‘More than a swineherd’

Abstract

This article suggests that alongside the strongly biblical defence of the royal supremacy, which was common in Elizabethan England, there can be found a distinctive line of argument; it stresses the roots of the magistrate’s ‘cura religionis’ in natural and human law, rather than simply divine law. This argument is often identified with Richard Hooker, who is taken to be innovative at this point. This study argues, however, that many of the same philosophical and theological points can be found in Peter Martyr Vermigli, who may have influenced Hooker. Elements of Vermigli’s Aristotelian political theory are traceable on a reading of his Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, and the application of these concepts in his biblical commentaries is noticeable.     

Why are conservatives happier than liberals?

In this research, we drew on system-justification theory and the notion that conservative ideology serves a palliative function to explain why conservatives are happier than liberals. Specifically, in three studies using nationally representative data from the United States and nine additional countries, we found that right-wing (vs. left-wing) orientation is indeed associated with greater subjective well-being and that the relation between political orientation and subjective well-being is mediated by the rationalization of inequality. In our third study, we found that increasing economic inequality (as measured by the Gini index) from 1974 to 2004 has exacerbated the happiness gap between liberals and conservatives, apparently because conservatives (more than liberals) possess an ideological buffer against the negative hedonic effects of economic inequality.     

Stronger suboptimal than optimal affective priming?

The finding of stronger affective priming in less conscious (suboptimal) conditions than in fully conscious (optimal) conditions (S. T. Murphy & R. B. Zajonc, 1993) is theoretically important because it contradicts notions that emotions are primarily reflected by conscious states. In 2 experiments, this pattern of results was obtained. Happy and angry faces were presented both optimally and suboptimally and were masked by unknown ideographs. In Experiment 1, instructions for the conscious and less conscious affective priming conditions were matched, and affective ratings of ideographs were determined. In Experiment 2, a more implicit affective measure (facial electromyography of musculus zygomaticus major and musculus corrugator supercilii) served as the dependent variable. Stronger suboptimal than optimal affective priming was found in both experiments. It is concluded that stronger suboptimal than optimal processing is characteristic for affective processing and that it can also be found when instructions are matched and when a more implicit measure is assessed.     

Do Maximizers Predict Better than Satisficers?

We examine the relationship between maximizing (i.e., seeking the best) versus satisficing (i.e., seeking the good enough) tendencies and forecasting ability in a real‐world prediction task: forecasting the outcomes of the 2010 FIFA World Cup. In Studies 1 and 2, participants gave probabilistic forecasts for the outcomes of the tournament and completed a measure of maximizing tendencies. We found that although maximizers expected themselves to outperform others much more than satisficers, they actually forecasted more poorly. Hence, on net, they were more overconfident about their relative performance. Decompositional analyses of overall accuracy revealed that differences in forecasting abilities were primarily driven by maximizers' tendency to give more noisy estimates. In Study 3, participants played a betting task where they could choose between safe and uncertain gambles linked to World Cup outcomes. Again, maximizers did more poorly and earned less, because of greater noise in their choice‐based responses. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Is an ant larger than a lion?

In order to examine the influence exerted by an irrelevant semantic variable in a comparative judgment task, we employed a Stroop-like paradigm. The stimuli were pairs of animal names that were different in their physical and semantic sizes (e.g., ant lion). Participants were asked to judge which of the two words was larger either in physical or in semantic size. Size congruity effect (i.e., faster reaction times with congruent than with incongruent stimuli) appeared in both semantic and physical judgments. The semantic distance effect (i.e., large semantic distances are processed faster than smaller ones), appeared only when the semantic dimension was relevant to the task. The findings indicate that when a word (animal name) is presented, its meaning is accessed automatically. Part of this meaning (at least with our stimuli) relates to the size of the animal in real life. Processing of meaning of the size of the words is carried out in parallel with the extraction of the physical features of the presented stimuli.     

Is Shepherd's pen mightier than Berkeley's word?

In 1827, Lady Mary Shepherd published Essays on the Perception of an External Universe, which offers both an argument for the existence of a world of external bodies existing outside our minds and a criticism of Berkeley's argument for idealism in A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge. In this paper, I evaluate Margaret Atherton's criticisms of Shepherd's case against Berkeley, and provide reasons for thinking that, although Shepherd's particular criticisms of Berkeley do not succeed, she correctly identifies an important problem to which Berkeley's reasoning is subject.     

Better than average? When can we say that subsampling of items is better than statistical summary representations?

Myczek and Simons (2008) have described a computational model that subsamples a few items from a set with high accuracy, showing that this approach can do as well as, or better than, a model that captures statistical representations of the set. Although this is an intriguing existence proof, some caution should be taken before we consider their approach as a model for human behavior. In particular, I propose that such simulation-based research should be based on a more expanded range of phenomena and that it should include more accurate representations of errors in judgments.     

Need metaphoric comprehension take longer than literal comprehension?

To determine if metaphoric comprehension necessarily depends upon a more complex process than literal comprehension, 120 subjects in six different experiments were asked to code a series of sentences into one of the following logical sentence categories: analytic, synthetic, contradictory, anomalous, and metaphoric. Prior to this task, all subjects were given practice in learning to code examples of each of the various categories. Results of the present set of experiments revealed few systematic differences among the various categories in RT and a high degree of consistency in coding patterns across both the learning and RT phases of the experiments. Although procedural variations introduced for purposes of control produced clear and easily understandable changes in RT, coding patterns were essentially unchanged across the various experiments, suggesting that none of the categories could be considered as logically more basic than any other. The results were discussed in terms of contemporary semantic theory, where it was suggested that metaphoric recognition need not be conceptualized as depending on a more inferential level of semantic processing than literal recognition and that future theories must be more context-sensitive than those currently in fashion.     

Complex problem solving — More than reasoning?

This study investigates the internal structure and construct validity of Complex Problem Solving (CPS), which is measured by a Multiple-Item-Approach. It is tested, if (a) three facets of CPS - rule identification (adequateness of strategies), rule knowledge (generated knowledge) and rule application (ability to control a system) - can be empirically distinguished, how (b) reasoning is related to these CPS-facets and if (c) CPS shows incremental validity in predicting school grade point average (GPA) beyond reasoning. N = 222 university students completed MicroDYN, a computer-based CPS test and Ravens Advanced Progressive Matrices. Analysis including structural equation models showed that a 2-dimensionsal model of CPS including rule knowledge and rule application fitted the data best. Furthermore, reasoning predicted performance in rule application only indirectly through its influence on rule knowledge indicating that learning during system exploration is a prerequisite for controlling a system successfully. Finally, CPS explained variance in GPA even beyond reasoning, showing incremental validity of CPS. Thus, CPS measures important aspects of academic performance not assessed by reasoning and should be considered when predicting real life criteria such as GPA.     

Is property dualism better off than substance dualism?

It is widely thought that mind–body substance dualism is implausible at best, though mere “property” dualism is defensible and even flourishing. This paper argues that substance dualism is no less plausible than property dualism and even has two advantages over it.     

Why are some obsessions more upsetting than others?

Little is known about why certain obsessional thoughts are more upsetting than others for people with obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD). Obsessional thought content often seems arbitrary to sufferers. The current study examined three possible reasons why particular thoughts would be especially upsetting for individuals, based on suggestions put forth by cognitive theories of obsessional thoughts. Twenty-eight individuals with a principal diagnosis of OCD completed questionnaires and interviews at two different periods of time on (1) their most upsetting current obsession and (2) their least upsetting current obsession. Results suggested that more upsetting obsessions were evaluated as more meaningful or significant than less upsetting obsessions, and more upsetting obsessions contradicted valued aspects of the self to a greater degree. All examples of current obsessions, both most and least upsetting, arose in the context of life concerns or issues. Results support cognitive theories in that the strength and nature of appraisal appears to be linked with the distress associated with a thought, and more upsetting thoughts are those that have implications for a person's sense of self.     

Spatial sustained attention: better focused than divided?

Visuospatial attention was studied using three different reaction time tasks in a sustained attention paradigm (N = 35). Contrasting with findings from a phasic attention paradigm, our results suggest an equal ability to divide or focus sustained attention in the left and right fields in simple RT, a Go/No go-task, and choice RT.     

Is age kinder to females than to males?

To investigate possible gender differences in the patterns of age-cognition relations, a meta-analysis was conducted on the data from 25 studies (5,201 participants) by the second author and his collaborators. Gender and age differences consistent with prior reports were found, but there were few measures on which the age × gender interactions were significant. Although the majority of neuroimaging studies investigating gender differences in age-related atrophy and functional decline report greater age-related differences in males, the only significant interactions on the cognitive measures in this study (on measures of speed and reasoning) were in the direction of lesser age-related declines for males than for females.     

Is academic buoyancy anything more than adaptive coping?

Abstract

Academic buoyancy refers to a positive, constructive, and adaptive response to the types of challenges and setbacks experienced in a typical and everyday academic setting. In this project we examined whether academic buoyancy explained any additional variance in test anxiety over and above that explained by coping. Two hundred and ninety-eight students in their final two years of compulsory schooling completed self-report measures of academic buoyancy, coping, and test anxiety. Results suggested that buoyancy was inversely related to test anxiety and unrelated to coping. With the exception of test-irrelevant thoughts, test anxiety was positively related to avoidance coping and social support. Test-irrelevant thoughts were inversely related to task focus, unrelated to social support, and positively related to avoidance. A hierarchical regression analysis showed that academic buoyancy explained a significant additional proportion of variance in test anxiety when the variance for coping had already been accounted for. These findings suggest that academic buoyancy can be considered as a distinct construct from that of adaptive coping.     

Why do men have higher expectancy than women?

The aim of the present study was to test the hypothesis that sex differences in expected academic achievement could be explained by corresponding differences in perceived intellectual ability, and to explore the relationship between perceived ability and the sex role related traits of instrumentality and expressiveness. Results showed sex differences both in expectancy and perceived ability. When perceived ability was controlled, sex no longer related to expectancy. A small correlation was found between expectancy and a measure of instrumentality. The latter variable correlated substantially with perceived ability. A measure of expressiveness was unrelated both to expectancy and perceived ability. Path analysis gave results consistent with the hypotheses that men have higher perceived ability than women because men think of themselves as more instrumental than women do, and that instrumentality determines expectancy indirectly through its relationship to perceived ability.     

Does the evidence confirm theism more than naturalism?

Conclusion Schlesinger's argument for the confirmation of Theism over Naturalism fails. Principle E on which it is based is unacceptable. But even if Principle E were acceptable the argument would not succeed, for other evidence, not considered by Schlesinger, pulls in the other direction cancelling out the confirmatory effect of the evidence he does cite. Further, granted Principle E, it is not clear that theism as it is usually understood makes the evidence he cites more probable than naturalism; consequently he is not justified in concluding that the evidence he cites confirms theism more than naturalism. Finally, Schlesinger fails to take into account the possibility that the initial credibility of theism may be less than naturalism since theism may be incoherent and naturalism may not be; he also fails to take into account the total available evidence relevant to the confirmation of theism and naturalism.