认知科学视域下的归纳逻辑研究述评

在认知价值的引导和认知科学方法论的昭示下,归纳逻辑已经完成了从面向定性认知和定量认知到面向不足认知和复杂认知的转型。但是,认知价值始终是归纳逻辑不变的取向。古典归纳逻辑中的诸多逻辑方法以推进人们的认知为己任,而现代归纳逻辑更是一开始就直接期望建立满足定量认知需要的完善体系。面向不足认知和复杂认知的归纳逻辑研究,不仅是人类认知需要的深入拓展,更是归纳逻辑必然的发展方向。逻辑学不仅在认知召唤下走得更远,而且对于归纳逻辑而言,进一步发展的动力和方向都可能是认知。     

论归纳悖论研究的认知转向

归纳悖论研究是当代逻辑哲学、科学哲学、形式知识论等领域的核心话题之一。归纳悖论的两次研究高潮取得了一系列成果,但也存在许多不足。通过回归归纳悖论的源发语境,分析和澄清其涵义及真实"悖境",梳理解悖的历史脉络,可以表明归纳悖论的研究应该且正在实现认知转向。同时,这种认知转向对构建合理的信念接受理论、解决葛梯尔问题等知识论疑难、构建新的动态认知逻辑分支,都有重要的启发意义和价值。     

逻辑学与修辞学

过去的50年中,我们看到了逻辑的范围由语形学扩展到语义学和语用学。但仍然存在问题:如何从逻辑到达修辞?换言之,在形式系统的研究与文体(style)及修辞手段的研究之间是否存在着一种关系? 作为逻辑学家,我对人们在价值问题上看法不一这个事实很感兴趣。从经验的逻辑实证主义的观点来看,这种不一致是由于价值判断的主观性所致,因而它们不能得到证实。但我不能接受这个结     

应用广泛的一种认知模型

认知逻辑最初是以逻辑的方法来研究哲学的认识论问题。因此,认知逻辑有着很强的哲学背景。哲学家对认知可以说有着悠久且值得骄傲的研究传统。“我们知道什么?”、“什么能够被知?”、“‘知道某件事’的意思究竟是什么?”等问题在哲学中被广泛讨论过。逻辑学家的任务是用逻辑的方法将这些哲学观点刻画出来,使之更加严格化、系统化。这项工作的价值是不容怀疑的。首先,哲学家无法证明其所有的认知观点的一致性。逻辑学家为其提供了严格的证明工具。其次,严格使用逻辑的分析方法可以深入研究这些哲学观点所蕴涵的命题。例如,“我知道我知道……     

认证悖论和绿蓝悖论

“悖论”(Paradox)一词是有岐义的。在关于演绎逻辑的讨论中,悖论是指一种特殊的逻辑矛盾,即:从命题A可推出非A.从非A又可推出A。但在关于归纳逻辑的讨论中,悖论不仅包括一切逻辑矛盾,而且包括那些与人们的直觉或常识相违的推论亦即怪论。这种广义的悖论在归纳逻辑中是为数不少的,其中最基本的并且至今悬而未决的悖论包括认证悖论和绿蓝悖论。下面我们分别介绍这两个归纳悖论。一、认证悖论认证悖论(the Paradoxes of Confirmation)是由著名逻辑学家和科学哲学家亨佩尔(CarlG.Hem. Pel)于1937年首先提出,以后他又在“认证逻辑研究”(即[1],此文最早发表于1945年)和     

面向不足与复杂认知的当代归纳逻辑研究

一从定性认知到定量认知:古典归纳逻辑到现代归纳逻辑归纳逻辑是以归纳推理和归纳方法为基本内容的知识体系。归纳推理的前提是一些关于个别事物或现象的判断,而结论是关于该类事物或现象的普遍性的判断。归纳推理的结论超出了前提所断定的范     

因果影响与函数式依赖:从逻辑的视角分析

近年来,关于如何刻画系统中变量间的相互依赖和相互影响在计算机以及哲学研究中激起了广泛讨论。其中非常经典的工作包括Pearl、Gales以及Halpern等逻辑学家和计算机科学家提出的因果模型和基于因果模型的因果逻辑。而最新Baltag与van Benthem的工作又提出了通过函数式依赖这一概念分析变量间影响的模型。本文将介绍并探讨这两种路径之间的关系,并且提出,在对Halpern等人的因果模型和逻辑做认知方面的扩充之后,我们能在这两种路径中找到更多共通之处。     

自然语言逻辑的研究内容——周礼全语言逻辑思想的启迪

自然语言逻辑也称"语言逻辑"、"自然逻辑"。从20世纪50年代起,中国的逻辑学家就开始了对自然语言逻辑的探索与研究。周礼全是中国语言逻辑研究的倡导者和奠基者。他不仅自己身体力行,而且鼓励、带动了一大批研究者从不同角度对自然语言逻辑做了多方面的研究。周先生对自然语言逻辑的     

《道义逻辑》专著一九九九年七月出版

道义逻辑是现代模态逻辑的一个重要分支，是逻辑学家把伦理概念予以逻辑分析而开辟的推理新领域。表达伦理规范的义务，允许、禁止和承诺等概念。粗略看来，表现的只是对于人的祈使和命令，但其中包含着奇妙的逻辑关系。正像哲学范畴中的必然，偶然和可能等概念，在逻辑学家看来，包含着奇妙逻辑关系一样。本书对于逻辑学工作者，伦理学工作者和法律工作者的理论研究和实际应用尤为有益。对于所有关心逻辑学发展，寻求社会发展的人文价值的各业人士也具有重要的参考价值。作者周祯祥在书中全面地论述了道义逻辑这门新学科发展的历史，它的具…     

逻辑、语言和思维:不同理论态度的剖析

从十七世纪末叶莱布尼兹提出数理逻辑的最初设想起,至今已有大约三百年的历史。其间,现代逻辑大致经历了三个主要的发展阶段。首先,逻辑学家通过引入数学方法研究和处理传统逻辑而建立起逻辑代数和关系逻辑,继而,又应研究数学基础问题和数学思维     

The Possibility of Inductive Moral Argumets

Abstract

Is it possible to have moral knowledge? ‘Moral justification skeptics’ hold it is not, because moral beliefs cannot have the sort of epistemic justification necessary for knowledge. This skeptical stance can be summed up in a single, eat argument, which includes the premise that ‘Inductive arguments from non-moral premises to moral conclusions are not possible.’ Other premises in the argument may rejected, but only at some cost. It would be noteworthy, therefore, if ‘inductive inferentialism’ about morals were show to be at least possible. Some philosophers may suppose that inductive moral argumets from non-moral premises cannot get off the ground, but I show that a perfectly legitimate inductive moral argument exists. This argument has on-moral premises and a moral conclusion, its premises are related to its conclusion in the right way, and it avoids some of the problems of other, better-know argumets from ‘Is’ to ‘Ought’.     

归纳推理的抽样理论

作者提出归纳推理的抽样理论,认为归纳推理实质是根据与归纳特征有关的抽样样本情况来推断结论类别具有归纳特征的可能性,其中的抽样可分为类别抽样和特征抽样两种。以大学生为被试的两个实验结果一致支持抽样理论而不是别的归纳推理理论。对于归纳推理的主要现象,抽样理论比其它的相似性解释具有更大的解释范围,特别是能够解释其它理论严格不能解释的归纳推理非对称性现象     

Inductive Reasoning in Alzheimer''s Disease

We evaluated knowledge of basic level and superordinate semantic relations and the role of cognitive resources during inductive reasoning in probable Alzheimer's disease (AD). Nineteen mildly demented AD patients and 17 healthy control subjects judged the truthfulness of arguments with a premise and a conclusion that contain familiar concepts coupled with "blank" predicates, such as "Spiders contain phosphatidylcholine; therefore all insects contain phosphatidylcholine." Like healthy control subjects, AD patients were relatively insensitive to the typicality of the premise category when judging the strength of arguments with a conclusion containing a basic-level concept, but were relatively sensitive to typicality during judgments of arguments containing a superordinate in the conclusion. Moreover, AD patients resembled control subjects in judging arguments with an immediate superordinate in the conclusion compared to arguments with a distant superordinate. AD patients differed from control subjects because they could not take advantage of two premises in an argument containing basic-level concepts. We conclude that semantic knowledge is sufficiently preserved in AD to support inductive reasoning, but that limited cognitive resources may interfere with AD patients' ability to consider the entire spectrum of information available during semantic challenges.     

Movin’ on up: higher-level requirements and inferential justification

Does inferential justification require the subject to be aware that her premises support her conclusion? Externalists tend to answer “no” and internalists tend to answer “yes”. In fact, internalists often hold the strong higher-level requirement that an argument justifies its conclusion only if the subject justifiably believes that her premises support her conclusion. I argue for a middle ground. Against most externalists, I argue that inferential justification requires that one be aware that her premises support her conclusion. Against many internalists, I argue that this higher-level awareness needn’t be doxastic or justified. I also argue that the required higher-level awareness needn’t be caused in some appropriate way, e.g. by a reliable or properly functioning faculty. I suspect that this weaker higher-level requirement is overlooked because, at first glance, it seems absurd to allow nondoxastic, unjustified, and unreliably-caused higher-level awareness to contribute to inferential justification. One of the central goals of this paper is to explain how such weak awareness can make an essential contribution to inferential justification.     

Mental models and probabilistic thinking

This paper outlines the theory of reasoning based on mental models, and then shows how this theory might be extended to deal with probabilistic thinking. The same explanatory framework accommodates deduction and induction: there are both deductive and inductive inferences that yield probabilistic conclusions. The framework yields a theoretical conception of strength of inference, that is, a theory of what the strength of an inference is objectively: it equals the proportion of possible states of affairs consistent with the premises in which the conclusion is true, that is, the probability that the conclusion is true given that the premises are true. Since there are infinitely many possible states of affairs consistent with any set of premises, the paper then characterizes how individuals estimate the strength of an argument. They construct mental models, which each correspond to an infinite set of possibilities (or, in some cases, a finite set of infinite sets of possibilities). The construction of models is guided by knowledge and beliefs, including lay conceptions of such matters as the “law of large numbers”. The paper illustrates how this theory can account for phenomena of probabilistic reasoning.     

Domain-sensitivity

In this paper, I argue that there are good motivations for a relativist account of the domain-sensitivity of quantifier phrases. I will frame the problem as a puzzle involving what looks like a logically valid inference, yet one whose premises are true while the conclusion is false. After discussing some existing accounts, literalist and contextualist, I will present and argue for an account that may be said to be relativistin the following sense: (i) a domain of quantification is required for determining truth value, but is idle in determining semantic content, and (ii) the same sentence, as used on one and the same occasion, may receive different truth values relative to different domains.     

Defining Deduction,Induction, and Validity

In this paper I focus on two contrasting concepts of deduction and induction that have appeared in introductory (formal) logic texts over the past 75 years or so. According to the one, deductive and inductive arguments are defined solely by reference to what arguers claim about the relation between the premises and the conclusions. According to the other, they are defined solely by reference to that relation itself. Arguing that these definitions have defects that are due to their simplicity, I develop definitions that remove these defects by assigning a combination of roles to both arguers’ claims concerning the premises/conclusion relation and the relation itself. Along the way I also present and briefly defend definitions of both deductive and inductive validity that are significantly different from the norm.     

The Content of Deduction

For deductive reasoning to be justified, it must be guaranteed to preserve truth from premises to conclusion; and for it to be useful to us, it must be capable of informing us of something. How can we capture this notion of information content, whilst respecting the fact that the content of the premises, if true, already secures the truth of the conclusion? This is the problem I address here. I begin by considering and rejecting several accounts of informational content. I then develop an account on which informational contents are indeterminate in their membership. This allows there to be cases in which it is indeterminate whether a given deduction is informative. Nevertheless, on the picture I present, there are determinate cases of informative (and determinate cases of uninformative) inferences. I argue that the model I offer is the best way for an account of content to respect the meaning of the logical constants and the inference rules associated with them without collapsing into a classical picture of content, unable to account for informative deductive inferences.     

Non-Naturalist Moral Realism and the Limits of Rational Reflection

This essay develops the epistemic challenge to non-naturalist moral realism. While evolutionary considerations do not support the strongest claims made by ‘debunkers’, they do provide the basis for an inductive argument that our moral dispositions and starting beliefs are at best partially reliable. So, we need some method for separating truth from falsity. Many non-naturalists think that rational reflection can play this role. But rational reflection cannot be expected to bring us to truth even from reasonably accurate starting points. Reflection selects views that are coherent and conflict-free, yet there is no reason to think that the non-natural moral truth must be like this. Inasmuch as we seek coherent, conflict-free, ethical viewpoints, that suggests that our goal is not non-natural truth at all.     

Inhibitory mechanism of the matching heuristic in syllogistic reasoning

A number of heuristic-based hypotheses have been proposed to explain how people solve syllogisms with automatic processes. In particular, the matching heuristic employs the congruency of the quantifiers in a syllogism — by matching the quantifier of the conclusion with those of the two premises. When the heuristic leads to an invalid conclusion, successful solving of these conflict problems requires the inhibition of automatic heuristic processing. Accordingly, if the automatic processing were based on processing the set of quantifiers, no semantic contents would be inhibited. The mental model theory, however, suggests that people reason using mental models, which always involves semantic processing. Therefore, whatever inhibition occurs in the processing implies the inhibition of the semantic contents.