自我欺骗实证研究述评

自我欺骗的施骗者和受骗者都是自我。这个特殊性导致自我欺骗的定义、类型、研究范式和机制等存在着争议。在系统梳理自我欺骗相关实证研究的基础上,比较了自我欺骗不同的定义和不同的研究范式,提出了两种新的自我欺骗分类方法,探析了自我欺骗的心理机制,以期为后续研究提供借鉴和参考。     

自我欺骗：通过欺骗自己更好地欺骗他人

心理学的研究几乎都把自欺看作一种个体特质, 主要探讨自欺对个体自身的作用。而在进化的理论框架中, 自欺是一种人际交往的策略, 目的是为了更好地欺骗其他个体。由于直接欺骗有可能被对方识破, 个体把自己欺骗之后就可以“诚实地”向对方传递错误信息而不被察觉。这就把自欺定义为人际间而非个体内的概念。本文系统地阐述人际间自欺的概念和思路, 并为之在心理学的研究中提出一套理论假设和研究方法。在理论上, 由于难以区别通过自欺的欺骗和直接的欺骗, 本文提出一系列假设和条件来证明自欺的存在, 这些条件包括欺骗双方的地位高低、道德高低、和人数多寡。因为自欺是用来应付高欺骗探测压力的, 上述条件可以反映被骗对象的欺骗探测能力的高低。在方法上, 本文提出采用两次回忆的方式来展现自欺, 第一次回忆时欺骗动机存在, 个体在诚实的状态下提供较少真实信息, 第二次回忆时欺骗动机消失, 个体可以提供较多真实信息, 通过比较两次回忆内容的差异来验证自欺的存在。这一操作方法突破了个体间自欺因缺乏操作定义而无法进行心理学研究的屏障, 为人们探讨人际间自欺提供了一条可行途径。     

自我欺骗实证研究述评

自我欺骗的施骗者和受骗者都是自我。这个特殊性导致自我欺骗的定义、类型、研究范式和机制等存在着争议。在系统梳理自我欺骗相关实证研究的基础上,比较了自我欺骗不同的定义和不同的研究范式,提出了两种新的自我欺骗分类方法,探析了自我欺骗的心理机制,以期为后续研究提供借鉴和参考。     

Self-deception and self-knowledge

The aim of this paper is to provide an account of a certain variety of self-deception based on a model of self-knowledge. According to this model, one thinks that one has a belief on the basis of one’s grounds for that belief. If this model is correct, then our thoughts about which beliefs we have should be in accordance with our grounds for those beliefs. I suggest that the relevant variety of self-deception is a failure of self-knowledge wherein the subject violates this epistemic obligation. I argue that construing this type of self-deception as a failure of self-knowledge explains two important aspects of it: The tension that we observe between the subject’s speech and her actions, and our inclination to hold the subject responsible for her condition. I compare this proposal with two other approaches to self-deception in the literature; intentionalism and motivationalism. Intentionalism explains the two aspects of self-deception but it runs into the so-called ‘paradoxes’ of self-deception. Motivationalism avoids those paradoxes but it cannot explain the two aspects of self-deception.     

The evolution and psychology of self-deception

In this article we argue that self-deception evolved to facilitate interpersonal deception by allowing people to avoid the cues to conscious deception that might reveal deceptive intent. Self-deception has two additional advantages: It eliminates the costly cognitive load that is typically associated with deceiving, and it can minimize retribution if the deception is discovered. Beyond its role in specific acts of deception, self-deceptive self-enhancement also allows people to display more confidence than is warranted, which has a host of social advantages. The question then arises of how the self can be both deceiver and deceived. We propose that this is achieved through dissociations of mental processes, including conscious versus unconscious memories, conscious versus unconscious attitudes, and automatic versus controlled processes. Given the variety of methods for deceiving others, it should come as no surprise that self-deception manifests itself in a number of different psychological processes, and we discuss various types of self-deception. We then discuss the interpersonal versus intrapersonal nature of self-deception before considering the levels of consciousness at which the self can be deceived. Finally, we contrast our evolutionary approach to self-deception with current theories and debates in psychology and consider some of the costs associated with self-deception.     

认认知模糊程度和动机强度对有意识和无意识自我欺骗的影响

三个实验分别探讨了无意识和有意识自我欺骗存在的可能性, 以及认知模糊程度与动机强度对两种自我欺骗的影响。实验1的结果发现, 自我欺骗存在无意识和有意识两种形式; 实验2的结果发现, 随着认知模糊程度的降低, 无意识自我欺骗人数明显减少, 而有意识自我欺骗人数显著增加; 实验3的结果发现, 随着动机强度的增加, 有意识自我欺骗人数显著增多, 无意识自我欺骗人数并无显著变化。结果提示, 自我欺骗具有现实存在性, 且有两种不同形式; 两种形式自我欺骗具有不同的产生机制。     

The association between self-deception and moral self-concept as functions of self-consciousness

Regulated by self-consciousness, self-deception is a part of the self-system that suppresses negative aspects of the self and maintains a positive moral self-concept. We tested this evolutionary hypothesis on 166 college students by measuring self-deception using both a questionnaire and a series of hypothetical helping scenarios. The results showed a positive correlation between self-deception and moral self-concept, which was moderated by private self-consciousness. Among participants with high, but not low, self-consciousness, high moral self-concept individuals were more willing to help when potential self-benefits were present than low moral self-concept individuals, whereas there was no difference between the two groups concerning helping without self-benefit. These results support the evolutionary view that self-deception serves to maintain optimal moral self-concept, especially for individuals with high self-consciousness.     

Self-Deception Needs No Explaining

How can one deceive oneself if at the same time one knows the truth? The idea of such a thing has puzzled philosophers, and many philosophical efforts have been devoted to explaining the puzzle. Yet all such attempts have been misplaced. For in fact there is nothing distinctive about the way the mind works in self-deception, nothing that needs special explaining. The perception of a puzzle arises from certain mistaken assumptions about how the mind works generally. Once this is explained, we see that the way the mind works in self-deception embodies no deviation from the norm. The aura of paradox then disappears, and we see that self-deception requires no special explanation of its own.     

Social strategies in self-deception

How do people deceive themselves? I argue that although self-deception tends to be conceptualized as something that happens ‘within an individual’, it can also be a process that is distributed across the social context of a self-deceiver. In this paper I will, first, conceptually distinguish different strategies of such ‘social self-deception’. Second, I will incorporate these into the two main conceptualizations of self-deception: intentionalism and deflationism. Finally, I will show how the proposed re-conceptualization of self-deception can be beneficial to conceptual, moral and empirical research.     

At "Permanent Risk": Reasoning and Self-Knowledge in Self-Deception

In this essay, I defend the following two claims: (1) reflective, critical reasoning is essential to the process of self-deception; and (2), the process of self-deception involves a certain characteristic error of self-knowledge. By appeal to (1) and (2). I hope to show that we can adjudicate the current dispute about the nature of self-deception between those we might term "traditionalists," and those we might term "deflationists."     

Self-deception as affective coping. An empirical perspective on philosophical issues

In the philosophical literature, self-deception is mainly approached through the analysis of paradoxes. Yet, it is agreed that self-deception is motivated by protection from distress. In this paper, we argue, with the help of findings from cognitive neuroscience and psychology, that self-deception is a type of affective coping.First, we criticize the main solutions to the paradoxes of self-deception. We then present a new approach to self-deception. Self-deception, we argue, involves three appraisals of the distressing evidence: (a) appraisal of the strength of evidence as uncertain, (b) low coping potential and (c) negative anticipation along the lines of Damasio’s somatic marker hypothesis. At the same time, desire impacts the treatment of flattering evidence via dopamine. Our main proposal is that self-deception involves emotional mechanisms provoking a preference for immediate reward despite possible long-term negative repercussions. In the last part, we use this emotional model to revisit the philosophical paradoxes.     

自我欺骗:为了调节个体心理状态

本研究旨在探索自我欺骗的研究方法、产生的原因和认知机制,以及这一领域中有待解决的新问题。近期研究发现:基于自我欺骗产生的动机特点,主要存在三类不同的定义方式,大多数心理学家是基于第三类定义来研究自我欺骗。研究方法上,适用性较强的自欺问卷是自欺性提升量表(SDE),操作性较强的经典实验范式是点追踪任务。在认知过程的任一阶段中,调节心理状态是个体产生自我欺骗的直接动机,改变个体的心理状态或对事物的模糊感知可能阻止个体自我欺骗的产生。未来应从如何调节个体心理状态的角度探讨和研究自我欺骗,能够利用点追踪任务,结合ERPs或fMRI技术为之后研究自欺产生的具体阶段、认知机制以及神经机制提供实证研究基础。     

The Ubiquity of Self-Deception

My paper is a discussion of Bas van Fraassen’s important, but neglected, paper on self-deception, “The Peculiar Effects of Love and Desire.” Paradoxes of self-deception are widely thought to follow from the ease with which we know ourselves. For example, if self-deception were intentional, how could we fail to know as target of our own deception just those things necessary to undermine the deception? Van Fraassen stands that reasoning on its head, arguing that is the ease with which we accuse ourselves of self-deception that undermines our confidence in our claims to know ourselves. I unpack and modify his argument, attempting to show that it makes a powerful case for scepticism about self-knowledge. I argue, contra van Fraassen, that local scepticism about self-knowledge threatens our claims to know ourselves in a way that global scepticism does not threaten our claims about the external world. I support this claim by showing that the Wittgensteinian response to the sceptic in On Certainty—that we don’t know what to do with the sceptic’s doubts, that we don’t know how to incorporate those doubts into our practices—does not succeed in deflecting scepticism about self-knowledge because the local sceptic’s doubts—about whether we can distinguish genuine claims to know ourselves from self-deceived claims—are integral to language game of self-knowledge. The local sceptic’s doubts are our doubts because it is natural to ask whether we are deceiving ourselves when we claim to know ourselves. However, because, we have no way of distinguishing genuine claims to know ourselves from self-deceived claims, our claims to self-knowledge are systematically undermined.     

Are self-deceivers enhancing positive affect or denying negative affect? Toward an understanding of implicit affective processes

Self-deception is an important construct in social, personality, and clinical literatures. Although historical and clinical views of self-deception have regarded it as defensive in nature and operation, modern views of this individual difference variable instead highlight its apparent benefits to subjective mental health. The present four studies reinforce the latter view by showing that self-deception predicts positive priming effects, but not negative priming effects, in reaction time tasks sensitive to individual differences in affective priming. In all studies, individuals higher in self-deception displayed stronger positive priming effects, defined in terms of facilitation with two positive stimuli in a consecutive sequence, but self-deception did not predict negative priming effects in the same tasks. Importantly, these effects occurred both in tasks that called for the retrieval of self-knowledge (Study 1) and those that did not (Studies 2–4). This broad pattern supports substantive views of self-deception rather than views narrowly focused on self-presentation processes. Implications for understanding self-deception are discussed.     

Self-deception's adaptive value: effects of positive thinking and the winner effect

There is a puzzle about why self-deception, a process that obscures the truth, is so pervasive in human behavior given that tracking the truth seems important for our survival and reproduction. William von Hippel and Robert Trivers argue that, despite appearances, there is good reason to think that self-deception is an adaptation by arguing: (1) self-deception leads to a positive self-perception and (2) a positive self-perception increases an individual's fitness. D.S. Neil Van Leeuwen, however, gives persuasive arguments against both steps. In response, we will defend both propositions, thereby supporting the conclusion that self-deception indeed has adaptive value. The first premise will be bolstered by a survey of the philosophical literature and empirical work on self-deception, whereas the second will be strengthened by empirical research on a behavioral phenomenon known as the winner effect.     

Self-deception and discrepancies in self-evaluation

Self-deception is an intricate psychological construct, grounded in relatively little empirical evidence as an individual difference variable. The present research offers a direct test of one of the central scales of self-deception—the Self-Deception Enhancement (SDE) scale—by comparing explicit and implicit self-evaluations. Using the Affect Misattribution Procedure (AMP), participants (N = 150) reported about their implicit self-evaluation. These ratings were compared to explicit self-reports about self-evaluation. Results showed that higher self-deception was associated with a larger discrepancy between explicit and implicit self-evaluations. Specifically, higher self-deception was associated with a more positive explicit self-evaluation but with a more negative implicit self-evaluation. These findings offer one of the first direct tests of the SDE, supporting its viability.     

Relationships between conscientiousness,self-efficacy,self-deception,and learning over time

The present study examined the dual mediating effects of self-efficacy and self-deception on the relationship between conscientiousness and learning over time. Data from 134 college students were used to investigate the relative impact of self-efficacy and self-deception. Consistent with the hypothesized model, conscientiousness was significantly and positively related to both early training self-efficacy and self-deception, and both self-efficacy and self-deception had significant effects on learning but in opposite directions. Furthermore, the relative impact of self-efficacy and self-deception on learning changed over time as expected. The negative effect of self-deception in early stages of training disappeared at later stages of training but the positive effects of self-efficacy remained. Support was not found for self-efficacy and self-deception as mediators of the conscientiousness-learning relationship.     

Is there evidence of robust,unconscious self-deception? A reply to Funkhouser and Barrett

Robust self-deception, in Funkhouser and Barrett’s sense, consists in the strategic pursuit of the goal of misleading oneself with respect to some proposition. Funkhouser and Barrett’s thesis is that an evaluation of the relevant empirical literatures reveals that the unconscious mind engages in robust self-deception. If Funkhouser and Barrett are correct, the psychological evidence vindicates an account of self-deception that challenges the orthodox motivationalist approach and makes clear the distinction between self-deception and other forms of motivated belief formation such as wishful thinking. The aim of this paper is to show that the evidence adduced by Funkhouser and Barrett fails to establish the existence of robust, unconscious self-deception.     

Voice recognition and the ontological status of self-deception

Douglas and Gibbins (1983) recently argued that our demonstration that errors in self-other recognition are often instances of self-deception was inadequate. In their study, they found that both self-other and acquaintance-other recognition errors met two of the four criteria we had offered as necessary and sufficient for ascribing self-deception. They presented no evidence that either type of recognition error was not an instance of self-deception. Here we describe the original basis of our demonstration and point out the logical fallacy in Douglas and Gibbins' argument.     

Self-deception as pseudo-rational regulation of belief

Self-deception is a special kind of motivational dominance in belief-formation. We develop criteria which set paradigmatic self-deception apart from related phenomena of auto-manipulation such as pretense and motivational bias. In self-deception rational subjects defend or develop beliefs of high subjective importance in response to strong counter-evidence. Self-deceivers make or keep these beliefs tenable by putting prima-facie rational defense-strategies to work against their established standards of rational evaluation. In paradigmatic self-deception, target-beliefs are made tenable via reorganizations of those belief-sets that relate relevant data to target-beliefs. This manipulation of the evidential value of relevant data goes beyond phenomena of motivated perception of data. In self-deception belief-defense is pseudo-rational. Self-deceivers will typically apply a dual standard of evaluation that remains intransparent to the subject. The developed model of self-deception as pseudo-rational belief-defense is empirically anchored. So, we hope to put forward a promising candidate.