What do our intuitions about the experience machine really tell us about hedonism?

Robert Nozick’s experience machine thought experiment is often considered a decisive refutation of hedonism. I argue that the conclusions we draw from Nozick’s thought experiment ought to be informed by considerations concerning the operation of our intuitions about value. First, I argue that, in order to show that practical hedonistic reasons are not causing our negative reaction to the experience machine, we must not merely stipulate their irrelevance (since our intuitions are not always responsive to stipulation) but fill in the concrete details that would make them irrelevant. If we do this, we may see our feelings about the experience machine becoming less negative. Second, I argue that, even if our feelings about the experience machine do not perfectly track hedonistic reasons, there are various reasons to doubt the reliability of our anti-hedonistic intuitions. And finally, I argue that, since in the actual world seeing certain things besides pleasure as ends in themselves may best serve hedonistic ends, hedonism may justify our taking these other things to be intrinsically valuable, thus again making the existence of our seemingly anti-hedonistic intuitions far from straightforward evidence for the falsity of hedonism.     

What's so special about the average face?

The past few years have seen a marked increase in our understanding of how faces are represented in the brain, with the discovery of new anatomical structures and new algorithms for representing faces. Still, the basic computational mechanism used by the primate visual system to identify faces remains a topic of intense debate. Are faces represented by matching to a set of stored exemplars, or by measuring the distance from a standard prototype along a set of different axes? A recent article by Rhodes and Jeffery provides compelling psychophysical evidence in favor of the latter 'axis' model.     

How should utilitarians think about the future?

Abstract

Utilitarians must think collectively about the future because many contemporary moral issues require collective responses to avoid possible future harms. But current rule utilitarianism does not accommodate the distant future. Drawing on my recent books Future People and Ethics for a Broken World, I defend a new utilitarianism whose central ethical question is: What moral code should we teach the next generation? This new theory honours utilitarianism’s past and provides the flexibility to adapt to the full range of credible futures – from futures broken by climate change to the digital, virtual and predictable futures produced by various possible technologies.     

Teaching science at the university level: What about the ethics?

Ethics in science is integrated into an interdisciplinary science course called “Science, Technology and Society” (STS). This paper focuses on the section of the course called “Societal Impact on Science and Technology”, which includes the topics Misconduct in Science, Scientific Freedom and Responsibility, and the Use of Human Subjects in Research. Students in the course become aware not only of the science itself, but also of the process of science, some aspects of the history of science, the social responsibilities of scientists, and the ethical issues in science. Teaching techniques include the instructor sharing experiences as a scientist with the students, sharing books and resources with students, utilizing current sources of information like the weekly “Science Times”, inviting guest speakers, and utilizing portfolios to assess student learning. This paper was delivered orally at the National Academy of Sciences’ “Convocation on Scientific Conduct”, 6–7 June 1994.     

What’s New about the New Induction?

The problem of underdetermination is thought to hold important lessons for philosophy of science. Yet, as Kyle Stanford has recently argued, typical treatments of it offer only restatements of familiar philosophical problems. Following suggestions in Duhem and Sklar, Stanford calls for a New Induction from the history of science. It will provide proof, he thinks, of “the kind of underdetermination that the history of science reveals to be a distinctive and genuine threat to even our best scientific theories” (Stanford 2001, p. S12). This paper examines Stanford’s New Induction and argues that it – like the other forms of underdetermination that he criticizes – merely recapitulates familiar philosophical conundra.     

What is magic about the magical number four?

Summary Previous studies have shown that the apprehension of number can be represented by three models according to the experimental procedure and the data analysis. The present experiment was designed to test the effect of figural characteristics of pattern on the response time. The subjects were asked to perform a same/different judgment, i.e., they were requested to decide whether a dot pattern, shown on a monitor, equalled a previously defined target number (n=2–6) or not. Different types of pattern were used and learning effects were studied. As was expected, the slopes for random and linear patterns were not so steep when the target number was low. With patterns in the dice mode, however, the slope was zero. Repeated presentations led to a slight reduction in slope for random and linear patterns only. In the case of the patterns in the dice mode, the repeated presentations caused only a change in the absolute reaction times (RTs) but had no effect on the slope. When the target numbers were larger (n=5–6), the repeated presentations led to remarkable reductions in slope for random and linear patterns. The slope discontinuity at n=4 occurred with all types of pattern but it became less pronounced in the course of training at least in the case of random and linear patterns. This result is explained by clustering effects, use of figural cues, and a more efficient scanning process.     

Are infants in the dark about hidden objects?

Infants appear to search for objects hidden by darkness earlier in development than they search for objects hidden by an occluder in the light. However, these two types of search tasks have differed in numerous ways that may have contributed to better performance in the dark (e.g. in whether the hidden objects made sound, in the number of familiarization trials with visible objects). The current studies controlled such incidental differences between search tasks, so that they could be directly compared. Six‐and‐a‐half‐month‐olds received four types of test events, in which either a toy or no toy was presented and then hidden in the dark or under a cloth in the light. Infants searched more often on toy than no‐toy trials in the dark than with a cloth. The advantage in searching for hidden objects in the dark thus appears to be genuine. Theoretical implications are discussed.     

Do assessment centres really care about the candidate?

This article sets out a detailed commentary on the neglected end of the assessment centre, namely, the candidate. It highlights the variety of ways in which assessment centres do not always live up to their claims and can act against rather than in the interests of the candidate. It shares with assessment, counselling and guidance professionals an important set of issues that affects their client-base and practice with a view to encourage debate and reflection regarding their role as interventionists. It suggests a number of practical correction measures.     

What does the nature of the stimuli tell us about the Global Precedence Effect?

The "Global Precedence Effect" (GPE) is a well-established phenomenon characterised by a global advantage (global response times that are faster than local response times) and an interference effect from global distractors during identification of local targets but not vice versa. In the present study, two experiments were carried out to examine how the GPE is affected by the meaningfulness of the stimuli. Using global/local compound stimuli based on either meaningful or meaningless stimuli, we found, on the one hand, that the global level was always processed faster than the local level, irrespective of the meaningfulness of the material. On the other hand, results show that the interference effect occurred only with meaningful stimuli. We propose that automatic identification of meaningful stimuli plays a role in the interference effect. These results suggest that the GPE involves both "sensory mechanisms" (responsible for the global advantage) and "cognitive mechanisms" (responsible for the interference effect).     

Thinking ethically about the global in ‘Global Ethics’

In what follows, I claim that the ‘global’ in ‘Global Ethics’ needs also to be thought about in a different way, not as the scope or object of ethical judgement but in relation to the worlds reproduced by the practice of ethical judgement itself. In summary, ethical reflection on the meaning of the ‘global’ in the practice of Global Ethics as a field of academic inquiry is what is required if the future of Global Ethics is to be something other than Ethics or Applied Ethics as traditionally conducted.     

Can Evaluativism about unpleasant pains meet the normative condition?

This paper assesses whether Evaluativism, as a view about the nature of unpleasant pains, can meet a specific normative condition. The normative condition says whatever candidate state is offered as an analysis of unpleasant pain should be intrinsically phenomenally bad for its subject to be in. I first articulate a method reflecting this condition, called the normative contrast method, and then frame Evaluativism in detail. The view is then tested through this method. I show that Evaluativism can explain why cases of evaluative thought, with the same contents as unpleasant pains, are not intrinsically phenomenally bad for their subjects to be in by appeal to intentional modes. However, I argue the appeal to perceptuality, which is central to this response is problematic, and therefore it remains unclear whether Evaluativism, as standardly articulated, can meet the normative condition on unpleasant pains.     

What's so logical about the “logical” axioms?

Intuitionists and classical logicians use in common a large number of the logical axioms, even though they supposedly mean different things by the logical connectives and quantifiers — conquans for short. But Wittgenstein says The meaning of a word is its use in the language. We prove that in a definite sense the intuitionistic axioms do indeed characterize the logical conquans, both for the intuitionist and the classical logician.     

Is there something quantum-like about the human mental lexicon?

Following an early claim by Nelson and McEvoy suggesting that word associations can display ‘spooky action at a distance behaviour’, a serious investigation of the potentially quantum nature of such associations is currently underway. In this paper quantum theory is proposed as a framework suitable for modelling the human mental lexicon, specifically the results obtained from both intralist and extralist word association experiments. Some initial models exploring this hypothesis are discussed, and experiments capable of testing these models proposed.     

“I was mad about it all,about the ban”: Emotional spaces of solidarity in the Poznan March of Equality

In this paper, I focus on the spatial and emotional constitution of protest in the context of gay and lesbian public activism in Poland, on the basis of a case study of the Poznan March of Equality. The event took place on 19 November 2005, despite an earlier ban issued by the mayor of the city, following the recent rise of right-wing parties in power. The brutal break-up of the peaceful demonstration by the police sparked a discussion on broader issues of freedom of assembly and the state of Polish democracy. Through the narratives of March organizers, I look at the ways in which the activists engaged in the practices of collective memory work and emotion work, focusing specifically on anger, fear and euphoria. I call for discussion of emotions of public protest in the context of sexual citizenship as well as argue that it is necessary to examine the space-time scale of these emotions. In particular, I look at the ways in which the spatial and emotional context of collective memory work enabled the activists to inscribe the event into the narrative of Polish 1980s Solidarity activism and sustain activism despite an unfavourable political context.