Why people fail to recognize their own incompetence

Successful negotiation of everyday life would seem to require people to possess insight about deficiencies in their intellectual and social skills. However, people tend to be blissfully unaware of their incompetence. This lack of awareness arises because poor performers are doubly cursed: Their lack of skill deprives them not only of the ability to produce correct responses, but also of the expertise necessary to surmise that they are not producing them. People base their perceptions of performance, in part, on their preconceived notions about their skills. Because these notions often do not correlate with objective performance, they can lead people to make judgments about their performance that have little to do with actual accomplishment.     

Perceiving while acting: action affects perception

In two experiments we studied how motor responses affect stimulus encoding when stimuli and responses are functionally unrelated and merely overlap in time. Such R-S effects across S-R assignments have been reported by Schubö, Aschersleben, and Prinz (2001), who found that stimulus encoding was affected by concurrent response execution in the sense of a contrast (i.e., emphasizing differences). The present study aimed at elucidating the mechanisms underlying this effect. Experiment 1 studied the time course of the R-S effect. Contrast was only obtained for short intertrial intervals (ITIs). With long ITIs contrast turned into assimilation (i.e., emphasizing similarities). Experiment 2 excluded an interpretation of the assimilation effect in terms of motor repetition. Our findings support the notion of a shared representational domain for perception and action control, and suggest that contrast between stimulus and response codes emerges when two S-R assignments compete with each other in perception. When perceptual competition is over, assimilation emerges in memory.     

Your own actions influence how you perceive other people: A misattribution of action appraisals

The attribution of personal traits to other persons depends on the actions the observer performs at the same time (Bach & Tipper, 2007). Here, we show that the effect reflects a misattribution of appraisals of the observers’ own actions to the actions of others. We exploited spatial compatibility effects to manipulate how fluently—how fast and how accurately—participants identified two individuals performing sporty or academic actions. The traits attributed to each person in a subsequent rating task depended on the fluency of participants’ responses in a specific manner. An individual more fluently identified while performing the academic action appeared more academic and less sporty. An individual more fluently identified while performing the sporty action appeared sportier. Thus, social perception is—at least partially—embodied. The ease of our own responses can be misattributed to the actions of others, affecting which personal traits are attributed to them.     

Your own actions influence how you perceive other people: A misattribution of action appraisals

The attribution of personal traits to other persons depends on the actions the observer performs at the same time (Bach & Tipper, 2007). Here, we show that the effect reflects a misattribution of appraisals of the observers' own actions to the actions of others. We exploited spatial compatibility effects to manipulate how fluently-how fast and how accurately-participants identified two individuals performing sporty or academic actions. The traits attributed to each person in a subsequent rating task depended on the fluency of participants' responses in a specific manner. An individual more fluently identified while performing the academic action appeared more academic and less sporty. An individual more fluently identified while performing the sporty action appeared sportier. Thus, social perception is-at least partially-embodied. The ease of our own responses can be misattributed to the actions of others, affecting which personal traits are attributed to them.     

Perceiving virtual geographical slant: action influences perception

In 4 experiments, the authors varied the extent and nature of participant movement in a virtual environment to examine the influence of action on estimates of geographical slant. Previous studies showed that people consciously overestimate hill slant but can still accurately guide an action toward the hill (D. R. Proffitt, M. Bhalla, R. Gossweiler, & J. Midgett, 1995). Related studies suggest that one's potential to act may influence perception of slant and that distinct representations may independently inform perceptual and motoric responses. The authors found that in all conditions, perceptual judgments were overestimated and motoric adjustments were more accurate. The virtual environment allowed manipulation of the effort required to walk up simulated hills. Walking with the effort appropriate to the visual slant led to increased perceptual overestimation of slant compared with active walking with the effort appropriate to level ground, while visually guided actions remained accurate.     

Knowing how they feel: Perceiving emotions felt by outgroups

Individuals can often accurately perceive others’ emotions in a purely interpersonal context. However, when people identify with an important ingroup, they experience distinctive patterns of emotion [Smith, E. R., Seger, C. R., & Mackie, D. M. (2007). Can emotions be truly group-level? Evidence regarding four conceptual criteria. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 93, 431-446]. Thus, in three studies using a variety of meaningful groups, we examine how a salient distinction between groups might influence people’s ability to estimate the emotions of outgroup members. Participants demonstrated substantial though imperfect accuracy in estimating the emotions reported by outgroups. Specific biases affected their estimates, especially the overlap of perceived emotions of the outgroup with the ingroup’s own emotions. Furthermore, there was a general overprediction of outgroups’ negative emotions and underprediction of their positive emotions. Because of the importance of an outgroup’s emotions as potential causes of their behavior, accuracy and biases in group emotion estimation may be consequential for intergroup relations.     

Perceiving by proxy: Effect-based action control with unperceivable effects

Anticipations of future sensory events have the potential of priming motor actions that would typically cause these events. Such effect anticipations are generally assumed to rely on previous physical experiences of the contingency of own actions and their ensuing effects. Here we propose that merely imagined action effects may influence behaviour similarly as physically experienced action effects do. Three experiments in the response–effect compatibility paradigm show that the mere knowledge of action–effect contingencies is indeed sufficient to incorporate these effects into action control even if the effects are never experienced as causally linked to own actions. The experiments further highlight constraints for this mechanism which seems to be rather effortful and to depend on explicit intentions.     

Perceiving motion while moving: how pairwise nominal invariants make optical flow cohere

Computer-generated sequences simulated observer movement toward 10 randomly placed poles, 1 moving and 9 stationary. When observers judged their direction of movement, or heading, they used 3 related invariants: The (a) convergence and (b) decelerating divergence of any 2 poles specified that heading was to the outside of the nearer pole, and the (c) crossover of 2 poles specified that heading was to the outside of the farther pole. With all poles stationary, the field of 45 pairwise movements yielded a coherent specification of heading. With I pole moving with respect to the others, however, the field could yield an incoherent heading solution. Such incoherence was readily detectable; similar pole motion leading to coherent flow, however, was less readily detectable.     

Children's developing understanding of differences between their own intentional action and passive movement

Four studies examined 3‐ and 4‐year‐olds' ability to judge accurately whether they acted intentionally. Children self‐initiated action to attain an outcome, or their arm was moved by the experimenter to create an outcome. In Experiment 3, children in both age groups accurately claimed they were agents of self‐guided action but not of passive movement. In contrast, in Experiments 1, 2 and 4, children in both age groups found it difficult to deny they intended to bring about the outcome, even though their movement was passive and, in some cases, the outcome was unexpected. They were consistently successful only when exclusively involved in creating one of two outcomes and asked which one they intended (Experiment 4). In sum, 3‐and 4‐year‐olds can distinguish when their movements are self‐directed and when they are passive. They are limited, however, in applying this distinction to self‐judgments concerning whether they acted intentionally. These findings are discussed with respect to linguistic and cognitive limitations that may influence the role first‐person knowledge plays in theory‐of‐mind development.     

Born in the USA: how immigrant generation shapes meritocracy and its relation to ethnic identity and collective action

Endorsing meritocracy can make low-status group members more accepting of inequality. This study examined whether rejecting meritocracy is related to increased ethnic identification among Latino immigrants, and whether identity in turn is related to increased support for collective action. We hypothesize that these relationships depend upon immigrant generation. A survey was conducted with 184 first- and second-generation Latino immigrants in New York City. Second-generation Latinos endorsed meritocracy less than those in the first generation, at least in part because they perceived that other Americans viewed their group in a less positive light (i.e., lower public regard). Further, meritocracy was negatively linked to ethnic identity and, through it, support for collective action among the second generation. Among the first generation, meritocracy was not related to ethnic identity and was positively related to support for collective action. We discuss the implications of growing up near the bottom of the U.S. social hierarchy for ethnic identity and collective action.     

Fired managers: Experiences from their own unemployment

This paper purports to enhance the understanding of stress and its effects on unemployed executives. The idea that unemployed managers perceive and confront stress differently from their employed colleagues is addressed. A sampling of 32 unemployed executives and managers was taken using The Stress Profile, to survey reasons for stress, coping ability, and response to stress. The profiled samples were then compared to a comparison group of 367 employed managers. The results showed that unemployed managers, when compared to their employed associates, tended to have less desireable family situations, more worries about finances, decreased perception of self and self-coherence, decreased coping ability, and heightened emotional and behavioral reaction to stress. The conclusion was that when dealing with stressors, unemployed managers experienced a decreased sense of psychological well-being and coping abilities as compared to employed managers.     

Social identity gratifications of social network sites and their impact on collective action participation

Collective action has been studied by social psychologists for over a century. Social network sites such as Facebook have further extended the ability of individuals to instigate social, political and organizational change, and provide a new context in which to study collective action. Drawing on social identity theory (SIT), self‐categorization theory (SCT) and uses and gratifications theory (UGT), this study explores the role of individuals’ group identification, social identity gratifications (SIG) and Facebook group use intensity on their willingness to participate in collective actions instigated through a Facebook group. Members of a Facebook group representing a cause against management completed an online survey (N = 406). Factor analyses reveal that motivations based on psychological affiliation with the group explained the most variance for Facebook group use. Moreover, compared to Facebook group use intensity, SIG were the stronger mediator between group identification and willingness to participate in collective action. The study demonstrates the utility of blending concepts from SIT, SCT and UGT to explore how socially motivated uses of the media can predict collective actions.     

Living large: the powerful overestimate their own height

In three experiments, we tested the prediction that individuals' experience of power influences their perceptions of their own height. High power, relative to low power, was associated with smaller estimates of a pole's height relative to the self (Experiment 1), with larger estimates of one's own height (Experiment 2), and with choice of a taller avatar to represent the self in a second-life game (Experiment 3). These results emerged regardless of whether power was experientially primed (Experiments 1 and 3) or manipulated through assigned roles (Experiment 2). Although a great deal of research has shown that more physically imposing individuals are more likely to acquire power, this work is the first to show that powerful people feel taller than they are. The discussion considers the implications for existing and future research on the physical experience of power.     

Perceiving possibilities for action: on the necessity of calibration and perceptual learning for the visual guidance of action

Tasks such as steering, braking, and intercepting moving objects constitute a class of behaviors, known as visually guided actions, which are typically carried out under continuous control on the basis of visual information. Several decades of research on visually guided action have resulted in an inventory of control laws that describe for each task how information about the sufficiency of one's current state is used to make ongoing adjustments. Although a considerable amount of important research has been generated within this framework, several aspects of these tasks that are essential for successful performance cannot be captured. The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of the existing framework, discuss its limitations, and introduce a new framework that emphasizes the necessity of calibration and perceptual learning. Within the proposed framework, successful human performance on these tasks is a matter of learning to detect and calibrate optical information about the boundaries that separate possible from impossible actions. This resolves a long-lasting incompatibility between theories of visually guided action and the concept of an affordance. The implications of adopting this framework for the design of experiments and models of visually guided action are discussed.     

Hoisted by their own petards: Philosophical positions that self-destruct

Philosophers have not resisted temptation to transgress against the logic of their own conceptual structures. Self-undermining position-taking is an occupational hazard. Philosophy stands in need of conceptual therapy.The author describes three conceptions of philosophy: the narcissistic, disputatious, and therapeutic. (i) Narcissistic philosophy is hermetic, believing itself to contain all evidence that can possibly be relevant to it. Philosophy undertaken in this spirit has led to defensive, monadically isolated positions. (ii) Disputatious philosophies are fundamentally question-begging, animated by assumptions that philosophical adversaries reject. (iii) The intention of therapeutic philosophy is to study philosophical positions from the standpoint of their internal consistency, or lack of it. In particular, its interest is in positions that either compel assent, because they cannot be rejected without self-referential inconsistency, or self-destruct because self-referential inconsistency cannot be avoided. The article's focus is on the latter. Several examples of self-undermining positions are drawn from the history of philosophy, exemplifying two main varieties of self-referential inconsistency: pragmatical and projective.     

Perceiving patterns in dynamic action sequences: Investigating the processes underpinning stimulus recognition and anticipation skill

We examined whether skilled and less‐skilled participants process dynamic sequences comprised of numerous elements using relational information or specific display features. Moreover, the processes underpinning anticipation and recognition judgments were compared. Participants viewed dynamic film sequences showing multiple display features and anticipated what would happen next. New and previously viewed action sequences were then presented in film or point‐light display format. Participants attempted to recognize previously viewed sequences. Skilled participants demonstrated superior anticipation skill and were more sensitive in discriminating previously viewed and novel clips than their less‐skilled counterparts. Skilled participants fixated more locations than less‐skilled participants, implying that they process dynamic scenes as a series of relations between display features. The patterns of eye fixation measures differed between the anticipation and recognition tasks suggesting that different processes underpin these two types of judgments. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.