Nietzsche: An intellectual Nebuchadnezzar

The essay introduces and defines the concept of an intellectual Nebuchadnezzar—one who, despite his hostility to religion, serves God's purposes by the depth of his ideas. In terms of this notion, some of Friedrich Nietzsche's views are explored. Specifically, Nietzsche's perspective on artistic creativity is analyzed and applied to the notion of creativity in human relationships. In addition to concluding that Nietzsche is himself an intellectual Nebuchadnezzar, the broader point is made that truth and insight should be welcomed by the religious community even if the source of that truth is one ostensibly hostile to religion.     

企业伦理的管理学态度——论德鲁克的企业伦理思想及其对企业伦理学的拒斥

管理学大师彼得·德鲁克的管理理论中蕴含着丰富的企业伦理思想,其企业伦理思想线索和体系主要表现在三方面：企业责任和伦理必须遵循伦理普适性原则,如同儒家伦理所主张的那样;由于管理者继承了社会的领导权力,因而必须承担社会责任,但仅限于其职能、权力和能力的范畴;管理者必须重视相互依赖的和和谐的关系。但是,德鲁克是“排斥”企业伦理学的。他反对企业伦理作为一个学科而不反对企业伦理本身。     

The Dark Side of Desire: Nietzsche,Transhumanism, and Personal Immortality

Nietzsche has become embroiled in two interesting twenty‐first century debates about advancing technology and its impact on human life, especially its meaning/value. The first focuses on Nietzsche himself and is concerned with the extent to which his views align with those of transhumanism. The second involves the not so blatantly Nietzsche‐centric question of whether or not immortality, or radical life‐extension, is desirable. Given that the desire for immortality, or at least some more feasible (but not so permanent) approximation of it, is strongly associated with transhumanism, it seems that these two debates have some fairly significant overlap. Establishing what Nietzsche ultimately believes about such a core transhumanist issue will go a long way toward determining how sympathetic he would be to the transhumanist cause in general. I argue that while his views do not commit him to an all‐encompassing disdain for immortality, his intolerance for immortality‐seekers means that he might only be open to some of the more fringe understandings of transhumanism.     

The Good,the Bad,and the Funny: An Ethics of Humor

This article begins by reviewing the overwhelmingly negative assessment of laughter and humor in Western philosophy and in Christianity, arguing that that evaluation arises from a misclassification of amusement as a malicious emotion. It then sketches a play theory of humor in which humor is an activity pursued for pleasure which allows participants to violate linguistic and social norms, especially rules about sincerity. Once we understand humor as a kind of play, familiar ethical objections to jokes based on gender and race are seen to be mistaken, and a new approach to the negative ethics of humor becomes possible. What is more, this play theory also explains how humor is morally praiseworthy in many situations.     

Nietzsche,intention, action

Nietzsche sometimes writes as if we are not in control—at least not in conscious control—of our actions. He seems to suggest that what we actually do is independent of our intentions. It turns out, though, that his understanding of both intention and action differs radically from most contemporary treatments of the issue. In particular, he denies that our actions are caused by their intentions, whose role is hermeneutical in a sense that this essay develops. How then is responsibility to be assigned, since its moral variety, at least, depends, on several views, on the intention with which an action is performed? Nietzsche, of course, is not interested in making attributions of moral responsibility. Still, his views on the relationship between an individual action, its intention, other actions by its agent, and the agent's character, as this essay presents them, provide a reasonable account of action generally and a different, broader account of responsibility for oneself.     

Nietzsche and decadence: The revaluation of morality

The creation of moralities is necessary for the enhancement of the species, yet, the assigning of values is a sign of decadence. According to Nietzsche, this is the problem of decadence with which human beings (in particular philosophers) must contend: they must place a value on life, but placing a value on life (even on one's individual life) is problematic because it involves fracturing the whole of life into pieces. The primary objective in this paper is to address Nietzsche's own battle with the problem of decadence as it applies to individuals. I will argue that in this battle, Nietzsche carried out a revaluation of decadence and transformed himself into a strong decadent. In calling himself a strong decadent, Nietzsche not only admitted to his own decadence, but also provided himself as an example for how other strong types might contend with the problem of decadence.     

Ethics Talk; Talking Ethics: An Example of Clinical Ethics Consultation

This written account of a clinical encounter - depicting fragments of a more extensive array of events - attempts to exemplify many facets and associated complexities of clinical ethics consultation. Within the general telling, I provide more detailed portrayals of several key events. In secion 1, I document briefly my initial interactions at the beginning of the consultation, focusing on the information gained - in the context of those interactions - as I read the medical chart of Mrs. Rose. Next in section 2, I briefly describes my initial conversation with Mrs. Rose's three sons. Section 3 illustrates several questions raised in sections 1 and 2. Then section 4 presents my encounter with Paul, the youngest son, as he was carrying out his vigil at his mother's bedside in the hospital. Section 5 chronicles my interactions with several care providers involved in Mrs. Rose's situation, including two different meetings that occurred with Mrs. Rose's attending physician. I conclude in section 6 by telling about a conversation I had with Mrs. Rose's middle son, Russell, approximately one month after Mrs. Rose died.     

The prohibited Nietzsche: anti-Nitzscheanism in Soviet Russia

This article discusses the reception of Nietzsche’s philosophy within the USSR. It covers the four phases of Soviet Nietzscheanism between 1920 and 1980, paying specific attention to the Soviet Nietzsche studies of the Stalin epoch. By making use of publications and archive materials, this article reconstructs the historical and logical formation of Nietzsche’s negative image in post-revolutionary Russia that characterized him as an ideologist of imperialism and National Socialism. In addition to this, this article examines the facts impeding the process of Nietzsche’s de-nazification in Russia.