observation that we observe properties – ways that things are – as well as things. I argue that the inference is not trivial but can and should be resisted. Ordinary property perception does not involve awareness of universals. But there are visual (and aural) experiences which do involve determinate universals: following Wittgenstein, I call these ‘aspect experiences’. The common view of perceptual content effectively conflates aspect experiences with mere property perceptions. Wittgenstein’s later writings on the philosophy of psychology provide an alternative way to think about both aspects and properties. It also forms a contrast with Wittgenstein’s own early treatment of perception in the Tractatus, the doctrine of which is much closer to the contemporary norm among philosophers of perception. In seeing how Wittgenstein moved away from his early view, we can see how we might move away from that norm.     

The Ways of ‘Being’ and ‘Becoming’ Human

We argue that developing integrative models of psychological phenomenon require dealing simultaneously with information-theoretic and meaning making processes at the individual and group levels. Attempts to fuse these across levels based on intentionality become difficult because phenomena at the lower level organisms are conceptualized employing concrete systems language, while in case of human and social systems both concrete and abstracted systems concepts are used. Intentionality also needs to be looked at as arising out of the processes of both being and becoming. Fusing of psycho-and socio-logics necessarily requires taking into consideration psychological processes and notions of intentionality and future within cultural contexts in a more holistic manner. It is also argued that both at personal and collective levels, human intentionality operate as bounded intentionality alternating between states of being and becoming.     

The ‘Compositional Rigidity’ of Recognitionality

Abstract

Empiricist philosophers of mind have long maintained that the possession conditions of many concepts include recognitional abilities. One of Jerry Fodor's recent attacks on empiricist semantics proceeds by attempting to demonstrate that there are no such, ‘recognitional’ concepts. His argument is built on the claim that if there were such concepts, they would not compose: i.e., they would exhibit properties which are not in general ‘inherited’ by complex concepts of which they are components. Debate between Fodor and his critics on this issue has focused on his construal of compositionality, the critics in effect advocating a weaker conception than that assumed by Fodor. I argue that the critics' contention is under-motivated, and in the current context ad hoc. But there is something else wrong with Fodor's argument. He misidentifies the notion of recognitionality in which the empiricist should trade. A proper understanding of recognitionality allows us to disarm Fodor's argument without resolving the question about compositionality that divides Fodor and his critics. I end with two very general remarks. First a contention about the motivation for empiricist semantics, and second, a suggestion that my proposal about recognitionality may be extended to disarm a more familiar and influential type of concern about their viability.     

The relativity of ‘absolute’ judgements

Suppose that, with rather few exceptions, the assignment of a number to a stimulus on one trial of a magnitude estimation or category judgement experiment serves as the point of reference for choosing an appropriate assignment on the next trial. This principle of relative judgement—relative to the immediate context—is developed to generate models for both magnitude estimation and category judgement experiments. It is applied, in particular, to the explanation of three, hitherto unrelated, phenomena: these are (a) the limited transmission of information in category judgements; (b) sequential constraints on the resolving power of category judgements; and (c) the autocorrelation of successive numerical magnitude estimates. Finally, some comparison is made between the principle of relative judgement introduced here and other contemporary ideas which have been addressed to one or more of these three critical phenomena.     

The Thought Experiment of Maxwell’s Demon and the Origin of Irreversibility

The problem of the irreversibility’s origin in thermodynamic processes occupies a distinguished place among many and lasting attempts by researchers to derive irreversibility from molecular-mechanical principles. However, this problem is still open and no universally accepted solution may be given during any course. In this paper, I shall try to show that the examining of Maxwell’s demon thought experiment may provide insight into the difficulties that emerge, looking for this origin because: (i) it is connected with the notion of irreversibility, and (ii) one of its functions is that of the “reversibility objection.” In order to illustrate this point, I study Boltzmann’s approach to the problem of a molecular-mechanical interpretation of irreversibility and I show that an auxiliary assumption (the selected direction of time) is responsible for producing irreversibility. But this result is accordant with the predictions of Maxwell’s demon thought experiment: the assumptions of this kind are not dictated by molecular-mechanical principles but are separate input in the model-systems used.

The logic of obligation, ‘better’ and ‘worse’

Research for this paper was supported by a grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities, FT-33794. I am grateful to an anonymous referee of this journal for remarks on an earlier version of this paper.     

The Italian school of ‘history of religions’

This study sets out to cast light on the most significant theoretical and methodological aspects of the Italian School of History of Religions, a school that owes its particular character to the cultural commitment of Raffaele Pettazzoni, Ernesto de Martino and Angelo Brelich. Since these scholars are not well known internationally, this article aims at providing some keys to their interpretation for the purpose of a wider circulation. The thought of Pettazzoni, de Martino and Brelich has not exhausted its potential and can make a far from negligible contribution to today's discussions on subjects such as the role of the history of religions in contemporary culture, the meaning of the secular approach to the religious phenomenon, and the search for new conceptions of the comparative method. The most pregnant image of the history of religions provided by an analysis of the works of these Italian scholars is that of a discipline committed to tackling the problems of our time.     

The ‘workshy’

Abstract

This article is an attempt to apply the Kleinian ‘positions’ to long-term unemployment and to use them to suggest an alternative to punitive concepts such as ‘workshy’, while discussing the paradox in which a sincere attempt to find work exists alongside behaviour which seems designed to sabotage it. Such sabotaging behaviour not only offers secondary gains but affords channels for projections which mitigate unresolved aggression. While effective in coping with long-term unemployment, these mechanisms inhibit development and ‘benign cycles’ are gridlocked. Change and growth are seen as threats and aggression cannot be worked through and must be projected. Persecutory anxieties and a lack of enrichment by ‘otherness’ results and is reinforced by the reality of chronic unemployment. No opportunity for reparative work exists, so ‘concern’ and a sense of responsibility are inhibited. Narcissistic omnipotence and grandiosity is a feature. Long-term unemployment and homelessness show similar revolving door patterns connected to similar coping mechanisms.     

‘The moral irrelevance of moral coercion’

Philosophical Studies - An agent A morally coerces another agent, B, when A manipulates non-epistemological facts in order that B’s moral commitments enjoin B to do what A wants B to do, and...     

The emotional geographies of the ‘livingdying’

This paper engages with Madge's (2016; 2018) notion of the ‘livingdying’ through an analysis of three recent autobiographies of death and dying. Dying: A Memoir by Australian author, Cory Taylor (2016), In Gratitude by British writer, Jenny Diski (2016), and The Bright Hour by American memoirist, Nina Riggs (2017), provide insight into the sometimes contradictory emotional responses to the different spaces traversed by the ‘livingdying’. We identify how the emotions of fear and anxiety, sadness and grief, anger and frustration, and isolation and loneliness infuse the liminal spaces that the ‘livingdying’ occupy. In doing so we highlight how the normative dualism of ‘the living’ and ‘the dying’ shapes emotional vulnerabilities. Finally, hoping to further advance Madge's (2016; 2018) provocation to acknowledge, account for and honour the intrinsic entanglement of living and dying and life and death, we propose a reframing of her notion of ‘livingdying’ that includes the ‘ordinary’ living, that is, those not dealing with a terminal illness.