WHAT IS A FEMINIST?

This article outlines the evaluation and stereotype of feminists, based on responses to closed-ended semantic differential traits as well as openended, projective responses to a hypothetical male or female feminist. Consistent across both methodologies, undergraduate respondents (Study 1: N = 210; Study 2: N = 135) viewed feminists as politically liberal, assertive/career oriented, and more likely to be heterosexual than lesbian. Most evaluations were neutral to slightly positive, with a few negative areas. However, feminists were seen in less positive terms than the typical woman and were described as much more assertive and politically liberal. Gender, race, birth cohort, gender of target, and feminist-attitude differences are presented. Despite the neutral to slightly positive evaluation, most respondents did not personally identify as feminists, possibly because they misperceive others' attitudes toward feminists as more negative than they actually are.     

IS PERCEPTION A PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDE?

It is widely agreed that perceptual experience is a form of intentionality, i.e., that it has representational content. Many philosophers take this to mean that like belief, experience has propositional content, that it can be true or false. I accept that perceptual experience has intentionality; but I dispute the claim that it has propositional content. This claim does not follow from the fact that experience is intentional, nor does it follow from the fact that experiences are accurate or inaccurate. I end by considering the relationship between this question and the question of whether experience has non-conceptual content.     

WHEN IS PARSIMONY A VIRTUE?

Parsimony is a virtue of empirical theories. Is it also a virtue of philosophical theories? I review four contemporary accounts of the virtue of parsimony in empirical theorizing, and consider how each might apply to two prominent appeals to parsimony in the philosophical literature, those made on behalf of physicalism and on behalf of nominalism. None of the accounts of the virtue of parsimony extends naturally to either of these philosophical cases. This suggests that in typical philosophical contexts, ontological simplicity has no evidential value.     

UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS AS A SHARED POLITICAL IDENTITY IMPOSSIBLE? NECESSARY? SUFFICIENT?

Abstract: Would a global commitment to international human rights norms provide enough of a sense of community to sustain a legitimate and sufficiently democratic global order? Sceptics worry that human rights cannot help maintain the mutual trust among citizens required for a legitimate political order, since such rights are now too broadly shared. Thus prominent contributors to democratic theory insist that the members of the citizenry must share some features unique to them, to the exclusion of others—be it a European identity ( Habermas and Derrida 2003 ) or a national public culture generally shared only by the members ( Miller 1995, 2000 ). This essay considers and rejects these arguments. While stable, democratic redistributive arrangements do require trust and institutionalised means of trustworthiness; they need not rely on norms or values that distinguish members from non-members: such exclusion is not required. Thus human rights may be part of a common political identity.     

BEYOND SECULARISM? TOWARDS A POST‐SECULAR POLITICAL THEOLOGY

In this article I analyse some of the reasons for a recent, resurgent interest in religion and theology by political philosophers and relate this interest to an inherent instability in modernity itself. In the first part I describe the landscape of current political philosophy with a particular emphasis on radical philosophers. In the second part I describe how the liberal distinction between religion and politics generates a theological instability due to the effective disappearance of the social embodiment of religion within modernity. In the third part I draw some conclusions regarding the challenges the new post‐secular condition presents to theology.     

IS THERE A DISTINCTIVE QUANTUM THEOLOGY?

Quantum mechanics (QM) is a favorite area of physics to feature in “science and religion” discussions. We argue that this is at least partly because the arcane results of QM can be deployed to make big theological claims by the linguistic sleight of hand of “register switching”—sliding imperceptibly from technical into everyday language using the same vocabulary. We clarify the discussion by deploying the formal mapping of QM into classical statistical mechanics (CSM) via the mathematical device of “Wick rotation.” This equivalence between QM and CSM suggests caution in claiming distinctiveness for quantum theologizing. After outlining two areas in which quantum insights nevertheless resonate with longstanding themes in theological reflection (hiddenness and visualizability), we suggest that both QM and CSM point to a theology of science in which scientists participate in the divine gaze on creation as imago Dei.     

IS SCIENCE PERSISTENCE A MATTER OF VALUES?

This study investigates the hypothesis that congruence in value perspectives distinguishes science-able students who persist in science from those who do not (nonpersisters). A science values measure was administered to 173 undergraduates with high levels of commitment and ability in the sciences. On each of six hypothetical dilemmas from everyday science, respondents rated the importance of three justice and three care considerations for self and for science, using a Likert-type 7-point scale. A significant three way interaction involving sex, persistence, and point of view (self/sience) emerged, with persisters generally demonstrating congruence between self and science on the value perspectives; female persisters, however, were more likely to combine justice and care perspectives than were males. Nonpersisters' self/science ratings of justice and care were sharply dissimilar, with females demonstrating the most incongruence. In all groups, justice was the prominent perspective attributed to science.     

IS THERE A FUTURE FOR THE DIALOGUE?

The title question was raised by Philip Hefner in an editorial in the March 2007 issue of Zygon, and answered in various ways in sixteen guest editorials in the June, September, and December 2007 issues. In this article, after defining some pertinent concepts, I comment on these essays. I review critical statements made by the guest editorialists and survey their proposals for further dialogue topics. I conclude with my own views on the future of the dialogue and the role of Zygon therein.     

IS GENDER-BIASED LANGUAGE SEXIST? A PERCEPTUAL APPROACH

Two studies were conducted to define reactions to gender-biased language empirically. In the first study, respondents evaluated the sexism in a series of sentences that contained no bias, used such words as man or he in the generic sense, or referred to women in an unfair, stereotypical manner. In the second study, reactions were examined in a more naturalistic context by asking respondents to evaluate an essay written using all plural pronouns, generic pronouns, or generic pronouns plus evaluative stereotypic phras-ings. The results were consistent with the recommendations of the American Psychological Association's "Guidelines for Nonsexist Language" (1975, 1977): (1) generic phrasings were perceived to be somewhat biased and sexist, (2) designation and evaluation stereotyping was perceived to be extremely biased and sexist, and (3) neutral alternatives were judged to be appropriately nonsexist. These findings suggest that authors should conform to the standards prescribed in the "Guideline" if they hope to avoid unfair treatment of the sexes.