How should utilitarians think about the future?

Abstract

Utilitarians must think collectively about the future because many contemporary moral issues require collective responses to avoid possible future harms. But current rule utilitarianism does not accommodate the distant future. Drawing on my recent books Future People and Ethics for a Broken World, I defend a new utilitarianism whose central ethical question is: What moral code should we teach the next generation? This new theory honours utilitarianism’s past and provides the flexibility to adapt to the full range of credible futures – from futures broken by climate change to the digital, virtual and predictable futures produced by various possible technologies.     

What do you think I think you think?: Strategic reasoning in matrix games

In reasoning about strategic interpersonal situations, such as in playing games, an individual's representation of the situation often includes not only information about the goals and rules of the game, but also a mental model of other minds. Often such mental models involve a hierarchy of reflexive reasoning commonly employed in social situations ("What do you think I think you think..."), and may be related to the developmental notion of 'theory of mind'. In two experiments, the authors formally investigate such interpersonal recursive reasoning in college-age adults within the context of matrix games. Participants are asked to predict the moves of another player (experimenter's confederate) in a two-choice, sequential-move game that may terminate at various stages with different payoffs for each player. Participants are also asked to decide optimally on their own moves based on the prediction made. Errors concerning the prediction, or translation of those predictions into decisions about one's action, were recorded. Results demonstrate the existence of a "default" mental model about the other player in the game context that is dynamically modified as new evidence is accumulated. Predictions about this other player's behavior are, in general, used consistently in decision-making, though the opponent tends to be modeled, by default, to behave in a myopic fashion not anticipating the participant's own action.     

What does the public think of placebo use? The Canadian experience

Part of the National Placebo Initiative in Canada included public consultations, based on the belief that the views of the public should inform Canadian policy development on what constitutes appropriate placebo use. Public consultations took place nationally in 2003. A deliberative dialogue approach was used, or a structured discussion format designed to facilitate the consideration of complex issues and build consensus. The placebo debate was characterized as having 3 distinct approaches and each were explored. The first approach “Maximize Patient Protection” identified the need for experts to determine appropriate placebo use and that placebos should only be allowed under very restricted conditions. The second approach “Maximize Medical Knowledge” identified that placebos give essential information about the safety and efficacy of new drugs, and are appropriate when the rights, safety and well-being of research participants are ensured. The third approach “Maximize Patient Autonomy” identified that the current system of regulating placebo use is paternalistic and that patients should be able to define what is in their best interests and have more leeway to determine for themselves if they wish to participate in a placebo-controlled trial. Advantages and disadvantages of each approach were considered and feedback on what constitutes appropriate placebo use was sought. The major findings were that: PCTs were considered a valuable and acceptable part of advancing medical knowledge; research using placebos must be valid and justifiable; a patient-centred approach needs to be fostered; patient autonomy (choice) should be a first consideration and take clear precedence in trials of low to medium risk; patient protection (or health) may need to “trump” patient autonomy at higher levels of risk and/or patient vulnerability; placebos are not a violation of the duty of care as duty of care is best met by identifying a choice for patients, whenever a choice is available. These consultations clearly were not designed to produce conclusive evidence, but rather to provide some useful insights into what the public may think about placebo use; additional studies are indicated. Funding for the public consultations was provided by Health Canada and the Canadian Institutes of Health Research. An earlier version of this paper was presented at an international conference, “Placebo: Its Action and Place in Health Research Today,” held in Warsaw, Poland on 12–13 April, 2003.     

How (not) to think of the ‘dead-donor’ rule

Although much has been written on the dead-donor rule (DDR) in the last twenty-five years, scant attention has been paid to how it should be formulated, what its rationale is, and why it was accepted. The DDR can be formulated in terms of either a Don’t Kill rule or a Death Requirement, the former being historically rooted in absolutist ethics and the latter in a prudential policy aimed at securing trust in the transplant enterprise. I contend that the moral core of the rule is the Don’t Kill rule, not the Death Requirement. This, I show, is how the DDR was understood by the transplanters of the 1960s, who sought to conform their practices to their ethics—unlike today’s critics of the DDR, who rethink their ethics in a question-begging fashion to accommodate their practices. A better discussion of the ethics of killing is needed to move the debate forward.     

What I think and feel—German experience with the revised form of the children's manifest anxiety scale

A German version of the Revised Children's Manifest Anxiety Scale (RCMAS-G) was administered to 303 students from German elementary school Grades 2–6. Ratings of anxiety-related classrom behaviors were obtained from their teachers on a Behavior Rating Form (BRF). Both instruments proved psychometrically sound (α = 0.84 and α = 0.87, respectively). The five-factor structure found for the U.S. version of the RCMAS could be replicated. A linear decrease of Anxiety scores was found with no sex differences. The correlation between Anxiety scores and BRF sum scores was weak (r = 0.21), but items measuring anxious support-seeking in achievement-related classrom situations showed stronger correlations (r = 0.40).     

What does Batman think about SpongeBob? children's understanding of the fantasy/fantasy distinction

Young children reliably distinguish reality from fantasy; they know that their friends are real and that Batman is not. But it is an open question whether they appreciate, as adults do, that there are multiple fantasy worlds. We test this by asking children and adults about fictional characters' beliefs about other characters who exist either within the same world (e.g., Batman and Robin) or in different worlds (e.g., Batman and SpongeBob). Study 1 found that although both adults and young children distinguish between within-world and across-world types of character relationships, the children make an unexpected mistake: they often claim that Batman thinks that Robin is make believe. Study 2 used a less explicit task, exploring intuitions about the actions of characters-whom they could see, touch, and talk to--and found that children show a mature appreciation of the ontology of fictional worlds.     

Why did the crowd think St Peter was drunk? An exercise in applied sociolinguistics

… And they were all filled with the Holy Spirit, and began to speak in other tongues, as the Spirit gave them utterance. Now there were dwelling in Jerusalem Jews, devout men from every nation under heaven. And at this sound the multitude came together, and they were bewildered, because each one heard them speaking in his own language. And they were amazed and wondered, saying, 'Are not all these who are speaking Galileans? And how is it that we hear, each of us in his own native language? Parthians and Medes and Elamites and residents of Mesopotamia, Judaea and Cappadocia, Pontus and Asia, Phrygia and Pamphylia, Egypt and the parts of Libya belonging to Cyrene, and visitors from Rome, both Jews and proselytes, Cretans and Arabians, we hear them telling in our own tongues the mighty works of God. And all were amazed and perplexed, saying to one another, 'What does this mean?' But others mocking said, They are filled with new wine'. But Peter, standing with the eleven, lifted up his voice and addressed them, 'Men of Judaea and all who dwell in Jerusalem, let this be known to you, and give ear to my words. For these men are not drunk, as you suppose, since it is only the third hour of the day'     

(Why) do I think what you think? Epistemic social tuning and implicit prejudice

This research examines whether people who experience epistemic motivation (i.e., a desire to acquire knowledge) came to have implicit attitudes consistent with the apparent beliefs of another person. People had lower implicit prejudice when they experienced epistemic motivation and interacted with a person who ostensibly held egalitarian beliefs (Experiments 1 and 2). Implicit prejudice was not affected when people did not experience epistemic motivation. Further evidence shows that this tuning of implicit attitudes occurs when beliefs are endorsed by another person, but not when they are brought to mind via means that do not imply that person's endorsement (Experiment 3). Results suggest that implicit attitudes of epistemically motivated people tune to the apparent beliefs of others to achieve shared reality.     

Who do you think I think I am? Accuracy in perceptions of others’ self-esteem

This study was conducted to assess the accuracy of perceptions of others’ self-esteem and to examine the potential moderating variables of target gender, perceiver gender, and degree of acquaintance. Degree of acquaintance was the only hypothesized moderator reliably related to accuracy. An overall tendency to overestimate targets’ self-esteem was evinced, but was not related to any of the hypothesized moderators. The data suggested that perceivers are influenced by a false consensus effect when estimating others’ level of self-esteem, independent of their degree of acquaintance with targets. Implications of the findings and directions for future investigation are discussed.     

“I think the best athletes use it”: Masculinities and self-compassion among men varsity athletes

We examined how men varsity athletes’ embodiments of masculinities shaped their perceptions and experiences of self-compassion to manage sport-related challenges. Two semi-structured interviews were conducted with 11 men varsity athletes (20 interviews total). Vignettes depiciting athletes low and high in self-compassion were used as talk elicitation tools during interviews. Data were analyzed using reflexive thematic analysis and four themes were identified from the mens’ accounts. Participants utilized self-compassion as a coping strategy in sport and other life-domains to maintain well-being. Self-compassion was used to balance self-criticism to support achievement striving efforts. The experience of contrasting masculine ideologies (hegemonic and inclusive) promoted and constrained the men’s implementation of self-compassion. Traditional masculine narratives created tensions for participants who at times embodied the (mis)belief that self-compassion promotes complacency in the pursuit of athletic achievement. Findings contribute to understandings of men athletes’ experiences of self-compassion and masculinities in relation to sport-related challenges and performance.     

We talk,therefore we think? A cultural analysis of the effect of talking on thinking

The Western assumption that talking is connected to thinking is not shared in the East. The research examines how the actual psychology of individuals reflects these different cultural assumptions. In Study 1, Asian Americans and European Americans thought aloud while solving reasoning problems. Talking impaired Asian Americans' performance but not that of European Americans. Study 2 showed that participants' beliefs about talking and thinking are correlated with how talking affects performance, and suggested that cultural difference in modes of thinking can explain the difference in the effect of talking. Study 3 showed that talking impaired Asian Americans' performance because they tend to use internal speech less than European Americans. Results illuminate the importance of cultural understanding of psychology for a multicultural society.     

Think crisis–think female: Further evidence

Many studies have demonstrated that interpersonally oriented leadership abilities such as being empathetic, supporting work relationships, or explicitly stating an interest in helping others are particularly relevant in crisis contexts. Since these leadership abilities coincide with stereotypically feminine roles and traits, it has been proposed that a “think crisis–think female” association may exist (Ryan, Haslam, Hersby, & Bongiorno, 2011). In a field study (N = 301 workers and managers) we examined this association and identified two relevant factors that may hinder the acceptance of female leaders and stereotypically feminine characteristics in crisis management: instrumental (male) leadership role models and sexist attitudes. In doing so, we provide new insights into the “think crisis–think female” relationship and illustrate the potential implications of this occurrence for gender studies and for research into work and organizational psychology.     

How smart do you think you are? A meta-analysis on the validity of self-estimates of cognitive ability

Individuals' perceptions of their own level of cognitive ability are expressed through self-estimates. They play an important role in a person's self-concept because they facilitate an understanding of how one's own abilities relate to those of others. People evaluate their own and other persons' abilities all the time, but self-estimates are also used in formal settings, such as, for instance, career counseling. We examine the relationship between self-estimated and psychometrically measured cognitive ability by conducting a random-effects, multilevel meta-analysis including a total of 154 effect sizes reported in 41 published studies. Moderator variables are specified in a mixed-effects model both at the level of the individual effect size and at the study level. The overall relationship is estimated at r = .33. There is significant heterogeneity at both levels (i.e., the true effect sizes vary within and between studies), and the results of the moderator analysis show that the validity of self-estimates is especially enhanced when relative scales with clearly specified comparison groups are used and when numerical ability is assessed rather than general cognitive ability. The assessment of less frequently considered dimensions of cognitive ability (e.g., reasoning speed) significantly decreases the magnitude of the relationship. From a theoretical perspective, Festinger's (1954) theory of social comparison and Lecky's (1945) theory of self-consistency receive empirical support. For practitioners, the assessment of self-estimates appears to provide diagnostic information about a person's self-concept that goes beyond a simple "test-and-tell" approach. This information is potentially relevant for career counselors, personnel recruiters, and teachers.     

What do the young (old) people think of me? Content and accuracy of age-based metastereotypes

Increasing age diversity in the workforce points to the need to understand the dynamics of interpersonal relations across age groups. An important element of these interactions involves interpersonal perceptions, including both what an individual believes about members of other age groups (stereotypes) and what individuals believe other age groups think of their own group (metastereotypes). We explore the content and accuracy of the stereotypes and metastereotypes in a sample of 247 younger, middle-aged, and older workers. We compare the stereotypes and metastereotypes of and by different groups in terms of their affective valence (positive/negative) and compare the results produced by open-ended and closed-ended methods. We map out the usefulness of these data for future work towards enhancing cross-aged interactions in the workplace.     

“Don't think zebras”: Uncertainty,interpretation, and the place of paradox in clinical education

Working retrospectively in an uncertain field of knowledge, physicians are engaged in an interpretive practice that is guided by couterweighted, competing, sometimes paradoxical maxims. “When you hear hoofbeats, don't think zebras,” is the chief of these, the epitome of medicine's practical wisdom, its hermeneutic rule. The accumulated and contradictory wisdom distilled in clinical maxims arises necessarily from the case-based nature of medical practice and the narrative rationality that good practice requires. That these maxims all have their opposites enforces in students and physicians a practical skepticism that encourages them to question their expectations, interrupt patterns, and adjust to new developments as a case unfolds. Yet medicine resolutely ignores both the maxims and the tension between the practical reasoning they represent and the claim that medicine is a science. Indeed, resolute epistemological naivete is part of medicine's accommodation to uncertainty; counterweighted, competing, apparently paradoxical (but always situational) rules enable physicians simultaneously to express and to ignore the practical reason that characterizes their practice.     

What do you think of followers? Examining the content,structure, and consequences of implicit followership theories

Implicit followership theories (IFTs) are defined as individuals’ personal assumptions about the traits and behaviors that characterize followers. Goals of this research were to: (1) Identify the content and structure of IFTs, (2) examine the relationship between IFTs and extant implicit theories in the leadership literature, and (3) establish a preliminary nomological network of leaders’ implicit followership theories by examining its consequences for leader–follower interpersonal outcomes. This study included 1362 participants across five separate studies and seven samples. Results provide evidence for content, convergent, discriminant, criterion, and incremental validity, as well as internal and temporal consistency of the IFTs instrument. IFTs are represented by a first-order structure (Industry, Enthusiasm, Good Citizen, Conformity, Insubordination, and Incompetence), and a second-order structure (Followership Prototype and Antiprototype). Leaders’ IFTs predicted interpersonal outcomes: liking, relationship quality, trust, and job satisfaction. Future research and practical implications are discussed for this understudied branch of leadership research.     

What do people think about when answering questionnaires to assess unrealistic optimism about skin cancer? A think aloud study

There is little information concerning what people think about when completing questionnaires that assess perceptions of risk, and even less for questionnaires assessing unrealistic optimism. The thoughts of 40 participants who displayed unrealistic optimism about risks of skin cancer were elicited using think aloud methods, when completing both direct and indirect ratings of unrealistic optimism. The most common thoughts overall concerned exposure to the sun, and features such as skin colouring. Thoughts concerning prevalence, reasons for risky behaviour and admissions of ignorance were more common for indirect measures of unrealistic optimism than for direct measures. The direct unrealistic optimism measures yielded more optimistic ratings for those participants who did not mention symptoms or signs of skin damage, and those who mentioned thoughts about prevalence. Participants seem to be drawing upon different sources of information when completing superficially similar direct and indirect measures of unrealistic optimism, which may explain why these measures are usually only modestly associated. People do not seem to think about numerical probabilities when estimating risk, but instead appear to focus on issues such as exposure to risk, and concrete bodily symptoms and signs. This may at least partially explain why attempts to influence behaviour by providing probabilistic information are generally unsuccessful.     

Are we more moral than we think? Exploring the role of affect in moral behavior and moral forecasting

Can people accurately predict how they will act in a moral dilemma? Our research suggests that in some situations, they cannot, and that emotions play a pivotal role in this dissociation between behavior and forecasting. In the current experiment, individuals in a moral action condition cheated significantly less on a math task than participants in a forecasting condition predicted they themselves would cheat. Furthermore, we found that participants in the action condition displayed significantly more physiological arousal, as measured by preejection period, skin conductance response (SCR), and respiratory sinus arrhythmia (RSA), and that the underestimation effect was mediated by SCR and RSA together. This research suggests that the affective arousal present during real-life moral dilemmas may not be fully engaged during moral forecasting, and that this may account for the moral forecasting errors that individuals make. This research has the potential to inform past work in the field of moral psychology, which has largely ignored actual behavior.