Evaluating dialectical structures with Bayesian methods

This paper shows how complex argumentation, analyzed as dialectical structures, can be evaluated within a Bayesian framework by interpreting them as coherence constraints on subjective degrees of belief. A dialectical structure is a set of arguments (premiss-conclusion structure) among which support- and attack-relations hold. This approach addresses the observation that some theses in a debate can be better justified than others and thus fixes a shortcoming of a theory of defeasible reasoning which applies the bivalence principle to argument evaluations by assigning them the status of being either defeated or undefeated. Evaluation procedures which are based on the principle of bivalence can, however, be embedded as a special case within the Bayesian framework. The approach developed in this paper rests on the assumptions that arguments can be reconstructed as deductively valid and that complex argumentation can be reconstructed such that premisses of arguments with equivalent conclusions are pairwise independent.     

A neural cognitive model of argumentation with application to legal inference and decision making

Formal models of argumentation have been investigated in several areas, from multi-agent systems and artificial intelligence (AI) to decision making, philosophy and law. In artificial intelligence, logic-based models have been the standard for the representation of argumentative reasoning. More recently, the standard logic-based models have been shown equivalent to standard connectionist models. This has created a new line of research where (i) neural networks can be used as a parallel computational model for argumentation and (ii) neural networks can be used to combine argumentation, quantitative reasoning and statistical learning. At the same time, non-standard logic models of argumentation started to emerge. In this paper, we propose a connectionist cognitive model of argumentation that accounts for both standard and non-standard forms of argumentation. The model is shown to be an adequate framework for dealing with standard and non-standard argumentation, including joint-attacks, argument support, ordered attacks, disjunctive attacks, meta-level attacks, self-defeating attacks, argument accrual and uncertainty. We show that the neural cognitive approach offers an adequate way of modelling all of these different aspects of argumentation. We have applied the framework to the modelling of a public prosecution charging decision as part of a real legal decision making case study containing many of the above aspects of argumentation. The results show that the model can be a useful tool in the analysis of legal decision making, including the analysis of what-if questions and the analysis of alternative conclusions. The approach opens up two new perspectives in the short-term: the use of neural networks for computing prevailing arguments efficiently through the propagation in parallel of neuronal activations, and the use of the same networks to evolve the structure of the argumentation network through learning (e.g. to learn the strength of arguments from data).     

Burden of proof

This paper presents an analysis of the concept of burden of proof in argument. Relationship of burden of proof to three traditional informal fallacies is considered: (i) argumentum ad hominem, (ii) petitio principii, and (iii) argumentum ad ignorantiam. Other topics discussed include persuasive dialoque, pragmatic reasoning, legal burden of proof, plausible reasoning in regulated disputes, rules of dialogue, and the value of reasoned dialogue.     

Burden of Proof Rules in Social Criticism

The article discusses burden of proof rules in social criticism. By social criticism I mean an argumentative situation in which an opponent publicly argues against certain social practices; the examples I consider are discrimination on the basis of species and discrimination on the basis of one's nationality. I argue that burden of proof rules assumed by those who defend discrimination are somewhat dubious. In social criticism, there are no shared values which would uncontroversially determine what is the reasonable presumption and who has the burden of proof, nor are there formal rules which would end the debate and determine the winner at a specific point.     

Rational Hypocrisy: A Bayesian Analysis Based on Informal Argumentation and Slippery Slopes

Moral hypocrisy is typically viewed as an ethical accusation: Someone is applying different moral standards to essentially identical cases, dishonestly claiming that one action is acceptable while otherwise equivalent actions are not. We suggest that in some instances the apparent logical inconsistency stems from different evaluations of a weak argument, rather than dishonesty per se. Extending Corner, Hahn, and Oaksford's (2006) analysis of slippery slope arguments, we develop a Bayesian framework in which accusations of hypocrisy depend on inferences of shared category membership between proposed actions and previous standards, based on prior probabilities that inform the strength of competing hypotheses. Across three experiments, we demonstrate that inferences of hypocrisy increase as perceptions of the likelihood of shared category membership between precedent cases and current cases increase, that these inferences follow established principles of category induction, and that the presence of self‐serving motives increases inferences of hypocrisy independent of changes in the actions themselves. Taken together, these results demonstrate that Bayesian analyses of weak arguments may have implications for assessing moral reasoning.     

Modularity in cognition: framing the debate

Modularity has been the subject of intense debate in the cognitive sciences for more than 2 decades. In some cases, misunderstandings have impeded conceptual progress. Here the authors identify arguments about modularity that either have been abandoned or were never held by proponents of modular views of the mind. The authors review arguments that purport to undermine modularity, with particular attention on cognitive architecture, development, genetics, and evolution. The authors propose that modularity, cleanly defined, provides a useful framework for directing research and resolving debates about individual cognitive systems and the nature of human evolved cognition. Modularity is a fundamental property of living things at every level of organization; it might prove indispensable for understanding the structure of the mind as well.     

Adoption is Not Abortion‐Lite

It is standardly taken for granted in the literature on the morality of abortion that adoption is almost always an available and morally preferable alternative to abortion — one that does the same thing so far as parenthood is concerned. This assumption pushes proponents of a woman's right to choose into giving arguments that are based almost exclusively around the physicality of pregnancy and childbirth. On the other side of the debate, the assumption that adoption is a real alternative seems to strengthen the contention that a woman who wishes to abort is morally deficient, whatever the status of the foetus: that she is selfish or short‐sighted in her refusal to bear the temporary physical burden of pregnancy. In this article, I will argue that adoption is not a genuine alternative to abortion. It does not ‘do the same thing’, even setting aside the physicality of pregnancy. I will show that on the most successful model of parental obligation — a causal account that formalises the distinction between parent: progenitor, and parent: carer — birth mothers and fathers remain obliged, life‐long, to their birth children even when the child is adopted out.     

Termination of logic programs with imperfect information: applications and query procedure

A general logic programming framework allowing for the combination of several adjoint lattices of truth-values is presented. The language is sorted, enabling the combination of several reasoning forms in the same knowledge base. The contribution of the paper is two-fold: on the one hand, sufficient conditions guaranteeing termination of all queries for the fix-point semantics for a wide class of sorted multi-adjoint logic programs are presented and related to some well-known probability-based formalisms; in addition, we specify a general non-deterministic tabulation goal-oriented query procedure for sorted multi-adjoint logic programs over complete lattices. We prove its soundness and completeness as well as independence of the selection ordering. We apply the termination results to probabilistic and fuzzy logic programming languages, enabling the use of the tabulation proof procedure for query answering.     

Prove it! The Burden of Proof Game in Science vs. Pseudoscience Disputes

The concept of burden of proof is used in a wide range of discourses, from philosophy to law, science, skepticism, and even in everyday reasoning. This paper provides an analysis of the proper deployment of burden of proof, focusing in particular on skeptical discussions of pseudoscience and the paranormal, where burden of proof assignments are most poignant and relatively clear-cut. We argue that burden of proof is often misapplied or used as a mere rhetorical gambit, with little appreciation of the underlying principles. The paper elaborates on an important distinction between evidential and prudential varieties of burdens of proof, which is cashed out in terms of Bayesian probabilities and error management theory. Finally, we explore the relationship between burden of proof and several (alleged) informal logical fallacies. This allows us to get a firmer grip on the concept and its applications in different domains, and also to clear up some confusions with regard to when exactly some fallacies (ad hominem, ad ignorantiam, and petitio principii) may or may not occur.     

Predictive versus diagnostic causal learning: Evidence from an overshadowing paradigm

Causal directionality belongs to one of the most fundamental aspects of causality that cannot be reduced to mere covariation. This paper is part of a debate between proponents of associative theories, which claim that learners are insensitive to the causal status of cues and outcomes, and proponents of causal-model theory, which postulates an interaction of assumptions about causal directionality and learning. Some researchers endorsing the associationist view have argued that evidence for the interaction between cue competition and causal directionality may be restricted to two-phase blocking designs. Furthermore, from the viewpoint of causal-model theory, blocking designs carry the potential problem that the predicted asymmetries of cue competition are partly dependent on asymmetries of retrospective inferences. The present experiments use a one-phase overshadowing paradigm that does not allow for retrospective inferences and therefore represents a more unambiguous test of sensitivity to causal directionality. The results strengthen causal-model theory by clearly demonstrating the influence of causal directionality on learning. However, they also provide evidence for boundary conditions for this effect by highlighting the role of the semantics of the learning task.     

Putting the Burden of Proof in Its Place: When Are Differential Allocations Legitimate?

It is widely assumed that legitimate differential allocations of the burden of proof are ubiquitous: that in all cases in which opposing views are being debated, one side has the responsibility of proving their claim and if they fail, the opposing view wins by default. We argue that the cases in which one party has the burden of proof are exceptions. In general, participants in reasoned discourse are all required to provide reasons for the claims they make. We distinguish between truth‐directed and non‐truth‐directed discourse, argue that the paradigm contexts in which there are legitimate differential allocations of the burden of proof (law and formal debate) are non‐truth‐directed, and suggest that in truth‐directed contexts, except in certain special cases, differential allocation of the burden of proof is not warranted.     

Beyond control of variables: What needs to develop to achieve skilled scientific thinking?

We identify three aspects of scientific thinking beyond the control-of-variables strategy that we claim are essential for students to master as a foundation for skilled scientific thinking. The first is strategic and involves the ability to coordinate effects of multiple causal influences on an outcome. The second is a mature understanding of the epistemological foundations of science, recognizing scientific knowledge as constructed by humans rather than simply discovered in the world. The third is the ability to engage in skilled argumentation in the scientific domain, with an appreciation of argumentation as entailing the coordination of theory and evidence. We present new empirical data with respect to the first two of these competencies, supporting the claim that they are not well developed by early adolescence and warrant attention and provision of effective kinds of scaffolding.     

Guest Editors’ Introduction

In spite of the widespread belief that there is (or at least there was) a clearcut and deep opposition between two forms of philosophizing vaguely characterized as 'continental' and 'analytic', it is not easy to find actual examples of debates between philosophers that clearly belong to the opposed camps. Perhaps the reason is that, on the assumption that the alleged 'divide' is so deep, each side feels that there is no point in arguing against the other, for argumentation would quickly be replaced by invective. In this paper I analyse one of the few recent examples of an across-divide debate m the Searle m Derrida polemic. Using a threefold typology of debates, I try to show that, in spite of the violent and sarcastic tone employed by both contenders, there is enough common ground, questioning of not-argued-for assumptions, and serious argumentation (on both sides) to consider this debate more than just an irrational dispute.     

论证的基于标记的论据状态(英文)

本文针对抽象论证体系中的论据状态给出了一种基于标记的定义方法。与基于扩张的传统方法相比,此定义能够更加细致准确地描述论据状态。同时,本文对论据状态的等级进行了定义和区分,并把该等级作为接受或驳斥论据的依据。由于该方法基于标准论证体系定义,在实现上使用了已有的基于论证的证明方法,因此,该定义与以往的抽象论证体系是完全兼容的。     

Metadialogues for Resolving Burden of Proof Disputes

In this paper, a solution to the problem of analyzing burden of proof in argumentation is developed by building on the pioneering work of Erik C. W. Krabbe on metadialogues. Three classic cases of burden of proof disputes are analyzed, showing how metadialogue theory can solve the problems they pose. The solution is based on five dialectical requirements: (1) global burden of proof needs to be set at the confrontation stage of a dialogue, (2) there need to be special mechanisms for resolving disputes about burden of proof at all four stages of the dialogue, (3) they are especially significant during the argumentation stage, where burden of proof often shifts back and forth at each move, (4) such local shifts need to be partly regulated by the global burden of proof already set, and (5) the connection between burden of proof and the speech act of making a presumption in a dialogue needs to be clarified.     

Happiness on the Political Agenda? PROS and CONS

This paper provides a critical analysis of the application of happiness research into policy domains. An overview of the current debate on the politics of happiness is elaborated by focusing on its promising perspectives as well as the potential problems it raises. Arguments of proponents and opponents are confronted with each other in discussing the following central issues in the debate: (1) the state of progress of the happiness research; (2) the value of happiness and its promotion by political means; (3) the possibility of promoting happiness; (4) paternalism versus autonomy and (5) a fair distribution of happiness. It is concluded from this that pragmatic issues do not pose insurmountable obstacles for the realization of a politics of happiness, although further research is definitely recommendable. The ideological or ethical issues however require further debate and research before the actual realization of a politics of happiness is possible. More specifically, the science of happiness needs to give more attention to analyzing the value of happiness and the desirability of increasing happiness by political means. Also the weighing of the value of happiness against other values and goals is an important issue to be put on the agenda. This paper thus explicates the moral choices and challenges that politicians would be confronted with if they want to put the increase of happiness on the political agenda.     

论医疗侵权诉讼中的举证责任倒置规则

医患关系的紧张再次引起了人们对医疗侵权诉讼中举证责任倒置这一规则的关注。在对有关基本知识和人们争议焦点的分析之后,提出了应该在准确理解医疗侵权诉讼中举证责任倒置的适用条件和内容的基础上,结合这一规则设置的目的在当事人之间合理地进行举证责任的分配。     

From Welfare to Rights without Changing the Subject

In this paper I introduce the ‘changing the subject’ problem. When proponents of animal protection use terms such as dignity and respect they can be fairly accused of shifting debate from welfare to rights because the terms purportedly refer to properties and values that are logically distinct from the capacity to suffer and the moral significance of causing animals pain. To avoid this problem and ensure that debate proceeds in the familiar terms of the established welfare paradigm, I present an expressivist analysis of animal rights vocabulary. When terms such as dignity and respect are understood in line with the theory of moral language use known as expressivism, proponents of animal protection that use these terms can escape the charge of changing the subject. Drawing upon Helm’s theory of love, I show how the usage of rights vocabulary can be respectable way for people to register their concern for the welfare of animals, even at times when it is unlikely that the animals concerned are suffering. Tying rights vocabulary to welfare via expressivism aligns the aims of animal rights with welfare without the theoretical problems associated with attempts to ‘reduce’ dignity or respect to natural behaviour or inherent value.