质性比较专家与新手的物理学知识结构

通过质性比较方法,本实验刻画了专家与新手在物理学欧姆定律上的知识差异,并发现,与新手相比,专家的知识结构有如下特点:(1)精致化,即拥有更多公式且生成了新公式,表示他们在知识之间形成了更多联系;(2)限制化,即添加更多恒定条件于知识中,从而产生更为明确的行动。此外,本实验在方法学上为细致描述和解释专长的实质提供了可能。     

质性比较专家与新手的物理问题解决过程

本实验致力于回答两个问题 :(1 )在何种任务限制下 ,专家表现出对新手的解题优势 ;(2 )可以采用何种实验手段 ,来细致刻画解题过程中运用的程序性知识 (“条件 -行动”)。本实验以物理学领域的“欧姆定律”为研究内容 ,采用专家 -新手比较范型 ,对被试的言语报告进行编码与分析 ,进而描绘了解题活动所依赖的“条件 -行动”关系 ,从中展现了专家解题相对于新手的整体优势。对这些优势的进一步个案分析表明 ,物理学解题专长的实质在于 :(1 )条件化操作 (从已知条件得出复杂关系 ) ;(2 )精致化知识 (比例公式与嵌套公式 )。     

专家医生的知识结构及诊断推理方式

医学专长研究中“中间者效应”的发现,引发了研究者对专家医生知识结构的探讨。在“知识打包”的基础上,医生的临床知识以“疾病脚本”的方式组织起来。随着临床经验的增加,专家医生积累了丰富的疾病脚本。在临床诊断中,他们无需对病人所有的体征和症状进行仔细地和系统地分析,而是通过非分析性的推理方式——“模式识别”或“样例识别”便可自动激活与之匹配的疾病脚本,据此对病人做出迅速而准确的诊断。医学专长的本质就在于专家医生以“疾病脚本”的方式组织起来的知识结构。“适应性专长”代表了未来医学专长研究的新方向     

Domain Knowledge and Hindsight Bias among Poker Players

Hindsight bias occurs when individuals believe that events were more predictable after they have occurred than they actually were before they occurred. Although hindsight bias is a well‐studied phenomenon, few studies have examined the role of expertise in this bias. Two experiments investigated the relation between the magnitude of hindsight bias and self‐reported poker expertise (Experiment 1) and assessed poker knowledge (Experiment 2). In Experiment 1, self‐rated poker expertise was negatively correlated with hindsight bias. Experiment 2 employed memory and hypothetical hindsight conditions and found that poker knowledge was negatively correlated with hindsight bias in the memory condition, but unrelated to hindsight bias in the hypothetical condition. These results help elucidate the role of expertise in hindsight bias and provide additional support for the separate components view, which claims there are different forms of hindsight bias that are differentially affected by certain factors. Domain knowledge appears to be one of such factors. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Projective Way of Knowing: A Useful Heuristic That Sometimes Misleads

For many purposes, people need a reasonably good idea of what other people know. This article presents an argument and considers evidence that people use their own knowledge as a basis for developing models of what specific other people know in particular, that they tend to assume that other people know what they know. This is a generally useful heuristic, but the assumption is often made uncritically, with the consequence that people end up assuming that others have knowledge that they do not have.     

Buddhism as Philosophy: An Introduction

Most of us spend a significant portion of our lives learning, practising, and performing a wide range of skills. Many of us also have a great amount of control over which skills we learn and develop. From choices as significant as career pursuits to those as minor as how we spend our weeknight leisure time, we exercise a great amount of agency over what we know and what we can do. In this paper we argue, using a framework first developed by Carbonell [2013], that in many real-world circumstances we have moral obligations to develop some skills rather than others.     

The sensory nature of knowledge: Sensory priming effects in semantic categorization

The aim of the present study was to show the perceptual nature of conceptual knowledge by using a priming paradigm that excluded an interpretation exclusively in terms of amodal representation. This paradigm was divided into two phases. The first phase consisted in learning a systematic association between a geometrical shape and a white noise. The second phase consisted of a short-term priming paradigm in which a primed shape (either associated or not with a sound in the first phase) preceded a picture of an object, which the participants had to categorize as representing a large or a small object. The objects were chosen in such a way that their principal function either was associated with the production of noise (“noisy” target) or was not typically associated the production of noise (“silent” target). The stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) between the prime and the target was 100 ms or 500 ms. The results revealed an interference effect with a 100-ms SOA and a facilitatory effect with a 500-ms SOA for the noisy targets only. We interpreted the interference effect obtained at the 100-ms SOA as the result of an overlap between the components reactivated by the sound prime and those activated by the processing of the noisy target. At an SOA of 500 ms, there was no temporal overlap. The observed facilitatory effect was explained by the preactivation of auditory areas by the sound prime, thus facilitating the categorization of the noisy targets only.     

The trouble with Madeleine

I respond to Selinger and Mix (Selinger, E. and Mix, J. 2004. On interactional expertise: Pragmatic and ontological considerations. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3: 145–163), concentrating on their charges that Collins (Collins, H. M. 2004a. Interactional expertise as a third form of knowledge. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3: 125–143) underrates the importance of interactional expertise as an expertise sui generis and that the paper fails to analyse the idea of embodiment sufficiently holistically, misleading treating the ‘body’ as no more than the linear sum of its parts. This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Emotion knowledge and autobiographical memory across the preschool years: a cross-cultural longitudinal investigation

Knowledge of emotion situations facilitates the interpretation, processing, and organization of significant personal event information and thus may be an important contributor to the development of autobiographical memory. This longitudinal study tested the hypothesis in a cross-cultural context. The participants were native Chinese children, Chinese children from first-generation Chinese immigrant families in the U.S., and European American children. Children's developing emotion knowledge and autobiographical memory were assessed three times at home, when children were 3, 3.5, and 4.5 years of age. Children's emotion knowledge uniquely predicted their autobiographical memory ability across groups and time points. Emotion knowledge further mediated culture effects on autobiographical memory. The findings provide important insight into early autobiographical memory development, and extend current theoretical understandings of the emotion-memory interplay. They further have implications for the phenomenon of infantile amnesia and cross-cultural differences in childhood recollections.     

Doing Ethics or Changing for the Better?

In this paper, classical pragmatism is used as a method, not as a substantial ethical theory, to develop “moral pragmatics.” Moral pragmatics offers a constructive approach for making progress where traditional ethical theories converge, and it innovates ethical deliberation. Assuming widespread agreement that real moral problems need practical solutions, the paper addresses two related problems: the missing link between ethical theories and moral practice, and the question of who is in charge of finding such solutions. It argues that “conscience” can create a link between ethical knowledge and moral practice, and that this partly discharges “the ethicist” from the task of solving problems that are not really, or not only, hers. Two specific methodological innovations are suggested that go beyond admonitions to render ethics sensitive to context. Instead, a reevaluation of “casuistry” and a sensitivity for “finding the right words” give an idea of how to achieve this goal.     

Compound cue processing within the fast and frugal heuristics approach in nonlinearly separable environments

Three experiments investigated whether participants used Take The Best (TTB) Configural, a fast and frugal heuristic that processes configurations of cues when making inferences concerning which of two alternatives has a higher criterion value. Participants were presented with a compound cue that was nonlinearly separable from its elements. The compound was highly valid in Experiments 1 and 2, but invalid in Experiment 3. Participants’ causal mental models were manipulated via instructions: participants were either told that cues acted through the same causal mechanism (configural causal model), through different causal mechanisms (elemental causal model), or the causal mechanisms were not specified (neutral causal model). A high percentage of participants used TTB-Configural when they had a configural causal model and a highly valid compound existed, suggesting that causal knowledge can be incorporated in otherwise very basic cognitive mechanisms to allow fine-grained adaptation to complex task structures.     

What is an expert?

Experts play an important role in society, but there has been little investigation about the nature of expertise. I argue that there are two kinds of experts: those whose expertise is a function of what theyknow (epistemic expertise), or what theydo (performative expertise). Epistemic expertise is the capacity to provide strong justifications for a range of propositions in a domain, while performative expertise is the capacity to perform a skill well according to the rules and virtues of a practice. Both epistemic and performative experts may legitimately disagree with one another, and the two senses are conceptually and logically distinct.