Guilty feelings, targeted actions

Early investigations of guilt cast it as an emotion that prompts broad reparative behaviors that help guilty individuals feel better about themselves or about their transgressions. The current investigation found support for a more recent representation of guilt as an emotion designed to identify and correct specific social offenses. Across five experiments, guilt influenced behavior in a targeted and strategic way. Guilt prompted participants to share resources more generously with others, but only did so when those others were persons whom the participant had wronged and only when those wronged individuals could notice the gesture. Rather than trigger broad reparative behaviors that remediate one's general reputation or self-perception, guilt triggers targeted behaviors intended to remediate specific social transgressions.     

Of words,tools, and actions

The author rejects Leon Galis's claim (Inquiry, Vol. II, No. 2) that in ‘Of Words and Tools’ (Inquiry, Vol. 10, No. 2) he attacks a form of the ‘use’ theory of meaning that no one has held. Galis's other claim, that the author criticizes a needlessly weak form of the theory, is found to be justified, but the author argues that his procedure was adequate, and parallel to that oi Galis's own reconstruction of the ‘use’ theory in terms of ‘goal‐directed action’. Difficulties in this reconstruction are pointed out, and some meta‐semantic issues about theories of meaning raised.     

Risk, moral value of actions, and mood

In this article the acceptability of risk is related to the moral value of risky actions. Four widely different groups of subjects (clergy, MBA students, prison inmates and pregnant women) judged 20 individual and 20 collective acts with reference to acceptability of risk, moral value, and value and probability of negative and positive consequences. They also rated their current mood. Acceptability of risks was most strongly related to moral value, which thus was found to be an important determiner of acceptability of risk. A depressed mood was associated with a lenient attitude to risks. Societal acts were more negatively evaluated than individual acts. There was a strong positive correlation between values and probabilities of outcomes, both positive and negative.     

Reasoning about cooperation,actions and preferences

In this paper, a logic for reasoning about coalitional power is developed which explicitly represents agents’ preferences and the actions by which the agents can achieve certain results. A complete axiomatization is given and its satisfiability problem is shown to be decidable and EXPTIME-hard.     

Action of structures,structure of actions

This paper was throught of as a form of silent dialogue with my friend Michael Wright. As such, it has the merits, if any, and the defects of a flowing course of thoughts that entersin medias res with less feignings than in standard philosophical literature.     

Automatic actions: Agency,intentionality, and responsibility

This article discusses a challenge to the traditional intentional-causalist conceptions of action and intentionality as well as to our everyday and legal conceptions of responsibility, namely the psychological discovery that the greatest part of our alleged actions are performed automatically, that is unconsciously and without a proximal intention causing and sustaining them. The main part of the article scrutinizes several mechanisms of automatic behavior, how they work, and whether the resulting behavior is an action. These mechanisms include actions caused by distal implementation intentions, four types of habit and habitualization, mimicry, and semantically induced automatic behavior (which is later disregarded because of its lack of clarity). According to the intentional-causalist criterion, the automatic behaviors resulting from all but one of these mechanisms turn out to be actions and to be intentional; and even the behavior resulting from the remaining mechanism (naturally acquired habits) is something we can be responsible for. Hence, the challenge, seen from close up, does not really call the traditional conception of action and intentionality into question.     

The link between anger and admiration toward governmental actions and self-reported preventive behaviour in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic

In the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, across six correlational studies in four different countries (total N = 4937), we examined the link between citizens' anger with and admiration for the government's actions and decisions (i.e., system-based anger and admiration) and engagement in preventive behaviour. The internal meta-analyses showed that individuals who admired the government's actions were more likely to adopt personal hygiene and social distancing behaviour. Yet, the link between emotions and preventive behaviour differed concerning the target of emotions, especially for anger. Specifically, anger about restrictions imposed by the government was negatively related to preventive behaviours, but this relationship was not significant when the target of anger was the government's overall handling of the pandemic. Our findings emphasise the importance of citizens' emotions and the targets of those emotions during the crisis.     

The means-end account of scientific,representational actions

Synthese - While many recent accounts of scientific representation have given a central role to the agency and intentions of scientists in explaining representation, they have left these agential...     

Order and chaos in thoughts, feelings, and actions

In the context of the concept of determinate chaos, introduced in psychology in the nineties, a modified stimulus-response formula is suggested which deals with the probabilistic predictions of responses of animate systems (brainless animate systems, animals, human persons) on stimuli. The suggested formula is used here in elaboration of a model describing the relationship among thoughts, feelings, and actions. In the framework of the model, a Darwin-like selection of behavioral and mental responses on stimuli is realized which is influenced by feelings. Transformations of human persons into mentally unhealthy states are discussed with the help of representations of the elaborated model. The model invites empirical test.     

Knowing how,basic actions,and ways of doing things

This paper investigates whether we can know how to do basic actions, from the perspective according to which knowing how to do something requires knowledge of a way to do it. A key argument from this perspective against basic know-how is examined and is found to be unsound, involving the false premise that there are no ways of doing basic actions. However, a new argument along similar lines is then developed, which contends that there are no ways of doing basic actions in any sense that matters for acquiring knowledge-how. This requires coming to a deeper understanding of ways of doing things than has hitherto been sought, which should be useful for further theorizing in this area. It is concluded that analyses of knowing-how in terms of knowledge of ways are inconsistent with the common assumption that there is basic know-how.     

Decisions,actions, and the appropriateness of confidence in knowledge

This research examines the appropriateness of confidence (i.e., subjective probability judgments) in knowledge associated with decisions and actions of social importance. One hundred and thirty seven participants completed a 50 item questionnaire assessing their knowledge of the two leading candidates in the 1988 presidential election in the U.S.A. Ninety one of the respondents completed the questionnaire one week prior to the election, whereas the other 46 completed the questionnaire on election day shortly after voting. After each item in the questionnaire, all respondents indicated whether or not the item content represented a reason why they voted (or intended to vote) for or against the candidate to whom the item referred. Within-person results indicated that, in comparison to items that were not cited as reasons for voting intentions or voting behavior, items endorsed as reasons were characterized by better accuracy and resolution, but worse overconfidence. Between groups, decision makers were significantly more accurate and better calibrated than those who had not made a decision between the candidates. Implications of inappropriate confidence on decision making effectiveness are discussed.     

Side-effect actions,acting for a reason,and acting intentionally

What is the relation between acting intentionally and acting for a reason? While this question has generated a considerable amount of debate in the philosophy of action, on one point there has been a virtual consensus: actions performed for a reason are necessarily intentional. Recently, this consensus has been challenged by Joshua Knobe and Sean Kelly, who argue against it on the basis of empirical evidence concerning the ways in which ordinary speakers of the English language describe and explain certain side-effect actions. Knobe and Kelly's argument is of interest not only because it challenges a widely accepted philosophical thesis on the basis of experimental evidence, but also because it indirectly raises an important and largely neglected question, the question of whether or in what sense an agent can perform a side-effect action for a reason. In this article, I address this question and provide a positive answer to it. Specifically, I argue that agents act for a reason whenever they perform side-effect actions as trade-offs. Thus, I claim that there are three distinct types of rational action: actions performed as ends in themselves, actions performed as means to further ends, and side-effect actions performed as trade-offs. Given this multiplicity of types of rational action, the question of whether or not actions performed for a reason are necessarily intentional is in need of refinement. The more specific question that lies at the heart of this article is whether or not side-effect actions performed as trade-offs are necessarily intentional. I conclude that, contrary to what Knobe and Kelly suggest, the question remains open.