Varieties of Epistemic Freedom

When we deliberate about what to do, we appear to be free to decide on different options. Three accounts use ordinary beliefs to explain this apparent freedom—appealing to different types of ‘epistemic freedom’. When an agent has epistemic freedom, her evidence while deliberating does not determine what decision she makes. This ‘epistemic gap’ between her evidence and decision explains why her decision appears free. The varieties of epistemic freedom appealed to might look similar. But there is an important difference. Two rely on an agent's ability to justifiably form beliefs unconstrained by evidence, and identify decisions as beliefs—either beliefs about acts (Velleman) or about decisions (Joyce and Ismael). But, when used to explain apparent freedom, these accounts face serious problems: they imply that agents have epistemic freedom over evidence-based beliefs, and rely on a faulty notion of justification. Underlying these troubles, it turns out that these accounts presuppose an unexplained apparent ability to form different beliefs. A third variety of epistemic freedom uses ignorance conditions instead (Levi and Kapitan). We appear free partly because we're ignorant of what we'll decide. Ignorance-based accounts avoid the above problems, and remain a promising alternative.     

An Inquiry into Views,Beliefs and Faith: Lessons from Buddhism,Behavioural Psychology and Constructivist Epistemology*

Abstract

 The causes of disagreements between individuals, social groups, cultural groups, political parties, and nations can be traced down to the basic human tendency to give form to – and to reify views, beliefs, and opinions. With this being the case, I would like to ask the question: what, exactly are ‘views’ (including here such overlapping categories as ‘opinions’, ‘beliefs’ and ‘attitudes’,)? How, exactly, do we give form to them? Why is it so difficult to change, or get rid of them? The Buddhist tradition since the time of its inception, has been greatly concerned with the matter of identifying ‘false views’ and replacing them with ‘correct views’. But serious and insightful research into the formation and maintenance of views and beliefs is by no means limited to Buddhism. It has been a topic of great concern in the past century to a wide range of secular researchers: social and behavioural psychologists; literary theorists and epistemologists; scientists and marketing strategists. What the specialists in these various fields have to say about beliefs is diverse – and yet there is much overlap. The ways in which they overlap are thought-provoking, and their differences are revelatory. In this paper, I investigate a few prominent approaches to the study of views and beliefs, and show how these various approaches can do much to fill in each other’s discourse. Finally, I reframe the Mahayana Buddhist notion of ‘correct faith’ within the context of this exploration of views.     

Why Is a Valid Inference a Good Inference?

True beliefs and truth‐preserving inferences are, in some sense, good beliefs and good inferences. When an inference is valid though, it is not merely truth‐preserving, but truth‐preserving in all cases. This motivates my question: I consider a Modus Ponens inference, and I ask what its validity in particular contributes to the explanation of why the inference is, in any sense, a good inference. I consider the question under three different definitions of ‘case’, and hence of ‘validity’: (i) the orthodox definition given in terms of interpretations or models, (ii) a metaphysical definition given in terms of possible worlds, and (iii) a substitutional definition defended by Quine. I argue that the orthodox notion is poorly suited to explain what's good about a Modus Ponens inference. I argue that there is something good that is explained by a certain kind of truth across possible worlds, but the explanation is not provided by metaphysical validity in particular; nothing of value is explained by truth across all possible worlds. Finally, I argue that the substitutional notion of validity allows us to correctly explain what is good about a valid inference.     

South[ern] Africa’s Dar ul-‘Ulums: Institutions of Social Change for the Common Good?

Muslim communities in principally non-Muslim nation states (e.g. South Africa, United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands) established a plethora of Muslim theological institutions. They have done so with the purpose of educating and reinforcing their Muslim identity. These educational structures have given rise to numerous questions that one encounters as one explores the rationale for their formation. Some are: have these institutions contributed towards the growth of Muslim extremism as argued by American and European Think Tanks? If so, then in which and why did they do so? If not, then why have they been falsely accused, and how should Muslims counter these erroneous criticisms? And, more importantly, have some of these educational institutions—as agents of ‘social change’—contributed towards the ‘common good’ of the society? In response, the article attempts to investigate the reasons for the formation of these Muslim educational institutions within a broad Southern Africa democratic context. It prefaces the discussion by first constructing ‘social change’ as a viable theoretical frame and it thereafter places the madrasas and Dar ul-‘Ulums within the mentioned context prior to reflecting upon the notion of the ‘common good.’ It then proceeds by making reference to the Dar ul-‘Ulum curriculum that plays a significant role in shaping and moulding the theologians’ thinking and behaviour. It concludes by questioning to what extent the type of theological curriculum that they constructed assists them to contribute towards the ‘common good’ of Southern Africa’ societies.     

Explaining social norm compliance. A plea for neural representations

How should we understand the claim that people comply with social norms because they possess the right kinds of beliefs and preferences? I answer this question by considering two approaches to what it is to believe (and prefer), namely: representationalism and dispositionalism. I argue for a variety of representationalism, viz. neural representationalism. Neural representationalism is the conjunction of two claims. First, what it is essential to have beliefs and preferences is to have certain neural representations. Second, neural representations are often necessary to adequately explain behaviour. After having canvassed one promising way to understand what neural representations could be, I argue that the appeal to beliefs and preferences in explanations of paradigmatic cases of norm compliance should be understood as an appeal to neural representations.     

From cooperation to conflict: The role of collective narratives in shaping group behaviour

In this paper, we review the concept of collective narratives and their role in shaping group behaviour. We see collective narratives as ‘meta-stories’ embraced by groups that incorporate values and beliefs about social reality, therefore providing a blueprint for group norms which, in turn, inform group members' behaviour. Our aim is to both describe the psychological processes underpinning the relation between collective narratives and group behaviours and develop an integrative typology of the functions of collective narratives (as they connect to various collective behaviours). We start by discussing definitions in the recent literature and propose an integrative conceptualisation which positions collective narratives in the context of collective action research. Next, we focus on the process by which collective narratives provide the bases for identity formation, development, and change, thus shaping group behaviour. We see collective narratives as central in understanding group behaviour, as they function as ‘meta-stories’ that incorporate moral codes and values, and beliefs about the ingroups and outgroups—providing a blueprint for group norms which, in turn, inform group members' behaviour. In the second part of the article, we describe a typology of collective narratives according to their functions, structured around two core dimensions: the context/s in which collective narratives develop and are shared (i.e., intragroup vs. intergroup) and their effects within these contexts (i.e., driving consensus vs. driving dissent). We identify four distinctive types of collective narrative functions and review research showing how each of them shapes specific social identity content, including behaviour prescribing norms. We then show how these specific norms shape behaviours ranging from cooperation and pro-social action to hostile intergroup conflict. The implications of this contribution are twofold. First, by providing a systematic account and categorisation of how collective narratives function in society and of their connections to social identities (and their content), we can more accurately deduct group norms and predict behaviours in specific circumstances, including in relation to political violence. Second, by better understanding the narratives that provide the bases of identity formation, development, and change, we can improve attempts to create alternative narratives that unify rather than divide people, so that pathways to co-operation might be chosen over conflict.     

Guilt and self-concept in ‘secondary psychopaths’

Thirty-two male and 25 female ‘secondary psychopaths’ and 24 male and 24 female ‘normal’ subjects filled in semantic differential scales relating to the concepts: Myself as I am, Myself when I lie, Myself if I were to steal, Myself as I would like to be, People who lie and People who steal. The Mosher Morality-Conscience Guilt scale and the Eysenck Personality Inventories were also administered. The psychopaths exhibited significantly higher Guilt scores than the normal subjects and had very poor self-image which was reflected in a constant feeling of guilt, regardless of whether or not they were rating transgression. Normal subjects, on the other hand, only rated themselves as feeling guilty when they violated acceptable norms. The findings suggest that guilt in ‘secondary psychopaths’ is partly related to their high level of trait anxiety and partly to their poor self-concept which may be a reflection of their disturbed family background and the constant disapproval that their behaviour creates. Since guilt in the psychopaths did not markedly increase with transgression it is argued that this may explain why guilt fails to inhibit unacceptable behaviour in some psychopaths.     

Why are some moral beliefs perceived to be more objective than others?

Recent research has investigated whether people think of their moral beliefs as objectively true facts about the world, or as subjective preferences. The present research examines variability in the perceived objectivity of different moral beliefs, with respect both to the content of moral beliefs themselves (what they are about), and to the social representation of those moral beliefs (whether other individuals are thought to hold them). It also examines the possible consequences of perceiving a moral belief as objective. With respect to the content of moral beliefs, we find that beliefs about the moral properties of negatively valenced acts are seen as reliably more objective than beliefs about the moral properties of positively valenced acts. With respect to the social representation of moral beliefs, we find that the degree of perceived consensus regarding a moral belief positively influences its perceived objectivity. The present experiments also demonstrate that holding a moral belief to be objective is associated with a more ‘closed’ response in the face of disagreement about it, and with more morally pejorative attributions towards a disagreeing other person.     

Yu in the Xunzi: toward a precise understanding

An ongoing dialogue in Xunzi scholarship addresses the role of yu (欲), often rendered as ‘desire,’ in motivation, but little has been said about what yu actually is, or whether the translation of ‘desire’ accurately reflects Xunzi’s use of the term. Employing textual analysis alongside research in cognitive science, most notably work on the so-called ‘wanting-liking’ distinction, I work toward a more precise understanding of Xunzi’s notion of yu and its functions. I suggest that yu be construed as a kind of desire with an emphasis on ‘wanting’ that, while motivational, differs from broader, less precise notions of desire, and that this feature constitutes a distinctive aspect of Xunzi’s philosophy of psychology. In so doing, I propose a particular methodological approach for the interpretation of classical Chinese philosophy: when interpreting concepts that are subjects of empirical inquiry, empirical findings should lead us to favor some interpretations over others.     

“Communities isn't just about trees and shops”: students from two South African universities engage in dialogue about ‘community’ and ‘community work’

The question of what constitutes ‘a community’ or even ‘the community’ takes on an extra salience in a divided society such as South Africa where the entire environment remains imprinted with the legacy of enforced segregation along racial lines. Higher education institutions need to prepare emerging health and social service students for the world of practice in a context of diversity, continuing segregation and marked inequality. As one step to helping students deal with working in a divided society, academic departments from two different South African universities have been involved in a collaborative teaching and research project. Fourth year psychology and social work students from the two universities took part in a collaborative, practical course which formed part of their curricula. In this course, students were given the opportunity to engage with the notion of ‘community’ and ‘community work’ with each other. The students came from diverse racial, class and political backgrounds, and by engaging with one another as they did, had the opportunity to ‘visit’ worlds they have rarely had access to. While this course was able to achieve a broadening awareness among students from different backgrounds about the notion of community, it will take both more engagement with courses of this kind, and a continuing history of change in South Africa, for students to feel more comfortable in transcending both physical and psychological boundaries. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Backward induction and beliefs about oneself

According to decision theory, the rational initial action in a sequential decision-problem may be found by ‘backward induction’ or “folding back’. But the reasoning which underwrites this claim appeals to the agent's beliefs about what she will later believe, about what she will later believe she will still later believe, and so forth. There are limits to the ‘depth’ of people's beliefs. Do these limits pose a threat to the standard theory of rational sequential choice? It is argued, first, that the traditional solutions of certain games depend on knowledge which exceeds depth limits, and that these solutions therefore cannot be shown rational in the usual sense. Then, for that related reason even ‘folding back’ solutions of one-person problems cannot be! A revision of our notion of rational choice is proposed, analogous to the reliabilist account of knowledge of Goldman and others, by which this paradox is resolved.     

Testing VBN theory in Japan: Relationships between values,beliefs, norms,and acceptability and expected effects of a car pricing policy

The VBN (value-belief-norm) theory of environmentalism postulates that values influence pro-environmental behaviour via pro-environmental beliefs and personal norms. A few studies provided support for the theory in explaining pro-environmental behaviour in Europe and Latin America. Beyond these studies, the question remains to what extent the VBN theory can also explain pro-environmental beliefs, norms, and behaviour in other cultures. This study tests the VBN theory in Japan and demonstrates that, as expected, the more people endorse biospheric values, the stronger they believe that car use has negative environmental impacts, the more they feel responsible for the problems caused by car use, and the more they feel personally obliged to reduce their car use. In contrast, stronger hedonic and, to a lesser extent, stronger egoistic values were related to less strong pro-environmental beliefs and norms. Furthermore, support was found for the mediation effects of pro-environmental beliefs in the relationships between hedonic and biospheric value orientations and norms. The VBN theory explained the acceptability and expected effects of a car pricing policy on an individual’s transport choices, but less strongly than in previous studies. Interestingly, biospheric and hedonic values not only predicted adjacent beliefs, but also other beliefs and norms farther down the causal chain, suggesting that values play an important role in promoting sustainable mobility.     

Racial Profiling And Cumulative Injustice

This paper tries to explain why racial profiling involves a serious injustice and to do so in a way that avoids the problems of existing philosophical accounts. An initially plausible view maintains that racial profiling is pro tanto wrong in and of itself by violating a constraint on fair treatment that is generally violated by acts of statistical discrimination based on ascribed characteristics. However, consideration of other cases involving statistical discrimination suggests that violating a constraint of this kind may not be an especially serious wrong in and of itself. To fully capture the significant wrong that occurs when racial profiling is targeted at black Americans or other similarly situated groups, it is argued that we should appeal to the idea that this basic injustice is exacerbated when it forms part of a larger pattern of similar actions that collectively realize a state of cumulative injustice.     

Problematisations of Complexity: On the Notion and Production of Diverse Complexities in Healthcare Interventions and Evaluations

Within the literature on the evaluation of health (policy) interventions, complexity is a much-debated issue. In particular, many claim that so-called ‘complex interventions’ pose different challenges to evaluation studies than apparently ‘simple interventions’ do. Distinct ways of doing evaluation entail particular ontologies and epistemologies of complexity. They differ in terms of whether they define complexity as a quantitative trait of interventions, whether they see evaluation as part of or outside the intervention, and whether complexity can be regarded as an emergent property of the intervention and its evaluation. In practice, evaluators and commissioners of large health care improvement programmes rely on different, sometimes contradictory, repertoires about what it means to conduct a ‘good’ evaluation. This is an ongoing matter negotiated between and among commissioners, researchers, and—sometimes—programme managers. In particular, notions of evaluability, usefulness and distance/independence are problematised in different ways and with diverse consequences, which, in turn, produce other notions and layers of complexity such as temporal, institutional and affective complexities. When (social science) researchers claim that one method or another is better able to grasp complexity, they elide the issue that any methodological choice emphasises some complexities and lets others fade into the background. Analysing the practicalities and emotions involved in evaluation studies opens up the notion of complexity to analytical scrutiny, and suggests a basis for co-theorising between biomedical, public health and social scientists (including Science and Technology Studies scholars).     

How Norms (Might) Guide Belief

Abstract

Belief normativism is roughly the view that judgments about beliefs are normative judgments. Kathrin Glüer and Åsa Wikforss (G&W) suggest that there are two ways one could defend this view: by appeal to what might be called ‘truth-norms’, or by appeal to what might be called ‘norms of rationality’ or ‘epistemic norms’. According to G&W, whichever way the normativist takes, she ends up being unable to account for the idea that the norms in question would guide belief formation. Plausibly, if belief normativism were true, the relevant norms would have to offer such guidance. I argue that G&W’s case against belief normativism is not successful. In section 1, I defend the idea that truth-norms can guide belief formation indirectly via epistemic norms. In section 2, I outline an account of how the epistemic norms might guide belief. Interestingly, this account may involve a commitment to a certain kind of expressivist view concerning judgments about epistemic norms.     

Explaining normative reasons

In this paper, we present and defend a natural yet novel analysis of normative reasons. According to what we call support-explanationism, for a fact to be a normative reason to φ is for it to explain why there's normative support for φ-ing. We critically consider the two main rival forms of explanationism—ought-explanationism, on which reasons explain facts about ought, and good-explanationism, on which reasons explain facts about goodness—as well as the popular Reasons-First view, which takes the notion of a normative reason to be normatively fundamental. Support-explanationism, we argue, enjoys many of the virtues of these views while avoiding their drawbacks. We conclude by exploring several further important implications: among other things, we argue that the influential metaphor of ‘weighing’ reasons is inapt, and propose a better one; that, contrary to what Berker (2019) suggests, there's no reason for non-naturalists about normativity to accept the Reasons-First view; and that, contrary to what Wodak (2020b) suggests, explanationist views can successfully accommodate what he calls ‘redundant reasons’.     

Norms,Rules and Steadfast Love: Towards an Inclusive Theology of Intimacy

Abstract

This article argues that defenders of the traditional view that marriage is the necessary condition for sexual experience generally make two important mistakes. First, they underestimate how open to emergent forms marriage actually is. And second, they confuse marriage as a norm for sexual expression with marriage as a rule. This article attempts a simple clarification of this basic distinction and, in so doing, is able to throw considerable fresh light on the place of marriage in the Christian understanding of sexuality. First, there will be some reminders about how adaptable the institution of marriage has actually been and may continue to be. Second, attempts will be made to explain the differences between a norm and a rule. Finally some possibilities and consequences arising from this distinction will be explored. These will provide some promptings towards what is called here ‘an inclusive theology of intimacy’. Radical Christians are cautioned regarding their peremptory search for alternatives to marriage. People inside and outside the churches who reject marriage may be rejecting versions of it which, while undoubtedly historical, simply do not bring to light the possibilities released by what might be called ‘the marital norm’.     

Latin America 1520–1600: a page in the history of the study of religion

This article examines the texts written by the first generation of missionaries on the beliefs and mores of the indigenous people of what came to be called Mexico and Peru, supplemented by some accounts written by travelers in Brazil. These works claimed to put forward knowledge about ‘the others’. It is argued that they were important precursors for the study of religion and should receive more attention as such. The issue of location is shown to be always present in this early material, along with the biological notion of hybridization. The conclusion asks whether the contemporary pursuit of knowledge can move from the biological unity of the human race to a view of the race as a social whole with common interests.