Does Semantics Need Normativity? Comments on Allan Gibbard,Meaning and Normativity

In the book Gibbard proposes, first, that statements about meaning are normative statements and, second, that they can be given an expressivist treatment, along the lines of Gibbard’s preferred metaethics. In my paper, I examine the first step: The claim that meaning statements are to be construed as being normative, as involving ‘oughts’. Gibbard distinguishes two versions of the normativity of meaning thesis – a weak version, according to which every means implies an ought, and a strong version, according to which for every means, there is an ought that implies it. I argue that neither thesis withstands scrutiny. The weak thesis depends on assumptions about the notion of semantic correctness that the anti-normativist rejects, and the strong thesis does not solve the problems Gibbard wants it to solve: the problems of indeterminacy and meaning skepticism. I conclude that semantics does not need normativity.     

Robustness of Additive Value Function Methods in MCDM

A simulation model is constructed of choice between a discrete number of non-dominated alternatives. The long-run goals of the decision maker are assumed to be consistent with a hypothetical preference structure which satisfies assumptions of completeness, transitivity and additive independence for an ideal set of criteria. The use of additive value functions to aid the decision maker in this choice is simulated for a variety of contexts and under a number of non-idealities such as the omission of criteria, confounding of criteria and inconsistent responses. It is found that ideal preference orderings are well identified by additive value functions provided that the non-idealities are moderate and that sufficient effort is put into modelling changing marginal values for different levels of performance. One of the potentially most sensitive areas is that of shifts in the decision maker's reference points as a result of the types of preference information asked.     

Variants of uncertainty

In contrast to formal theories of judgement and decision, which employ a single notion of probability, psychological analyses of responses to uncertainty reveal a wide variety of processes and experiences, which may follow different rules. Elementary forms of expectation and surprise in perception are reviewed. A phenomenological analysis is described, which distinguishes external attributions of uncertainty (disposition) from internal attributions of uncertainty (ignorance). Assessments of uncertainty can be made in different modes, by focusing on frequencies, propensities, the strength of arguments, or direct experiences of confidence. These variants of uncertainty are associated with different expressions in natural language; they are also suggestive of competing philosophical interpretations of probability.     

Nietzsche and the origin of the idea of modernism

This paper combines a phenomenological account of the types of causal transaction found in social reality with a critique of two theories, one structuralist and one Marxist, that contravene it. Part I argues that there are three types of causal transaction in social life in addition to physical causal transactions: people bringing about states of affairs by acting, states of affairs bringing about actions by inducing responses, and entities and states of affairs bringing about what makes sense to people to do by making certain factors determine this. It is also contended that social formations and structures cause actions and other social formations/structures only by way of participating in these types of transaction. The conditions under which this occurs are discussed. Part II criticizes Peter Blau's account of structural effects and Jean‐Paul Sartre's version of a materialist theory of history, two theories that either advocate or require causal transactions between social structures/ formations which do not reduce to transactions of the types described in Part I. The paper concludes by suggesting that social entities that make actions possible do not thereby cause them.     

Kuhn’s notion of scientific progress: “Reduction” between incommensurable theories in a rigid structuralist framework

In the last two sections of Structure, Thomas Kuhn first develops his famous threefold conception of the incommensurability of scientific paradigms and, subsequently, a conception of scientific progress as growth of empirical strength. The latter conception seems to be at odds with the former in that semantic incommensurability appears to imply the existence of situations where scientific progress in Kuhns sense can no longer exist. In contrast to this seeming inconsistency of Kuhns conception, we will try to show in this study that the semantic incommensurability of scientific terms appears to be fully compatible with scientific progress. Our argumentation is based on an improved version of the formalization of Kuhns conception as developed in the 1970s by Joseph Sneed and Wolfgang Stegmüller: In order to be comparable, incommensurable theories need the specification of relations that refer to the concrete ontologies of these theories and involve certain truth claims. The original structuralist account of reduction fails to provide such relations, because (1) it is too structural and (2) it is too wide. Moreover, the original structuralist account also fails to cover important cases of incommensurable theories in being too restrictive for them. In this paper, we develop an improved notion of “reduction” that allows us to avoid these shortcomings by means of a more flexible device for the formalization of (partially reductive) relations between theories. For that purpose, we use a framework of rigid logic, i.e., logic that is based on a fixed collection of objects.     

Positive behavioral contrast when pigeons press treadles during multiple schedules

Pigeons were placed on multiple variable-interval 15-second variable-interval 15-second and on multiple variable-interval 15-second extinction schedules in which treadle presses produced food reinforcers. Positive behavioral contrast occurred. That is, rates of responding were higher during the variable-interval 15-second component when the other component was extinction than when it was another variable-interval 15-second schedule. These results contradict the findings of other studies, which failed to find positive contrast when pigeons pressed treadles for food reinforcers. They may also question the additive theories of behavioral contrast that predict that contrast should not occur in this situation.     

Negative behavioral contrast on multiple treadle-press schedules

Eight pigeons pressed treadles for food reinforcers delivered by several multiple variable-interval schedules. The rate of reinforcement for responding during one component schedule was held constant at 30 reinforcers per hour. The rate of reinforcement for responding during the other component varied from 0 to 120 or 240 reinforcers per hour. The schedules were presented in different orders for different subjects. The rate of responding emitted during the variable component schedule varied directly with the rate of reinforcement it provided. The rate of responding during the constant component did not increase consistently when the rate of reinforcement obtained from the variable component decreased from 30 to 0 reinforcers per hr. The rate of responding emitted during the constant component decreased when the rate of reinforcement obtained from the variable component increased from 30 reinforcers per hour to a higher rate. That is, negative but not positive behavioral contrast occurred. The failure to find positive contrast is consistent with one of the predictions of the additive theories of behavioral contrast. Finding negative contrast has ambiguous implications for the additive theories.     

Exploring the set-theoretical structure of objects by additive trees

Arrangements of feature sets that have been proposed to represent qualitative and quantitative variation among objects are shown to generate identical sets of set-symmetric distances. The set-symmetric distances for these feature arrangements can be represented by path lengths in an additive linear tree. Imperfect versions of these feature arrangements are proposed, which also are indistinguishable by the set-symmetric distance model. The distances for the imperfect versions can be represented by path lengths in an additive imperfectly linear tree. When dissimilarities are defined by the more general contrast model and a constant may be added to proximity data, then for both the perfect and imperfect arrangements an additive tree analysis obtains a perfect fit with an imperfectly linear tree. However, in the case of the contrast model also the distinction between the perfect and imperfect arrangements disappears in that also for the perfect arrangements the resulting tree need no longer be linear.The author is grateful to Mathieu Koppen for detailed comments on an earlier version of this article.     

Aristotle's Aesthetic Ethics

It is sometimes asked whether virtue ethics can be assimilated by Kantianism or utilitarianism, or if it is a distinct position. A look at Aristotle's ethics shows that it certanly can be distinct. In particular, Aristotle presents us with an ethics of aesthetics in contrast to the more standard ethics of cognition: A virtuous agent identifies the right actions by their aesthetic qualities. Moreover, the agent's concern with her own aesthetic character gives us a key to the important role the emotions play for Aristotle, which further distinguishes him from the other two theories we have mentioned.     

Theorienreduktion in den Sozialwissenschaften. Eine Fallstudie am Beispiel der Balancetheorien

Theory Reduction in the Social Sciences. The example of balance theories. A central topic both in philosophy of science as well as in the empirical sciences is the reconstruction of the relations between theories. In the past comparisons of theories by means of traditional linguistic methods have proved to be extremely difficult and complicated. In this article the reconstruction of intertheoretical relations based on model-theoretical terms is propagated, as formulated within the structuralist view of theories. The efficiency of a model theoretical based comparison of theories is demonstrated by two theory elements from the social science research program of balance theories: The basic element by Heider and the transitivity theory by Holland and Leinhardt. First of all both theory elements are introduced informally and reconstructed in the structuralist format. On the basis of these reconstructions can be shown, that the Heider theory can be formally reduced to the Holland-Leinhardt theory and that the theory younger in history means an improvement. However, an integration of all balance theoretical elements into a theory net is not possible. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Emergence of response‐response relations

The present study examined whether bidirectional response‐response relations could be established without direct reinforcement. In AB training for 12 undergraduates, higher rates of touches to a white circle on the monitor screen (A1) produced two stimuli (B1 and B2) on half of the trials, whereas lower rates (A2) produced the same effect on the other half. Choosing one of the two stimuli was reinforced according to the preceding responding (A1B1 and A2B2). In BC training, touching a stimulus (B1 or B2) produced three white circles lined up horizontally on the screen, after which one of two different response sequences to the circles (left‐center‐right, C1 or C2, and right‐center‐left, C2 or C1) were reinforced, depending on the stimulus presented (B1C1 and B2C2). After AB and BC relations were established, 11 of 12 participants showed the emergence of untrained relations (BA, CB, AC, and CA) throughout five test sessions, and the remaining participant showed it in the first four test sessions. These response‐response relations were replicated with five other undergraduates and different trained relations.     

Global Supervenience, Coincident Entities and Anti-Individualism

Theodore Sider distinguishes two notions of global supervenience: strong global supervenience and weak global supervenience. He then discusses some applications to general metaphysical questions. Most interestingly, Sider employs the weak notion in order to undermine a familiar argument against coincident distinct entities. In what follows, I reexamine the two notions and distinguish them from a third, intermediate, notion (intermediate global supervenience). I argue that (a) weak global supervenience is not an adequate notion of dependence; (b) weak global supervenience does not capture certain assumptions about coincidence relations; (c) these assumptions are better accommodated by the stronger notion of intermediate global supervenience; (d) intermediate global supervenience, however, is also not an adequate notion of dependence; and (e) strong global supervenience is an adequate notion of dependence. It also fits in with anti-individualism about the mental. It does not, however, serve to rebut arguments against coincident entities.     

Existential Import in Cartesian Semantics

The paper explores the existential import of universal affirmative in Descartes, Arnauld and Malebranche. Descartes holds, inconsistently, that eternal truths are true even if the subject term is empty but that a proposition with a false idea as subject is false. Malebranche extends Descartes’ truth-conditions for eternal truths, which lack existential import, to all knowledge, allowing only for non-propositional knowledge of contingent existence. Malebranche's rather implausible Neoplatonic semantics is detailed as consisting of three key semantic relations: illumination by which God's ideas cause mental terms, creation by which God's ideas cause material substances by a kind of ‘ontic privation’, and sensation in which brain events occasion states of mental awareness. In contrast, Arnauld distinguishes two types of propositions – necessary and contingent – with distinct truth-conditions, one with and one without existential import. Arnauld's more modern semantics is laid out as a theory of reference that substitutes earlier causal accounts with one that adapts the medieval notion of objective being. His version anticipates modern notions of intentional content and appeals in its ontology only to substances and their modes.     

Standing in the Last Ditch: On the Communicative Intentions of Fiction Makers

Some of us have suggested that what fiction makers do is offer us things to imagine, that this is what is distinctive of fiction and what distinguishes it from narrative‐based but assertive activities such as journalism or history. Some of us hold, further, that it is the maker's intention which confers fictional status. Many, I think, feel the intuitive appeal of this idea at the same time as they sense looming problems for any proposal about fiction's nature based straightforwardly on the identification of fiction with the to‐be‐imagined. I formulate a very weak version of the proposal which is not vulnerable to some objections recently presented. My formulation is in terms of supervenience. But while this version is weak, it is also quite precise, and its precision brings into view certain other problems which have not so far been attended to. To the extent that these problems are serious, the prospects for an intentional theory of fiction look, I am sorry to say, poor; the version susceptible to the objections is weak, and anything weaker still but not so susceptible could hardly be thought of as a theory of fiction, though it might supplement such a theory.     

Causal Relata: Tokens, Types, or Variables?

The literature on causation distinguishes between causal claims relating properties or types and causal claims relating individuals or tokens. Many authors maintain that corresponding to these two kinds of causal claims are two different kinds of causal relations. Whether to regard causal relations among variables as yet another variety of causation is also controversial. This essay maintains that causal relations obtain among tokens and that type causal claims are generalizations concerning causal relations among these tokens.     

Integration of Two Skeptical Emotion Theories: Dimensional Appraisal Theory and Russell's Psychological Construction Theory

This inquiry attempts to integrate two skeptical emotion theories: dimensional appraisal theory and Russell's (2003) psychological construction theory. To bring out the skeptical elements of these theories, I compare them first with two classic theories: affect program theory and discrete appraisal theory. The skeptical theories are similar to each other in that they replace the concept of emotion with the concept of emotional episode, and that they organize the variety within the set of emotional episodes according to dimensions instead of vernacular emotion subsets. Their differences concern the strength of the relations among the components in emotional episodes and the scientific status of the set of emotional episodes. To make an informed decision about the elements to keep and to revise from both theories, I engage in a separate analysis of the behavior-related components and the experience component, guided by insights from general behavior theories and general theories of consciousness. The analysis of the behavior-related components suggests the relatively uncharted idea that the so-called emotional aspect of behavior can be caused by a goal-directed mechanism. The analysis of the experience component reveals that different theories have emphasized different aspects of experience and hence different paths toward experience. The inquiry ends with an integrated theory that rejects the scientific status of emotions or emotional episodes, but accepts the scientific status of the components and sees strong causal relations among them.     

Theories of mind in infancy

This paper reviews and evaluates various theories of the origins of theory of mind in infancy. In what a theory of mind consists is first considered. It is argued that any theory of mind has two important features. Firstly, a theory of mind recognizes, at least, the existence of psychological relations between agents and objects, including some relations which involve “action at a distance”. Secondly, in a theory of mind, self and other are equivalent in that both can act equally as agents of psychological relations. Any theory of the development of theory of mind must explicate how it is possible to acquire an understanding of these two features. With this requirement in mind, four main types of recent theories are considered — modularity theories, Piagetian theories, matching theories, and intersubjectivity theories. While no decision is made amongst these theories, suggestions for further improvement in theorizing on this topic are presented.     

Fettering, Development and Revolution

In this article, I contrast two theories of history: a Marxist theory (that of G. A. Cohen) and an anarchist theory. Both theories, in their respective attempts at explaining epochal transitions, seem to require some plausible construal of Marx's claim that revolutions occur when a society's economic relations 'fetter' the development of its productive forces. From an examination of a number of different construals of 'fettering'—'development fettering', 'use fettering', 'ACRU fettering', 'net fettering', and even 'forfeitur'—I conclude that none of them supports the Marxist theory of revolution, while each is consistent with the anarchist theory of epochal transformation.