Brands as intentional agents framework: How perceived intentions and ability can map brand perception

Building on the Stereotype Content Model, this paper introduces and tests the Brands as Intentional Agents Framework. A growing body of research suggests that consumers have relationships with brands that resemble relations between people. We propose that consumers perceive brands in the same way they perceive people. This approach allows us to explore how social perception theories and processes can predict brand purchase interest and loyalty. Brands as Intentional Agents Framework is based on a well-established social perception approach: the Stereotype Content Model. Two studies support the Brands as Intentional Agents Framework prediction that consumers assess a brand's perceived intentions and ability and that these perceptions elicit distinct emotions and drive differential brand behaviors. The research shows that human social interaction relationships translate to consumer–brand interactions in ways that are useful to inform brand positioning and brand communications.     

The generative basis of natural number concepts

Number concepts must support arithmetic inference. Using this principle, it can be argued that the integer concept of exactly ONE is a necessary part of the psychological foundations of number, as is the notion of the exact equality - that is, perfect substitutability. The inability to support reasoning involving exact equality is a shortcoming in current theories about the development of numerical reasoning. A simple innate basis for the natural number concepts can be proposed that embodies the arithmetic principle, supports exact equality and also enables computational compatibility with real- or rational-valued mental magnitudes.     

Equality, Priority and Person-Affecting Value

Derek Parfit has argued that (Teleological) Egalitarianism is objectionable by breaking a person-affecting claim to the effect that an outcome cannot be better in any respect - such as that of equality - if it is better for nobody. So, he presents the Priorty View, i.e., the policy of giving priority to benefiting the worse-off, which avoids this objection. But it is here argued, first, that there is another person-affecting claim that this view violates. Secondly, Egalitarianism can be construed as person-affecting in a weaker sense. Thirdly, it is possible to construct a Relational version of the Priority View which incorporates the Egalitarian value of just equality in this sense. Two reasons are given for why this Relational View and Egalitarianism are superior to the Parfitian Absolute Priority View. However, no attempt is made to abjudicate between the first two views, the main point being that they both accept the value of just equality in the same sense.     

II—Véronique Munoz-Dardé

ABSTRACT Are there distinctively political values? Certain egalitarians seem to think that equality is one such value. Scheffler's contribution to the symposium seeks to articulate a division of moral labour between norms of personal morality and the principles of justice that regulate social institutions, and using this suggests that the egalitarian critique of Rawls can be deflected. In this paper, instead, I question the status of equality as an intrinsic value. I argue that an egalitarianism which focuses on the status of equality as valuable in itself embraces a theory of value with the worst elements of utilitarianism (in particular its consequentialism) while leaving behind any of the intuitive appeal that utilitarianism has. In its place I press that we need a political conception of egalitarianism which stresses the role of equality as a political ideal without presupposing any values with which we engage beyond those found in the norms of personal morality.     

John Stuart Mill and the Conflicts of Equality

John Stuart Mill commented on the relationship between equality and liberty in general terms, and he also discussed the relationships between equality and four more concrete social goals: equality vs. diversity and individual spontaneity, equality vs. freedom of trade and entrepreneurial activity, equality vs. economic incentives for workpeople, and equality vs. welfare. In his more general statements he wrote off potential conflicts between equality and liberty, claiming that only those liberties that can be enjoyed by all are real liberties—or at least they are the only ones worth defending. However, in several of his more concrete discussions he gave higher priority to various liberty-related goals than to equality. This seeming contradiction can be resolved if we assume that he distinguished between valuing a liberty per se and valuing it as a means to achieve something else.

     

Unity in nominal equational reasoning: The algebra of equality on nominal sets

There are currently no fewer than four dedicated logics for equality reasoning over nominal sets: nominal algebra, nominal equational logic, nominal equational logic with equality only, and permissive-nominal algebra.In this survey and research paper we present these logics side-by-side in a common notation, survey their similarities and differences, discuss their proof- and model-theories, and discuss in detail what the implications of those differences are for mathematical reasoning in each of them.     

Equality as Comparative Fairness

The goal of this article is modest. It is simply to help illuminate the nature of egalitarianism. More particularly, I aim to show what certain egalitarians are committed to, and to suggest that equality, as these egalitarians understand it, is an important normative ideal that cannot simply be ignored in moral deliberations. In doing this, I distinguish between equality as universality, equality as impartiality, and equality as comparability, and also between instrumental and non‐instrumental egalitarianism. I then characterise the version of egalitarianism with which I am concerned, which I call equality as comparative fairness. I discuss the relations between equality, fairness, luck, and responsibility, and defend egalitarianism against rival views that focus on subsistence, sufficiency, or compassion. I also defend egalitarianism against the Levelling Down and Raising Up Objections, and present several key examples to illustrate egalitarianism's distinct appeal, in contrast to prioritarianism's. I conclude by considering two common questions about my view: first, whether my ultimate concern is really with comparative fairness, rather than equality, so that my view is not, in fact, a substantive, non‐instrumental version of egalitarianism, and second, whether my view ultimately reduces to a theory about desert.     

ARE FREEDOM AND EQUALITY NATURAL ENEMIES? A CHRISTIAN‐THEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE

It is often difficult to balance the conflicting interests of freedom and equality in the public domain. This article attempts to provide a Christian perspective on freedom and equality that might help to reconcile some of the conflicts between freedom and equality that are likely to arise. The first section discusses the significance of religious ethics for social justice, the second section attempts to provide a conceptual framework for freedom and equality from a theological perspective. The third section offers a societal framework within which conflicts between freedom and equality can be resolved. The conclusion arrived at is that freedom and equality are compatible values as long as they are used in a conceptually correct manner which upholds the inherent principles governing societal processes.     

经济平等的三重维度

我们可从权利平等、机会平等、结果平等三个维度来具体分析经济关系中的平等问题。经济关系中的平等问题需要在发挥市场的基础作用和国家的积极干预之间才可能找到解决问题的最佳途径。     

Performatiwiteit en selfonthulling as sleutelbegrippe in Hannah Arendt se etiek van deugdelikheid

Abstract

In this paper I argue that, in a liberal society that confmes itself solely to providing free basic education, children from the higher strata are systematically subjected to developmental opportunities that can reliably be expected to give them an advantage in the process of meritocratic competition. I will show how enforcing the universal education policy can include children from the least fortunate families in the process of meritocratic competition.

I make a case for a commitment to the extensive redistributive tax measures needed to ensure truly universal education as the condition of equal opportunity. I argue that this proposal is, in fact, consistent with real egalitarians’ aim to achieve equality, and consistent with their principle of fair equality of opportunity. Providing an equal opportunity in an educational programme could possibly be an attempt to attain equality.     

Comparing several robust tests of stochastic equality with ordinally scaled variables and small to moderate sized samples

In a comparison of 2 treatments, if outcome scores are denoted by X in 1 condition and by Y in the other, stochastic equality is defined as P(X < Y) = P(X > Y). Tests of stochastic equality can be affected by characteristics of the distributions being compared, such as heterogeneity of variance. Thus, various robust tests of stochastic equality have been proposed and are evaluated here using a Monte Carlo study with sample sizes ranging from 10 to 30. Three robust tests are identified that perform well in Type I error rates and power except when extremely skewed data co-occur with very small n. When tests of stochastic equality might be preferred to tests of means is also considered.     

Of Mice and Men: Equality and Animals

Can material Egalitarianism (requiring, for example, the significant promotion of fortune) include animals in the domain of the equality requirement? The problem can be illustrated as follows: If equality of wellbeing is what matters, and normal mice are included in this egalitarian requirement, then normal mice have a much stronger claim to resources than almost any human. This is because normal mice have a much stronger claim to resources than almost any human. This is because their wellbeing is much lower than that of normal humans. Thus, equality of wellbeing requires a massive shift of resources away from most humans to mice. This view, however, seems crazy. I explore this problem and propose a solution.     

More eyes on the prize: variability in White Americans' perceptions of progress toward racial equality

Much recent research suggests that Whites and non-Whites think differently about issues of race in contemporary America. For example, Eibach and Ehrlinger (2006) recently demonstrated that Whites perceive that more progress toward racial equality has been made as compared to non-Whites. The authors of this article sought to extend Eibach and Ehrlinger's analysis. To this end, they found that differences in Whites' and non-Whites' perceptions of racial progress can be explained by the reference points they use for understanding progress toward racial equality (Study 1). Furthermore, they demonstrated that there is variability in White people's perceptions of racial progress that can be explained by self-reported racial prejudice (Studies 1 and 2). Finally, they demonstrated that White people's perceptions of racial progress predict reactions to affirmative action (Study 2). Implications for better understanding intergroup relations and reactions to social policies are discussed.     

Why Freedom Implies Equality

ABSTRACT Equality and freedom have been represented as conflicting values. In this paper, I propose to argue that the idea of freedom has clear egalitarian implications.
Freedom is commonly represented as being negative or positive, but it has both senses in ordinary usage, and the distinction fails adequately to explain the relationship between views on freedom and poverty. An alternative representation of the concept distinguishes individual freedom, based on the autonomous individual, from social freedom, which sees freedom as a social relationship.
Equality implies the elimination of disadvantage. Freedom is a redistributive idea, implying that the freedom of some must be restricted to increase the freedom of others. Although the individual concept of freedom is restrictive, equal treatment and equality of opportunity are largely compatible with it, and even equality of outcome can be reconciled with it to some degree. The social concept of freedom is broader, extending the scope of redistribution to all forms of social disadvantage. This demands a high degree of equality; it also defines the boundaries of the pursuit of equality, which is justifiable in so far as it increases freedom.
Freedom is not, therefore, in conflict with equality. Certain egalitarian assumptions are part of its normative base, and it actively requires a degree of redistribution.     

Human science and counselling psychology: Closing the gap between research and practice

In this article, the case is made that human science-or ‘qualitative research’ as it is now popularly known–promises to be a better way of closing the gap between research and practice in counselling psychology than has been provided by the natural science approach to the discipline as instantiated in the Boulder model of the scientist-practitioner. Like the practice of counselling psychology, human science focuses on subjectivity and stresses the achievement of an understanding as opposed to the demonstration of truth; it stresses collaboration with participants rather than a subject-object dualism; and it emphasizes holism in contrast with fragmentation. Some practicalities entailed in the conduct of human science in counselling psychology are discussed.     

Health care, equality, and inequality: Christian perspectives and moral disagreements.

Equality is a concept that is often used in health care discussions about the allocation of resources and the design of health care systems. In secular discussions and debates the concept of equality is highly controverted and can take on many different specifications. One might think that Christians hold a common understanding of equality. A more careful study, though, makes it clear that equality is just as controversial among different Christian communities as it is in the secular world.     

INEQUALITY,INJUSTICE AND LEVELLING DOWN

The levelling down objection is the most serious objection to the principle of equality, but we think it can be conclusively defeated. It is serious because it pits the principle of equality squarely against the welfares of the persons whose welfares or resources are equalized. It suggests that there is something perverse about the principle of equality. In this paper, we argue that levelling down is not an implication of the principle of equality. To show this we offer a defence of, and partial elaboration of, what we call a common good conception of the principle of equality, which principle favours states in which everyone is better off to those in which everyone is worse off. We contrast this with what we call a purely structural conception of the principle of equality. The common good conception of equality involves two basic components: (1) in each circumstance there exists an ideal egalitarian distribution, which distributes equally all the available good in the distribution with the highest average welfare and (2) in evaluating how just the world is, it will matter how far the actual distribution is from the ideal distribution. The ideal egalitarian distribution in the circumstance is Pareto optimal and the approximation rule implies that Pareto superior states are less unjust than Pareto inferior states. 1     

An Egalitarian Plateau? Challenging the Importance of Ronald Dworkin’s Abstract Egalitarian Rights

Ronald Dworkin’s work on the topic of equality over the past twenty-five years or so has been enormously influential, generating a great deal of debate about equality both as a practical aim and as a theoretical ideal. The present article attempts to assess the importance of one particular aspect of this work. Dworkin claims that the acceptance of abstract egalitarian rights to equal concern and respect can be thought to provide a kind of plateau in political argument, accommodating as it does a number of well-known ethical theories of social arrangement from utilitarianism to libertarianism. The article explores the moral foundations of these egalitarian rights and critically examines five specific reasons for supposing they matter in political debate. It is argued that though these reasons are perhaps less constructive than they might be reasonably expected to be, there is another more fundamental question we can ask about the scope of egalitarian rights the answer to which might ultimately help to explain their fundamental nature and importance. That question is: equality among whom?     

Cosmopolitan Justice and Equalizing Opportunities

This paper defends a global principle of equality of opportunity, which states that it is unfair if some have worse opportunities because of their national or civic identity. It begins by outlining the reasoning underpinning this principle. It then considers three objections to global equality of opportunity. The first argues that global equality of opportunity is an inappropriate ideal given the great cultural diversity that exists in the world. The second maintains that equality of opportunity applies only to people who are interconnected in some way and infers from this that it should not be implemented at the global level. The third, inspired by Rawls's The Law of Peoples , maintains that it is inappropriate to thrust liberal ideals (like global equality of opportunity) on nonliberal peoples. Each of these challenges, I argue, is unpersuasive.