共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 31 毫秒
1.
Harold Langsam 《Erkenntnis》2008,68(1):79-101
In this paper, I argue that what underlies internalism about justification is a rationalist conception of justification, not
a deontological conception of justification, and I argue for the plausibility of this rationalist conception of justification.
The rationalist conception of justification is the view that a justified belief is a belief that is held in a rational way;
since we exercise our rationality through conscious deliberation, the rationalist conception holds that a belief is justified
iff a relevant possible instance of conscious deliberation would endorse the belief. The importance of conscious deliberation
stems from its role in guiding us in acquiring true beliefs: whereas the externalist holds that if we wish to acquire true
beliefs, we have to begin by assuming that some of our usual methods of belief formation generally provide us with true beliefs, the internalist holds that if
we form beliefs by conscious deliberation, we can be conscious of reasons for thinking that our beliefs are true. Conscious deliberation can make us conscious of reasons because it proceeds via rational
intuitions. I argue that despite the fallibility of rational intuition, rational intuitions do enable us to become conscious
of reasons for belief.
相似文献
Harold LangsamEmail: |
2.
Hamid Vahid 《Erkenntnis》2008,69(3):295-313
It is not difficult to make sense of the idea that beliefs may derive their justification from other beliefs. Difficulties
surface when, as in certain epistemological theories, one appeals to sensory experiences to give an account of the structure
of justification. This gives rise to the so-called problem of ‘nondoxastic justification’, namely, the problem of seeing how
sensory experiences can confer justification on the beliefs they give rise to. In this paper, I begin by criticizing a number
of theories that are currently on offer. Finding them all wanting, I shall then offer a diagnosis of why they fail while gesturing
towards a promising way of resolving the dispute. It will be argued that what makes the problem of nondoxastic justification
a hard one is the difficulty of striking the right balance between a notion of normative justification that is content-sensitive
and truth conducive and the possibility of error while acknowledging the fact that our experiences can justify our beliefs
in cases we are hallucinating.
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Hamid VahidEmail: |
3.
Walter Hopp 《Husserl Studies》2009,25(1):1-14
If Husserl is correct, phenomenological inquiry produces knowledge with an extremely high level of epistemic warrant or justification.
However, there are several good reasons to think that we are highly fallible at carrying out phenomenological inquiries. It
is extremely difficult to engage in phenomenological investigations, and there are very few substantive phenomenological claims
that command a widespread consensus. In what follows, I introduce a distinction between method-fallibility and agent-fallibility,
and use it to argue that the fact that we are fallible phenomenologists does not undermine Husserl’s claims concerning the
epistemic value of phenomenological inquiry. I will also defend my account against both internalist and externalist objections.
相似文献
Walter HoppEmail: |
4.
C. Behan McCullagh 《Sophia》2007,46(1):21-34
One cannot prove the truth of theological statement, but perhaps one can justify believing them because of the good consequences
of doing so. It is irrational to believe statements of which there are good reasons to think false, but those of which there
is some, albeit inconclusive, evidence can be believed for pragmatic reasons. However, in the interest of simplicity, it must
not be possible to achieve those good consequences without such faith. John Bishop and others have argued that one need only
assume theological statements to be true to enjoy the good consequences of a religious life, but in fact, faith is needed
for most of these consequences to be achieved.
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C. Behan McCullaghEmail: |
5.
Elizabeth Brake 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2007,10(3):243-254
This paper develops a Kantian account of the moral assessment of institutions. The problem I address is this: while a deontological
theory may find that some legal institutions are required by justice, it is not obvious how such a theory can assess institutions
not strictly required (or prohibited) by justice. As a starting-point, I consider intuitions that in some cases it is desirable
to attribute non-consequentialist moral value to institutions not required by justice. I will argue that neither consequentialist
nor virtue-ethical accounts account for these intuitions, suggesting that a distinctive deontological account is needed. The
account I give is drawn from Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals; I distinguish it from Kantian views of institutions developed by Barbara Herman and Onora O’Neill. Throughout, I use marriage
as an example.
相似文献
Elizabeth BrakeEmail: |
6.
Manuel Pérez Otero 《Philosophical Studies》2008,141(3):357-376
Hume argued that inductive inferences do not have rational justification. My aim is to reject Hume’s argument. The discussion
is partly motivated by an analogy with Carroll’s Paradox, which concerns deductive inferences. A first radically externalist
reply to Hume (defended by Dauer and Van Cleve) is that justified inductive inferences do not require the subject to know
that nature is uniform, though the uniformity of nature is a necessary condition for having the justification. But then the
subject does not have reasons for believing what she believes. I defend a moderate externalist account that seeks to partly
accommodate that objection to the radical externalist proposal. It is based on an extension of Peacocke’s theory of concepts:
possession conditions for predicative concepts standing for natural properties include (fallible) dispositions to project
them to new cases in accordance with inductive inferential patterns.
相似文献
Manuel Pérez OteroEmail: |
7.
Dorit Ganson 《Philosophical Studies》2008,139(3):441-458
Evidentialism is the view that facts about whether or not an agent is justified in having a particular belief are entirely
determined by facts about the agent’s evidence; the agent’s practical needs and interests are irrelevant. I examine an array
of arguments against evidentialism (by Jeremy Fantl, Matthew McGrath, David Owens, and others), and demonstrate how their
force is affected when we take into account the relation between degrees of belief and outright belief. Once we are sensitive
to one of the factors that secure thresholds for outright believing (namely, outright believing that p in a given circumstance
requires, at the minimum, that one’s degree of belief that p is high enough for one to be willing to act as if p in the circumstances),
we see how pragmatic considerations can be relevant to facts about whether or not an agent is justified in believing that
p—but largely as a consequence of the pragmatic constraints on outright believing.
相似文献
Dorit GansonEmail: |
8.
Simon Robertson 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2008,11(3):263-277
A common view of the relation between oughts and reasons is that you ought to do something if and only if that is what you
have most reason to do. One challenge to this comes from what Jonathan Dancy calls ‘enticing reasons.’ Dancy argues that enticing
reasons never contribute to oughts and that it is false that if the only reasons in play are enticing reasons then you ought
to do what you have most reason to do. After explaining how enticing reasons supposedly work and why accepting them may appear
attractive, I firstly show why we are not committed to accepting them into our conceptual framework and then argue that no
reasons work in the way enticing reasons are claimed to. Thus we should reject the category of enticing reasons entirely.
相似文献
Simon RobertsonEmail: |
9.
Sanford C. Goldberg 《Philosophical Studies》2009,142(1):105-117
The following three propositions appear to be individually defensible but jointly inconsistent: (1) reliability is a necessary
condition on epistemic justification; (2) on contested matters in philosophy, my beliefs are not reliably formed; (3) some
of these beliefs are epistemically justified. I explore the nature and scope of the problem, examine and reject some candidate
solutions, compare the issue with ones arising in discussions about disagreement, and offer a brief assessment of our predicament.
相似文献
Sanford C. GoldbergEmail: |
10.
Paul Formosa 《Human Studies》2007,30(2):57-77
Evil acts strike us, by their very nature, as not only horrifying and reprehensible, but also as deeply puzzling. No doubt
for reasons like this, evil has often been seen as mysterious, demonic and beyond our human powers of understanding. The question
I examine in this paper is whether or not we can (or would want to) overcome this puzzlement in the face of evil acts. I shall
argue that we ought want to (in all cases) and can (in at least most cases) come to understand why people perpetrate evil
acts. This is an appealing conclusion as it allows us to take practical steps to both minimise future occurrences of evil
and come to terms with its past abominations.
相似文献
Paul FormosaEmail: |
11.
Paul Boghossian 《Philosophical Studies》2009,144(1):111-119
I agree with Sosa that intuitions are best thought of as attractions to believe a certain proposition merely on the basis
of understanding it. However, I don’t think it is constitutive of them that they supply strictly foundational justification
for the propositions they justify, though I do believe that it is important that the intuition of a suitable subject be thought
of as a prima facie justification for his intuitive judgment, independently of the reliability of his underlying capacities.
I also think that we need to be able to explain how mere understanding of a proposition can confer upon us an ability to have
reliable intuitions, that we cannot simply take that idea for granted. And that when try to explain that, our best avenue
for doing so is to take the intuitions as constituting the understanding of which they are said to be a manifestation.
相似文献
Paul BoghossianEmail: |
12.
In this introduction we discuss the motivation behind the workshop “Towards a New Epistemology of Mathematics” of which this
special issue constitutes the proceedings. We elaborate on historical and empirical aspects of the desired new epistemology,
connect it to the public image of mathematics, and give a summary and an introduction to the contributions to this issue.
相似文献
Bernd BuldtEmail: |
Benedikt L?we (Corresponding author)Email: |
Thomas MüllerEmail: |
13.
Robert Huseby 《Res Publica》2008,14(1):1-18
Thomas Pogge has argued that we have strong negative duties to assist the global poor because we harm them through our contribution to the global economic order. I argue that Pogge’s concept of harm is indeterminate. The resources
of any group will typically be affected by at least two economic schemes. Pogge suggests that the responsibility for any affected
group’s shortfall from a minimum standard ought to be shared between the contributing schemes. I argue that shared responsibility
can be interpreted in two different ways. Unfortunately, both interpretations are problematic. Lastly, I suggest a strategy
for amending this problem.
相似文献
Robert HusebyEmail: |
14.
Some Thoughts on Terrorism, Moral Complaint, and the Self-Reflexive and Relational Nature of Morality 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Saul Smilansky 《Philosophia》2006,34(1):65-74
The contemporary discussion of terrorism has been dominated by deontological and consequentialist arguments. Building upon my previous work on a paradox concerning moral complaint, I try to broaden the perspectives through which we view the issues. The direction that seems to me as most promising is a self-reflexive, conditional, and, to some extent, relational emphasis. What one is permitted to do to others would depend not so much on some absolute code constraning actions or on the estimate of what would optimize overall the resulting well-being but on the precedents that the past actions of those others provided, on the relationships among the participants, on tacit or explicit offers and possible agreements among them, and on the reciprocity (or lack thereof) that ensues.
相似文献
Saul SmilanskyEmail: |
15.
Nathan Hanna 《Philosophical Studies》2009,145(3):325-349
I argue that contemporary liberal theory cannot give a general justification for the institution or practice of punishment,
i.e., a justification that would hold across a broad range of reasonably realistic conditions. I examine the general justifications
offered by three prominent contemporary liberal theorists and show how their justifications fail in light of the possibility
of an alternative to punishment. I argue that, because of their common commitments regarding the nature of justification,
these theorists have decisive reasons to reject punishment in favor of a non-punitive alternative. I demonstrate the possibility
of this alternative by means of a careful examination of the nature of punishment, isolating one essential characteristic—the
aim to impose suffering—and showing how this characteristic need not guide enforcement. There is logical space for a forceful
and coercive, yet non-punitive method of enforcement. This fact poses difficulties for many classical and contemporary justifications
of punishment, but it poses particularly crippling problems for general liberal justifications.
相似文献
Nathan HannaEmail: |
16.
Jacob Busch 《Philosophia》2009,37(1):55-65
The underdetermination of theory by data argument (UD) is traditionally construed as an argument that tells us that we ought
to favour an anti-realist position over a realist position. I argue that when UD is constructed as an argument saying that
theory choice is to proceed between theories that are empirically equivalent and adequate to the phenomena up until now, the
argument will not favour constructive empiricism over realism. A constructive empiricist cannot account for why scientists
are reasonable in expecting one theory to be empirically adequate rather than another, given the criteria he suggests for
theory choice.
相似文献
Jacob BuschEmail: |
17.
Richard Fumerton 《Philosophical Studies》2009,142(1):67-76
In this paper I argue that there is no viable alternative to construing our knowledge and justified belief as resting on a
foundation restricted to truths about our internal states. Against Williamson and others I defend the claim that the internal
life of a cognizer really does constitute a special sort of cognitive home that is importantly different from the rest of
what we think we know and justifiably believe.
相似文献
Richard FumertonEmail: |
18.
Varelius J 《Science and engineering ethics》2009,15(1):39-50
It has been suggested that, in addition to individual level decision-making, informed consent procedures could be used in
collective decision-making too. One of the main criticisms directed at this suggestion concerns decision-making power. It
is maintained that consent is a veto power concept and that, as such, it is not appropriate for collective decision-making.
This paper examines this objection to collective informed consent. It argues that veto power informed consent can have some
uses in the collective level and that when it is not appropriate the decision power a concerned party ought to have in connection
with an arrangement should be made relative to the interest she has at stake in it. It concludes that the objection examined
does not undermine collective informed consent.
相似文献
Jukka VareliusEmail: |
19.
Recent and puzzling experimental results suggest that people’s judgments as to whether or not an action was performed intentionally
are sensitive to moral considerations. In this paper, we outline these results and evaluate two accounts which purport to
explain them. We then describe a recent experiment that allegedly vindicates one of these accounts and present our own findings
to show that it fails to do so. Finally, we present additional data suggesting no such vindication could be in the offing
and that, in fact, both accounts fail to explain the initial, puzzling results they were purported to explain.
相似文献
Hagop SarkissianEmail: |
20.
We consider and reject a variety of attempts to provide a ground for identifying and differentiating disembodied minds. Until
such a ground is provided, we must withhold inclusion of disembodied minds from our picture of the world.
相似文献
Jesse R. SteinbergEmail: |