How to Be an Ethical Expressivist

Expressivism promises an illuminating account of the nature of normative judgment. But worries about the details of expressivist semantics have led many to doubt whether expressivism's putative advantages can be secured. Drawing on insights from linguistic semantics and decision theory, I develop a novel framework for implementing an expressivist semantics that I call ordering expressivism. I argue that by systematically interpreting the orderings that figure in analyses of normative terms in terms of the basic practical attitude of conditional weak preference, the expressivist can explain the semantic properties of normative sentences in terms of the logical properties of that attitude. Expressivism's problems with capturing the logical relations among normative sentences can be reduced to the familiar, more tractable problem of explaining certain coherence constraints on preferences. Particular attention is given to the interpretation of wide‐scope negation. The proposed solution is also extended to other types of embedded contexts—most notably, disjunctions.     

How to Be an Alethically Rational Naturalist

Alvin Plantinga has famously argued that naturalism is self-defeating. Plantinga's argument is, at its heart, an argument from analogy. Plantinga presents various epistemic situations and claims of each that (i) a person in such a situation has an undefeated defeater for each of his beliefs, and (ii) a reflective naturalist is in a relevantly similar situation. I present various epistemic situations and claim of each that a person in such a situation does not have an undefeated defeater for each of his beliefs. I further claim that at least some of these situations are more relevantly like the situation faced by the reflective naturalist than any of the situations Plantinga describes. Therefore, Plantinga's argument fails to establish that the reflective naturalist has an undefeated defeater for each of his beliefs and hence fails to establish that naturalism is self-defeating.     

如何才能成为一个真正的马克思主义者?——汤普森“致列泽克·科拉克夫斯基的公开信”解读

在1973年的"致列泽克·科拉克夫斯基的公开信"中,汤普森通过给科拉克夫斯基这个受到第二代英国新左派热捧、然而在他看来已经出现背叛迹象的东欧马克思主义者写公开信,向第二代英国新左派阐发了他对在英国如何才能成为一个真正的马克思主义者这个重大问题的基本理解.     

How to Be a Bayesian Dogmatist

Rational agents have (more or less) consistent beliefs. Bayesianism is a theory of consistency for partial belief states. Rational agents also respond appropriately to experience. Dogmatism is a theory of how to respond appropriately to experience. Hence, Dogmatism and Bayesianism are theories of two very different aspects of rationality. It's surprising, then, that in recent years it has become common to claim that Dogmatism and Bayesianism are jointly inconsistent: how can two independently consistent theories with distinct subject matter be jointly inconsistent? In this essay I argue that Bayesianism and Dogmatism are inconsistent only with the addition of a specific hypothesis about how the appropriate responses to perceptual experience are to be incorporated into the formal models of the Bayesian. That hypothesis isn't essential either to Bayesianism or to Dogmatism, and so Bayesianism and Dogmatism are jointly consistent. That leaves the matter of how experiences and credences are related, and so in the remainder of the essay I offer an alternative account of how perceptual justification, as the Dogmatist understands it, can be incorporated into the Bayesian formalism.     

How to Be a Humean Interventionist

This paper aims to provide Humean metaphysics for the interventionist theory of causation. This is done by appealing to the hierarchical picture of causal relations as being realized by mechanisms, which in turn are identified with lower‐level causal structures. The modal content of invariances at the lowest level of this hierarchy, at which mechanisms are reduced to strict natural laws, is then explained in terms of projectivism based on the best‐system view of laws.     

How to Be Helpful to Multiple People at Once

When someone hosts a party, when governments choose an aid program, or when assistive robots decide what meal to serve to a family, decision-makers must determine how to help even when their recipients have very different preferences. Which combination of people’s desires should a decision-maker serve? To provide a potential answer, we turned to psychology: What do people think is best when multiple people have different utilities over options? We developed a quantitative model of what people consider desirable behavior, characterizing participants’ preferences by inferring which combination of “metrics” (maximax, maxsum, maximin, or inequality aversion [IA]) best explained participants’ decisions in a drink-choosing task. We found that participants’ behavior was best described by the maximin metric, describing the desire to maximize the happiness of the worst-off person, though participant behavior was also consistent with maximizing group utility (the maxsum metric) and the IA metric to a lesser extent. Participant behavior was consistent across variation in the agents involved and  tended to become more maxsum-oriented when participants were told they were players in the task (Experiment 1). In later experiments, participants maintained maximin behavior across multi-step tasks rather than shortsightedly focusing on the individual steps therein (Experiment 2, Experiment 3). By repeatedly asking participants what choices they would hope for in an optimal, just decision-maker, and carefully disambiguating which quantitative metrics describe these nuanced choices, we help constrain the space of what behavior we desire in leaders, artificial intelligence systems helping decision-makers, and the assistive robots and decision-makers of the future.     

How to Be a Friend of Absolute Goodness

This paper critically examines Richard Kraut’s attack on the notion of absolute value, and lays out some of the conceptual work required to defend such a notion. The view under attack claims that absolute goodness is a property that provides a reason to value what has it. Kraut’s overall challenge is that absolute goodness cannot play this role. Kraut’s own view is that goodness-for, instead, plays the reason-providing role. My targets are Kraut’s double-counting objection, and his ethical objection against absolute value. After explaining the double-counting objection, and discussing the idea of non-additive reasons, I examine and reject Kraut’s reasons for holding that nonadditivity can rescue relative value but not absolute value. I proceed then to explore a different reply to the double-counting objection by introducing a distinction between normative reasons for action and reasons that explain why a certain consideration is a reason for action. Such a distinction (hinted at by Kraut) would either help both Kraut and the friend of absolute value, or neither of them. I defend the distinction from the objection that it would make absolute value just a ‘shadow’. Finally, I reply to Kraut’s ethical objection that being motivated by absolute value is depersonalizing, on two grounds: 1) if thinking in terms of absolute value depersonalizes relationships, then we have absolute-value-given reasons not to think in those terms; 2) the distinction between normative and explanatory reasons explains why even a motivation centred on absolute value need not be depersonalizing.     

Dying to Be an Analyst

This article is a personal exploration of the symbol of the scorpion, a rather unloved, kept in the shadows aspect that lives in us all. I will discuss my encounter with the scorpion and its impact on a transitional time in my life. The symbol of the scorpion is amplified using dream material, myth, science, and astrology. The article also amplifies and invites readers to explore the tension of the time when the poison becomes the medicine.     

How To Be A Reliabilist

In this paper, I aim to develop a novel virtue reliabilist account of justified belief, which incorporates insights from both process reliabilism and extant versions of virtue reliabilism. Like extant virtue reliabilist accounts of justified belief, the proposed view takes it that justified belief is a kind of competent performance and that competent performances require reliable agent abilities. However, unlike extant versions of virtue reliabilism, the view takes abilities to essentially involve reliable processes. In this way, the proposed view should take a leaf from process reliabilism. Finally, I will provide reason to believe that the view compares favourably with both extant versions of virtue reliabilism and process reliabilism. In particular, I will show that in taking abilities to essentially involve reliable processes, the view has an edge over extant versions of virtue reliabilism. Moreover, I will argue that the proposed view can either solve or defuse a number of classical problems of process reliabilism, including the new evil demon problem, the problem of clairvoyant cases and the generality problem.     

亲属拒证权的人伦精神解读

我国现行法律抛弃了亲属拒证权制度,这不利于社会的和谐与稳定,在司法实践中的危害日益呈现.其实,亲属拒证权作为刑事诉讼中一项重要的证据规则,在中国古代法律以及当今的大陆法系、英美法系国家的证据立法中都有明确的规定.它不但契舍了自然法标准和刑法的期待可能性理论,而且蕴含着独特的人性关怀品格,彰显了法的人伦精神,具有普适存在的相对合理性和现实基础.     

伦理管理"如何可能"之策新探

企业伦理管理"如何可能"问题是伦理管理的技术性或工具性实现难题,尽管美国经验可资借鉴,但我国实践中仍存在许多操作难题,研究也以宏观层面和中观层面的解决之策为主,缺乏可操作性较强的"术"的层面的策略研究成果,因此,有必要对伦理管理"如何可能"之术作进一步探讨.以此为基点,策略可分为伦理管理目标能见度提高策略和伦理管理运行机制的效力提升策略.     

医学伦理审查如何适应转化医学的要求

随着转化医学的兴起,医学伦理审查面临前所未有的机遇与挑战.如何使医学伦理审查工作更好地适应转化医学发展的需要,提高审查质量,成为亟需解决的问题.在分析当前我国医学伦理审查工作现状和主要问题的基础上,进一步探讨了可行的解决方法,如进一步明确和强化管理部门服务功能、保证伦理委员会成员多样性和重视伦理审查多视角、强化伦理委员会后续跟踪审查、规范伦理审查委员的培训与继续教育等,为我国医学伦理审查工作的规范化发展和医学伦理审查质量的进一步提高提供参考.