How to Be an Ethical Expressivist

Expressivism promises an illuminating account of the nature of normative judgment. But worries about the details of expressivist semantics have led many to doubt whether expressivism's putative advantages can be secured. Drawing on insights from linguistic semantics and decision theory, I develop a novel framework for implementing an expressivist semantics that I call ordering expressivism. I argue that by systematically interpreting the orderings that figure in analyses of normative terms in terms of the basic practical attitude of conditional weak preference, the expressivist can explain the semantic properties of normative sentences in terms of the logical properties of that attitude. Expressivism's problems with capturing the logical relations among normative sentences can be reduced to the familiar, more tractable problem of explaining certain coherence constraints on preferences. Particular attention is given to the interpretation of wide‐scope negation. The proposed solution is also extended to other types of embedded contexts—most notably, disjunctions.     

How to Be an Alethically Rational Naturalist

Alvin Plantinga has famously argued that naturalism is self-defeating. Plantinga's argument is, at its heart, an argument from analogy. Plantinga presents various epistemic situations and claims of each that (i) a person in such a situation has an undefeated defeater for each of his beliefs, and (ii) a reflective naturalist is in a relevantly similar situation. I present various epistemic situations and claim of each that a person in such a situation does not have an undefeated defeater for each of his beliefs. I further claim that at least some of these situations are more relevantly like the situation faced by the reflective naturalist than any of the situations Plantinga describes. Therefore, Plantinga's argument fails to establish that the reflective naturalist has an undefeated defeater for each of his beliefs and hence fails to establish that naturalism is self-defeating.     

如何才能成为一个真正的马克思主义者?——汤普森“致列泽克·科拉克夫斯基的公开信”解读

在1973年的"致列泽克·科拉克夫斯基的公开信"中,汤普森通过给科拉克夫斯基这个受到第二代英国新左派热捧、然而在他看来已经出现背叛迹象的东欧马克思主义者写公开信,向第二代英国新左派阐发了他对在英国如何才能成为一个真正的马克思主义者这个重大问题的基本理解.     

How to Be a Humean Interventionist

This paper aims to provide Humean metaphysics for the interventionist theory of causation. This is done by appealing to the hierarchical picture of causal relations as being realized by mechanisms, which in turn are identified with lower‐level causal structures. The modal content of invariances at the lowest level of this hierarchy, at which mechanisms are reduced to strict natural laws, is then explained in terms of projectivism based on the best‐system view of laws.     

How to Be a Friend of Absolute Goodness

This paper critically examines Richard Kraut’s attack on the notion of absolute value, and lays out some of the conceptual work required to defend such a notion. The view under attack claims that absolute goodness is a property that provides a reason to value what has it. Kraut’s overall challenge is that absolute goodness cannot play this role. Kraut’s own view is that goodness-for, instead, plays the reason-providing role. My targets are Kraut’s double-counting objection, and his ethical objection against absolute value. After explaining the double-counting objection, and discussing the idea of non-additive reasons, I examine and reject Kraut’s reasons for holding that nonadditivity can rescue relative value but not absolute value. I proceed then to explore a different reply to the double-counting objection by introducing a distinction between normative reasons for action and reasons that explain why a certain consideration is a reason for action. Such a distinction (hinted at by Kraut) would either help both Kraut and the friend of absolute value, or neither of them. I defend the distinction from the objection that it would make absolute value just a ‘shadow’. Finally, I reply to Kraut’s ethical objection that being motivated by absolute value is depersonalizing, on two grounds: 1) if thinking in terms of absolute value depersonalizes relationships, then we have absolute-value-given reasons not to think in those terms; 2) the distinction between normative and explanatory reasons explains why even a motivation centred on absolute value need not be depersonalizing.     

Dying to Be an Analyst

This article is a personal exploration of the symbol of the scorpion, a rather unloved, kept in the shadows aspect that lives in us all. I will discuss my encounter with the scorpion and its impact on a transitional time in my life. The symbol of the scorpion is amplified using dream material, myth, science, and astrology. The article also amplifies and invites readers to explore the tension of the time when the poison becomes the medicine.     

How To Be A Reliabilist

In this paper, I aim to develop a novel virtue reliabilist account of justified belief, which incorporates insights from both process reliabilism and extant versions of virtue reliabilism. Like extant virtue reliabilist accounts of justified belief, the proposed view takes it that justified belief is a kind of competent performance and that competent performances require reliable agent abilities. However, unlike extant versions of virtue reliabilism, the view takes abilities to essentially involve reliable processes. In this way, the proposed view should take a leaf from process reliabilism. Finally, I will provide reason to believe that the view compares favourably with both extant versions of virtue reliabilism and process reliabilism. In particular, I will show that in taking abilities to essentially involve reliable processes, the view has an edge over extant versions of virtue reliabilism. Moreover, I will argue that the proposed view can either solve or defuse a number of classical problems of process reliabilism, including the new evil demon problem, the problem of clairvoyant cases and the generality problem.     

灵魂何在

存在于世界上的一切事物,包括所有生物,毫无例外都是以物质为基础的.整个宇宙也是物质的,在我们的星球之外,如果还有其他生命形式存在,也必然是物质的.     

医学伦理审查如何适应转化医学的要求

随着转化医学的兴起,医学伦理审查面临前所未有的机遇与挑战.如何使医学伦理审查工作更好地适应转化医学发展的需要,提高审查质量,成为亟需解决的问题.在分析当前我国医学伦理审查工作现状和主要问题的基础上,进一步探讨了可行的解决方法,如进一步明确和强化管理部门服务功能、保证伦理委员会成员多样性和重视伦理审查多视角、强化伦理委员会后续跟踪审查、规范伦理审查委员的培训与继续教育等,为我国医学伦理审查工作的规范化发展和医学伦理审查质量的进一步提高提供参考.     

Searle on Consciousness: or How not to Be a Physicalist

In The Rediscovery of the Mind , John Searle offers a novel theory of consciousness that attempts to overcome the traditional debates within the philosophy of mind between dualism and materialism. Searle maintains that one can be a thoroughgoing materialist without denying the existence of mental phenomena that are inherently subjective in nature. In this paper I argue that Searle's view does not so easily bypass the traditional philosophical debate between materialism and dualism, and, indeed, that Searle's attempt to have it both ways is inconsistent. More specifically, I examine Searle's discussion of the causal reducibility of consciousness and his claim that consciousness is just another property of certain biological systems and argue that in both cases Searle has failed to show that consciousness can be both irreducibly subjective and a normal physical feature of the brain.     

How to Be a Substantivalist Without Getting Shifty About It*

According to substantivalism, spacetime points and regions are real entities whose existence is not dependent on matter. In this paper, I motivate and defend a version of substantivalism which takes the totality of spacetime as fundamental, and show how this position avoids certain problem cases, in particular the objection from static Leibniz shifts, and better conforms to how we think about space in physics. I argue that, even though the static Leibniz shifts do not show ordinary substantivalism is committed to in‐principle undetectable physical structure (pace Dasgupta (2015a)), they do indicate something problematic about the modal profile of space‐time and its constituents. While the problem is modal, the solution cannot be solely a matter of revising the substantivalist's modal claims. Rather, I argue, the substantivalist must revise her background ontology of space‐time. I show how this can be done by developing substantivalist theory that rejects this picture in favor of an alternative ontology of space‐time in the spirit of priority monism.