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Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics - 相似文献
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Martina Roesner 《Husserl Studies》2012,28(1):61-80
Die vorliegende Studie befasst sich mit der Deutung, die der so vielschichtige Begriff des Lebens Anfang des 20. Jahrhunderts
in der neukantianischen Transzendentalphilosophie sowie in der Ph?nomenologie erfahren hat. Am Beispiel von Natorp, Husserl
und Heidegger werden verschiedene Ans?tze analysiert, die darauf abzielen, den Lebensbegriff aus seinen vitalistischen und
historistischen Verengungen zu befreien und zur Deutung der Grundstrukturen des Bewusstseins bzw. der faktischen Existenz
heranzuziehen. Dabei zeichnet sich eine Entwicklung ab, die von einer wenig differenzierten Verwendung des Lebensbegriffs
als Synonym der Bewusstseinsdynamik als solcher (Natorp) über die Dualit?t von vorph?nomenologischem Welterleben und transzendentalem
Bewusstseinsleben (Husserl) bis hin zur Einsicht in die vorsubjektive Primordialit?t des „Lebens selbst“ (Heidegger) führt.
Das Leben erscheint somit letztlich als kein wie immer geartetes Was, sondern als ein Wie, n?mlich als die M?glichkeit, das
Kontinuum des Welterlebens jederzeit zu durchbrechen und es auf den Grad seiner N?he zur Intensit?t des Ursprungserlebens
hin transparent zu machen. 相似文献
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Markus Schmitz 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》2001,32(2):271-305
The epistomology of the definition of number and the philosophical foundation of arithmetic based on a comparison between
Gottlob Frege's logicism and Platonic philosophy (Syrianus, Theo Smyrnaeus, and others). The intention of this article is to provide arithmetic with a logically and methodologically valid definition of number for
construing a consistent philosophical foundation of arithmetic. The – surely astonishing – main thesis is that instead of
the modern and contemporary attempts, especially in Gottlob Frege's Foundations of Arithmetic, such a definition is found in the arithmetic in Euclid's Elements. To draw this conclusion a profound reflection on the role of epistemology for the foundation of mathematics, especially
for the method of definition of number, is indispensable; a reflection not to be found in the contemporary debate (the predominate
‘pragmaticformalism’ in current mathematics just shirks from trying to solve the epistemological problems raised by the debate
between logicism, intuitionism, and formalism). Frege's definition of number, ‘The number of the concept F is the extension
of the concept ‘numerically equal to the concept F”, which is still substantial for contemporary mathematics, does not fulfil
the requirements of logical and methodological correctness because the definiens in a double way (in the concepts ‘extension
of a concept’ and ‘numerically equal’) implicitly presupposes the definiendum, i.e. number itself. Number itself, on the contrary,
is defined adequately by Euclid as ‘multitude composed of units’, a definition which is even, though never mentioned, an implicit
presupposition of the modern concept ofset. But Frege rejects this definition and construes his own - for epistemological
reasons: Frege's definition exactly fits the needs of modern epistemology, namely that for to know something like the number
of a concept one must become conscious of a multitude of acts of producing units of ‘given’ representations under the condition
of a 1:1 relationship to obtain between the acts of counting and the counted ‘objects’. According to this view, which has
existed at least since the Renaissance stoicism and is maintained not only by Frege but also by Descartes, Kant, Husserl,
Dummett, and others, there is no such thing as a number of pure units itself because the intellect or pure reason, by itself
empty, must become conscious of different units of representation in order to know a multitude, a condition not fulfilled by Euclid's conception. As this is Frege's
main reason to reject Euclid's definition of number (others are discussed in detail), the paper shows that the epistemological
reflection in Neoplatonic mathematical philosophy, which agrees with Euclid's definition of number, provides a consistent
basement for it. Therefore it is not progress in the history of science which hasled to the a poretic contemporary state of
affairs but an arbitrary change of epistemology in early modern times, which is of great influence even today.
This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献