Socratic Courage in Plato's Socratic Dialogues

This article considers Socrates's conception of courage in Plato's Socratic dialogues. Although the Laches, which is the only dialogue devoted in toto to a pursuit of the definition of courage, does not explicitly provide Socrates's definition of courage, I shall point out clues therein which contribute to an understanding of Socrates's conception of courage. The Protagoras is a peculiar dialogue in which Socrates himself offers a definition of courage. Attending to the dramatic structure and personalities of the dialogue, I will point out that Socrates does not commit to the definition and that the hedonism and the definition of courage are used to disclose Protagoras's confusion regarding virtue. Following one of the clues within the Laches I will turn to the Apology and indicate Socrates's conception of courage which is based on his awareness of lack of knowledge of death and his religious conviction that nothing will happen for the good in life or in death. Finally I will show that such conception of Socratic courage satisfies the criteria in the Laches.     

Socratic Trees

The method of Socratic proofs (SP-method) simulates the solving of logical problem by pure questioning. An outcome of an application of the SP-method is a sequence of questions, called a Socratic transformation. Our aim is to give a method of translation of Socratic transformations into trees. We address this issue both conceptually and by providing certain algorithms. We show that the trees which correspond to successful Socratic transformations—that is, to Socratic proofs—may be regarded, after a slight modification, as Gentzen-style proofs. Thus proof-search for some Gentzen-style calculi can be performed by means of the SP-method. At the same time the method seems promising as a foundation for automated deduction.     

Socratic Film

This article is about a relationship between the Socratic practice of philosophy and the aesthetic practice of watching and appreciating film. The conclusion that I defend is that certain narrative films, like the elenctic method in the hands of Socrates, are philosophical tools for examining our cognitive and emotional life and thus for gaining insight into aspects of our character. In the early sections of the article I construct an analogy between the practice of watching narrative film and the practice of self‐examination through dialogue and reflection. I argue that good aesthetic practice in film appreciation is analogous to good philosophical practice in the manner of Socrates, and I treat the elenchus as a method of self‐examination rather than of conceptual analysis and Socrates himself as an examiner of people rather than of abstract concepts. In the later sections I discuss three films directed by Christopher Nolan—Memento (2000), The Prestige (2006), and Inception (2010)—as paradigm cases of Socratic film. I argue that these films show us something about ourselves by prompting extemporaneous emotional responses and cognitive judgments that we come, reflectively, to reject.     

Socratic Proofs

Journal of Philosophical Logic - Our aim is to express in exact terms the old idea of solving problems by pure questioning. We consider the problem of derivability: “Is A derivable from...     

Socratic Irony and Argumentation

Argumentation - Socratic irony can be understood independently of the immortal heroics of Plato’s Socrates. We need a systematic account and criticism of it both as a debate-winning strategy...     

Socratic Proofs for Quantifiers

First-order logic is formalized by means of tools taken from the logic of questions. A calculus of questions which is a counterpart of the Pure Calculus of Quantifiers is presented. A direct proof of completeness of the calculus is given. *Research for this paper was supported by The Foundation for Polish Science (both authors), and indirectly (in the case of the first author) by a bilateral exchange project funded by the Ministry of the Flemish Community (project BIL 01/80) and the State Committee for Scientific Research, Poland.     

Socratic Persuasion in the Crito

Socrates does not use the Laws' Speech in the Crito principally to persuade Crito to accept his coming execution. It is used instead to persuade Crito to examine and work on his inadequate view of justice. Crito's view of justice fails to coordinate one's duties to friends and those to the law. The Laws' Speech accomplishes this persuasive goal by accompanying Crito’s earlier speech. Both start from the same view of justice, one that Crito accepts, but reach opposing conclusions. Crito cannot judge between the two appealing speeches. His understanding of justice is too confused for him to decide well how to help Socrates. His need to explain what happened the morning he visited Socrates will prompt him and others to examine this indeterminate view of justice. Socrates foregoes direct refutation because Crito will not abide that usual way of interrogation. Engaging in short question-and-answer conversation is not the only way to bring a person to aporia and the intention to examine oneself. Socrates does not here undermine his assertions in the Apology about his ignorance, lack of interest in teaching, constant philosophizing, and his belief that what he does is question, examine, and test those he talks to.     

Aurelius Augustine on Imagination

The evaluation of a person seeking or volunteering information in cooperatively or competitively oriented problem solving groups was investigated in 63 white and black, male and female, high school and college students. It was hypothesized that under cooperative conditions the seeking of information would be evaluated more positively than would the volunteering of information, while under competitive conditions the volunteering of information would be evaluated more positively than would the seeking of information. A highly trained confederate (C) engaged in either the seeking of information or the volunteering of information in four-person problem solving groups in which Ss were either cooperatively or competitively oriented. Ss rated Cs on eight bipolar scales. The results confirmed the hypothesis.     

An apology for Socratic bioethics

Bioethics is a hybrid discipline. As a theoretical enterprise it stands for untrammeled inquiry and argument. Yet it aims to influence medical practice and policy. In this article we explore tensions between these two dimensions of bioethics and examine the merits and perils of a "Socratic" approach to bioethics that challenges "the conventional wisdom."