Inhibition and interference in the think/no-think task

Five experiments using the think/no-think (TNT) procedure investigated the effect of the no-think and substitute instructions on cued recall. In Experiment 1, when unrelated A–B paired associates were studied and cued for recall with A items, recall rates were reliably enhanced in the think condition and reliably impaired below baseline in the no-think condition. In Experiments 2 and 5, final recall was cued with B items, leading to reliably higher recall rates, as compared with baseline, in both the think and no-think conditions. This pattern indicates backward priming of no-think items. In Experiments 3 and 4, the no-think instruction was replaced with a thought substitution instruction, and participants were asked to think of another word instead of the studied one when they saw the no-think cued items. As in Experiments 1 and 2, the same amount of forgetting of B items was observed when A items were the cues, but in contrast to Experiment 2, there was no increase in the recall performance of A items when B items were the cues. These results suggest that not thinking of studied items or, alternatively, thinking of a substitute item to avoid a target item may involve different processes: the former featuring inhibition and the latter interference.     

Effects of emotion and age on performance during a think/no-think memory task

Recent studies have demonstrated that young adults can voluntarily suppress information from memory when directed to. After learning novel word pairings to criterion, participants are shown individual words and instructed either to "think" about the associated word, or to put it out of mind entirely ("no-think"). When given a surprise cued recall test, participants typically show impaired recall for no-think words relative to think or "control" (un-manipulated) words. The present study investigated whether this controlled suppression effect persists in an aged population, and examined how the emotionality of the to-be-suppressed word affects suppression ability. Data from four experiments using the think/no-think task demonstrate that older and younger adults can suppress information when directed to (Experiment 1), and the age groups do not differ significantly in this ability. Experiments 2 through 4 demonstrate that both age groups can suppress words that are emotional (positive or negative valence) or neutral. The suppression effect also persists even if participants are tested using independent probe words that are semantically related to the target words but were not the studied cue words (Experiments 3 and 4). These data suggest that the cognitive functioning necessary to suppress information from memory is present in older adulthood, and that both emotional and neutral information can be successfully suppressed from memory.     

The episodic nature of episodic-like memories

Studying episodic memory in nonhuman animals has proved difficult because definitions in humans require conscious recollection. Here, we assessed humans' experience of episodic-like recognition memory tasks that have been used with animals. It was found that tasks using contextual information to discriminate events could only be accurately performed using recollection, not familiarity. However, tasks using temporal information to discriminate events could be accurately performed using either recollection or familiarity. The results strengthen the position that some episodic-like recognition memory tasks are a valid model of episodic memory. However, tasks that rely on temporal information may be susceptible to nonepisodic strategies.     

The episodic nature of involuntary autobiographical memories

Involuntary autobiographical memories are conscious and unintended recollections of personal experiences. In Study 1, involuntary memories were compared with voluntary word-cued memories, both retrieved in naturalistic settings via a self-paced procedure. The involuntary memories more frequently referred to specific episodes, came with more physical reaction, had more impact on mood, and dealt with more unusual and less positive events. Study 2 demonstrated that these differences were not due to differences between verbal and nonverbal cues, by using Francis Galton's "memory walk" as a nonverbal method to cue voluntary memories. In both studies, systematic differences were found between specific and nonspecific memories. The findings show that the way autobiographical memories are sampled greatly affects the findings and that involuntary retrieval more often provides access to memories of specific episodes and associated emotional states.     

Perceptual priming enhances the creation of new episodic memories

In recent years, most studies of human memory systems have placed the emphasis on differences rather than on similarities. The present study sought to assess the impact of perceptual priming on the creation of new episodic memories. It was composed of three distinct experimental phases: (1) an initial study phase, during which the number of repetitions of target words was manipulated; (2) a perceptual priming test phase, involving both target and new control words, which constituted the incidental encoding phase of (3) a subsequent Remember/Know/Guess recognition task. Results showed that the greater the perceptual priming at encoding, the more the episodic memory performance was enhanced, whereas no such relation was found for know judgments or feeling of familiarity. Furthermore, the words that were associated with the creation of new episodic memories had been perceptually primed to a greater extent during the incidental encoding phase than the words that were subsequently judged to be known or forgotten. These results suggest that the perceptual contents of episodic memories are constituted by the very perceptual representations that generate priming effects. Potential mechanisms linking perceptual priming to the creation of episodic memories are discussed.     

More on the distinction between episodic and semantic memories

In reply to a critique of the episodic/semantic distinction (McKoon, Ratcliff, & Dell, 1986), Tulving (1986) argues that the usual rules for testing theories do not apply to the classification of phenomena with respect to memory systems. But we respond that the classification methods proposed by Tulving (1986) may be detrimental to the advancement of theory and that whole domains of inquiry should not be excluded from the usual criteria of experimental psychology.     

Reported serial positions of true and illusory memories in the Deese/Roediger/McDermott paradigm

One of the easiest ways to induce illusory memories in the laboratory is to use the Deese–Roediger–McDermott (DRM) word-list paradigm. Researchers have used this paradigm not only to study people's memories of stimuli that were not actually presented, but also to study the phenomenological qualities of these illusions. In four experiments, the current investigation explored a phenomenological quality of illusory memories that has received almost no attention, specifically, temporality. A serial position task was incorporated into the DRM paradigm to examine temporal attributes of participants' true and false memories. Effects of list strength, presentation order, and types of warnings were examined. Results showed consistent serial position responses for true and false memories. However, only responses for illusory memories were affected by manipulations at study. The current findings thus lend support to encoding-based explanations of false recollections.     

The role of episodic memories in current and future well-being

The purpose of the present research was to examine the automatic role of psychological need satisfaction in episodic memories and in their associated networked memories on people's sense of well-being. In each of four studies, participants were asked to describe a main episodic memory and networked memories, that is, other memories related to their main episodic memory. Results of Studies 1 and 2 revealed that levels of need satisfaction in a main episodic memory and in its networked memories both uniquely contributed to the prediction of well-being (based on either participants' or peers' ratings). Study 3 examined the automatic effect of priming an episodic memory network on people's well-being in the here and now. Study 4 revealed that need satisfaction in episodic memory networks predicted changes in well-being over time. In addition, this relationship held after controlling for broad dispositional traits, mental health, and general need satisfaction ratings.     

Aging memories: differential decay of episodic memory components

Some memories about events can persist for decades, even a lifetime. However, recent memories incorporate rich sensory information, including knowledge on the spatial and temporal ordering of event features, while old memories typically lack this "filmic" quality. We suggest that this apparent change in the nature of memories may reflect a preferential loss of hippocampus-dependent, configurational information over more cortically based memory components, including memory for individual objects. The current study systematically tests this hypothesis, using a new paradigm that allows the contemporaneous assessment of memory for objects, object pairings, and object-position conjunctions. Retention of each memory component was tested, at multiple intervals, up to 3 mo following encoding. The three memory subtasks adopted the same retrieval paradigm and were matched for initial difficulty. Results show differential decay of the tested episodic memory components, whereby memory for configurational aspects of a scene (objects' co-occurrence and object position) decays faster than memory for featured objects. Interestingly, memory requiring a visually detailed object representation decays at a similar rate as global object recognition, arguing against interpretations based on task difficulty and against the notion that (visual) detail is forgotten preferentially. These findings show that memories undergo qualitative changes as they age. More specifically, event memories become less configurational over time, preferentially losing some of the higher order associations that are dependent on the hippocampus for initial fast encoding. Implications for theories of long-term memory are discussed.     

Tracking the emergence of memories: A category-learning paradigm to explore schema-driven recognition

Previous research has shown that prior knowledge structures or schemas affect recognition memory. However, since the acquisition of schemas occurs over prolonged periods of time, few paradigms allow the direct manipulation of schema acquisition to study their effect on memory performance. Recently, a number of parallelisms in recognition memory between studies involving schemas and studies involving category learning have been identified. The current paper capitalizes on these findings and offers a novel experimental paradigm that allows manipulation of category learning between individuals to study the effects of schema acquisition on recognition. First, participants learn to categorize computer-generated items whose category-inclusion criteria differ between participants. Next, participants study items that belong to either the learned category, the non-learned category, both, or neither. Finally, participants receive a recognition test that includes old and new items, either from the learned, the non-learned, or neither category. Using variations on this paradigm, four experiments were conducted. The results from the first three studies suggest that learning a category increases hit rates for old category-consistent items and false alarm rates for new category-consistent lures. Absent the category learning, no such effects are evident, even when participants are exposed to the same learning trials as those who learned the categories. The results from the fourth experiment suggest that, at least for false alarm rates, the effects of category learning are not solely attributable to frequency of occurrence of category-consistent items during learning. Implications for recognition memory as well as advantages of the proposed paradigm are discussed.     

Stress administered prior to encoding impairs neutral but enhances emotional long-term episodic memories

Stressful events frequently comprise both neutral and emotionally arousing information, yet the impact of stress on emotional and neutral events is still not fully understood. The hippocampus and frontal cortex have dense concentrations of receptors for stress hormones, such as cortisol, which at high levels can impair performance on hippocampally dependent memory tasks. Yet, the same stress hormones can facilitate memory for emotional information, which involves interactions between the hippocampus and amygdala. Here, we induced psychosocial stress prior to encoding and examined its long-term effects on memory for emotional and neutral episodes. The stress manipulation disrupted long-term memory for a neutral episode, but facilitated long-term memory for an equivalent emotional episode compared with a control condition. The stress manipulation also increased salivary cortisol, catecholamines as indicated by the presence of alpha-amylase, heart rate, and subjectively reported stress. Stressed subjects reported more false memories than nonstressed control subjects, and these false memories correlated positively with cortisol levels, providing evidence for a relationship between stress and false memory formation. Our results demonstrate that stress, when administered prior to encoding, produces different patterns of long-term remembering for neutral and emotional episodes. These differences likely emerge from differential actions of stress hormones on memory-relevant regions of the brain.     

Integrating episodic memories and prior knowledge at multiple levels of abstraction

Prior knowledge can have a large influence on recall when the memory for the original event is error prone or incomplete. We investigated the interaction between memory and prior knowledge in a recall task involving natural objects such as fruits and vegetables. We first quantified prior knowledge for the sizes of objects in a norming experiment. We then assessed the influence of prior knowledge in a memory experiment in which we compared the actual size of objects shown during a study phase with the reconstructed size of an object during the test phase. Recall was biased both by the mean size of the specific object studied and by the mean size of all objects in the category. This result suggests that the influence of prior knowledge can come from multiple, hierarchically related levels of representation, such as the object-category and superordinate-category levels.     

To think or not to think,that is the question: Individual differences in suppression and rebound effects in autobiographical memory

Two studies explored the effects of forget instructions on autobiographical memory at immediate test and following delays of either 12–13 months, or 3–4 months. Using the Autobiographical Think/No-Think procedure (cf., Noreen & MacLeod, 2013), 24 never-depressed participants (Study 1) first generated 12 positive and 12 negative autobiographical memories and associated cues. Participants were then asked to recall the memory associated with some of the cues (i.e., ‘think’ condition), or to avoid saying or thinking about the memory associated with other cues (i.e., ‘no-think’ condition). Participants were then asked to recall the memories associated with all the cues at immediate test and following a delay of 12–13 months. Participants were found to be successful at forgetting both positive and negative autobiographical memories following ‘no-think’ instructions at immediate test but this forgetting effect did not persist following a 12–13 month delay. This pattern of remembering and forgetting was replicated in a second study (using 27 never-depressed participants) following a 3–4 month delay. Participants who had been less successful at forgetting ‘no-think’ memories at immediate test, were more likely to show rebound effects for those memories following a delay compared to memories which received neither ‘think’ nor ‘no-think’ instructions. Individual differences in inhibitory control and the efficacy of potential therapeutic interventions of ‘no-think’ instructions are considered.     

Comparing decay rates for accurate and false memories in the DRM paradigm

Although previous studies have consistently reported different forgetting rates for true and false memory when tested with recall, studies comparing the rates of decay for true and false recognition have reported inconsistent results. The present study attempted to clarify this inconsistency by comparing forgetting rates for true and false recognition in addition to addressing methodological differences among the previous studies. Recognition of list items and critical lures was assessed at six delays (2, 5, 10, 15, and 20 min, and 2 days). A comparison of power function slopes across item type provided evidence of slope differences such that false recognition decayed more quickly than true recognition, which is inconsistent with predictions from activation/ source-monitoring and fuzzy tracetheories.     

Generalization through the recurrent interaction of episodic memories: a model of the hippocampal system

In this article, we present a perspective on the role of the hippocampal system in generalization, instantiated in a computational model called REMERGE (recurrency and episodic memory results in generalization). We expose a fundamental, but neglected, tension between prevailing computational theories that emphasize the function of the hippocampus in pattern separation (Marr, 1971; McClelland, McNaughton, & O'Reilly, 1995), and empirical support for its role in generalization and flexible relational memory (Cohen & Eichenbaum, 1993; Eichenbaum, 1999). Our account provides a means by which to resolve this conflict, by demonstrating that the basic representational scheme envisioned by complementary learning systems theory (McClelland et al., 1995), which relies upon orthogonalized codes in the hippocampus, is compatible with efficient generalization-as long as there is recurrence rather than unidirectional flow within the hippocampal circuit or, more widely, between the hippocampus and neocortex. We propose that recurrent similarity computation, a process that facilitates the discovery of higher-order relationships between a set of related experiences, expands the scope of classical exemplar-based models of memory (e.g., Nosofsky, 1984) and allows the hippocampus to support generalization through interactions that unfold within a dynamically created memory space.     

Individual differences in the suppression of unwanted memories: the executive deficit hypothesis

When confronted with reminders to an unpleasant memory, people often try to prevent the unwanted memory from coming to mind. In this article, we review behavioral and neurocognitive evidence concerning the consequences of exerting such control over memory retrieval. This work indicates that suppressing retrieval is accomplished by control mechanisms that inhibit the unwanted memories, making them harder to recall later, even when desired. This process engages executive control mechanisms mediated by the lateral prefrontal cortex to terminate recollection-related activity in the hippocampus. Together, these findings specify a neurocognitive model of how memory control operates, suggesting that executive control may be an important means of down-regulating intrusive memories over time. We conclude by proposing that individual differences in the regulation of intrusive memories in the aftermath of trauma may be mediated by pre-existing differences in executive control ability. In support of this executive deficit hypothesis, we review the recent work indicating links between executive control ability and memory suppression.     

Habituation in children within a behavior suppression paradigm

Using an instrumental response suppression paradigm, Experiment 1 demonstrated habituation and long-term retention of habituation to a tone stimulus in third-grade children, but specificity of habituation was not obtained when a new tone stimulus was presented. In Experiment 2 first graders showed specificity of habituation to auditory stimuli on the response suppression measure whereas fifth graders did not. However, both age groups evidenced specificity when a skin conductance measure was employed. In addition, specificity of habituation was not affected by amount of training at either age level. Experiment 3 demonstrated specificity of habituation in fifth graders on the response suppression measure when a cross-modality stimulus change was introduced. Implications of these data for analyses of habituation and traditional learning are discussed.     

Forgetting to forget: On the duration of voluntary suppression of neutral and emotional memories

Can we control the content of our memory and forget what we do not want to think about by an act of will? If so, is forgetting temporary or permanent, and is it independent of the nature of what we wish to forget? Using Anderson and Green’s (2001) “think/no-think” paradigm with neutral and emotional nouns, we found in agreement with other studies that memory for neutral words was reduced instantly upon repeated attempts at suppression. However, the effect was temporary and vanished after a period of one week, which strongly suggests that intended memory suppression interferes with immediate retrieval but does not lead to long-term forgetting. Furthermore, the amount of training that clearly reduced immediate recall of neutral items did not at all reduce recall of emotional items. This finding is in accordance with the notion that emotional items have a higher degree of salience and tend to attract more attention than neutral items.