Recollection, fluency, and the explicit/implicit distinction in artificial grammar learning

In this article, the authors propose that both implicit memory and implicit learning phenomena can be explained by a common set of principles, in particular via participants' strategic use of recollective and fluency heuristics. In a series of experiments, it was demonstrated that manipulating processing fluency had an impact on classification decisions in an artificial grammar learning task (Experiments 1, 2, 4, and 7), showing that participants were using a fluency heuristic. Under identical conditions, however, this manipulation had no effect on recognition decisions (Experiments 3 and 5), consistent with a greater default reliance on recollection. Most significant, the authors also showed that a fluency effect can be induced in recognition (Experiments 4-6) and can be eliminated in classification (Experiment 7).     

Are two heuristics better than one? The fluency and distinctiveness heuristics in recognition memory

Four experiments were conducted to test the impact of having multiple heuristics (distinctiveness and fluency) available during a recognition test. Recent work by Gallo, Perlmutter, Moore, and Schacter (Memory & Cognition 36:461–466, 2008) suggested that fluency effects are reduced when the distinctiveness heuristic can be applied to a recognition decision. In Experiment 1, we used a response reversal paradigm (Van Zandt & Maldonado-Molina Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition 30:1147–1166, 2004) to demonstrate that participants transitioned from an early response strategy that was largely reliant on fluency to a later strategy in which the influences of fluency and distinctiveness were both observable. Experiments 2a, 2b, and 3 showed no evidence for reduction of the fluency heuristic after picture study when the test required a delayed response (Exp. 2a), confidence ratings (Exp. 2b), or the application of conceptual fluency (Exp. 3). The results are consistent with models of memory that assume that familiarity and recollection influence individual memory decisions Wixted (Psychological Review, 114:152–176, 2007).     

Fluency heuristic: a model of how the mind exploits a by-product of information retrieval

Boundedly rational heuristics for inference can be surprisingly accurate and frugal for several reasons. They can exploit environmental structures, co-opt complex capacities, and elude effortful search by exploiting information that automatically arrives on the mental stage. The fluency heuristic is a prime example of a heuristic that makes the most of an automatic by-product of retrieval from memory, namely, retrieval fluency. In 4 experiments, the authors show that retrieval fluency can be a proxy for real-world quantities, that people can discriminate between two objects' retrieval fluencies, and that people's inferences are in line with the fluency heuristic (in particular fast inferences) and with experimentally manipulated fluency. The authors conclude that the fluency heuristic may be one tool in the mind's repertoire of strategies that artfully probes memory for encapsulated frequency information that can veridically reflect statistical regularities in the world.     

Change in perceptual form attenuates the use of the fluency heuristic in recognition

Four experiments (total N=295) were conducted to determine whether within-modality changes in perceptual form between the study and the test phases of an experiment would moderate the role of the fluency heuristic in recognition memory. Experiment 1 showed that a change from pictures to words reduced the role of fluency in recognition memory. In Experiment 2, the same result was found using counterfeit study lists that supposedly consisted of pictures or words. Experiments 3 and 4 showed that changes in the font used to present the study and test words also attenuated the contribution of fluency to the recognition decision when font change was manipulated between subjects, but not within subjects. Results suggest that the fluency heuristic is subject to metacognitive control, since participants' attributions of perceptual fluency depend on the perceived usefulness of fluency as a cue to recognition.     

Fluent, fast, and frugal? A formal model evaluation of the interplay between memory, fluency, and comparative judgments

A new process model of the interplay between memory and judgment processes was recently suggested, assuming that retrieval fluency-that is, the speed with which objects are recognized-will determine inferences concerning such objects in a single-cue fashion. This aspect of the fluency heuristic, an extension of the recognition heuristic, has remained largely untested due to methodological difficulties. To overcome the latter, we propose a measurement model from the class of multinomial processing tree models that can estimate true single-cue reliance on recognition and retrieval fluency. We applied this model to aggregate and individual data from a probabilistic inference experiment and considered both goodness of fit and model complexity to evaluate different hypotheses. The results were relatively clear-cut, revealing that the fluency heuristic is an unlikely candidate for describing comparative judgments concerning recognized objects. These findings are discussed in light of a broader theoretical view on the interplay of memory and judgment processes.     

Does easily learned mean easily remembered?: it depends on your beliefs about intelligence

Because numerous studies have shown that feelings of encoding fluency are positively correlated with judgments of learning, a single dominant heuristic, easily learned = easily remembered (ELER), has been posited to explain how people interpret encoding fluency when assessing their own memory. However, the inferences people draw from feelings of encoding fluency may vary with their beliefs about why information is easy or effortful to encode. We conducted two experiments in which participants studied word lists and then predicted their future recall of those items. Results revealed that subjects who viewed intelligence as fixed, and who tended to interpret effortful encoding as indicating that they had reached the limits of their ability, used the ELER heuristic to make judgments of learning. However, subjects who viewed intelligence as malleable, and who tended to interpret effortful encoding as indicating greater engagement in learning, did not use the ELER heuristic and at times predicted greater memory for items that they found more effortful to learn.     

Feeling the ease: How the use of oral motor fluency changes in amnesia

The present study examined the evolution observed in amnesic patients’ use of motor fluency when making recognition memory decisions. In this experiment, 9 patients with amnesia and 18 matched controls were presented with two recognition memory tasks composed of 3 types of items: (1) natural words, (2) nonwords difficult to pronounce, and (3) nonwords easy to pronounce, the latter having been shown to be processed in a surprisingly fluent manner as long as participants can articulate them at a subvocal level (i.e., oral motor fluency). Our results provide evidence that the motor-movement manipulation was successful to induce a fluency effect. More specifically, data revealed that both amnesic patients and control participants showed a pattern of response consistent with the use of fluency as a cue to memory for studied items. However, only control participants relied on fluency to increase their rate of “yes” responses for unstudied items. These results suggest that patients with amnesia set a more conservative response criterion before relying on oral motor fluency, showing a pattern consistent with the idea that fluency is only used as a cue to memory when it exceeds a certain threshold. These findings are discussed in terms of adaptative metacognition strategies implemented by amnesic patients to reduce fluency-based memory errors as well as in terms of the variations that seem to occur in these strategies depending on the type of fluency that is experienced.     

The generation and resemblance heuristics in face recognition: cooperation and competition

Like all probabilistic decisions, recognition memory judgments are based on inferences about the strength and quality of stimulus familiarity. In recent articles, B. W. A. Whittlesea and J. Leboe (2000; J. Leboe & B. W. A. Whittlesea, 2002) proposed that such memory decisions entail various heuristics, similar to well-known heuristics in overt decision making. Using verbal stimulus materials, Whittlesea and Leboe illustrated 3 separate memory heuristics: fluency, generation, and resemblance. In the present investigation, the authors examined the generation and resemblance heuristics in face recognition. In 12 experiments, people memorized faces and later performed exclusion (source memory) tasks. Every experiment contained natural groups of facial photographs (e.g., Caucasian vs. Asian faces), but such groups were not always valid source-memory predictors. Instead, across experiments, the potential utility of generation and resemblance strategies was systematically varied. People were quite sensitive to such variations, changing from one heuristic to another as needed. However, they also combined heuristics, both improving and damaging performance across conditions. The relevance of recognition decision heuristics to eyewitness memory is considered.     

Enhanced processing fluency leads to biases in source memory

The present experiments were conducted to determine whether processing fluency affects source memory decisions. In the first three experiments, participants decided whether test items appeared in the same sensory modality (Experiments 1A, 1B) or perceptual form (font type, Experiment 2) at study and test. The results were consistent across the three studies and showed that perceptual priming leads to an increase in reports that stimuli were presented in the same sensory or perceptual form during the study and test phase. Experiment 3 showed that conceptual fluency affects source attributions in much the same way as perceptual fluency, and Experiment 4 showed that fluency is associated with a subjective experience of familiarity even when it might serve as a basis for source inference. These results are consistent with recent neuropsychological and neuroimaging evidence that familiarity-based processes contribute to source memory decisions under some circumstances, such as when items and contexts are unitized rather than merely bound together at encoding.     

Enhanced processing fluency leads to biases in source memory

The present experiments were conducted to determine whether processing fluency affects source memory decisions. In the first three experiments, participants decided whether test items appeared in the same sensory modality (Experiments 1A, 1B) or perceptual form (font type, Experiment 2) at study and test. The results were consistent across the three studies and showed that perceptual priming leads to an increase in reports that stimuli were presented in the same sensory or perceptual form during the study and test phase. Experiment 3 showed that conceptual fluency affects source attributions in much the same way as perceptual fluency, and Experiment 4 showed that fluency is associated with a subjective experience of familiarity even when it might serve as a basis for source inference. These results are consistent with recent neuropsychological and neuroimaging evidence that familiarity-based processes contribute to source memory decisions under some circumstances, such as when items and contexts are unitized rather than merely bound together at encoding.     

Do People Order Cues by Retrieval Fluency when Making Probabilistic Inferences?

In multiple‐cue probabilistic inferences, people infer alternatives' unknown values on decision criteria, using alternatives' attributes as cues. Some inferential strategies, like take‐the‐best, assume that people consider relevant cues sequentially in order of decreasing validity. This assumption has been deemed cognitively implausible by some, who suggest memory retrieval principles to guide cue order. We test whether memory‐based inferences are better described by a model considering cues in order of validity or in order of memory retrieval. In an experiment, we manipulated the frequency with which cues appeared in a learning phase, increasing retrieval fluency of cue values related to the more frequently appearing cue. In a subsequent decision phase, participants made a series of two‐alternative decisions based on the learned cue values. We compared two sequential sampling models, which differed in whether cues are sampled in order of subjective cue validity or in order of retrieval fluency. To model retrieval order of cues in the fluency sampling model, we used the declarative memory theory embedded in the ACT‐R cognitive architecture. Most participants' decisions were best described by the model sampling cues in order of memory retrieval. Only a minority of participants were classified as sampling cues by validity. Our result suggests that retrieval fluency is the primary driver of cue order in inferences from memory, irrespective of the cues' validities. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

流畅性对再认的影响:实验证据及理论解释

流畅性可以影响再认,而且仅影响熟悉性加工的观点已得到大量研究的证实。近年一些研究者采用掩蔽启动范式并结合修改的R/K范式、独立判断的R/K范式等实验范式,操控测验项目的流畅性,发现流畅性影响的可能是猜测或者回想加工,因而质疑这个结论。为解释流畅性对再认的影响,流畅性归因理论侧重对流畅性的归因、冲突-归因理论侧重期待流畅性和实际流畅性之间的冲突、预激活-适应模型侧重启动刺激引起的神经活动激活或适应、线索-学习理论侧重流畅性线索的有效性。未来研究应关注流畅性对来源和联结记忆的影响,并考察流畅性对再认的影响在不同年龄人群或遗忘症人群中的表现是否一致。     

How forgetting aids heuristic inference

Some theorists, ranging from W. James (1890) to contemporary psychologists, have argued that forgetting is the key to proper functioning of memory. The authors elaborate on the notion of beneficial forgetting by proposing that loss of information aids inference heuristics that exploit mnemonic information. To this end, the authors bring together 2 research programs that take an ecological approach to studying cognition. Specifically, they implement fast and frugal heuristics within the ACT-R cognitive architecture. Simulations of the recognition heuristic, which relies on systematic failures of recognition to infer which of 2 objects scores higher on a criterion value, demonstrate that forgetting can boost accuracy by increasing the chances that only 1 object is recognized. Simulations of the fluency heuristic, which arrives at the same inference on the basis of the speed with which objects are recognized, indicate that forgetting aids the discrimination between the objects' recognition speeds.     

Illusory recollection and dual-process models of recognition memory

Higham and Vokey (2000, Exps.1 & 3)demonstrated that a slight increase in the display duration of a briefly presented word prior to displaying it in the clear for a recognition response increased the bias to respond “old”. In the current research, three experiments investigated the phenomenology associated with this illusion of memory using the standard remember-know procedure and a new, independent-scales methodology. Contrary to expectations based on the fluency heuristic, which predicts effects of display duration on subjective familiarity only, the results indicated that the illusion was reported as both familiarity and recollection. Furthermore, manipulations of prime duration induced reports of false recollection in all experiments. The results—in particular, the implications of illusory recollection—are discussed in terms of dual-process, fuzzy-trace, two-criteria signal detection models and attribution models of recognition memory.     

Ethanol reduces rCFB activation of left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex during a verbal fluency task

In a previous study in normal subjects (Wendt et al., 1994), using a reversing checkerboard as activation stimulus, we found that the coupling between local neuronal activity and regional cerebral blood flow was preserved following ethanol, and that a right-sided occipital activation response seen during sobriety became symmetrical during inebriation. In the present study we investigated if ethanol has a detrimental effect also on the activation of the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex found in normals during verbal fluency. Measurements of regional cerebral blood flow in 20 healthy, young, male, right-handed volunteers during rest and verbal fluency were made during sobriety and inebriation (0.06% blood alcohol concentration) with a 1-week interval. We found a decrease in word production during inebriation. The normal activation within the frontotemporal part of the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortext was preserved during inebriation. The activation of this region seems thus to be robust to the effects of ethanol. During inebriation no activation response to the word fluency test was found in the anterior prefrontal part of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. This region is important for working, temporal, and short-term memory functions, processes that are affected by ethanol. Hemispheric functioning and specialization seem to be adversely affected by ethanol, regardless of which hemisphere is most involved while sober.     

Judgment heuristics and recognition memory: Prime identification and target-processing fluency

In three experiments, the effect of identification of a briefly presented word (prime) on a subsequent recognition response to that word (target) was investigated. Theories of current processing fluency (e.g., Jacoby & Whitehouse, 1989) suggest that prime identification should reduce P(old) relative to prime misidentification because awareness of the prime provides a source to which to attribute target fluency, rendering attributions to prior presentation less likely. However, counter to these predictions, Experiment 1 demonstrated that prime identification increased P(old) relative to misidentified primes. It is hypothesized that this reversed effect was due to participants' using a heuristic that related prime identification success to prior presentation but was not based on current processing fluency. In Experiment 2, participants were induced to avoid using this heuristic by making an alternate source for prime identification success (display duration) highly available. Under these circumstances, prime identification reduced P(old) relative to prime misidentification, suggesting that participants now relied on current processing fluency rather than on prime identification success. Experiment 3 replicated the results of Experiments 1 and 2, but with fixed rather than variable prime displays.     

Perceptual fluency can be used as a cue for categorization decisions

Learning in the prototype distortion task is thought to involve perceptual learning in which category members experience an enhanced visual response (Ashby & Maddox. Annual Review of Psychology, 56, 149-178, 2005). This response likely leads to more-efficient processing, which in turn may result in a feeling of perceptual fluency for category members. We examined the perceptual-fluency hypothesis by manipulating fluency independently from category membership. We predicted that when perceptual fluency was induced using subliminal priming, this fluency would be misattributed to category membership and would affect categorization decisions. In a prototype distortion task, the participants were more likely to judge stimuli that were not members of the category as category members when the nonmembers were made perceptually fluent with a matching subliminal prime. This result suggests that perceptual fluency can be used as a cue during some categorization decisions. In addition, the results provided converging evidence that some types of categorization are based on perceptual learning.     

The Psychological Construct of Word Fluency

Measures of word fluency have been convincingly linked in the literature to damage in the left prefrontal lobe region. Yet, a reduction in word fluency has also been reported with diffuse, multifocal and nonfrontal lobe damage. Despite the undisputed neuropsychological application of multiple word fluency measures, the psychological construct underlying this measure is not well understood. In a sample of 360 normal adults stratified by age, gender, and level of education, we found that auditory attention and word knowledge were among the most important determinants. With respect to memory, short-term memory was not significantly correlated, but long-term memory was. Despite these three determinants, a large share of the variance of the multiple regression was still not accounted for, which underscores the partial independence of word fluency per se. Thus, we propose a distinction between (1) poor word fluency secondary to deficient verbal attention, word knowledge, and/or verbal long-term memory and (2) impaired word fluency without these three areas concurrently affected. Based on a review of the literature, it seems likely that in the latter condition, the profile is more associated with prefrontal lobe impairment, versus in the former condition, diffuse multifocal or nonfrontal lobe factors can play a role.     

Bias in self-motion perceived speed can enhance episodic memory

Prior experiences of a stimulus facilitate reprocessing of that stimulus on a subsequent occasion. This relative ease and speed with which information is processed is defined as fluency and can constitute a basis for memory judgment. Fluency can also be manipulated on line by perceptual bias (e.g., levels of noise), leading to an increase in recognition for items processed more fluently (e.g., items with less noise). Previous experiments using Remember-Know paradigm have shown an impact of perceptual fluency only on familiarity and not on recollection. Recent episodic memory models have postulated a strong link between episodic memory and spatial processes, especially with egocentric updating (Gomez et al. in Acta Psychol 132(3):221-227, 2009). The present experiment was conducted to determine whether self-motion fluency affects recognition performance and particularly has an impact on "Remember" responses. Thirty participants learned a 4-min path movie and then had to recognize among short paths if they were part of the learned path, followed by a Remember-Know procedure for recognized items. Self-motion fluency was manipulated with the presence of nimble acceleration applied on a small part of the recognition paths. Results show that the presence of a self-motion fluency increases significantly the proportion of remember responses solely on learned paths. This study spotlights for the first time a specific fluency effect on recollection and indicates an implication of egocentric-updating processing in episodic memory retrieval.     

Inducing an availability heuristic on the Wason selection task overrides the matching bias

A long history of examining reasoning using the Wason selection task has revealed that many respondents are biased towards choices that match the items expressed in the rule. One reason for this particular heuristic may be that no better information is immediately available, and thus matching items win over the competing choice simply via recognition. In two experiments, we sought to examine whether a stronger memory trace could override the matching bias. We created rules from common, easily recognisable nursery rhymes and varied the degree to which the presented rules matched the commonly known rhymes. The components of the remembered rhyme had a strong influence on the participants’ selections, suggesting that a strong memory trace can override the usual matching bias. We provide an interpretation of these results in light of answer fluency, mental models, and probabilistic estimates.