The agony of victory and thrill of defeat: Mixed emotional reactions to disappointing wins and relieving losses

Because of counterfactual comparisons, good outcomes that could have been better (i.e., disappointing wins) and bad outcomes that could have been worse (i.e., relieving losses) elicit relatively middling ratings on bipolar emotion scales. We conducted two experiments with gambles to examine whether such outcomes elicit neutral emotions, sequentially mixed emotions of positive and negative affect, or simultaneously mixed emotions. In Experiment 1, static unipolar measures of positive and negative affect revealed that disappointing wins and relieving losses elicit mixed emotions, rather than relatively neutral emotions. In Experiment 2, participants provided continuous unipolar measures of positive and negative affect by pressing one button whenever they felt good and another button whenever they felt bad. Results revealed that disappointing wins and relieving losses elicit positive and negative affect simultaneously, rather than in alternation.     

The propositional basis of cue-controlled reward seeking

Two experiments examined the role of propositional and automatic (ideomotor) processes in cue-elicited responding for rewarding outcomes (beer and chocolate). In a training phase, participants earned either chocolate or beer points by making one of two button-press responses. Rewards were indicated by the presentation of chocolate and beer pictures. On test, each trial began with a picture of beer or chocolate, or a blank screen, and choice of the beer versus chocolate response was assessed in the presence of these three pictures. Participants tended to choose the beer and chocolate response in the presence of the beer and chocolate pictures, respectively. In Experiment 1, instructions signalling that the pictures did not indicate which response would be rewarded significantly reduced the priming effect. In Experiment 2, instructions indicating that the pictures signified which response would not be rewarded resulted in a reversed priming effect. Finally, in both experiments, the priming effect correlated with self-reported beliefs that the cues signalled which response was more likely to be reinforced. These results suggest that cue-elicited response selection is mediated by a propositional belief regarding the efficacy of the response–outcome relationship, rather than an automatic ideomotor mechanism.     

The differential effect of realistic and unrealistic counterfactual thinking on regret

Research has established that realistic counterfactual thinking can determine the intensity and the content of people's affective reactions to decision outcomes and events. Not much is known, however, about the affective consequences of counterfactual thinking that is unrealistic (i.e., that does not correspond to the main causes of a negative outcome). In three experiments, we investigate the influence of realistic and unrealistic counterfactuals on experienced regret after negative outcomes. In Experiment 1, we found that participants who thought unrealistically about a poor outcome reported less regret than those who thought realistically about it. In Experiments 2a and 2b, we replicated this finding and we showed that the decrease in regret was associated with a shift in the causal attributions of the poor outcome. Participants who thought unrealistically attributed it more to external circumstances and less to their own behaviours than those who thought realistically about it. We discuss the implications of these findings for the role of counterfactuals as self-serving biases and the functionality of regret as a counterfactual emotion.     

Spoilt for choice: The role of counterfactual thinking in the excess choice and reversibility paradoxes

Contrary to popular belief many choice options and the ability to reverse one's initial choice are sometimes associated with decreased chooser satisfaction. Two studies investigated the role of counterfactual thinking in explaining these paradoxes. Participants chose drawing implements from either a limited (6) or extensive (24) choice set (Study 1), or an expected reversible/non-reversible selection (Study 2). Following a drawing task, satisfaction with their chosen implement was rated under either high or low cognitive load to manipulate the availability of counterfactual alternatives. In Study 1 satisfaction was higher with limited vs. extensive choice under low load. The number of counterfactuals generated mediated this effect. Under high load the pattern was reversed. Participants in Study 2 generated more counterfactuals when reversibility was expected under low but not high load and this partially mediated the impact of expected reversibility on revealed satisfaction. Implications for theoretical understanding of these paradoxes are discussed.     

大学生心理控制源与内疚感和羞耻感对反事实思维的影响

研究以128名大学生为研究对象,采用2 (心理控制源: 外控型、内控型)×2 (自我道德感: 内疚感、羞耻感) 两因素被试间实验设计,考察了外控和内控大学生在内疚感和羞耻感两种不同的自我道德情感下反事实思维内容的差异。结果表明:(1) 心理控制源对大学生反事实思维不同内容的诱发具有重要的影响:外控者更倾向于产生行为和情境导向的反事实思维,而内控者更倾向于产生自我导向的反事实思维。内疚感和羞耻感对大学生反事实思维内容的产生没有直接的影响;(2) 反事实思维内容的产生受到了心理控制源与内疚感和羞耻感两种自我道德情感的交互影响:外控者在羞耻感的启动条件下比在内疚感的启动条件下表现出了更多的行为和情境导向的反事实思维,而内控者在内疚感的启动条件下比在羞耻感的条件下表现出了更多的自我导向的反事实思维。研究结果有助于解释以中西方不同被试而得出的内疚感和羞耻感与反事实思维关系的矛盾结论。     

The effect of autonomy on counterfactual thinking about controllable events

We investigated the role of autonomy in counterfactual thinking in two experiments. Autonomy emphasises intrinsic motivation and reduced preoccupation with external outcomes. Experiment 1 demonstrated that autonomy influences both the number and content of counterfactual thoughts, particularly for individuals performing a task rather than reading about someone else performing a task. Experiment 2 investigated the performance improving effects of counterfactual thinking, while considering the role of autonomy. Individuals higher in autonomy were more likely to focus on undoing controllable aspects of their behaviour compared to individuals lower in autonomy. Controllable (versus uncontrollable) counterfactual thoughts were associated with greater performance improvement on a subsequent task. Self-regulatory traits such as autonomy may be important in the types of counterfactual thoughts that people generate. We discuss the mechanisms by which autonomy may exert an influence on counterfactual thinking and consider the implications of the findings for the functional theory of counterfactual thought.     

Bitter struggle for survival: Evolved bitterness embodiment of survival motivation

In four experiments, we tested the hypothesis that survival motivation is grounded in the physical experience of bitter taste. Chinese (Experiment 1) and non-Chinese participants (Experiment 2) who tasted a bitter drink were quicker than the control participants who drank plain water in responding to survival-related words in a lexical decision task. Chinese participants who chewed bitter lotus root were more likely to discount the future than those who chewed sour lemon (Experiment 3). Finally, surprise retention tests revealed that experiencing a bitter rather than sweet taste led to higher retention of words processed for survival rather than mating scenarios (Experiment 4). These findings support our prediction that the taste of bitterness embodies survival motivation because both are adaptations to harsh environment.     

Affect as a motivational state

Using Brehm's (1999) intensity of emotion paradigm, we investigated whether basic positive or negative affect operates like a motivational state. We focused on one of the most basic affects, the sensory affect experienced when eating food. Participants tasted a delicious chocolate truffle (Study 1) or some bitter chocolate (Study 2) and were exposed to either a weak, moderately strong, or a very strong reason for feeling an opposing-valence affect or to no reason. In line with the predictions, the affect that participants reported in response to chocolate functioned like a motivational state as its intensity was a cubic function of the importance of the reason for feeling an opposing affect. We discussed the implications of these findings for the conceptualisation of affect and consider several applications for food advertising and consumer rating research.     

Strategy compatibility: The time versus money effect on product evaluation strategies

We show that time priming leads consumers to adopt an alternative-based evaluation strategy, whereas money priming elicits the use of an attribute-based evaluation strategy. In Experiment 1, we used process tracing in Mouselab to test this proposition, and the results suggested that the effect of time versus money priming on the choice of product-evaluation strategy was mediated by a holistic versus piecemeal information-processing. The results of Experiments 2A and 2B showed that the use of time versus money priming to trigger the choice of an alternative-based versus attribute-based evaluation strategy may result in systematic preference reversals. Specifically, when time (versus money) was primed, the participants were found to be more likely to choose a product dominating on a verbally described (versus numerically described) attribute (Experiment 2A), and one dominating on a non-alignable (versus alignable) attribute (Experiment 2B).     

The Face of the Chameleon: The Experience of Facial Mimicry for the Mimicker and the Mimickee

This research addressed three questions concerning facial mimicry: (a) Does the relationship between mimicry and liking characterize all facial expressions, or is it limited to specific expressions? (b) Is the relationship between facial mimicry and liking symmetrical for the mimicker and the mimickee? (c) Does conscious mimicry have consequences for emotion recognition? A paradigm is introduced in which participants interact over a computer setup with a confederate whose prerecorded facial displays of emotion are synchronized with participants’ behavior to create the illusion of social interaction. In Experiment 1, the confederate did or did not mimic participants’ facial displays of various subsets of basic emotions. Mimicry promoted greater liking for the confederate regardless of which emotions were mimicked. Experiment 2 reversed these roles: participants were instructed to mimic or not to mimic the confederate’s facial displays. Mimicry did not affect liking for the confederate but it did impair emotion recognition.     

Life‐events and post‐traumatic stress in a sample of English adolescents

The aim of the present study was to investigate the lifetime prevalence of negative life‐events and their association with post‐traumatic stress in English adolescents. Of the 427 adolescents surveyed, 360 (84%) endorsed at least one negative event. Respondents were asked to complete the Impact of Event Scale (IES: Horowitz, Wilner and Alvarez, 1979) for each event that they endorsed. For boys, highest levels of post‐traumatic stress were found in those who had experience of a ‘family member with a drink or drugs problem’, followed by ‘parental separation or divorce’, ‘life threat to family member’, and ‘life‐threat to self ’. For girls, highest levels of post‐traumatic stress were found in those who had experienced ‘attack or physical assault to self ’, followed by ‘family member with drink or drugs problem’, ‘parental separation or divorce’, and ‘life threat to family member’. These data suggest that moderate levels of post‐traumatic stress are present in around one fifth of adolescents who have experienced one of these events and that community levels of post‐traumatic stress in adolescents may be higher than previously thought. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Counterfactual thinking and stereotypes: The nonconformity effect

Past research has shown that counterfactual thinking (‘if only…’) is related to judgements of responsibility for negative events. It has also shown that behaviours deviating from the target's own behavioural standard (intrapersonal norm) are likely to trigger counterfactuals—the so‐called exceptional‐routine effect. In the present research, we demonstrate that behaviours deviating from a social category's behavioural standard (social norm) are also likely to trigger counterfactuals—what may be called the nonconformity effect. Two studies investigated counterfactual thinking regarding a rape case, classifying counterfactuals according to their conformity versus nonconformity to relevant social norms, and their focus on actions versus inactions. In Study 1, participants with higher endorsement of the rape victim stereotype generated more counterfactuals on the victim's non‐conforming inactions than did participants with lower stereotype endorsement. The presence of a nonconformity effect was confirmed in Study 2, where participants rated their agreement with externally generated counterfactuals. Moreover, in Study 2, counterfactuals focused on the victim's non‐conforming inactions predicted responsibility attribution to the victim through the mediating role of perceived avoidability of the event. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

“If only I had” versus “If only I had not”: Mental deletions,mental additions,and perceptions of meaning in life events

ABSTRACT

The present research investigated the relationship between meaning perceptions and the structure of counterfactual thoughts. In Study 1, participants reflected on how turning points in their lives could have turned out otherwise. Those who were instructed to engage in subtractive (e.g. If only I had not done X…”) counterfactual thinking (SCT) about those turning points subsequently reported higher meaning perceptions than did those who engaged in additive (e.g. ‘If only I had done X…’) counterfactual thinking (ACT). In Study 2, participants who reflected upon life events from the perspective of understanding the past (versus preparing for the future) tended to engage in more SCT than ACT. Finally, in Study 3, participants engaged in more SCT than ACT about life events whose meaning was perceived as certain (as opposed to uncertain) – presumably to maintain their pre-existing sense of meaning. Implications for the study of counterfactual thinking and meaning are discussed.     

Imagery perspective and source monitoring in imagination inflation

The present experiments suggest that imagery perspective—first person (own) versus third person (observer’s)—influences source-monitoring judgments. Imagination inflation (Garry, Manning, Loftus, &; Sherman, 1996) occurs when imaginary experience with events is mistaken for real experience. In Experiment 1, the perspective used to visualize real past events depended on memory test wording (“remember doing?” vs. “happened to you?”). Experiment 2 manipulated the perspective used to visually imagine counterfactual events and showed that the effect on imagination inflation depended on memory test wording. Imagination inflation was most likely when memory test wording encouraged participants to visualize real events from the same perspective as they had used to imagine counterfactual ones. Imagination inflation may result not simply from having created imaginary representations of events, but also from having created representations that match the decision criteria used in source monitoring.     

儿童内疚情绪对其亲社会行为的影响

为考察儿童内疚情绪对其亲社会行为的影响,本研究采用现场实验的方法探讨了小学5年级学生内疚情绪与其亲社会行为的关系。结果显示：（1）内疚情绪能促进儿童亲社会行为水平的提高,难过情绪不能促进儿童亲社会行为水平的提高;（2）当儿童将注意力集中于自己对团体造成的不良影响,产生内疚情绪,但如果其将注意力集中于自己的不良结果时,则产生难过情绪。结论：儿童的消极情绪是否能促进其亲社会行为水平的提高,取决于其将注意力集中于自己还是他人。     

The implications of counterfactual mind-sets for the functioning of implementation intentions

Two experiments explored how counterfactual mind-sets interact with implementation intentions and affect their flexibility. Participants engaged in a subtractive mind-set, an additive mind-set, or a control condition and were subsequently given either goal intentions or implementation intentions that facilitated cue detection (Experiment 1) or the goal-directed response (Experiment 2). Dependent variables were the number of targets specified in the intentions and the legitimate alternatives to the targets (flexibility measure). In Experiment 1, the implementation intention (versus goal intention) group were better at detecting specified cues, but worse on alternatives, regardless of mind-set. In Experiment 2, an interaction emerged. For both specified and alternative responses, the subtractive mind-set paired with an implementation intention versus goal intention performed better. This pattern was reversed for additive mind-set conditions. Hence, how counterfactual mind-sets affect the flexibility of planning is dependent on the particular mind-set used and the specific operations of plan.     

The effects of nonconsciously priming emotion concepts on behavior

Current empirical evidence regarding nonconsciously priming emotion concepts is limited to positively versus negatively valenced affect. This article demonstrates that specific, equally valenced emotion concepts can be nonconsciously activated, remain inaccessible to conscious awareness, and still affect behavior in an emotion-specific fashion. In Experiment 1A, participants subliminally primed with guilty emotion adjectives showed lower indulgence than did participants subliminally primed with sad emotion adjectives; even after the addition of a 5-min time delay, these results were replicated in Experiment 1B. Participants in the different priming conditions showed no differences in their subjective emotion ratings and were unaware of the emotion prime or concept activation. Experiments 2A and 2B replicated these findings using a helping measure, demonstrating that individuals primed with guilt adjectives show more helping than do individuals primed with sadness adjectives. In all studies, effects were moderated by individuals' specific emotion-response habits and characteristics.     

Holistic face encoding is modulated by perceived face race: Evidence from perceptual adaptation

Human expertise at processing faces relies on how facial features are encoded: as a whole template rather than as a sum of independent features. This holistic encoding is less prominent for other-race faces, possibly accounting for the difficulty one encounters in recognizing these faces (the ‘other-race effect’). Here, we tested the hypothesis that the magnitude of holistic face encoding can be modulated by racial categorization of the face. Caucasian participants performed a face-composite task with ‘racially-ambiguous’ face-stimuli (cross-race morphed faces, equally categorized as Asian or Caucasian faces in an independent task). The perceived race of the ambiguous faces was manipulated using adaptation. Experiment 1 showed that identical morphed face-stimuli were processed more holistically when perceived as ‘same-race’ than as ‘other-race’, i.e., following adaptation to ‘other-race’ versus ‘same-race’, respectively. Experiment 2 ascertained that the determining factor in the observed holistic processing modulation was the race of the racially-ambiguous face as perceived, rather than expected, by the participants, which supports the idea that the holistic processing of the face-stimuli was modulated by their race-categorization at the perceptual level.     

The role of the counterfactually satisfied desire in the lag between false‐belief and false‐emotion attributions in children aged 4–7

A robust lag was evidenced between the attribution to an individual of a false belief about the world and the attribution of the false emotion associated with this false belief (Bradmetz & Schneider, 1999). This lag was unexpected in the frame of current theories of mind which consider that emotion has a rational cognitive basis. The present paper refers to the theory of appraisal which links emotion to the belief about desire satisfaction rather than the belief concerning the state of the world. The authors claim that, even if counterfactual belief is understood, the associated emotion and belief about counterfactual satisfaction of desire are not automatically understood because they depend on the success of an action. Two experiments conducted on happiness, fear, and anger confirmed this view: Attributing false belief about counterfactual desire satisfaction is much more difficult than attributing false belief about a current state of affairs, and the emotion attributed to the individual is more closely linked to a belief about desire than to a belief about the world. A four‐step developmental sequence is proposed, and the link between action and realist bias is discussed.