Probability of reciprocation in repeated prisoner's dilemma games

Both social cooperation and self‐control require reciprocation. In social cooperation situations a single person's cooperative act, if not reciprocated by others, would be unreinforced both immediately and in the long term. Similarly, a single act of self‐control (refusing a single cigarette, for example), if not followed up by other such acts, would also be unreinforced immediately and in the long term. The present experiments varied probability of reciprocation in a prisoner's dilemma‐like game that could resemble a social cooperation or a self‐control situation. Participants earned points by playing against a computer. The computer offered the participant a choice between 5 or 6 points (‘cooperation’ by the computer) or between 1 or 2 points (‘defection’ by the computer). The participant's choice of the lesser alternative (‘cooperation’) or the greater alternative (‘defection’) on the current trial led, respectively, to cooperation or defection by the computer on the next trial with a probability (probability of reciprocation, PR) which could vary. When PR was greater than 63%, consistent cooperation maximized the participant's earnings. When PR was less than 63%, defection maximized earnings. Three conditions were studied: PR signaled by spinners; PR unsignaled; PR unsignaled with participants believing that they were playing with another person, not the computer. With PR = 100% (‘tit‐for‐tat’) and PR = 50%, the modal participant maximized earnings under all three conditions. With PR = 75%, participants maximized earnings only when PR was signaled. These results indicate that differences between people's tendency to cooperate with other people (social cooperation) and their tendency to cooperate with their own future interests (self‐control) may lie in differences in subjective PR. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A re‐examination of melioration and rational choice

We examined how people allocate choices between two alternatives when the payoff from each alternative varied as a function of the allocation of recent choices. On any one trial alternative A had a higher immediate payoff than alternative B, but across all trials B had a higher overall payoff than A. Rational choice theory requires that participants allocate all their responses to the alternative with the greatest overall payoff irrespective of which has the higher immediate payoff. Melioration, in contrast, proposes that participants are motivated to choose the alternative with the higher immediate payoff, irrespective of the consequences for future returns. We report four experiments in which we varied the nature of the payoffs. Participants exhibited self‐control consistent with rational choice theory when payoffs varied in magnitude, but exhibited impulsiveness consistent with melioration when the payoffs varied in probability. Finally, we show that impulsivity when payoffs varied in probability can be overcome following un‐reinforced practice. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Mindless resistance to persuasion: Low self‐control fosters the use of resistance‐promoting heuristics

In our consumer society, people are confronted on a daily basis with unsolicited persuasion attempts. The present research challenges the prevailing view that resisting persuasion is more likely to fail when consumers have low self‐control. Four experiments tested the hypothesis that impaired self‐regulation may actually facilitate resistance to persuasion when the influence context contains resistance‐promoting heuristics. Indeed, participants with low self‐control were less likely to comply with a persuasive request (Experiments 1 and 3), reported a less favourable attitude towards an advertised product (Experiment 2), and generated more negative responses towards a persuasive message (Experiment 4) than participants with high self‐control, when they could rely on resistance‐promoting heuristics: a violation of the norm of reciprocity (Experiments 1 and 3), an advertisement disclaimer (Experiment 2), or negative social proof (Experiment 4). Together, these studies demonstrate that contextual cues can bolster resistance when one does not carefully scrutinize an influence attempt.     

‘Put Your Money Where Your Mouth Is!’: Effects of Streaks on Confidence and Betting in a Binary Choice Task

Human choice under uncertainty is influenced by erroneous beliefs about randomness. In simple binary choice tasks, such as red/black predictions in roulette, long outcome runs (e.g. red, red, red) typically increase the tendency to predict the other outcome (i.e. black), an effect labeled the “gambler's fallacy.” In these settings, participants may also attend to streaks in their predictive performance. Winning and losing streaks are thought to affect decision confidence, although prior work indicates conflicting directions. Over three laboratory experiments involving red/black predictions in a sequential roulette task, we sought to identify the effects of outcome runs and winning/losing streaks upon color predictions, decision confidence and betting behavior. Experiments 1 (n = 40) and 3 (n = 40) obtained trial‐by‐trial confidence ratings, with a win/no win payoff and a no loss/loss payoff, respectively. Experiment 2 (n = 39) obtained a trial‐by‐trial bet amount on an equivalent scale. In each experiment, the gambler's fallacy was observed on choice behavior after color runs and, in experiment 2, on betting behavior after color runs. Feedback streaks exerted no reliable influence on confidence ratings, in either payoff condition. Betting behavior, on the other hand, increased as a function of losing streaks. The increase in betting on losing streaks is interpreted as a manifestation of loss chasing; these data help clarify the psychological mechanisms underlying loss chasing and caution against the use of betting measures (“post‐decision wagering”) as a straightforward index of decision confidence. © 2014 The Authors. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.     

Self‐Control Moderates Decision‐Making Behavior When Minimizing Losses versus Maximizing Gains

We examined (1) whether people would be more responsive to the delayed consequences of their decisions when attempting to minimize losses than when attempting to maximize gains in a history‐dependent decision‐making task and (2) how trait self‐control would moderate such an effect. In two experiments, participants performed a dynamic decision‐making task where they chose one of two options on each trial. The increasing option always gave a smaller immediate reward but caused future rewards for both options to increase. The decreasing option always gave a larger immediate reward but caused future rewards for both options to decrease. In Experiment 1 where the two options had equivalent expected value in the long run, participants were more prone to select the increasing option, which yielded larger benefits on future trials, in the loss‐minimization condition than in the gain‐maximization condition. Trait self‐control moderated the effect of losses by enhancing the effect for low self‐control participants while attenuating it for high self‐control participants. In Experiment 2 where selecting the increasing option was suboptimal, low self‐control participants still attempted to reduce losses on future trials by selecting the increasing option more often than high self‐control participants. These results suggest that decision makers value delayed consequences of their actions more in a losses domain relative to a gains domain and low self‐control individuals are more susceptible to such an effect. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The effect of social motives,communication and group size on behaviour in an N-person multi-stage mixed-motive game

Two experiments investigated the impact of social motives or individuals' preferences for specific self—other outcome distributions, on behaviour in an n-person game. Subjects' social motives (altruistic, cooperative, individualistic, competitive) were assessed prior to the decision-making in either 7-person games (Experiment 1) or 20-person games (Experiment 2). A modification of the n-person game format normally employed is introduced in this research to permit the choices made by players on a given trial to modify the payoff matrix available to self and others on subsequent trials. The game format, a simulated social dilemma, was presented in terms of a conservation of resources problem. In Experiment 1 communication opportunities were manipulated. As predicted, there were consistent differences between the four classes of social motivation in the amount of the resources taken for self competitive subjects took the most, individualistic subjects took less than the competitive ones but more than the average, while cooperative and altruistic subjects took the smallest amount of the resources for themselves. Moreover, competitive subjects expected the others to take fewer resources than they intended to themselves, and altruistic subjects expected the others to take more resources than they intended to themselves. These findings are only partly consistent with existing theories concerning the relationship between behaviour and expected behaviour of others. In addition, when communication was allowed, significantly fewer resources were taken for self Contrary to the predictions based on previous research findings, subjects in the 20-person groups did not take more resources for self than subjects in the 7-person groups.     

Self‐framing of risky choice

Previous research on framing effects has largely focused on how choice information framed by external sources influences the response of a decision maker. This research examined how decision makers framed choice options and how the hedonic tone of self‐framing influenced their risk preference. By using pie charts and a complementary sentence‐completion task in Experiment 1, participants were able to interpret and frame the expected choice outcomes themselves before making a choice between a sure option and a gamble in either a life–death or a monetary problem. Each of these self‐frames (phrases) was then rated by a group of independent judges in terms of its hedonic tone. The hedonic tone of self‐frames was mostly positive and was more positive in the life–death than the monetary context, suggesting a motivational function of self‐framing. However, positive outcomes were still more likely to be framed positively than negative outcomes. In Experiment 2, choice outcomes were depicted with a whole‐pie chart instead of a pie slice in order to emphasize positive and negative outcomes equally. The results showed that the hedonic tone of self‐framing was still largely positive and more positive in the life domain than the monetary domain. However, compared to Experiment 1, the risk preference in the life–death domain was reversed, showing an outcome salience effect: when the pie‐slice chart emphasized only survival outcomes, participants were more risk taking under positive hedonic frames whereas when the whole‐pie chart depicted both survival and mortality outcomes, they became risk averse under positive frames. In sum, self‐framing reflected a positive bias in encoding risk information and affected the risk preference of the decision maker. Like the tone of voice used in communication, the hedonic tone of self‐framing, either positive or negative, can affect risk perception of a choice problem. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Leader‐driven distortion of probability and payoff information affects choices between risky prospects

Research indicating that decision makers often distort new information to favor nascent preferences has focused primarily on riskless choice rather than risky choice. In addition, the critical assumption that information distortion mediates the link between the initially preferred alternative and the final choice has not been tested in a compelling manner. In an experiment designed to fill these gaps, participants made six choices involving pairs of hypothetical three‐outcome monetary gambles. We manipulated initial preferences by varying the order in which gamble features were presented. Multilevel regressions indicated that participants distorted their evaluations of precise probabilities and payoffs in the direction of their emerging preferences and that they used their biased evaluations to update those preferences. As expected, information distortion mediated the effect of initial preferences on final choices and final preference strength. In a follow‐up experiment, we compared a standard measure of information distortion (based on comparisons to mean ratings in a no‐choice control task) to a more personalized measure (based on participants' own ratings in the control task) and found the mean‐based measure to be superior for the probability and payoff information in question. Other findings in Experiment 2 corroborated the results of Experiment 1. In both studies, the distortion of quantitative inputs in a simple task highlights the non‐normative circularity of the choice process. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Reexamining the Calculus of Voting

This study applies social cognitive theory to the study of voter turnout, examining the effects of self‐efficacy on citizens' decisions of whether or not to vote. Consistent with recent arguments in cognitive psychology ( Fenton‐O'Creevy, Nicholson, Soane, & Willman, 2003, 2005 ), I argue that excessive perceptions of self‐efficacy lead some citizens to overestimate their vote's impact in close elections and to vote as a consequence of these perceptions. This illusion of control is further engendered by the features of skill‐based activities such as choice, personal involvement, stimulus familiarity, and exertion of effort ( Langer, 1975 ) that are inherent in the act of voting. Employing both cross‐sectional and panel data, I find that individuals with high levels of self‐efficacy are more likely to be moved to vote by perceptions that an election will be close than are citizens with low levels of self‐efficacy.     

Struggling to be liked: The prospective effect of trait self‐control on social desirability and the moderating role of agreeableness

Drawing from the literature on the interpersonal functions of self‐control, we examined longitudinal associations between trait self‐control and social desirability, using a survey of the general population in the Netherlands. Trait self‐control at baseline was positively associated with social desirability at a follow‐up, even when controlling for prior levels of social desirability. That is, high self‐control contributed to individuals' tendency to give socially desirable responses in self‐reports. This effect was moderated by individual differences in agreeableness. Highly agreeable individuals were more likely to “use” their self‐regulatory resources to respond in a socially desirable manner, compared to less agreeable individuals, suggesting that individuals might use self‐regulatory resources in a way consistent with the motivational bases of their personality.     

A RUNS‐TEST ALGORITHM: CONTINGENT REINFORCEMENT AND RESPONSE RUN STRUCTURES

Four rats' choices between two levers were differentially reinforced using a runs‐test algorithm. On each trial, a runs‐test score was calculated based on the last 20 choices. In Experiment 1, the onset of stimulus lights cued when the runs score was smaller than criterion. Following cuing, the correct choice was occasionally reinforced with food, and the incorrect choice resulted in a blackout. Results indicated that this contingency reduced sequential dependencies among successive choice responses. With one exception, subjects' choice rule was well described as biased coin flipping. In Experiment 2, cuing was removed and the reinforcement criterion was changed to a percentile score based on the last 20 reinforced responses. The results replicated those of Experiment 1 in successfully eliminating first‐order dependencies in all subjects. For 2 subjects, choice allocation was approximately consistent with nonbiased coin flipping. These results suggest that sequential dependencies may be a function of reinforcement contingency.     

Profit maximization versus disadvantageous inequality: the impact of self‐categorization

Choice behavior researchers (e.g., Bazerman, Loewenstein, & White, 1992 ) have found that individuals tend to choose a more lucrative but disadvantageously unequal payoff (e.g., self—$600/other—$800) over a less profitable but equal one (e.g., self—$500/other—$500); greater profit trumps interpersonal social comparison concerns in the choice setting. We suggest, however, that self‐categorization (e.g., Hogg, 2000 ) can shift interpersonal social comparison concerns to the intergroup level and make trading disadvantageous inequality for greater profit more difficult. Studies 1–3 show that profit maximization diminishes when recipients belong to different social categories (e.g., genders, universities). Study 2 further implicates self‐categorization, as self‐categorized individuals tend to forgo profit whether making a choice for themselves or another ingroup member. Study 3, moreover, reveals that social categorization alone is not sufficient to diminish profit maximization; individuals must self‐categorize and identify with their categorization. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The role of self‐esteem and anxiety in decision making for self versus others in relationships

Previous research has documented a tendency for people to make more risk‐seeking decisions for others than for themselves in relationship scenarios. Two experiments investigated whether this self–other difference is moderated by participants' self‐esteem and anxiety levels. In Experiment 1, lower self‐esteem and higher anxiety levels were associated with more risk‐averse choices for personal decisions but not for decisions for others. Therefore, participants with lower self‐esteem/higher anxiety showed greater self–other differences in comparison to participants with higher self‐esteem/lower anxiety levels. Experiment 2 demonstrated that this effect was largely mediated by participants' expectations of success and feelings about potential negative outcomes. These results are discussed in the context of “threats to the self,” with a central role played by anxiety and self‐esteem threats in personal decision making but not in decision making for others. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Effects of priming self‐construals on self‐evaluations: Cultural game player perspective

This study examined the validity of situational view on culture‐specific behaviours focusing on self‐evaluation. Two experiments with American students as samples were conducted to examine whether priming their self‐construals would affect individuals' self‐evaluation. In Experiment 1, the participants' self‐evaluation was compared across different conditions of primed self‐contruals. In Experiment 2, the participants were split into 2 groups based on their initial default self‐consturals and, the self‐evaluations were compared across the 2 groups after priming self‐contruals. The results demonstrated that although the participants' self‐evaluation was initially in accord with their default self‐construal, it changed into accord with the primed self‐construals. The findings supported the proposed cultural game player view. Implications on situational view of self‐evaluation are also discussed.     

Information selectivity in decision making by younger and older adults

Past research has demonstrated that older adults are more likely than younger adults to exhibit information selectivity in decision making. Two alternative explanations have been proposed to account for this age difference. One explanation attributes the increase in information selectivity to older adults' reliance on prior knowledge, whereas the other explanation suggests that it reflects reduced information processing capacity. The aim of this research was to explore the latter explanation by controlling for experiential factors and varying the cognitive demands involved in decision making. Specifically, participants were faced with unfamiliar decision problems, and had to base their decisions on the available information in order to reach a desired goal. In Experiment 1 younger and older participants were required to play a game involving chance. The outcome payoff was varied between three conditions (approach, avoidance, and control). The results indicated that both the younger and the older participants based their decisions on payoff, though the older participants did so to a lesser extent. In Experiment 2 younger and older participants performed a similar decision task but with higher cognitive demands. Specifically, the decision‐making task included two dimensions of information, outcome probability and outcome payoff. The results showed that the younger participants based their decisions on probability and payoff whereas the older participants based their decisions on probability alone. In Experiment 3 younger and older participants made decisions in a sale context and received instructional cue to incorporate payoff information in their decisions. As before, the younger participants utilized probability and payoff, whereas the older participants based their decisions only on probability information. The findings are discussed in terms of age differences in information‐processing capacity, metacognition, motivation, and goal‐setting.     

Evidential reasoning in the prisoner's dilemma

Classic game theory considers defection to be the rational choice in the Prisoner's Dilemma. Although defection maximizes a player's gain regardless of the opponent's choice, many players cooperate. We suggest that cooperation can be explained in part by expectations of reciprocal behavior, that is, by the belief that players facing the same situation probably will come to the same decision. In Experiment 1, expectations of reciprocity were experimentally manipulated. As predicted, cooperation increased monotonically with these expectations. In Experiment 2, experimentally manipulated expectations of opponent cooperation were not associated with higher rates of cooperation. These findings are interpreted in light of a general model of payoff maximization, and implications for other models (e.g., social value orientation) are discussed.     

Can People Identify “Deceptive” or “Misleading” Items that Tend to Produce Mostly Wrong Answers?

In many domains, two‐alternative forced‐choice questions produce more correct responses than wrong responses across participants. However, some items, dubbed “deceptive” or “misleading”, produce mostly wrong answers. These items yield poor calibration and poor resolution because the dominant, erroneous response tends to be endorsed with great confidence, even greater than that of the correct response. In addition, for deceptive items, group discussion amplifies rather than mitigates error while enhancing confidence in the erroneous response. Can participants identify deceptive items when they are warned about their existence? It is argued that people's ability to discriminate between deceptive and non‐deceptive items is poor when the erroneous responses are based on the same process assumed to underlie correct responses. Indeed, participants failed to discriminate between deceptive and non‐deceptive perceptual items when they were warned that some of the items (Experiment 1) or exactly half of the items (Experiment 2) were deceptive. A similar failure was observed for general‐knowledge questions (Experiment 3) except when participants were informed about the correct answer (Experiment 4). Possibly, for these tasks, people cannot escape the dangers lurking in deceptive items. In contrast, the results suggest that participants can identify deceptive problems for which the wrong answer stems from reliance on a fast, intuitive process that differs from the analytic mode that is likely to yield correct answers (Experiment 5). The practical and theoretical implications of the results were discussed. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Maximizing Scales Do Not Reliably Predict Maximizing Behavior in Decisions from Experience

In this paper, we explore the relationships between psychometric and behavioral measures of maximization in decisions from experience (DfE). In two experiments, we measured choice behavior in two experimental paradigms of DfE and self‐reported maximizing tendencies using three prominent scales of maximization. In the repeated consequentialist choice paradigm, participants made repeated choices between two unlabeled options and received consequential feedback on each trial. In the sampling paradigm, participants freely sampled from two options and received feedback on their sampling before making a single consequential choice. Individuals exhibited different degrees of maximizing behavior in both paradigms and across different payoff distributions, but none of the maximizing scales predicted this behavior. These results indicate that maximization scales address constructs that are different from the maximization behavior observed in DfE, and that these measures will need to be improved to reflect behavioral aspects of choice and search from experience. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Too exhausted to remember: Ego depletion undermines subsequent event‐based prospective memory

Past research has consistently found that people are likely to do worse on high‐level cognitive tasks after exerting self‐control on previous actions. However, little has been unraveled about to what extent ego depletion affects subsequent prospective memory. Drawing upon the self‐control strength model and the relationship between self‐control resources and executive control, this study proposes that the initial actions of self‐control may undermine subsequent event‐based prospective memory (EBPM). Ego depletion was manipulated through watching a video requiring visual attention (Experiment 1) or completing an incongruent Stroop task (Experiment 2). Participants were then tested on EBPM embedded in an ongoing task. As predicted, the results showed that after ruling out possible intervening variables (e.g. mood, focal and nonfocal cues, and characteristics of ongoing task and ego depletion task), participants in the high‐depletion condition performed significantly worse on EBPM than those in the low‐depletion condition. The results suggested that the effect of ego depletion on EBPM was mainly due to an impaired prospective component rather than to a retrospective component.