The relationship between cognitive dissonance and helping behavior

An experiment was conducted to study the relationship between cognitive dissonance and helping behavior. A counterattitudinal procedure was employed to arouse dissonance. For half of the participants, an experimental confederate entered the room and elicited an opportunity for them to offer help. In this situation, fewer subjects in the dissonance condition offered help than subjects in the no‐dissonance condition. The least helping occurred among dissonance subjects with the highest level of commitment to the counterattitudinal task. Those with a medium level of commitment offered significantly more help. Despite the fact that results in line with Festinger's cognitive dissonance theory (subjects' attitudinal change) were obtained in the no‐helping situation, in helping situations, dissonance subjects who offered help presented significantly less attitude change than those who did not offer it. This was considered to be a result of helpfulness reducing dissonance arousal.     

Is dissonance phenomenologically aversive?

This study examined whether dissonance is, phenomenologically, an aversive state. Experimental subjects were induced to write counterattitudinal essays under a high-choice condition. One group of subjects was led to believe that a pill, which they had just taken in the context of a separate experiment, would cause them to feel pleasantly excited. A second group was led to believe that the pill would make them feel tense. A third group was given no information about the pill's potential side effects, while a fourth group expected to have no side effects at all. In this last condition, the results yielded the usual dissonance effect: subjects stated attitudes more congruent with the essay than did subjects in a survey control condition. When subjects were given an opportunity to attribute their arousal to an arousing, but nonaversive pill (i.e., the pleasant excitement condition), this effect was unchanged. In contrast, when subjects could attribute their arousal to an aversive pill (i.e., in the tensè and the no information conditions), this effect was virtually eliminated. These results are consistent with the notion that dissonance is an aversive state and that subjects will seize, when possible, an external attribution for this state.     

Preference of dissonance reduction modes as a function of their order,familiarity and reversibility

Two central hypotheses of the original version of the theory of cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957) (1) that dissonance is to be conceived of as a primary drive and (2) that in order to reduce dissonance less resistant cognitions will be changed more than highly resistant ones led to hypotheses which were confirmed by two experiments. In Experiment I, a 2 × 3 factorial design, order and familiarity of dissonance reduction modes were manipulated. After receiving a dissonant information the subjects were offered a relatively low and a relatively high resistant cognition for dissonance reduction, each being placed first (series I, high-low resistance) or last (series II, low-high resistance) respectively. Subjects did (known) or did not (unknown) read these modes before reacting to them. Under the unknown condition dissonance will be reduced more with a specific mode if it is placed first than last. With known reduction modes the order of presentation does not have an effect. Under series I condition the first-placed, higher-resistant cognition will be changed more in the unknown condition than in the known condition. Under the series II condition the first-placed, lower-resistant cognition will be changed equally in the known and unknown condition. In short, the higher-resistant cognition will be changed more, only when it is placed first and when the following modes are not known. Two explanations for these results are possible: (1) The more dissonance is reduced by changing a more or a less resistant congnition, the less further reduction is necessary; (2) dissonance will be reduced in an internally consistent way. Experiment II excluded the first explanation. Subjects were allowed to revise their original way of reducing dissonance. First, subjects in one condition received series I unknown and subjects in the other condition received series II unknown. Reacting to the dissonance reduction modes the second time, there was more revision when the high-resistant congition was placed first (series 1 revision) than when placed last (series II revision). These results support the hypothesis that dissonance reduction by changing a less-resistant congnition more and changing a high-resistant one less is preferred. Implications of the results of the two experments for the stability of dissonance reduction, the method and interpretation of dissonance experiments are discussed.     

Belief discrepant behavior and the bogus pipeline: Impression management or arousal attribution

Based on recent studies impression management theorists conclude that following belief discrepant behavior, persons will feign attitude change on paper measures, but report their “true” beliefs when attached to a lie detector (the bogus pipeline). A dissonance arousal explanation of these bogus pipeline results suggests that subjects may attribute their arousal to the bogus pipeline equipment instead of to dissonance and therefore may not be motivated to change their attitudes. The present study examined these competing interpretations and yielded results which support the dissonance arousal attribution explanation. Subjects who were attached to a (bogus pipeline) lie detector exhibited attitude change if given the opportunity to get accustomed to the equipment (which made attribution of arousal to the equipment less plausible), but showed no attitude change if no habituation experience was provided.     

The similarities between cognitive dissonance and guilt: Confession as a relief of dissonance

It is proposed that dissonance is similar to the feeling of guilt. If they are in fact analogous, and confession relieves guilt, then one implication is that confession would relieve dissonance. This experiment tested this prediction using a standard induced compliance paradigm. Forty-five undergraduate subjects were assigned to either a no-choice condition, a choice-confession condition, or a choice-no-confession condition. The results indicate that confession does relieve dissonance. Further, as predicted, a negative correlation was found between attitudinal shift and guilt. The implications of the findings concerning the mechanisms of confession are discussed.     

The similarities between cognitive dissonance and guilt: Confession as a relief of dissonance

It is proposed that dissonance is similar to the feeling of guilt. If they are in fact analogous, and confession relieves guilt, then one implication is that confession would relieve dissonance. This experiment tested this prediction using a standard induced compliance paradigm. Forty-five undergraduate subjects were assigned to either a no-choice condition, a choice-confession condition, or a choice-no-confession condition. The results indicate that confession does relieve dissonance. Further, as predicted, a negative correlation was found between attitudinal shift and guilt. The implications of the findings concerning the mechanisms of confession are discussed.     

The effect of combined arousal states on attitude change

An experiment was devised in which subjects either were given a choice or were given no choice to listen to a counter-attitudinal communication. For half the subjects (Interrupt condition) the tape of the communication broke during the concluding sentence of the speech. The other half of the subjects (No Interrupt condition) heard the speech in its entirety. A recall measure indicated that subjects in the Interrupt condition recalled significantly more arguments made in the communication than subjects who heard the complete speech. This was interpreted as being a Zeigarnik effect caused by arousal created by the interruption. The choice manipulation should have created dissonance and motivated attitude change. Consistent with dissonance theory, measures of attitude change showed that greater attitude change toward the position of the speech occurred in the Choice condition than in the No Choice condition. In addition, an interaction in which significantly greater change occurred in the Choice-Interrupt condition than any of the other conditions was obtained. Since both the choice and interruption manipulations were hypothesized to be arousing, it was speculated that, in the Choice-Interrupt condition, the arousal created by the cognitive inconsistency and by the interrupted task may have combined to yield the increased attitude change. The conditions under which arousal states might combine were discussed.     

Selective exposure to information and cognitive dissonance

Despite numerous attempts, the selective exposure prediction of Festinger's (A theory of cognitive dissonance. Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson, 1957) theory of cognitive dissonance has not been consistently demonstrated. In previous studies, this failure can be attributed to design deficiencies, and other related problems. The present study manipulated dissonance by having subjects write a counterattitudinal essay under conditions of high or low choice. Information in the form of pamphlets and discussion groups was offered to the subjects such that they could choose information that was consonant and dissonant with the decision to write the essay. The information was offered either before or after an attitude measure on the essay topic, as the attitude measure could also be a source of dissonance reduction. The results indicate that the high choice manipulation yielded greater attitude change than the low-choice manipulation. High-choice subjects desired consonant information more and dissonant information less than did low-choice subjects. This effect was found for both measures of information desire (pamphlets and discussion groups). Low-choice subjects who received the attitude questionnaire before the information measures wanted information more than if offered the information before the attitude questionnaire, implying a sensitizing effect produced by the attitude questionnaire for the low-choice subjects. The various effects are discussed as providing support for predictions from Festinger's dissonance theory.     

Pills and attitude change: misattribution of arousal or excuses for negative actions?

Two experiments evaluated the competing interpretations of cognitive dissonance and impression management theories regarding the pill and misattribution studies of attitude change in the forced compliance situation. Attitude change was eliminated when subjects were told about the tension side effects of taking a placebo, replicating the usual effect. Attitude change was also eliminated, however, when subjects took the pill following counterattitudinal behavior. In one condition of the second experiment, subjects were given instructions about tension side effects but were also told that the drug would not affect their moral judgment or behavior. These instructions eliminated attitude change in a standard pill condition. The typical finding of attitude change was manifested in the misattribution/no-excuse condition. The primary and secondary data from both studies provided more support for the impression management interpretation of the standard misattribution manipulations than for a theory of misattribution of dissonance-produced arousal.     

Criterion Development and Validity of the CQT in Field Application

Two experiments evaluated the competing interpretations of cognitive dissonance and impression management theories regarding the pill and misattribution studies of attitude change in the forced compliance situation. Attitude change was eliminated when subjects were told about the tension side effects of taking a placebo, replicating the usual effect. Attitude change was also eliminated, however, when subjects took the pill following counterattitudinal behavior. In one condition of the second experiment, subjects were given instructions about tension side effects but were also told that the drug would not affect their moral judgment or behavior. These instructions eliminated attitude change in a standard pill condition. The typical finding of attitude change was manifested in the misattribution/no-excuse condition. The primary and secondary data from both studies provided more support for the impression management interpretation of the standard misattribution manipulations than for a theory of misattribution of dissonance-produced arousal.     

Impression management in the forced compliance situation: Two studies using the bogus pipeline

Two studies were performed to assess the interpersonal concerns of subjects in the forced compliance paradigm. The first study counterposed dissonance and impression management theory predictions in a 2 × 2 design by varying the public versus private nature of the counterattitudinal behavior and by assessing attitudes with the usual pencil-and-paper method or with a bogus pipeline technique designed to create strong pressures toward sincere reporting. Attitude change occurred only in the Public/Pencil-and-Paper condition and thus supported an interpersonal or impression management interpretation. The second study examined the effect of measuring the critical attitude a second time in the mode not experienced in the first assessment. This three-group design (Pencil-and-Paper/Bogus Pipeline, Bogus Pipeline/Pencil-and-Paper, Control) demonstrated that attitude change occurred only in the Pencil-and-Paper/Bogus Pipeline condition and was maintained on the second assessment when measured by the bogus pipeline. A common-factor analysis of the secondary measures in the second study demonstrated that the Pencil-and-Paper/Bogus Pipeline subjects reported a great deal of negative arousal such as embarrassment and guilt, while the subjects in the Bogus Pipeline/Pencil-and-Paper condition reported feeling manipulated and constrained. The findings of both studies were interpreted as consistent with impression management theory.     

Forced compliance: Commitment to compliance and commitment to activity

It is argued that the standard manipulation of free choice in a forced compliance situation has fostered confusion between the two different types of choices offered to subjects, namely commitment or non-commitment to compliance with the experimenter and choice of counter-attitudinal activity per se. From a theoretical viewpoint, the two choices have very different implications. The former is a prerequisite to dissonance arousal; the latter may bring about consonant cognitions which reduce the dissonance ratio. Two experiments which separated these two choices confirmed the above predictions, derived from a radical conception of the dissonance theory (Beauvois and Joule, 1981, 1994). The results are inconsistent with the reinterpretation of dissonance effects in self-perception terms.     

The interaction model of anxiety and dental treatment

An empirical test of the interaction model of anxiety was provided by assessing the state anxiety and trait anxiety of 20 female and 7 male dental patients undergoing periodontal surgery. Measures of A-State (PARQ IV), A-Trait (S-R GTA), and perceptions (PSRF) were administered in both a high-stress condition (30 min prior to surgery) and a low-stress condition (4 to 6 days after surgery). It was hypothesized that undergoing periodontal surgery would be perceived as a combination ambiguous/physical danger situation. Accordingly it was predicted that high-ambiguous A-Trait subjects would experience greater decreases in A-State than low-ambiguous A-Trait subjects in proceeding from the high-stress to the low-stress condition. Similarly it was predicted that high-physical danger A-Trait subjects would show greater decreases in A-State than low-physical danger A-Trait subjects. Significant A-Trait × stress condition interactions were not expected to occur for noncongruent A-Trait facets (social evaluation and innocuous). Results indicated that, while the high-stress condition was perceived as an ambiguous/physical danger situation, the A-Trait × stress condition interactions were not significant for ambiguous, physical danger, or innocuous A-Trait facets. Contrary to prediction, a significant interaction was observed between social evaluation A-Trait and stress condition. This finding was explained in terms of the complex relationship between situation perception and situation reaction.     

小学4～6年级儿童数学应用题表征模型的使用研究

该研究考察了小学4～6年级学生在数学应用题中理解阶段和执行阶段使用表征模型的情况,研究运用实验法对某普通小学的158名4～6年级学生进行了应用题改写任务和缩写任务.结果表明：（1）学生在理解阶段更多地选择情境条件,使用情境模型来表征问题;在执行阶段较少选择情境条件,转而使用问题模型来表征问题;（2）随着年级的升高,相对于优等生来说,其他学生在缩写任务中对情境条件的选择数量越来越少,而优等生在这方面一直都做得很好.差等生识别多余条件的能力并没有随着年级的升高而发生改变,而优等生却在不断增强.     

Cognitive dissonance induced by writing a counterattitudinal essay facilitates performance on simple tasks but not on complex tasks that involve working memory

This article examines how performance is facilitated with simple tasks and is impaired with complex ones in individuals experiencing dissonance. Experiment 1 measured the performance of dissonance participants at a simple reaction time task. Reaction times were shortest in the dissonance condition. This facilitation effect was interpreted as resulting from increased arousal with dissonance. In Experiment 2, participants performed a more complex secondary memory task that required to memorize and to recall short and long series of numbers. Participants in the dissonance condition performed less well than participants in the no-dissonance condition only under a high memory load and did not differ with a low load. It is suggested that dissonance requires some working memory resources. Accordingly, it is assumed that the arousal properties of dissonance facilitate performance with simple task that do not involve working memory and require a dominant response, but that dissonance impairs performance with tasks that strongly involve working memory.     

Cognitive dissonance and the perception of natural environments

Two studies demonstrated that the motivation to resolve cognitive dissonance affects the visual perception of physical environments. In Study 1, subjects crossed a campus quadrangle wearing a costume reminiscent of Carmen Miranda. In Study 2, subjects pushed themselves up a hill while kneeling on a skateboard. Subjects performed either task under a high-choice, low-choice, or control condition. Subjects in the high-choice conditions, presumably to resolve dissonance, perceived the environment to be less aversive than did subjects in the low-choice and control conditions, seeing a shorter distance to travel (Study 1) and a shallower slope to climb (Study 2). These studies suggest that the impact of motivational states extends from social judgment down into perceptual processes.     

The origins of cognitive dissonance: evidence from children and monkeys

In a study exploring the origins of cognitive dissonance, preschoolers and capuchins were given a choice between two equally preferred alternatives (two different stickers and two differently colored M&M's, respectively). On the basis of previous research with adults, this choice was thought to cause dissonance because it conflicted with subjects' belief that the two options were equally valuable. We therefore expected subjects to change their attitude toward the unchosen alternative, deeming it less valuable. We then presented subjects with a choice between the unchosen option and an option that was originally as attractive as both options in the first choice. Both groups preferred the novel over the unchosen option in this experimental condition, but not in a control condition in which they did not take part in the first decision. These results provide the first evidence of decision rationalization in children and nonhuman primates. They suggest that the mechanisms underlying cognitive-dissonance reduction in human adults may have originated both developmentally and evolutionarily earlier than previously thought.     

Dissonance and abstraction: Cognitive conflict leads to higher level of construal

This study investigated the effects of cognitive conflict on abstract thinking. According to action‐identification theory, an ambiguous and unfamiliar situation might propel an individual to a more abstract mindset. Based on this premise, cognitive conflict was hypothesized to put people in an abstract mindset. The induced compliance paradigm, in which participants are asked to write a counter‐attitudinal essay under either low choice (producing little dissonance) or high choice (producing more dissonance), was employed. Results showed that an abstract mindset was in fact activated in the induced compliance paradigm, and this effect was more pronounced for participants having a more concrete mindset to begin with. The results suggest that the experience of cognitive conflict is closely related to increased abstraction.     

Dissonance and self-perception: An integrative view of each theory's proper domain of application

The literature concerning the controversy between dissonance and selfperception theories is reviewed. It is proposed that the two theories be regarded not as “competing” formulations but as complementary ones and, furthermore, that each theory is applicable only to its own specialized domain. Self-perception theory, it is suggested, accurately characterizes attitude change phenomena in the context of attitude-congruent behavior and dissonance theory attitude change in the context of attitude-discrepant behavior. Attitude-congruent is defined as any position within an individual's latitude of acceptance; attitude-discrepant as any position in the latitude of rejection. An experimental test of these notions produced confirming evidence. Subjects who were given an opportunity to misattribute any potential dissonance arousal to an external stimulus did not change their attitudes, relative to low choice subjects, if they were committed to endorsing a position in their latitude of rejection. If the commitment concerned a position in the latitude of acceptance, however, these subjects did exhibit attitude change relative to low choice subjects.     

Using Cognitive Dissonance to Encourage Water Conservation1

In a field experiment on water conservation, we aroused dissonance in patrons of the campus recreation facility by making them feel hypocritical about their showering habits. Using a 2 × 2 factorial design, we manipulated subjects “‘mindfulness” that they had sometimes wasted water while showering, and then varied whether they made a “public commitment” urging other people to take shorter showers. The “hypocrisy” condition-in which subjects made the public commitment after being reminded of their past behavior-was expected to be dissonance-arousing, thereby motivating subjects to increase their efforts to conserve water. The results were consistent with this reasoning. Compared to controls, subjects in the hypocrisy condition took significantly shorter showers. Subjects who were merely reminded that they had wasted water, or who only made the public commitment, did not take shorter showers than control subjects. The findings have implications for using cognitive dissonance as means of changing behavior in applied settings, especially those in which people already support the desired goal, but their behavior is not consistent with those beliefs.