Mindreading with ease? Fluency and belief reasoning in 4- to 5-year-olds

For decades, philosophers and psychologists have assumed that children understand other people’s behavior on the basis of Belief Reasoning (BR) at latest by age 5 when they pass the false belief task. Furthermore, children’s use of BR in the true belief task has been regarded as being ontogenetically prior. Recent findings from developmental studies challenge this view and indicate that 4- to 5-year-old children make use of a reasoning strategy, which is cognitively less demanding than BR and called perceptual access reasoning (PAR), in true belief tasks. I appeal to research on fluency to explain these findings. On my account, 4- to 5- year-old children understand other people’s behavior by means of BR if they experience cognitive strain (such as in false belief tasks) but they revert to simpler heuristics PAR when such an experience is missing (such as in true belief tasks).     

When can children handle referential opacity? Evidence for systematic variation in 5- and 6-year-old children's reasoning about beliefs and belief reports

Five- and 6-year-olds (N=51) heard stories in which a character sorted items into two locations. Either the character had a false belief about one of the items (e.g., thought a tin contained biscuits, not Lego), or was only partially informed of an item's dual identity (e.g., did not know that a tie was a present). Children found it easier to reject a report of the character's belief that described the true state of affairs when the character had a false belief (e.g., Is Fred's uncle thinking "where shall I put this Lego?"), than to reject one in which an object known to the character was described using a term of which she was ignorant (e.g., Is Mum thinking "where shall I put this present?"). Similarly, children found it easier to predict the character's incorrect sorting of the target items for false belief (with food not toys) than for dual identity (in the wardrobe not with things to take on a visit). Correct reasoning about beliefs and reports of beliefs that misrepresent an object does not imply mastery of the fact that beliefs represent an object in a particular way.     

Children’s reasoning about norms and traits as motives for behavior

Two important sources of information for social judgments are personality dispositions (traits) and social norms. Existing research suggests that young children do not find traits salient. To what extent might they rely on a different source of information? Two experiments explored how information about preferences (what someone likes) and rules (what is allowed or forbidden) affected social judgments. Five-year-olds predicted people’s future behavior would be consistent with rules, but appeared insensitive to information about preferences. Preferences were better predictors than rules for 8-year-olds. Older children and adults consistently judged that actors would want to, and be happy to, satisfy preferences rather than rules. Younger children were more likely to use rules to infer people’s psychological states. Results are consistent with the hypothesis that deontic relations, such as rules and norms play a central role in young children’s social cognition, with ideas of individual psychological dispositions emerging in middle childhood.     

Motivated reasoning in the prediction of sports outcomes and the belief in the “hot hand”

The present paper explores the role of motivation to observe a certain outcome in people’s predictions, causal attributions, and beliefs about a streak of binary outcomes (basketball scoring shots). In two studies we found that positive streaks (points scored by the participants’ favourite team) lead participants to predict the streak’s continuation (belief in the hot hand), but negative streaks lead to predictions of its end (gambler’s fallacy). More importantly, these wishful predictions are supported by strategic attributions and beliefs about how and why a streak might unfold. Results suggest that the effect of motivation on predictions is mediated by a serial path via causal attributions to the teams at play and belief in the hot hand.     

Students’ knowledge about the value of discussions for teaching and learning

We are particularly interested in looking at teaching and learning from students perspectives. Focussed interviews and written responses from a number of linked investigations with middle-school and tertiary students highlighted that students perceive discussion to be a valuable teaching -- learning technique. This paper provides text extracts, organised into six key themes, to illustrate students understandings about how discussion helps them to learn. We conclude that, across the whole participant group, knowledge about the various potentials of discussion for learning is wide ranging. However, at the individual level, some students perspectives appear limited. We propose that specific attention to enhancing students pedagogical knowledge about techniques such as discussion should accompany subject matter instruction.     

Are there limits to collectivism? Culture and children's reasoning about lying to conceal a group transgression

This study explored the effects of collectivism on lying to conceal a group transgression. Seven‐, 9‐, and 11‐year‐old US and Chinese children (N=374) were asked to evaluate stories in which protagonists either lied or told the truth about their group's transgression and were then asked about either the protagonist's motivations or justification for their own evaluations. Previous research suggests that children in collectivist societies such as China find lying for one's group to be more acceptable than do children from individualistic societies such as the United States. The current study provides evidence that this is not always the case: Chinese children in this study viewed lies told to conceal a group's transgressions less favourably than did US children. An examination of children's reasoning about protagonists' motivations for lying indicated that children in both countries focused on an impact to self when discussing motivations for protagonists to lie for their group. Overall, results suggest that children living in collectivist societies do not always focus on the needs of the group. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Time to contemplate change? A framework for assessing readiness to change with offenders

An improved understanding of offenders' readiness to change would enhance our ability to assess and engage such readiness. This paper provides a critique of the Stages of Change Model (SCM) which is widely used to assess readiness to change with offenders. We argue that the SCM does not provide a sound theoretical basis for understanding offender readiness to change. We highlight problems measuring constructs with the SCM accurately and question the theoretical coherence and level of explanation of readiness to change offered by the model.The second section of the paper presents the Readiness to Change Framework (RCF) as an alternative theoretical framework for understanding readiness to change. The RCF has been designed as a generic framework for understanding readiness to change for multiple behaviors. The two models within the framework are described, and examples of how they may be useful to practitioners working in the area of readiness to change are presented. Finally, strengths, limitations, and potential further developments of the framework are discussed.     

Is there a general factor in ratings of job performance? A meta-analytic framework for disentangling substantive and error influences

A database integrating 90 years of empirical studies reporting intercorrelations among rated job performance dimensions was used to test the hypothesis of a general factor in job performance. After controlling for halo error and 3 other sources of measurement error, there remained a general factor in job performance ratings at the construct level accounting for 60% of total variance. Construct-level correlations among rated dimensions of job performance were substantially inflated by halo for both supervisory (33%) and peer (63%) intrarater correlations. These findings have important implications for the measurement of job performance and for theories of job performance.     

Competence and performance in belief-desire reasoning across two cultures: the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth about false belief?

There is a change in false belief task performance across the 3-5 year age range, as confirmed in a recent meta-analysis [Wellman, H. M., Cross, D., & Watson, J. (2001). Meta-analysis of theory mind development: The truth about false-belief. Child Development, 72, 655-684]. This meta-analysis identified several performance factors influencing success, including manipulations that highlight the salience of the initial belief content (such as asking where Sally will look first for the marble). However, because a proportion of variance in performance remained unexplained even when identified performance factors were controlled for, the authors concluded from the standpoint of a 'theory-theory' account that children's improvement is the result of conceptual change. Further, the meta-analysis showed that manipulations such as 'look first' improve performance only in children who are in the older part of the 3-5 year range, and thus plausibly operating with a 'transitional' theory of mind--just on the point of realizing conceptual change. Here, we present three studies systematically investigating the 'look first' manipulation which showed that: (i) the advantage for the look first question can be demonstrated in children across different cultures, (ii) look first has an effect that is additive to the improvement with age; there is no interaction such that older children gain more benefit from younger children, (iii) performance in younger children can be, but is not always, elevated to levels that are statistically above chance. These results challenge the theory-theory account and are discussed in terms of models of belief-desire reasoning in which both conceptual competence and performance factors play central roles.     

Hidden talents in harsh conditions? A preregistered study of memory and reasoning about social dominance

Although growing up in stressful conditions can undermine mental abilities, people in harsh environments may develop intact, or even enhanced, social and cognitive abilities for solving problems in high‐adversity contexts (i.e. ‘hidden talents’). We examine whether childhood and current exposure to violence are associated with memory (number of learning rounds needed to memorize relations between items) and reasoning performance (accuracy in deducing a novel relation) on transitive inference tasks involving both violence‐relevant and violence‐neutral social information (social dominance vs. chronological age). We hypothesized that individuals who had more exposure to violence would perform better than individuals with less exposure on the social dominance task. We tested this hypothesis in a preregistered study in 100 Dutch college students and 99 Dutch community participants. We found that more exposure to violence was associated with lower overall memory performance, but not with reasoning performance. However, the main effects of current (but not childhood) exposure to violence on memory were qualified by significant interaction effects. More current exposure to neighborhood violence was associated with worse memory for age relations, but not with memory for dominance relations. By contrast, more current personal involvement in violence was associated with better memory for dominance relations, but not with memory for age relations. These results suggest incomplete transfer of learning and memory abilities across contents. This pattern of results, which supports a combination of deficits and ‘hidden talents,’ is striking in relation to the broader developmental literature, which has nearly exclusively reported deficits in people from harsh conditions. A video abstract of this article can be viewed at: https://youtu.be/e4ePmSzZsuc .     

Team adaptation: A fifteen-year synthesis (1998–2013) and framework for how this literature needs to “adapt” going forward

Organizations increasingly operate within dynamic environments that require them to adapt. To respond quickly and effectively to acute or on-going change, many organizations use teams to help them remain competitive. Accordingly, the topic of team adaptation has become more prominent within the broader organizational team literature. Given the wealth of knowledge that has been accumulated, we consider what has been learned to date. However, even with the increased attention to team adaptation within the literature, not all teams are created equal in terms of their capacity for adaptability. Thus, we review factors that serve as antecedents of team adaptation, the process of adaptation, and the resulting adaptive outcomes. Finally, we suggest future directions for research and practice as we introduce a conceptual framework, whereby the focus of a team’s adaptation process is impacted by the type and severity of the disruption or trigger that gives rise to the need for adaptation.     

Why did this happen to me? Religious believers’ and non-believers’ teleological reasoning about life events

People often believe that significant life events happen for a reason. In three studies, we examined evidence for the view that teleological beliefs reflect a general cognitive bias to view the world in terms of agency, purpose, and design. Consistent with this hypothesis, we found that individual differences in mentalizing ability predicted both the tendency to believe in fate (Study 1) and to infer purposeful causes of one’s own life events (Study 2). In addition, people’s perception of purpose in life events was correlated with their teleological beliefs about nature, but this relationship was driven primarily by individuals’ explicit religious and paranormal beliefs (Study 3). Across all three studies, we found that while people who believe in God hold stronger teleological beliefs than those who do not, there is nonetheless evidence of teleological beliefs among non-believers, confirming that the perception of purpose in life events does not rely on theistic belief. These findings suggest that the tendency to perceive design and purpose in life events—while moderated by theistic belief—is not solely a consequence of culturally transmitted religious ideas. Rather, this teleological bias has its roots in certain more general social propensities.     

Public knowledge,attitudes, and beliefs about homeless people: Evidence for compassion fatigue?

Media reports suggest that the public is becoming impatient with the homeless—that so-called “compassion fatigue” has gripped the nation. This characterization of public sentiment could have important policy consequences—restrictive measures can be justified by growing public impatience, and progressive housing policies seem infeasible within a hostile climate of opinion. But evidence to support the compassion fatigue notion is anecdotal. We examine the issue by tracking the results of public opinion polls and by reporting detailed evidence from a nationwide random-digit dial telephone survey (N=1,507) concerning knowledge attitudes and beliefs about homeless people. To be sure, the public sees homelessness as an undesirable social problem and wants something done about it. However, although the homeless are clearly stigmatized, there is little evidence to suggest that the public has lost compassion and is unwilling to support policies to help homeless people.     

Technical clarification to Silbert and Thomas (2013): “Decisional separability,model identification,and statistical inference in the general recognition theory framework”

We offer a minor technical correction to the published proof of part (ii) of the main theorem in Silbert and Thomas (Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 20, 1–20, 2013) that somewhat limits the scope of the equivalence observed in that work. Specifically, in order for a mean shift integrality with decisional separability to be mimicked by a perceptually separable but nondecisionally separable configuration, one needs to assume stimulus invariance. This holds when all of the covariance matrices in the stimulus configuration are equal to each other. We note that part (i) of the theorem is unaffected by this modification; an empirical finding of perceptual separability and the failure of decisional separability can be mimicked by a perceptually nonseparable, decisionally separable configuration without restricting the covariance matrices to be equal. We also note that stimulus invariance is often assumed in simple designs (e.g., Macmillan & Ornstein in Journal of the Acoustical Society of America, 97, 1261–1285, 1998), due to the implausibility of different perceptual correlations being present within stimuli perched very closely in perceptual space.     

When do stereotypes come to mind and when do they color judgment? A goal-based theoretical framework for stereotype activation and application

The authors describe a theoretical framework for understanding when people interacting with a member of a stereotyped group activate that group's stereotype and apply it to that person. It is proposed that both stereotype activation and stereotype application during interaction depend on the strength of comprehension and self-enhancement goals that can be satisfied by stereotyping one's interaction partner and on the strength of one's motivation to avoid prejudice. The authors explain how these goals can promote and inhibit stereotype activation and application, and describe diverse chronic and situational factors that can influence the intensity of these goals during interaction and, thereby, influence stereotype activation and application. This approach permits integration of a broad range of findings on stereotype activation and application.     

Faith and belief in The Anti-Christ: A re-evaluation of Nietzsche’s relation to Jesus

This paper re-evaluates the significance of Jesus for Nietzsche by looking at The Anti-Christ. Specifically we will ask whether a re-evaluation of this relation can shed new light on Nietzsche’s critique of Christianity. And we will do this first by surveying the standard interpretations of this issue, as well as the existing literature on The Anti-Christ. Arguing that the latter picks out nothing new regarding a critique of Christianity, we nonetheless suggest that a new criticism can be developed via the discussion of Jesus there. Further, this can be done by looking at the account given of faith and belief in that text. That is, we will explore the status of Jesus for Nietzsche by looking at the origins and development of “faith” as a mode of belief. In particular, we trace the former’s development as a type from a basic mode of faith. As such, we begin by looking at the psychological origins of this kind of belief in “decadence”, and why Nietzsche is critical of this. However, we will then discuss the emergence of a more positive faith in the form of Buddhism, and see how this represents an analogue for Jesus’s faith. Continuing, we will see how Jesus signifies a similar problematic development, but also “overcoming”, of initial decadence faith. And we will argue, also, that this overcoming is rooted in his emphasis on the immediacy of lived experience. Finally though, we will look at how Christianity returns Jesus’s more productive relation to the world again to a primitive mode of faith. In other words, we will see how Christianity converts the fluid, lived, “faith” of Jesus into something again based on transcendent belief. And lastly, we will ask what new light this point sheds on Nietzsche’s critique of Christianity, and his affinity with Jesus the man.     

Psychics,aliens, or experience? Using the Anomalistic Belief Scale to examine the relationship between type of belief and probabilistic reasoning

A growing body of research has shown people who hold anomalistic (e.g., paranormal) beliefs may differ from nonbelievers in their propensity to make probabilistic reasoning errors. The current study explored the relationship between these beliefs and performance through the development of a new measure of anomalistic belief, called the Anomalistic Belief Scale (ABS). One key feature of the ABS is that it includes a balance of both experiential and theoretical belief items. Another aim of the study was to use the ABS to investigate the relationship between belief and probabilistic reasoning errors on conjunction fallacy tasks. As expected, results showed there was a relationship between anomalistic belief and propensity to commit the conjunction fallacy. Importantly, regression analyses on the factors that make up the ABS showed that the relationship between anomalistic belief and probabilistic reasoning occurred only for beliefs about having experienced anomalistic phenomena, and not for theoretical anomalistic beliefs.