Independence training,need achievement and need affiliation

American white and American Indian grade school boys and girls from the North Central Plains are studied. The previously shown significant and positive relationship between high need achievement and low need affiliation is hypothesized to be a culturally based and sex related phenomenon. The early training of Plains Indian children especially that of boys emphasizes early independence rather than either affiliation or achievement. As hypothesized, it was found in this study both that white children had significantly higher need affiliation scores than Indian children and that boys indicated higher need achievement than girls, indicating cultural and sexual differences. It appeared also that success is a more potent condition for Indian boys in intensifying need achievement scores, whereas failure intensifies the need achievement scores of white children. This suggests that perceived success and failure operate differentially between these cultural groups. Other results also corroborate earlier findings of the culture bias of « standard » intelligence tests.     

The need of courage

A brave man leaveth not the battle, He who flieth from it is no true warrior, In the field of this body a great war is toward Against Passion, Hunger, Pride and Greed, It is for the Kingdom of Truth, of Contentment and of Purity that this battle is raging: And the sword that ringeth most loudly is the sword Of His name.

—KABIR, Hindu Poet

     

The role of need level and/or need salience as moderators of the relationship between need satisfaction and work alienation-involvement

Contrary to previous findings documenting the importance of higher-order need satisfaction, a recent study by G. J. Gorn and R. N. Kanungo (Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 1980, 26, 265–277) has indicated that satisfaction of lower-order needs may lead to job involvement if such needs are salient. Data from a heterogeneous sample of 632 employees from six organizations were used to test six hypotheses concerning the effects of need level (higher vs lower order) and need salience as moderators of the relationship between need satisfaction and alienation-involvement. Three different ways of operationalizing need saliency were used, including a replication of Gorn and Kanungo's procedure. Higherorder need satisfaction was correlated with alienation-involvement scores to a significantly greater degree than was lower-order need satisfaction, even for those for whom lower-order needs were most salient. Need saliency was not found to moderate the need satisfaction-involvement relationship when need level was controlled. Issues regarding the operationalization of “need salience” were discussed and a new measure of alienation-involvement (the A-I Scale) was introduced. Implications for further empirical investigations of the need saliency issue were noted, as was the universal application of job enrichment programs aimed at promoting higher-order need satisfaction.     

The need to dominate

The American Journal of Psychoanalysis -     

The need to explain

How do reasoners deal with inconsistencies? James (1907) believed that the rational solution is to revise your beliefs and to do so in a minimal way. We propose an alternative: You explain the origins of an inconsistency, which has the side effect of a revision to your beliefs. This hypothesis predicts that individuals should spontaneously create explanations of inconsistencies rather than refute one of the assertions and that they should rate explanations as more probable than refutations. A pilot study showed that participants spontaneously explain inconsistencies when they are asked what follows from inconsistent premises. In three subsequent experiments, participants were asked to compare explanations of inconsistencies against minimal refutations of the inconsistent premises. In Experiment 1, participants chose which conclusion was most probable; in Experiment 2 they rank ordered the conclusions based on their probability; and in Experiment 3 they estimated the mean probability of the conclusions' occurrence. In all three studies, participants rated explanations as more probable than refutations. The results imply that individuals create explanations to resolve an inconsistency and that these explanations lead to changes in belief. Changes in belief are therefore of secondary importance to the primary goal of explanation.     

The need to explain

How do reasoners deal with inconsistencies? James (1907) believed that the rational solution is to revise your beliefs and to do so in a minimal way. We propose an alternative: You explain the origins of an inconsistency, which has the side effect of a revision to your beliefs. This hypothesis predicts that individuals should spontaneously create explanations of inconsistencies rather than refute one of the assertions and that they should rate explanations as more probable than refutations. A pilot study showed that participants spontaneously explain inconsistencies when they are asked what follows from inconsistent premises. In three subsequent experiments, participants were asked to compare explanations of inconsistencies against minimal refutations of the inconsistent premises. In Experiment 1, participants chose which conclusion was most probable; in Experiment 2 they rank ordered the conclusions based on their probability; and in Experiment 3 they estimated the mean probability of the conclusions' occurrence. In all three studies, participants rated explanations as more probable than refutations. The results imply that individuals create explanations to resolve an inconsistency and that these explanations lead to changes in belief. Changes in belief are therefore of secondary importance to the primary goal of explanation.     

Indeterminacy and the principle of need

The principle of need—the idea that resources should be allocated according to need—is often invoked in priority setting in the health care sector. In this article, I argue that a reasonable principle of need must be indeterminate, and examine three different ways that this can be dealt with: appendicizing the principle with further principles, imposing determinacy, or empowering decision makers. I argue that need must be conceptualized as a composite property composed of at least two factors: health shortfall and capacity to benefit. When one examines how the different factors relate to each other, one discovers that this is sometimes indeterminate. I illustrate this indeterminacy in this article by applying the small improvement argument. If the relation between the factors are always determinate, the comparative relation changes by a small adjustment. Yet, if two needs are dissimilar but of seemingly equal magnitude, the comparative relation does not change by a small adjustment of one of the factors. I then outline arguments in favor of each of the three strategies for dealing with indeterminacy, but also point out that all strategies have significant shortcomings. More research is needed concerning how to deal with this indeterminacy, and the most promising path seems to be to scrutinize the position of the principle of need among a plurality of relevant principles for priority setting in the health care sector.     

Motivational correlates of need for cognition

Need for cognition is usually characterized as an intrinsic desire to engage in challenging intellectual activity. In achievement situations, however, it could be associated with more extrinsic goals such as success or the avoidance of failure. Three experiments examined this possibility. Participants in all studies were led to believe they would perform either an easy or a difficult intellectual task that they were likely to fail. After inducing this expectation, indices of extrinsic motivation were obtained. Participants with high need for cognition became more motivated to avoid negative consequences of their behavior (e.g., failure) when they expected the task they would perform to be difficult. In contrast, participants with low need for cognition were not appreciably affected by these expectancies. The anticipation of engaging in intellectual activity apparently stimulates different motives in people with high and low need for cognition, and the mindset induced by these motives influences their later behavioral decisions. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.