礼义廉耻的历史作用及其现代意义

礼义廉耻的历史作用及其现代意义樊婧王引兰在中国伦理思想史上,礼义廉耻又称为“四维”,出自《管子·牧民》：“何谓四维？一曰礼,二曰义,三曰廉,四曰耻。”明清之际顾炎武也曾指出：“礼义廉耻,国之四维,四维不张,国乃灭亡。”“维”即“纲”的意思。可见在中国...     

《管子》对铁的开发与经营管理

《管子》对铁的开发与经营管理石小同《管子·地数》载：桓公问管子天财地利之所在，管子对曰：＂山上有赭者其下有铁。出铁之山三千六百九十山，此非所以分壤树谷也，戈矛之所发，刀币之所起也。能者有余，拙者不足……谨封为禁，有动封山者，罪死不赦。有犯令者，左足入...     

泰山之阴齐币论

泰山之阴齐币论朱活《史记·货殖列传》：＂……泰山之阳则鲁,泰山之阴则齐。＂太史公曰：＂吾适齐,自泰山属琅邪,北被于北海,膏壤二千里,其民阔达多匿知,其天性也。以太公之圣,建国本,桓公之盛,修善政,以为诸侯会盟,称伯,不亦宜乎？洋洋哉,固大国之风也！＂...     

试析《管子》的渔业治理之策

齐法家的代表人物管仲及其继任者在渔业治理领域有着超前的管理策略,主要措施有：立＂海王之国＂为基本国策,发展齐国的海洋经济;行＂官海＂之制,谋＂渔盐之利＂,设＂三虞＂、＂祈望＂之职管理陆海渔业;渔业生产＂取物顺时,以时禁发＂;资源索取＂网罟必有正＂、＂地利不可竭＂;重视经济调节,＂相地而衰征＂,渔业税制机动灵活;运筹轻重,繁荣渔业外贸;海陆兼顾,发展淡水养殖。管仲等诸先贤的渔业治理策略循道而为,令顺民心,最终促成了齐国富民强国的霸主之业。其中,有关资源可持续利用以及经济调节的法律思想,直至今天都有很强的现实指导价值。     

《管子》论“国有四维”的现代启示

“礼”、“义”、“廉”、“耻”为国家的“四维”,《管子》曰：“国有四维,一维绝则倾,二维绝则危,三维绝则覆,四维绝则灭。”可见“礼”、“义”、“廉”、“耻”犹如支撑国家大厦的四根柱子,如果有一根断裂,就会危及国家的安危。在市场经济高度发展的现代,我们要借鉴“守国之道,在饰四维”的治国之道,汲取中国传统文化中“礼义廉耻”的合理因素,加强道德建设,使我们的国家更加昌盛富强。     

达尔文的宗教观——纪念达尔文诞生200周年和《物种起源》发表150周年

达尔文（1809—1882）＂一生中的主要享受和唯一职业就是科学工作＂。独立的思考和研究实践使他相信：科学同基督没有任何关系,也未曾有过＂什么神的启示＂;＂神创论＂是＂怪异的理论＂、＂超自然的东西＂,是＂不能同意＂的。因而,他放弃了普通的宗教信仰。     

寄语《管子学刊》

《汉书·货殖传》里有一段文章说:“昔先王之制,自天子、公、侯、卿、大夫、士,至于皂隶,……各有差品,小不得僭大,贱不得逾贵。夫然,故上下序而民志定。……是以欲寡而事节,财足而不争。于是在民上者道之以德,齐之以礼,故民有耻而且敬,贵谊而贱利。……及周室衰,……陵夷至乎桓文之后,礼谊大坏,上下相冒,国异政,家殊俗,耆欲     

当前中小学书法教育的机遇与挑战

<正>书法教育自古有之,历史悠久,从先秦时期开始即有明确的书法教育记载,如在《周礼·地官司徒·保氏》中的记录“养国子以道,乃教之六艺：一曰五礼,二曰六乐,三曰五射,四曰五御,五曰六书,六曰九数。”六艺就是礼、乐、射、御、书、数。其实这里的“书”也就是指书法教育。历朝历代对书法的教育都尤其重视,并且都作为单独的学科去发展。     

关于郭店楚简《缁衣》篇的两处异文

郭店楚简中的《缁衣》篇和今本有不少差异,包括次序和文字。这些差异,学者们大多做过扎实的研究和有益的探索,但仍存在一些问题。本文仅就其中的两处异文进行探讨,以供学术界参考。为了醒目起见和理解文义的方便,我们先把有关文句的宽式释文按原简号抄出,并在需要讨论的异文下面加着重号：子曰：可言30不可行,君子弗言;可行不可言,君子弗行,则民言不祸行,〔行〕不祸31言。《诗》云："淑慎尔止,不■于仪"。子曰：君子道人以言,而极以行。故言32则虑其所终,行则稽其所敝,则民慎于言而谨于行。《诗》云："穆穆33文王,於缉熙敬…     

道家“因”论

＂因＂是道家政治哲学的核心范畴,＂因者,君之纲＂。道家＂因＂论包含有因循、因仍、因应和因凭四重内涵,其价值功用是＂因则无敌＂。道家＂因＂论作为一种＂君术＂,强调＂因臣之为＂和＂因民之性＂两个基本面,其总的原则是＂曲因其当＂,而核心本质则凸显为＂舍己而以物为法＂。     

《管子》论“且怀且威”及其现代启示

《管子》认为,治理国家既要采用怀柔政策,主张为政者"先之以德",通过整饬四维来形成良好的社会风尚;又强调"法不可不审",主张通过严刑峻法来树立君主的权威,赏罚严明,使人们严格遵守各项法令制度,坚持"且怀且威",礼法并重,其思想对现代社会有很好的启迪意义。     

On Failing to be Cartesian: Reconsidering the ‘Impurity’ of Descartes’s Meditation

Abstract

This paper begins from the observation that in the Meditations, Descartes never achieves the ‘pure’, thoroughly decontextualized kind of thinking he famously promoted. Some commentators have used this observation to promote pure inquiry more diligently and to criticize Descartes for failing to achieve it. Other commentators have simply called for greater historical fairness and urged that we renew our efforts to understand how Descartes’s inquiry actually does operate. This paper, although sympathetic with this second group of commentators, argues that in revisiting the tensions between what Descartes actually accomplished and what he said he was trying to accomplish, we should see a contemporary lesson, not just better historical understanding. It is argued that in spite of the strong presence in his writings of the imagery of the ‘Cartesian’ ideal of a perfectly presuppositionless philosophical standpoint, not only does Descartes himself never become a Cartesian, but his own practice provides perhaps the best evidence against the very possibility of the Cartesian ‘project of pure inquiry’ to which he aspired.     

Crispin Wright on Moral Disagreement

Wright argues that if there are moral disagreements that cannot be attributed to inferential error, ignorance of relevant data or some similar form of deficiency (i.e., what I call 'radical' disagreements), then moral realists are committed to the view that moral truths are evidence-transcendent. Moreover, since he thinks that this view is implausible and that moral disagreements can indeed be radical, he has suggested that we should reject realism here. I indicate how a realist can respond to this challenge, by offering two arguments to the effect that a realist might plausibly hold that moral disagreements can never be found to be radical. However, this is not so much intended to be a defence of moral realism as a critique of Wright's basic strategy, since a similar defence may be provided in support of realism about any (minimally truth-apt) discourse.     

Kant and Women

Kant's conception of women is complex. Although he struggles to bring his considered view of women into focus, a sympathetic reading shows it not to be anti‐feminist and to contain important arguments regarding human nature. Kant believes the traditional male‐female distinction is unlikely to disappear, but he never proposes the traditional gender ideal as the moral ideal; he rejects the idea that such considerations of philosophical anthropology can set the framework for morality. This is also why his moral works clarifies that all citizens, including women have the right, and should be encouraged to strive towards an active condition.     

Method in Kant and Hegel

ABSTRACT

For Kant as for Hegel method is not a structure or procedure imported into philosophy from without, as, e.g. a mathematical demonstration in modern physics or in the proof-structure of philosophies such as Spinoza’s or Wolff’s. For both Hegel and Kant method is the arrangement that reason gives its contents and cognitions; for both, that is, method and object do not fall asunder, unlike in all disciplines other than philosophy. For Kant method is the design and plan of the whole, the scientific form that guides the organization of cognitions (KrV A 707/B 736, Ak 24, 780). Likewise, Hegel writes that method is the consciousness of the form of its inner movement (WL 1, 49, SL 53, W 3 47, PhS 28). Unfortunately, Hegel never considers Kant an example or a precursor or a positive role model. It is important to ask why Hegel never takes seriously Kant’s Doctrine of Method. Why, if he shares so many central points with the Architectonic of the first Critique, does he never acknowledge Kant as a possible ally? Why does he misunderstand Kant on analysis and synthesis as he does? These are some of the questions I plan to discuss in this paper.     

Beyond Existence and Non-Existence

Abstract

When Husserl speaks of the so-called ‘transcendental reduction’ or ‘phenomenological epochē’ many believe that he is eschewing the question of truth or existence. Two reasons are given for this: First, Husserl explicitly states that when we perform the reduction, we should no longer naively ‘accept [the world] as it presents itself to me as factually existing’ (Id I §30, p. 53) and should suspend our judgement with regard to ‘the positing of its actual being’ (Id I §88, p. 182). Second, Husserl seems to have no problem in referring to an ‘object’ of thought even when we refer to non-existent, hallucinatory or indeed impossible objects. This seems to suggest that he is not interested in the question whether or not there is a corresponding ‘ordinary’ object. The paper seeks to question this and will show that his inquiry never loses sight of the questions of truth and existence but rather brings them into the foreground.     

The Importance of Being Actual: Some Reasons for and Against Procreation

In 'Axiological Actualism' Josh Parsons attempts to defend both the intuition that the anticipated welfare of a person cannot constitute a reason to bring him or her into being and the intuition that such considerations can constitute a reason not to. The former, 'basic' intuition he defends by an appeal to the belief that 'ethical theory should refrain from assigning levels of welfare … or anything of the sort to merely possible people'. The latter, 'converse' intuition he defends by an appeal to prudential considerations. I argue that Parsons's attempts to defend these intuitions are unpersuasive. On the one hand, and notwithstanding his attempts to demonstrate the contrary, the basic intuition is undermined by the claim that an actual person could have been worse off if she had never existed. On the other, his grounding of the converse intuition in prudential considerations runs counter to the ought implies can dictum and is also highly counterintuitive.     

RECONSIDERING BARTH'S REJECTION OF PRZYWARA'S ANALOGIA ENTIS

Many interpreters argue that Barth's rejection of Erich Przywara's analogia entis is based upon a misinterpretation and that Barth actually incorporated a form of the analogia entis into his mature theology. Through an examination of records from Przywara's visit to Barth's seminar on Thomas Aquinas at the University of Münster in 1929 along with key texts from that period, I argue that Barth did not reject the analogia entis because he misinterpreted it. Rather, he did so on the basis of an accurate account of its meaning and content provided to him personally by Przywara. I also argue that, while Barth's response to the analogia entis did change over the course of his career, he never retracted, either explicitly or implicitly, his rejection of it—nor should he have done so.     

帛书易传《要》篇"五正"考释

马王堆帛书《要》篇有“五正”一词,乃为古代易学讲君道的特定术语。其内容是帝王取度于身所建立的规矩绳权衡五种法度,与八卦中的某些卦、四时和五方等相配纳,而形成的易学模式。此配纳模式说明,君主布施规矩绳权衡五正,其旨在因顺阴阳、谐和四时、理顺五行,以达致天人祥和的理想政治境界。此古《易》“五正”的要义,是君道合于天地、阴阳之道。     

Externalism and Memory: Jane Heal

Tye claims that an externalist should say that memory content invoking natural kind concepts floats free of the setting where the memory is laid down and is at later times determined by the context in which the memory is revived. His argument assumes the existence of 'slow switching' of the meaning of natural kind terms when a person is transported from Earth to Twin Earth. But proper understanding of natural kind terms suggests that slow switching (contrary to what is often presupposed) is likely never to be completed. Hence the situation of a person unknowingly transported to Twin Earth is not that his memories switch content but rather than he gets two natural kinds confused.