共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
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This paper takes a fresh look at the nativism–empiricism debate, presenting and defending a nativist perspective on the mind. Empiricism is often taken to be the default view both in philosophy and in cognitive science. This paper argues, on the contrary, that there should be no presumption in favor of empiricism (or nativism), but that the existing evidence suggests that nativism is the most promising framework for the scientific study of the mind. Our case on behalf of nativism has four parts. (1) We characterize nativism’s core commitments relative to the contemporary debate between empiricists and nativists, (2) we present the positive case for nativism in terms of two central nativist arguments (the poverty of the stimulus argument and the argument from animals), (3) we respond to a number of influential objections to nativist theories, and (4) we explain the nativist approach to the conceptual system. 相似文献
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History and the modern sciences are characterized by what is sometimes called a “methodological naturalism” that disregards
talk of divine agency. Some religious thinkers argue that this reflects a dogmatic materialism: a non-negotiable and a priori commitment to a materialist metaphysics. In response to this charge, I make a sharp distinction between procedural requirements and metaphysical commitments. The procedural requirement of history and the sciences—that proposed explanations appeal to publicly-accessible
bodies of evidence—is non-negotiable, but has no metaphysical implications. The metaphysical commitment is naturalistic, but is both a posteriori and provisional, arising from the fact that for more than 400 years no proposed theistic explanation has been shown capable
of meeting the procedural requirement. I argue that there is nothing to prevent religious thinkers from seeking to overturn
this metaphysically naturalistic stance. But in order to do so they would need to show that their proposed theistic explanations
are the best available explanations of a range of phenomena. Until this has been done, the metaphysical naturalism of history
and the sciences remains defensible. 相似文献
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The Journal of Value Inquiry - 相似文献
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Phillip Montague 《The Journal of value inquiry》1969,3(2):126-135
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Martin Carrier 《国际科学哲学研究》1998,12(3):217-232
It is argued that psychological explanations involve psychological generalizations that exhibit the same features as laws of physics. On the basis of the “systematic theory of lawhood”, characteristic features of laws of nature are elaborated. Investigating some examples of explanations taken from cognitive psychology shows that these features can also be identified in psychological generalizations. Particular attention is devoted to the notion of “ccteris‐paribus laws”. It is argued that laws of psychology are indeed ceteris‐paribus laws. However, this feature does not distinguish them from the laws of physics, because such laws are found in physics as well. Moreover, the laws invoked in psychological explanations are genuine laws of psychology; they are not laws of other disciplines that are brought to bear on psychological problems. The conclusion is that if there are laws of physics then laws of psychology exist as well. 相似文献
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Mark Kaplan 《Synthese》2010,176(1):41-55
Orthodox Probabilists hold that an inquirer ought to harbor a precise degree of confidence in each hypothesis about which
she is concerned. Modest Probabilism is one of a family doctrines inspired by the thought that Orthodox Probabilists are thereby
demanding that an inquirer effect a precision that is often unwarranted by her evidence. The purpose of this essay is (i)
to explain the particular way in which Modest Probabilism answers to this thought, and (ii) to address an alleged counterexample
to Modest Probabilism meant to offer proof that Modest Probabilism is no better than its orthodox predecessor at avoiding
unwarranted precision. 相似文献