Brighten up: Smiles facilitate perceptual judgment of facial lightness

The metaphoric expression ‘bright smile’ may reflect the actual judgment of facial lightness under varying emotional expressions. The present research examined whether people in fact judge smiling faces as perceptually brighter than frowning faces. Four studies demonstrated that participants believed smiling faces were brighter compared to frowning faces in a binary choice task and in an absolute judgment task. The results suggest that emotional expressions (i.e., smiles and frowns) can bias judgments of facial brightness in ways consistent with the metaphor. Among other implications, such results suggest that stereotypes about darker-skinned individuals may be attenuated by smiles.     

Judgments of genuine, suppressed, and faked facial expressions of pain.

The process of discriminating among genuine, suppressed, and faked expressions of pain was examined. Untrained judges estimated the severity of pain being experienced when viewing videotaped facial expressions of chronic pain patients undergoing a painful diagnostic test or dissimulating reactions. Verbal feedback as to whether pain was experienced also was provided, so as to be either consistent or inconsistent with the facial expression. Judges were able to distinguish genuine pain faces from baseline expressions but, relative to genuine pain faces, attributed more pain to faked faces and less pain to suppressed ones. Advance warning of deception did not improve discrimination but led to a more conservative or nonempathic judging style. Verbal feedback increased or decreased judgments, as appropriate, but facial information consistently was assigned greater weight. An augmenting model of the judgment process that attaches considerable importance to the context in which information is provided was supported.     

Differences between children and adults in the recognition of enjoyment smiles

The authors investigated the differences between 8-year-olds (n=80) and adults (n=80) in recognition of felt versus faked enjoyment smiles by using a newly developed picture set that is based on the Facial Action Coding System. The authors tested the effect of different facial action units (AUs) on judgments of smile authenticity. Multiple regression showed that children base their judgment on AU intensity of both mouth and eyes, with relatively little distinction between the Duchenne marker (AU6 or "cheek raiser") and a different voluntary muscle that has a similar effect on eye aperture (AU7 or "lid tightener"). Adults discriminate well between AU6 and AU7 and seem to use eye-mouth discrepancy as a major cue of authenticity. Bared-teeth smiles (involving AU25) are particularly salient to both groups. The authors propose and discuss an initial developmental model of the smile recognition process.     

基于动态特征的真伪笑容表达与识别

笑容是人类最普遍、最频繁的表情。人类进化出伪装笑容的能力,也拥有部分识别伪装的能力。在表情的表达与识别上,动态信息起着重要的作用。一方面,笑容表达的动态特征可能为区分真伪笑容提供重要的信息,所以我们拟借助近年发展的计算机视觉的特征提取技术,系统地量化分析真伪笑容的动态特征(时长、方向、速度、流畅性、运动对称性、不同部位同步性、头动模式等),考察笑容在不同伪装方式及不同情境下的区别与一致性,深入理解人类笑容表达的特点。另一方面,通过探索有效动态特征与正确识别率的关系,检验知觉-注意假说,了解真伪笑容的识别特点及研究识别机制。通过比较动态真伪笑容的表达特点与识别特点,进一步理解人类表情信号编码与解码之间的关系。     

Am I Abnormal? Relative Rank and Social Norm Effects in Judgments of Anxiety and Depression Symptom Severity

Overdetection and underdetection of depression and anxiety in primary care are common and may partly reflect individuals' misperceptions of the severity of symptoms they experience. Here, we explore how people's judgments about the severity of their own symptoms are influenced by their beliefs about the distribution of symptoms experienced by the rest of the population. We apply the rank‐based decision by sampling cognitive model of judgment to symptom severity. The model proposes that judgments depend on the relative rank of an item within a mental sample of comparable items. It is predicted that judgments of symptom severity will be context dependent and more specifically that an individual's judgments will be invalid to the extent that the individual has inaccurate beliefs about the relevant social context. Two studies found that participants' assessments of symptom severity were rank based. Study 1 elicited participants' beliefs about the social distribution of symptoms and found that participants' judgments of whether they were depressed or anxious were mainly predicted not by their symptoms' objective severity but rather by where participants ranked the severity of their symptoms in comparison with the believed symptoms of others. Study 2 varied symptom distributions experimentally and again found relative rank effects as predicted. It is concluded that the real‐world application of contextual models of judgment requires investigation of individual differences in participants' background beliefs. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

样例多样性和流畅性信念对类别学习判断的影响

目的:通过三个实验考查样例特征、流畅性和信念对类别学习及其元认知判断的影响。方法:实验1采用2(样例特征)×2(测试类型)的组内设计以检验样例特征的作用; 实验2采用2(样例特征)×2(测试类型)×2(流畅性)的组内设计以检验流畅性的作用; 实验3采用2(样例特征)×2(测试类型)×2(流畅性信念)的混合设计以检验信念对类别学习判断的作用。结果表明:样例特征影响学习成绩、类别学习判断和流畅感; 流畅性不会影响类别学习判断; 原理解释能够有效建立“关于流畅性的信念”,且“关于流畅性的信念”对类别学习判断起作用。即样例多样性和流畅性信念对类别学习判断起作用,支持信念假说。     

Causal uncertainty and correction of judgments

We examined whether raising uncertainty about the causes of one’s judgments motivates correction. Specifically, we examined whether activating chronically accessible causal uncertainty (CU) beliefs with a conditional warning about possible bias enhances correction of weather judgments for tropical weather primes and of word frequency judgments for the availability bias. In two studies we showed that activating chronic beliefs led to careful correction of target judgments. Moreover, Study 2 revealed that chronically high-CU individuals who received a conditional warning felt more uncertain than did other participants, but that this uncertainty was suppressed somewhat by adjusting for the bias. Results are discussed in light of recent models of judgment correction (e.g., Wegener & Petty, 1997), and the causal uncertainty model (Weary & Edwards, 1996).     

Sensibility and understanding in perceptual judgments

The main aim of this paper is to work towards an account of how sensibility and understanding combine in perceptual judgments, with the emphasis on the role of sensibility in both the justification of such judgments and the explanation of how it is possible for them to apply to an objective world. I argue that in the normal course of events sensory intuitions function as (animal-level) beliefs about the objective world; and that these in turn acquire the status of perceptual judgments to the extent that they are imbedded in and engaged with the high-level patterns of consciousness and reasoning characteristic of full-blown human judgment. In terms of this account sensibility is seamlessly integrated with understanding in perceptual judgments. This does not, however, imply that its contribution to perceptual judgments cannot be separated analytically, for in my terms the basic justification and objective reference of perceptual judgments are directly inherited from the sensory intuitions (functioning as sensory beliefs) which constitute those judgments. I conclude by showing how this account can be used to undermine John McDowell's claim that any attempt to assign a separable contribution to sensibility cannot avoid a commitment to the Myth of the Given.     

Moral internalism and moral cognitivism in Hume’s metaethics

Most naturalists think that the belief/desire model from Hume is the best framework for making sense of motivation. As Smith has argued, given that the cognitive state (belief) and the conative state (desire) are separate on this model, if a moral judgment is cognitive, it could not also be motivating by itself. So, it looks as though Hume and Humeans cannot hold that moral judgments are states of belief (moral cognitivism) and internally motivating (moral internalism). My chief claim is that the details of Hume’s naturalistic philosophy of mind actually allow for a conjunction of these allegedly incompatible views. This thesis is significant, since readers typically have thought that Hume’s view that motivation is not produced by representations, coupled with his view that moral judgments motivate on their own, imply that moral judgments could never take the form of beliefs about, or representations of, the moral (virtue and vice).     

Once more: is beauty in the eye of the beholder? Relative contributions of private and shared taste to judgments of facial attractiveness

Misconstruing the meaning of Cronbach's alpha, experts on facial attractiveness have conveyed the impression that facial-attractiveness judgment standards are largely shared. This claim is unsubstantiated, because information necessary for deciding whether judgments of facial attractiveness are more influenced by commonly shared or by privately held evaluation standards is lacking. Three experiments, using diverse face and rater samples to investigate the relative contributions of private and shared taste to judgments of facial attractiveness, are reported. These experiments show that for a variety of ancillary conditions, and contrary to the prevalent notion in the literature, private taste is about as powerful as shared taste. Important implications for scientific research strategy and laypeople's self-esteem are discussed.     

Language That Puts You in Touch With Your Bodily Feelings: The Multimodal Responsiveness of Affective Expressions

ABSTRACT— Observing and producing a smile activate the very same facial muscles. In Experiment 1 , we predicted and found that verbal stimuli (action verbs) that refer to emotional expressions elicit the same facial muscle activity (facial electromyography) as visual stimuli do. These results are evidence that language referring to facial muscular activity is not amodal, as traditionally assumed, but is instead bodily grounded. These findings were extended in Experiment 2 , in which subliminally presented verbal stimuli were shown to drive muscle activation and to shape judgments, but not when muscle activation was blocked. These experiments provide an important bridge between research on the neurobiological basis of language and related behavioral research. The implications of these findings for theories of language and other domains of cognitive psychology (e.g., priming) are discussed.     

Perceived differences between chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes) and human (Homo sapiens) facial expressions are related to emotional interpretation

Human face perception is a finely tuned, specialized process. When comparing faces between species, therefore, it is essential to consider how people make these observational judgments. Comparing facial expressions may be particularly problematic, given that people tend to consider them categorically as emotional signals, which may affect how accurately specific details are processed. The bared-teeth display (BT), observed in most primates, has been proposed as a homologue of the human smile (J. A. R. A. M. van Hooff, 1972). In this study, judgments of similarity between BT displays of chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and human smiles varied in relation to perceived emotional valence. When a chimpanzee BT was interpreted as fearful, observers tended to underestimate the magnitude of the relationship between certain features (the extent of lip corner raise) and human smiles. These judgments may reflect the combined effects of categorical emotional perception, configural face processing, and perceptual organization in mental imagery and may demonstrate the advantages of using standardized observational methods in comparative facial expression research.     

3～5岁幼儿基于面孔的信任判断的发展

本研究通过两个实验探讨了262名3~5岁幼儿基于面孔的信任判断能力及其年龄间差异。结果发现:(1)实验1中,当陌生面孔单张呈现时,3岁幼儿还不能正确地区分被成人评价为可信和不可信的面孔,而4、5岁幼儿已经能够基于面孔特征做出与成人基本一致的信任判断;(2)实验2中,当配对呈现可信vs.不可信两张面孔时,3~5岁幼儿都能够在日常交往情境中依据陌生交往者的面孔特征做出与成人基本一致的信任判断,并且随着年龄的增长,信任判断准确率逐步提高。这些结果表明幼儿从3岁开始已经能够基于面孔做出信任判断,随着年龄的增长,信任判断能力逐步发展。     

The value of genuine and polite smiles

Humans show remarkable ability to adapt their social behavior to suit the changing requirements of their interactions. An interaction partner's social cues, particularly facial expressions, likely play an important role in motivating and reinforcing this behavioral adaptation. Over three studies, we test a key aspect of this idea. Specifically, we ask how the reinforcement value of facial expressions compares to that of nonsocial feedback and to what degree two frequently occurring expressions (genuine and polite smiles) differ in reinforcement value. Our findings show that social feedback is preferred over nonsocial feedback and that genuine smiles are preferred over polite smiles. Based on a logistic model of our data, we show that both monetary and social values of stimuli contribute significantly to participants' decisions. Indeed, participants were willing to sacrifice the chance of a monetary reward to receive a genuine smile and produced inflated estimates of the value of genuinely smiling faces. These findings suggest that genuine smiles, and potentially other social cues, may be useful social reinforcers and therefore important in the control of social behavior on a moment-to-moment basis during interaction.     

The Simulation of Smiles (SIMS) model: Embodied simulation and the meaning of facial expression

Recent application of theories of embodied or grounded cognition to the recognition and interpretation of facial expression of emotion has led to an explosion of research in psychology and the neurosciences. However, despite the accelerating number of reported findings, it remains unclear how the many component processes of emotion and their neural mechanisms actually support embodied simulation. Equally unclear is what triggers the use of embodied simulation versus perceptual or conceptual strategies in determining meaning. The present article integrates behavioral research from social psychology with recent research in neurosciences in order to provide coherence to the extant and future research on this topic. The roles of several of the brain's reward systems, and the amygdala, somatosensory cortices, and motor centers are examined. These are then linked to behavioral and brain research on facial mimicry and eye gaze. Articulation of the mediators and moderators of facial mimicry and gaze are particularly useful in guiding interpretation of relevant findings from neurosciences. Finally, a model of the processing of the smile, the most complex of the facial expressions, is presented as a means to illustrate how to advance the application of theories of embodied cognition in the study of facial expression of emotion.     

An analysis of the determinants of the feeling of knowing

Research has demonstrated that feeling-of-knowing (FOK) judgments are affected by the amount of accessible information related to an inaccessible target. Further, studies have demonstrated that, in some situations, FOK judgment magnitude is not only related to the amount (quantity) of accessed features, but also the correctness of those features (Thomas, Bulevich, & Dubois, 2011). The present study examined the conditions under which the correctness of features would influence FOK judgment magnitude. We hypothesized that accuracy of retrieved features would influence FOK judgments, but only in situations where semantically meaningful information was accessible. In three experiments, we manipulated accessibility of semantic information. In all experiments, the quantity, or amount of retrieved partial information had a greater impact on FOK judgments than the accuracy of that information. However, in situations where semantic information was accessible, accuracy of retrieved semantic features also influenced FOK judgment magnitude, and later recognition.     

Making causal judgments from the proportion of confirming instances: the pCI rule

It is proposed that causal judgments about contingency information are derived from the proportion of confirmatory instances (pCI) that are evaluated as confirmatory for the causal candidate. In 6 experiments, pCI values were manipulated independently of objective contingencies assessed by the deltaP rule. Significant effects of the pCI manipulations were found in all cases, but causal judgments did not vary significantly with objective contingencies when pCI was held constant. The experiments used a variety of stimulus presentation procedures and different dependent measures. The power PC theory, a weighted version of the deltaP rule, the Rescorla-Wagner associative learning model (R. A. Rescorla & A. R Wagner, 1972), and the deltaD rule, which is the frequency-based version of the pCI rule, were unable to account for the significant effects of the pCI manipulations. These results are consistent with a general explanatory approach to causal judgment involving the evaluation of evidence and updating of beliefs with regard to causal hypotheses.     

The truth and bias model of judgment

We present a new model for the general study of how the truth and biases affect human judgment. In the truth and bias model, judgments about the world are pulled by 2 primary forces, the truth force and the bias force, and these 2 forces are interrelated. The truth and bias model differentiates force and value, where the force is the strength of the attraction and the value is the location toward which the judgment is attracted. The model also makes a formal theoretical distinction between bias and moderator variables. Two major classes of biases are discussed: biases that are measured with variables (e.g., assumed similarity) and directional bias, which refers to the extent to which judgments are pulled toward 1 end of the judgment continuum. Moderator variables are conceptualized as variables that affect the accuracy and bias forces but that do not affect judgments directly. We illustrate the model with 4 examples. We discuss the theoretical, empirical, methodological, measurement, and design implications of the model.     

When Vague Sentences Inform: A Model Of Assertability

A speaker often decides whether or not to saysomething based on his assessment of the impact itwould have on his hearer's beliefs. If he thinks itwould bring them more in line with the truth, he saysit; otherwise he does not. In this paper, I developa model of these judgments, focusing specifically onthose of vague sentences. Under the simplifyingassumption that an utterance only conveys a speaker'sapplicability judgments, I present a Bayesian model ofan utterance's impact on a hearer's beliefs. Fromthis model I derive a model of a speaker's judgment ofwhether or not an utterance would be informative. Iillustrate it with several examples of judgments ofvague and non-vague sentences. For instance, I showthat it models the common judgment that assertingeither ``George is tall' or ``George is not tall' wouldbe misleading if George were borderline tall, butasserting ``George is tall and he isn't tall' would notbe.