Mediation and production deficiencies in children's judgments of morality

This study investigated the influence of intentions and consequences on moral judgments. Children's and adults' production of inferences about an actor's intentions was assessed separately from their use of intentions as mediators of moral judgments. Two hundred and sixteen kindergarten, fourth grade and adult subjects viewed one of four videotaped episodes in which an actor either intentionally or accidentally produced a positive or negative result. Participants received one of two prompts to produce inferences about the actor's intentions or received no prompt. Each subject rated the actor's intent and the good-ness-badness of the actor. Results supported a mediational deficiency explanation for children's objective moral judgments. Both 6- and 10-year-old children made reliable, adult-like inferences of intentions. However, children's moral evaluations were based primarily on objective consequences while adults' evaluations were based primarily on the intentions of the actor. Young children did have intentionality information available, yet even with prompting this information did not mediate their judgments in an adult-like way; suggesting that there may be a period in development during which the child understands and produces subjective inferences but does not use this information as a basis for moral judgments.     

Principled moral sentiment and the flexibility of moral judgment and decision making

Three studies test eight hypotheses about (1) how judgment differs between people who ascribe greater vs. less moral relevance to choices, (2) how moral judgment is subject to task constraints that shift evaluative focus (to moral rules vs. to consequences), and (3) how differences in the propensity to rely on intuitive reactions affect judgment. In Study 1, judgments were affected by rated agreement with moral rules proscribing harm, whether the dilemma under consideration made moral rules versus consequences of choice salient, and by thinking styles (intuitive vs. deliberative). In Studies 2 and 3, participants evaluated policy decisions to knowingly do harm to a resource to mitigate greater harm or to merely allow the greater harm to happen. When evaluated in isolation, approval for decisions to harm was affected by endorsement of moral rules and by thinking style. When both choices were evaluated simultaneously, total harm -- but not the do/allow distinction -- influenced rated approval. These studies suggest that moral rules play an important, but context-sensitive role in moral cognition, and offer an account of when emotional reactions to perceived moral violations receive less weight than consideration of costs and benefits in moral judgment and decision making.     

Social-cognitive development: Domain distinctions and coordinations

Recent research on social-cognitive development has identified three conceptual domains which form the basis of the child's structuring of the social world: the moral, societal, and psychological domains. Research on distinct conceptual domains has thus far focused on events and actions that are clear examples of content for the domains. The issue of domain coordinations has not been addressed. This paper examines coordinations between conceptual domains in children's social judgments through a discussion of the experiential origins of the domains and judgments about mixed, second-order, and ambiguously multifaceted events. The utility of the conceptual domain model for understanding social judgments and social development is discussed.     

Children's and adults' integration of information about noise and interest levels in their judgments about learning

This study examined developmental changes in the understanding of distractibility. It focused on how information about both interest level and noise level are used to form judgments of how many items a hypothetical child would learn. A total of 112 subjects from grades K, 2, and 5 and college age used a rating scale to judge the amount of learning in situations generated by a factorial combining of three levels of interest and three levels of surrounding noise. Children at all ages, even kindergarteners, used both noise and interest information in making their judgments. Interest level influenced judgments much more than noise level at all ages, but this imbalance waned somewhat with increasing age. The rules for combining noise and interest were more complex at the older ages. The discussion focused on interpretations of the subjects' belief that interest level heavily influences attentiveness.     

What Makes A Hero? The Impact of Integrity on Admiration and Interpersonal Judgment

Principled and expedient ideologies affect self-regulation and guide people along divergent ethical paths. A more principled ideology, indicative of higher claimed integrity, involves a greater personal commitment to ethical beliefs, standards, and self-schemas that facilitate positive social activities and help resist the temptation of illicit activities. Two studies showed that differences in reported integrity are related to people's preferences for and judgments of others. Those higher in integrity spontaneously described their heroes as more principled, honest, spiritual, and benevolently oriented toward others (Study 1). In addition, integrity was related to people's evaluations of characters who made ethical or unethical career decisions (Study 2). The judgments of those higher in integrity were greatly influenced by whether or not the decision was ethical but were largely unaffected by the consequences (career success or failure), whereas those lower in integrity were less influenced by whether the decision was ethical and more influenced by the career consequences.     

Ethical intuitionism and the linguistic analogy

It is a central tenet of ethical intuitionism as defended by W. D. Ross and others that moral theory should re?ect the convictions of mature moral agents. Hence, intuitionism is plausible to the extent that it corresponds to our well-considered moral judgments. After arguing for this claim, I discuss whether intuitionists o?er an empirically adequate account of our moral obligations. I do this by applying recent empirical research by John Mikhail that is based on the idea of a universal moral grammar to a number of claims implicit in W. D. Ross’s normative theory. I argue that the results at least partly vindicate intuitionism.     

Moral dilemmas and moral rules

Recent work shows an important asymmetry in lay intuitions about moral dilemmas. Most people think it is permissible to divert a train so that it will kill one innocent person instead of five, but most people think that it is not permissible to push a stranger in front of a train to save five innocents. We argue that recent emotion-based explanations of this asymmetry have neglected the contribution that rules make to reasoning about moral dilemmas. In two experiments, we find that participants show a parallel asymmetry about versions of the dilemmas that have minimized emotional force. In a third experiment, we find that people distinguish between whether an action violates a moral rule and whether it is, all things considered, wrong. We propose that judgments of whether an action is wrong, all things considered, implicate a complex set of psychological processes, including representations of rules, emotional responses, and assessments of costs and benefits.     

Dimensions of Moral Intensity and Ethical Decision Making: An Empirical Study

Moral intensity is a construct that relates to issues in terms of their perceived moral significance. Individuals' perceptions of moral intensity should impact their recognition of issues as posing moral dilemmas and should also affect ethical judgments and behavioral intentions regarding issues. This study examined the relationship between 4 dimensions of moral intensity and the ethical decision-making process. Two work-related actions were presented to respondents, who then completed measures of the 4 dimensions of moral intensity, whether the actions posed an ethical issue, ethical judgments regarding the actions, and the likelihood that they would engage in the actions. Results indicate that moral intensity dimensions were associated with individuals' ethical decisions. Social consensus and seriousness of consequences were particularly important influences on the ethical decision-making process.     

The influence of decision time on sensitivity for consequences,moral norms,and preferences for inaction: Time,moral judgments,and the CNI model

It is often discussed that moral judgments are either consistent with the principle of utilitarianism or with the principle of deontology. Utilitarianism is a moral principle stating that the right act is the one that produces the best overall outcome. Deontology represents an ethical position indicating that the morality of an action depends on the intrinsic nature of the action regardless of the consequences. Criticism on the structure of moral dilemmas includes the problem that these dilemmas confound norms and consequences. Recently, a multinomial model (the CNI model) was developed to disentangle and measure sensitivity to consequences (C), sensitivity to moral norms (N), and general preference for inaction versus action (I), respectively. In Experiment 1, we examined the influence of time pressure on moral judgments using the CNI model. We found that time pressure influenced moral dilemma judgments by decreasing participants' sensitivity for consequences. There were no significant effects of time pressure on participants' sensitivity to norms and general preference for inaction. Furthermore, in Experiment 2, we examined the link of reaction times to moral judgments more closely by fitting a hierarchical Bayesian version of the CNI model. Longer reaction times lead to an increase in parameter N, and there was no influence of reaction times on parameter C or I.     

Moral vs. non-moral attribution in adolescence: Environmental and behavioural correlates

According to the domain theory, moral rules are universal, not contingent on rules and authority, and are activated by avoiding harm to other people. Not all individuals, however, interpret moral events in terms of domain in a similar manner. The hypotheses of the present research were: (i) a high exposure to deviant context will affect the manner in which adolescents interpret moral events and their involvement in antisocial behaviour; (ii) the moral attribution style will directly affect involvement in antisocial behaviour and mediate the relationship between deviant context and antisocial behaviour. Four hundred fifty-three adolescents completed self-report questionnaires about their involvement in antisocial behaviours, their friends' involvement, and their exposure to community violence as a witness. Moral versus non-moral attribution (MNMA) was evaluated through a questionnaire consisting of hypothetical scenarios of moral violations followed by questions related to the above-mentioned criteria. Findings, obtained testing a model, were consistent with the hypotheses. Adolescents who live in violent contexts and attend deviant friends tend to interpret moral violation in terms of non-moral domains and are more engaged in antisocial behaviours. Results are discussed with respect to the literature about normativeness of deviance and its consequences.     

Authority as a contingency plan

Humean constructivists object to Kantian constructivism that by endorsing the constitutivist strategy, which grounds moral obligations in rational agency, this position discounts the impact of contingency in moral life. In response to these charges, I argue that Humeans misrepresent the challenge of contingency and fail to provide adequate resources to cope with it. In its formalist variety, Humean constructivism fails to make sense of an important category of ethical judgments, which claim universal authority. The substantive varieties of Humean constructivism recognize that some ethical judgments aspire to universality, but fail to fully justify such an aspiration. These versions of constructivism represent a setback in regard to the achievements of Kantian constructivism. In conclusion, I briefly resume the advantages of advocating a Kantian conception of rational authority as a response to contingency.     

道德困境研究的范式沿革及其理论价值

通过评述道德困境研究范式的发展过程, 系统阐释了经典两难法、加工分离法、CNI模型法和CAN算法的优缺点和理论价值。后来的研究范式均在一定程度上克服了之前研究范式的局限。加工分离法克服了经典两难法的加工纯粹性假设等局限, CNI模型法在加工分离法基础上进一步分离了道德困境决策的多种心理过程, CAN算法则修正了CNI模型法的序列加工的不恰当预设。研究范式的沿革启示研究者综合应用新方法来解决研究争议和重新审视以往道德理论, 合理应用新方法来探索其他具有潜在冲突性的研究议题。总之, 本文为道德困境及相关研究提供了方法学参考。     

Complexity of ethical decision making in psychiatry

Psychiatric residents and psychiatrists have little difficulty in making judgments about a clinical course of action to take with patients. However, making ethical clinical decisions is more challenging, because psychiatric residents are usually provided little formal training in ethics. Further, many ethical dilemmas are complex, requiring knowledge of the psychiatric profession's ethics code, moral principles, law, and practice standards and of how they should be weighed in the decision-making process. The purpose of this article is to demonstrate this complexity in regard to the identification of potential ethical dilemmas, understanding the issues that these dilemmas raise, and formulating potential solutions to them. Two common but important areas of treatment in which ethical dilemmas arise (informed consent and competence of care) are used as examples for our presentation. The article demonstrates that to successfully engage in ethical analysis in psychiatry is impossible without substantial formal training in the process.     

Judgment Difficulty and the Moral Intensity of Unethical Acts: A Cognitive Response Analysis of Dual Process Ethical Judgment Formation

This study analyzes cognitive responses to explore a dual processing perspective of ethical judgment formation. Specifically, the study investigates how two factors, judgment task difficulty and moral intensity, influence the extent of deontological and teleological processing and their effects on ethical judgments. A single experiment on 110 undergraduate research participants found that judgment task difficulty affected the extent of deontological and teleological processing. Although moral intensity affected ethical judgments, it did not produce effects on either deontological or teleological cognitive responses. Results did not support the hypotheses that deontological and teleological cognitive responses would mediate the relationships between the experimental factors and ethical judgments. Overall, the results support continued research of factors that affect the nature of information processing in ethical decision situations and the use of cognitive response analysis as a tool for conducting this research.     

时间距离提高伦理判断

本文从识解水平理论角度研究问题表征对伦理判断的影响。本文推断,事件的时间距离使得人们更容易形成高识解表征,能更好地辨别决策困境中的伦理原则;未来结果考虑特征高的管理者更关注决策的长期后果,也倾向于维护伦理原则。研究用两个实验递进验证了假设。139位大学生被试参加了实验1,结果支持了假设;实验2采用92位MBA学生的样本重复检验结论,并进一步验证未来结果考虑如何调节影响时间距离与伦理判断之间的关系。     

COHERENTISM AND THE EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION OF MORAL BELIEFS: A CASE STUDY IN HOW TO DO PRACTICAL ETHICS WITHOUT APPEAL TO A MORAL THEORY

This paper defends a coherentist approach to moral epistemology. In “The Immorality of Eating Meat” (2000), I offer a coherentist consistency argument to show that our own beliefs rationally commit us to the immorality of eating meat. Elsewhere, I use our own beliefs as premises to argue that we have positive duties to assist the poor (2004) and to argue that biomedical animal experimentation is wrong (2012). The present paper explores whether this consistency‐based coherentist approach of grounding particular moral judgments on beliefs we already hold, with no appeal to moral theory, is a legitimate way of doing practical ethics. I argue (i) that grounding particular moral judgments on our core moral convictions and other core nonmoral beliefs is a legitimate way to justify moral judgments, (ii) that these moral judgments possess as much epistemic justification and have as much claim to objectivity as moral judgments grounded on particular ethical theories, and (iii) that this internalistic coherentist method of grounding moral judgments is more likely to result in behavioral guidance than traditional theory‐based approaches to practical ethics. By way of illustrating the approach, I briefly recapitulate my consistency‐based argument for ethical vegetarianism. I then defend the coherentist approach implicit in the argument against a number of potentially fatal metatheoretical attacks.     

The psychology and philosophy of luck

There has been a great deal of interest in the concept of luck in the recent psychological and philosophical literature. In philosophy, this interest has tended to focus not upon luck simpliciter but rather upon the role that luck plays in ethical and epistemological debates concerning (respectively) moral and epistemic luck. In psychology, in contrast, a number of studies have explicitly examined our everyday conceptions of luck and the manner in which these conceptions influence our lives. This article surveys both the recent psychological and philosophical literature on this topic and argues that (to different degrees) the work of both disciplines in this area has been hampered by a failure to be clearer about what luck involves. Accordingly, this article offers a specification of what is core to the notion of luck and highlights how this analysis can aid further research in this area by both psychologists and philosophers.     

The resident researcher: An alternative career model centered on community

Considers the potential benefits and costs of an alternative career model for community researchers, one in which professionals specialize in the community where they live. By virtue of their local familiarity, resident researchers can make more informed judgments about research problems and methods. They can employ longitudinal designs to assess change and be available to assist in interpretation and implementation of research. Potential costs include the possibility of provincialism, unintended researcher effects, ethical dilemmas, the need to cultivate community relations, and role conflicts. Interdisciplinary training programs and research field stations can contribute to the development of the resident researcher role. Researchers in the community can help generate grass roots support for social science research. We acknowledge Louise Shedd Barker's helpful comments and suggestions on an earlier version of this article.     

Children's judgments of numerical quantity: A new view of early quantification

Three experiments investigated the role of length, density, and number dimensions in children's numerosity judgments of linear arrays of beads. The number dimension is physically defined by a length × density rule. Judgments based, even in part, on the number dimension would show signs of a length × density rule. Experiment 1 examined numerosity judgments of large arrays. Results showed that judgments by 3- and 4-year-olds obeyed a length + density rule, providing cogent evidence for a general adding strategy in young children's judgments of quantity. The physical length × density rule emerged gradually with increasing age. Experiment 2 showed that numerosity judgments of small arrays by 3- and 4-year-olds obeyed a length × density rule, indicating response to the number dimension. This result was expected and thereby validated the linearity of the response scale at the youngest ages. Experiment 3 verified the integration rules for individual 3- and 4-year-olds. The integration rules were interpreted in terms of Piaget's stages of the development of quantification. No evidence for Piaget's initial stage was found. This leads to a new view of early quantification which grants young children the ability to integrate stimulus dimensions.