共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 46 毫秒
1.
Daphna Erdinast-Vulcan 《Human Studies》2007,30(4):395-409
In this paper I address some related aspects of Merleau-Ponty’s unfinished texts, The Visible and the Invisible and The Prose of the World. The point of departure for my reading of these works is the sense of philosophical disillusionment which underlies and motivates
them, and which, I argue, leads Merleau-Ponty towards an engagement with art in general and with literature in particular.
I suggest that Merleau-Ponty’s emerging conception of ethics—premised on the paradox of a “universal singularity” and concerned
with the concrete experience of the individual subject, rather than with abstractions and formal categories—can best be articulated
through the formalist concept of “defamiliarization,” the fundamental performativity of all literature, and the dialogic relations
which, though inherent in all discourse, become most powerfully evident in the dynamics of reading.
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Daphna Erdinast-VulcanEmail: |
2.
Richard Menary 《Topoi》2009,28(1):31-43
Naturalistic philosophers ought to think that the mind is continuous with the rest of the world and should not, therefore,
be surprised by the findings of the extended mind, cognitive integration and enactivism. Not everyone is convinced that all
mental phenomena are continuous with the rest of the world. For example, intentionality is often formulated in a way that
makes the mind discontinuous with the rest of the world. This is a consequence of Brentano’s formulation of intentionality,
I suggest, and can be overcome by revealing that the concept of intentional directedness as he receives it from the Scholastics
is quite consistent with the continuity thesis. It is only when intentional directedness is conjoined with intentional inexistence
that intentionality and content are consistent with a discontinuity thesis (such as Brentano’s thesis). This makes room to
develop an account of intentional directedness that is consistent with the continuity thesis in the form of Peirce’s representational
principle. I also argue against a form of the discontinuity thesis in the guise of the derived/underived content distinction.
Having shown that intentionality is consistent with the continuity thesis I argue that we should focus on intentionality and
representation as bodily enacted. I conclude that we would be better off focussing on representation and intentionality in
action rather than giving abstract functional accounts of extended cognition.
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Richard MenaryEmail: |
3.
Stewart Cohen 《Philosophical Studies》2009,144(1):121-125
I raise several objections to Sosa’s account of knowledge as aptness. I argue that aptness is neither necessary nor sufficient
for knowledge. I also raise some objection to Sosa’s treatment of dreaming skepticism.
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Stewart CohenEmail: |
4.
Jeff Wisdom 《Philosophical Studies》2008,138(3):429-434
In this essay I distinguish between a synchronic view of base property exemplification and a diachronic one. I argue that
only a diachronic view of base property exemplification can substantiate a ban on morally mixed worlds. I then argue that
one of Robert Mabrito’s recent criticisms of Russ Shafer-Landau’s moral realism fails on either a synchronic or a diachronic
view.
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Jeff WisdomEmail: |
5.
Jack Reynolds 《Sophia》2008,47(3):311-325
This essay raises some critical questions about the interpretation that Derrida offers of Merleau-Ponty in his recent book,
On Touching: Jean-Luc Nancy, where Derrida implies that the latter’s work remains mired in theological prejudices. As well as defending Merleau-Ponty’s
analyses of the senses and inter-subjectivity against such claims, this essay is also concerned to examine Derrida’s transcendental
philosophy of time (or philosophy of the contretemps that breaks open time but nonetheless pertains to it) that undergirds
and motivates his engagement with various philosophies of touch. In this latter respect, I will argue that Derrida’s philosophy
is itself ‘touched’ by time, in the peculiar sense of ‘touched’ that connotes affected and wounded. His work instantiates
an ethics of non-presentist time (which is also the transcendental condition for any event of touch) and I ask whether there
is reason to look for a different understanding of both time and the transcendental to Derrida’s.
相似文献
Jack ReynoldsEmail: |
6.
Charles B. Cross 《Erkenntnis》2009,70(2):173-188
In this essay I renew the case for Conditional Excluded Middle (CXM) in light of recent developments in the semantics of the
subjunctive conditional. I argue that Michael Tooley’s recent backward causation counterexample to the Stalnaker-Lewis comparative
world similarity semantics undermines the strongest argument against CXM, and I offer a new, principled argument for the validity
of CXM that is in no way undermined by Tooley’s counterexample. Finally, I formulate a simple semantics for the subjunctive
conditional that is consistent with both CXM and Tooley’s counterexample.
相似文献
Charles B. CrossEmail: |
7.
Jenny Slatman 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2009,8(3):321-342
This article provides a phenomenological analysis of the difference between self-recognition and recognition of another, while
referring to some contemporary neuroscientific studies on the rubber hand illusion. It examines the difference between these
two forms of recognition on the basis of Husserl’s and Merleau-Ponty’s work. It argues that both phenomenologies, despite
their different views on inter-subjectivity, allow for the specificity of recognition of another. In explaining self-recognition,
however, Husserl’s account seems less convincing. Research concerning the rubber hand illusion has confirmed that self-recognition
involves more than an immediate experience of oneself. Merleau-Ponty’s later work, describing self-recognition as the result
of assimilative identification, will be used to explain the possibility of illusion between one’s “hereness” and “thereness”.
The possibility of this illusion is inherent to self-recognition, while it is lacking in recognition of another.
相似文献
Jenny SlatmanEmail: |
8.
David Phillips 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2007,10(5):457-468
I argue that John Mackie’s treatment of practical reason is both attractive and unjustly neglected. In particular, I argue
that it is importantly different from, and much more plausible than, the kind of instrumentalist approach famously articulated
by Bernard Williams. This matters for the interpretation of the arguments for Mackie’s most famous thesis: moral scepticism,
the claim that there are no objective values. Richard Joyce has recently defended a version or variant of moral scepticism
by invoking an instrumentalist theory like Williams’. I argue that this is a serious strategic mistake.
相似文献
David PhillipsEmail: |
9.
Phillip Montague 《Philosophia》2009,37(1):125-131
This paper is a rejoinder to Thaddeus Metz’s article “Censure Theory Still Best Accounts for Punishment of the Guilty: Reply
to Montague.” In his article, Metz attempts to answer objections to censure theory that I had raised previously. I argue in
my rejoinder that Metz’s defense of censure theory remains seriously problematic despite what he says in his reply.
相似文献
Phillip MontagueEmail: |
10.
Per Sandin 《Philosophia》2009,37(1):153-167
This paper discusses the application of the supreme emergency doctrine from just-war theory to non-antagonistic threats. Two
versions of the doctrine are considered: Michael Walzer’s communitarian version and Brian Orend’s prudential one. I investigate
first whether the doctrines are applicable to non-antagonistic threats, and second whether they are defensible. I argue that
a version of Walzer’s doctrine seems to be applicable to non-antagonistic threats, but that it is very doubtful whether the
doctrine is defensible. I also argue that Orend’s version of the doctrine is applicable to non-antagonistic threats, but that
his account is not defensible, regardless of whether the threats are antagonistic or not.
相似文献
Per SandinEmail: |
11.
Bas van der Vossen 《Res Publica》2008,14(4):299-302
In this paper I respond to Bernd Krehoff’s article ‘Legitimate Political Authority and Sovereignty: Why States Cannot Be the
Whole Story’. I criticize Krehoff’s use of Raz’s theory of authority to evaluate the legitimacy of our political institutions.
Krehoff argues that states cannot (always) claim exclusive authority and therefore cannot possess exclusive legitimacy. Although
I agree with his conclusion, I argue that the questions of legitimacy and (Razian) authority are distinct and that we need
to focus more on the former in order to really support and defend Krehoff’s conclusions.
相似文献
Bas van der VossenEmail: |
12.
Peter-Paul Verbeek 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2008,7(3):387-395
This article investigates the types of intentionality involved in human–technology relations. It aims to augment Don Ihde’s
analysis of the relations between human beings and technological artifacts, by analyzing a number of concrete examples at
the limits of Ihde’s analysis. The article distinguishes and analyzes three types of “cyborg intentionality,” which all involve
specific blends of the human and the technological. Technologically mediated intentionality occurs when human intentionality takes place “through” technological artifacts; hybrid intentionality occurs when the technological actually merges with the human; and composite intentionality is the addition of human intentionality and the intentionality of technological artifacts.
相似文献
Peter-Paul VerbeekEmail: |
13.
Melissa Frankel 《Philosophia》2009,37(3):409-413
This is a response to Stavroula Glezakos’ commentary on my paper, in which I address three main points: (1) whether Berkeley
is entitled to argue via inference to the best explanation, (2) whether Berkeley’s likeness principle might be too strict,
and (3) whether the texts support my reading.
相似文献
Melissa FrankelEmail: |
14.
Hannah Ginsborg 《Philosophical Studies》2008,137(1):65-77
I criticize recent nonconceptualist readings of Kant’s account of perception on the grounds that the strategy of the Deduction
requires that understanding be involved in the synthesis of imagination responsible for the intentionality of perceptual experience.
I offer an interpretation of the role of understanding in perceptual experience as the consciousness of normativity in the
association of one’s representations. This leads to a reading of Kant which is conceptualist, but in a way which accommodates
considerations favoring nonconceptualism, in particular the primitive character of perceptual experience relative to thought
and judgment.
相似文献
Hannah GinsborgEmail: |
15.
Roger Foster 《Continental Philosophy Review》2007,40(2):187-204
I argue that the reflections on language in Adorno and Heidegger have their common root in a modernist problematic that dissected
experience into ordinary experience, and transfiguring experiences that are beyond the capacity for expression of our language.
I argue that Adorno’s solution to this problem is the more resolutely “modernist” one, in that Adorno is more rigorous about
preserving the distinction between what can be said, and what strives for expression in language. After outlining the definitive
statement of this problematic in Nietzsche’s early epistemological writings, I outline Heidegger’s solution and subsequently
Adorno’s critique of Heidegger. Finally, I argue that situating Adorno within the modernist problem of language and expression
is crucial for making sense of his philosophy as a form of critical theory.
相似文献
Roger FosterEmail: |
16.
Jesse R. Steinberg 《Sophia》2007,46(1):1-5
Numerous examples have been offered that purportedly show that God cannot be omnipotent. I argue that a common response to
such examples (i.e., that failure to do the impossible does not indicate a lack of power) does not preserve God’s omnipotence
in the face of some of these examples. I consider another possible strategy for preserving God’s omnipotence in the face of
these examples and find it wanting.
相似文献
Jesse R. SteinbergEmail: |
17.
Marjorie Spear Price 《Philosophia》2008,36(1):129-140
According to the Particularist Theory of Events, events are real things that have a spatiotemporal location. I argue that
some events do not have a spatial location in the sense required by the theory. These events are ordinary, nonmental events
like Smith’s investigating the murder and Carol’s putting her coat on the chair. I discuss the significance of these counterexamples
for the theory.
相似文献
Marjorie Spear PriceEmail: |
18.
Skeptical Theism and God’s Commands 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Stephen Maitzen 《Sophia》2007,46(3):237-243
According to Michael Almeida and Graham Oppy, adherents of skeptical theism will find their sense of moral obligation undermined
in a potentially ‘appalling’ way. Michael Bergmann and Michael Rea disagree, claiming that God’s commands provide skeptical
theists with a source of moral obligation that withstands the skepticism in skeptical theism. I argue that Bergmann and Rea
are mistaken: skeptical theists cannot consistently rely on what they take to be God’s commands.
相似文献
Stephen MaitzenEmail: |
19.
Luca Incurvati 《Erkenntnis》2008,69(2):261-274
Leon Horsten has recently claimed that the class of mathematical truths coincides with the class of theorems of ZFC. I argue
that the naturalistic character of Horsten’s proposal undermines his contention that this claim constitutes an analogue of
a thesis that Daniel Isaacson has advanced for PA. I argue, moreover, that Horsten’s defence of his claim against an obvious
objection makes use of a distinction which is not available to him given his naturalistic approach. I suggest a way out of
the objection which is in line with the naturalistic spirit of Horsten’s proposal but which further weakens the analogy with
Isaacson’s Thesis. I conclude by evaluating the prospects for providing an analogue of Isaacson’s Thesis for ZFC.
相似文献
Luca IncurvatiEmail: |
20.
Husserl’s Discovery of Philosophical Discourse 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Robert Sokolowski 《Husserl Studies》2008,24(3):167-175
Husserl’s Idea of Phenomenology is his first systematic attempt to show how phenomenology differs from natural science and in particular psychology. He does
this by the phenomenological reduction. One of his achievements is to show that the formal structures of intentionality are
more akin to logic than to psychology. I claim that Husserl’s argument can be made more intuitive if we consider phenomenology
to be the study of truth rather than knowledge, and if we see the reduction as primarily a modification in our vocabulary
and discourse and not as simply a change in attitude. I briefly compare Husserl’s concept of philosophy with those of Plato
and Kant.
相似文献
Robert SokolowskiEmail: |