The processing of positive and negative information

An affirmative statement which is known to be false and the complementary negative statement which is known to be true, provide the same information, i.e. that something is not the case. Similarly, an affirmative statement which is known to be true and the complementary negative statement which is known to be false, both imply that something is the case. (If P is false, not-P is true and if P is true, not-P is false.) Hence there are four kinds of statement (“conditions”): true affirmatives, false affirmatives, true negativee and false negatives, but only two kinds of information: positive and negative.

This experiment investigates the times taken to process information presented in these ways. The task was to select two alternative words which would make affirmative or negative conjunctive statements agree or conflict with given situations. The four conditions were presented six times in different serial orders, so that each occurred once in every block of four trials. The mean response times were: true affirmatives 8-99 sec, false affirmatives 11 19 sec., true negatives 12-58 sec, false negatives 15-17 sec. This order was the same at each of the six presentations of the conditions, the differences being significant at the 0 001 level in each case. There was a pronounced decline in errors (without knowledge of results) for three of the conditions. These results are discussed in relation to (i) the assumption of a positive set, established through a long learning process; (ii) the inferential nature of negative information in relation to experience; and (iii) the possible emotional effects of negative terms.     

Executive function and children's understanding of false belief: how specific is the relation?

The present study examined developmental relations among understanding false belief, understanding “false” photographs, performance on the Dimensional Change Card Sort (DCCS), and performance on a picture–sentence verification task in 69 3–5-year-old children. Results showed that performance on the DCCS predicted performance on false belief questions even after controlling for children's age and verbal ability. However, neither performance on the picture–sentence verification task, nor performance on the “false” photograph task predicted false belief understanding. Implications of these findings are discussed in the context of suggestions that understanding false belief reflects a general understanding of representation, propositional negation, and the ability to use higher order rules.     

Fluctuating confidence: the dynamic consequences of true/false affirmatives and denials on how a listener appraises their personal past

The present study examined the mnemonic consequences of true/false denials and affirmatives on how a listener appraises their personal past. To this end, participants (listeners) rated the extent to which they were confident certain events occurred during their childhood. They rated these events both before and after a confederate (speaker) denied or affirmed the occurrence of four different childhood events each, for a total of eight “rehearsed” events. For each set (denials and affirmatives) of events, half were true and half were false. In turn, this created four types of events (two each): true denials, true affirmatives, false denials, and false affirmatives. Additionally, half of the participants were told that the speaker was provided independent information about the veracity of the event’s occurrence (“expert” condition). Overall, listeners were less confident in the occurrence of false denial events, but more so when they believed the speaker to be more knowledgeable of the listeners memories, more confident in false affirmative events and, counter intuitively, more confident in the occurrence of true denial events. These results underscore the importance of a nuanced approach to the mnemonic consequences of true and false denials and affirmations in the course of social interactions.     

Inspecting pictures for information to verify a sentence: Eye movements in general encoding and in focused search

When we see combinations of text and graphics, such as photographs and their captions in printed media, how do we compare the information in the two components? Two experiments used a sentence-picture verification task in which statements about photographs of natural scenes were read in order to make a true/false decision about the validity of the sentence, and in which eye movements were recorded. In Experiment 1 the sentence and the picture were presented concurrently, and objects and words could be inspected in any order. In Experiment 2 the two components were presented one after the other, either picture first or sentence first. Fixation durations on pictures were characteristically longer than those on sentences in both experiments, and fixations on sentences varied according to whether they were being encoded as abstract propositions or as coreferents of objects depicted in a previously inspected picture. The decision time data present a difficulty for existing models of sentence verification tasks, with an inconsistent pattern of differences between true and false trials.     

汉语句子-图片信息整合的眼动测量

采用眼球追踪-分析法考察了“句子-图片”验证范式下句图信息整合过程中句式和语义关系类型的作用。实验结果表明：（1）汉语句子-图片信息整合过程中,句图继时呈现没有消除语义失配效应,注视次数、总注视时间显著增加,瞳孔直径扩大。语义失配会显著干扰句法难度低的句式的句图信息整合。（2）句式影响句子-图片信息的整合过程,注视次数、总注视时间、瞳孔直径随句法难度增加而增加。（3）汉语句图信息整合过程中,语义失配效应受句式影响,表现出任务的特异性,这说明成分比较模型不具有一般性     

Generation of a pictorial code

In Experiments I and II direct measures were obtained of the time required to convert a picture or a sentence to a report of visualization or to a simple drawing, latencies were faster for pictures than for sentences and were affected by the surface form of the sentence. In Experiment Ill, Ss matched pictures or sentences against a test picture under conditions of simultaneous or successive presentation. “Yes” and “No” response times were affected by sentence form under both conditions, although the difference between sentence-picture and picture-picture comparisons was virtually eliminated under the successive condition. In Experiment IV, Ss held a sentence or picture in memory over a 1,500-msec interval at the end of which a test picture or an instruction to draw the design was presented. Construction latencies were shorter in response to pictures than sentences, and there were effects of sentence form on verification time. Some implications of these results are discussed.     

The Effect of LPC Narrowband Processing and Bit Error Rate on Performance in a Sentence Verification Task

The comprehension of narrowband digital speech with bit errors was tested using a sentence verification task. The difficulty of the verification task was varied by using predicates that were either strongly or weakly related to the subjects (e.g., A toad has warts./A toad has eyes.). The test conditions included unprocessed speech and speech processed using a 2,400 bitdsec linear predictive coding (LPC) voice processing algorithm with random bit error rates of 0%, 2%, and 5%. In general, response accuracy decreased and reaction time (RT) increased with LPC processing and with increasing bit error rates. Weakly related true sentences and strongly related false sentences were more difficult than strongly related true sentences and weakly related false sentences, respectively. Interactions between sentence type and speech processing conditions are discussed. The longer time taken to react to degraded speech has implications for performance in military combat situa- tions where split-second decisions are required. The higher error rates with degraded sentences that contain little contextual information are particularly relevant to policy conversations that use a varied vocabulary.     

句子理解中颜色信息的心理表征

采用混合实验设计、实时和事后的句子-图片匹配范式, 以隐含物体典型颜色和非典型颜色信息的句子为实验材料, 以被试对图片的反应时间和阅读时间为因变量指标, 通过不同时间间隔的设置以及不同的实验程序, 探讨了句子理解中静态和动态颜色信息心理表征的特点。结果表明：(1)在加工时间有限的情况下, 两个加工任务是否竞争相同的认知资源是造成句-图范式下匹配易化和不匹配易化的关键因素。(2)对于句子隐含的静态颜色信息, 大脑对典型颜色信息的心理表征具有即时性和局部性, 而对非典型颜色信息的心理表征还具有非局部性的特点。(3)对于句子隐含的动态颜色信息, 大脑不能对其进行即时的心理表征, 这种动态颜色信息的心理表征是在句子阅读晚期发生的。     

On the process of comparing sentences against pictures

The present study outlines a theory of how people compare sentences against pictures. This theory was tested in four experiments in which Ss were timed as they judged whether a sentence (e.g., Star isn't above plus) was true or false of a picture (e.g., ⁺_∗). The latencies in these tasks were consistent with the thesis that: (1) sentences are represented in terms of elementary propositions; (2) pictures are encoded in the same interpretive format; (3) these two codes are compared in an algorithmic series of mental operations, each of which contributes additively to the response latency; and (4) sentence encoding, picture encoding, comparing, and responding are four serially ordered stages, and their component latencies are additive. From these results, it was also possible to rule out certain explanations based on visual imagery, conversion (e.g., converting isn't above into is below), reading time, normative word frequencies, and other factors. Finally, it was shown that this theory is consistent with previous studies on sentence comprehension, sentence verification, concept verification, and other related phenomena.     

The relation between comprehending and remembering some complex sentences

This research concerns the distinction between processes in sentence comprehension and those in sentence memory. Comprehension was monitored by timing subjects while they decided whether a sentence was true or false of their knowledge of the world. The memory process was tapped by examining subjects' incidental memory for the sentences they had previously verified. The verification latencies indicated that at the time of comprehension, sentences likeIt is true that a fire isn't cold were often recoded into an equivalent affirmative form, namely,It is true that a fire is hot. However, negative sentences likeIt isn't true that a fire is cold were not recoded during comprehension. Recoding in recall occurred only for those types of sentences that were recoded at the time of comprehension.     

汉语确定性无界否定句模拟加工的时间进程

以往关于否定句理解的心理模拟过程是一步完成的还是两步完成的, 结果并不一致, 这与各个研究使用的实验材料类型有关。本研究以汉语确定性无界否定句为研究对象, 采用句-图匹配范式和2(句子类型：汉语确定性无界肯定句和汉语确定性无界否定句) × 2 (图片描绘事物状态与句子描述的事物状态的匹配类型：匹配与不匹配)被试内实验设计, 以对图片判断的反应时和正确率为指标, 探讨其理解的早期(250 ms)、中期(750 ms)和晚期(1500 ms)的心理模拟过程。研究结果表明：确定性无界否定句理解的心理模拟是分两步进行的, 首先模拟的是否定句的被否定状态, 随着加工时间的推进, 完成了对确定性无界否定句的第二步模拟即对实际状态的模拟。但是, 比其他类型否定句的模拟过程所用的时间要短, 即在阅读理解的中期就完成了心理模拟。     

汉语主动句、被动句的命题表征项目顺序特点

以中国大学生为被试,采用句子—图画验证任务(sentence-picture verification task )探讨了中国学生理解汉语主动句、被动句所形成的命题表征中项目顺序特点。结果表明,无论是语义水平较高的不可逆句,还是语义水平较低的可逆句,中国学生理解汉语主动句、被动句所建构的命题表征中项目顺序均为“施事→受事”。本研究结果初步表明,中国学生理解汉语主动句和被动句时,能根据它们不同的表层结构（汉语主动句的语言表达顺序为“施事→受事”、汉语被动句的语言表达顺序为“受事→施事”）建构相同的深层结构（语义内容的命题表征项目顺序“施事→受事”）,可能是一个按照“施事→受事”固定方向进行的系列认知心理加工的过程     

Interference and facilitation effects of primes upon verification processes

Priming effects on sentence verification were investigated. The semantic relation of the prime and the probe, and the interval between prime and probe presentation (SOA), were varied for both ambiguous and unambiguous sentences. Reaction time to decide that a sentence was true or false was longer if the preceding prime was a word that was unrelated to the probe than if the prime was the word “blank.” In contradiction of Posner and Snyder’s (1975) claim that conscious processes develop slowly, this result was found at SOAs as short as 250 msec. Verification performance was facilitated for both sentence types when the prime word was the first of the to-be-presented probe sentence, but the magnitude of the facilitation effects depended upon the truth value of the probe, the associative strength of the subject and predicate of the probe sentence, and upon SOA. These findings indicate that priming affects the processing of relations among concepts in semantic memory, as well as the encoding of the probe.     

Context and Complexity in Incremental Sentence Interpretation: An ERP Study on Temporal Quantification

The present event-related potential (ERP) study used picture–sentence verification to investigate the neurolinguistic correlates of the online processing of compositional-semantic information. To this end, we examined context effects on sentences involving temporal adverbial quantification likeJana war jeden Morgen schwimmen an den Arbeitstagen (“Jana went for a swim every morning during the working week”). We tested whether the conceptual complexity associated with quantifying over time intervals leads to delayed predictions regarding the upcoming words in a sentence. The present study replicated previous results relating to quantification over individuals, which are conceptually less complex than time intervals. Analogous to previous studies, false vs. true sentences elicited an N400 whenever contextual cues did not permit a potential revision of a locally assigned truth value. The present results are compatible with an approach under which contextual cues are immediately considered for predicting how a sentence continues. The fact that the contextual complexity did not lead to processing delays indicates that the processing system quickly abstracts away from the conceptual complexity associated with the linguistic input if such an abstraction is possible.     

Slowing presentation speed increases illusions of knowledge

Prior research on false memories has shown that suggestibility is often reduced when the presentation rate is slowed enough to allow monitoring. We examined whether slowing presentation speed would reduce factual errors learned from fictional stories. Would subjects use the extra time to detect the errors in the stories, reducing reproduction of these errors on a later test? Surprisingly, slowing presentation speed increased the production of story errors on a later general knowledge test. Instructing the reader to mark whether each sentence contained an error, however, did decrease suggestibility. Readers appear to passively accept information presented in stories and need a constant reminder to monitor for errors. These results highlight differences between typical episodic false memories and illusions of knowledge (such as learning from fiction). Manipulations that reduce suggestibility for episodic false memories do not always reduce suggestibility for illusions of knowledge.     

The Answering System to Yes–No Truth-Functional Questions in Korean–English Bilingual Children

This study presents an experiment that explores the patterns of answers to yes–no truth-functional questions in English and Korean. The answering patterns are examined from 12 Korean–English bilingual children and 10 Korean-monolingual children. Four types of sentences in relation to given situations (Wason in Br J Psychol 52:133–142, 1961) were provided as questions such as true affirmative (TA), true negative (TN), false affirmative (FA), and false negative (FN). The bilingual children’s answers were observed in separate language settings, English and Korean. The results by the bilingual in the Korean setting were compared with those by the monolinguals. The results show that bilingual children can process two systems rather successfully by providing correct responses to the given questions. But difficulty patterns, measured from error rates in each setting, are found different in two languages. The bilinguals’ difficulty patterns in English and Korean, however, show deviation from monolinguals’ difficulty patterns suggested in previous studies (Wason in Br J Psychol 52:133–142, 1961, Akiyama in Dev Psychol 20:219–228, 1984, Kim in Dev Psychol 21(3):462–472, 1985, Choi in Dev Psychol 29(3):407–420, 1991). The present work also shows that negatives are not uniformly reported with more errors than affirmatives when the truth condition and the answering system are further involved. All in all, the current study suggests that bilingual children have two separate processing systems for yes–no truth-functional questions. However, the two systems cannot be understood as a simple coexistence of two monolingual systems. Interaction of the two competing linguistic systems is discussed further.     

Insight into a logical relation

Two experiments are reported which aimed to investigate factors affecting the gain of insight into the logical relation of implication. In the first experiment, subjects had to make a series of inferences about either a conditional sentence or a quantified sentence, both of which had the same underlying logical form. Under one condition the sentences had to be proved true, and under another condition, false. Proving a sentence false facilitated gain of insight, but the linguistic form of the sentence exerted no significant effect on the main dependent variable. In the second experiment, implication was not expressed as a sentence but was inherent in the structure of the task. The experimental material differed in complexity and allowed the cognitive load imposed on the subject to be varied. Results suggested that insight was not all-or-none. It was spontaneously gained when the material was simple, but temporarily lost when it was complex.     

The role of imagery in the evaluation of sentences

Reaction time was the dependent variable in this sentence verification experiment. Simple sentences, which were either true or false, were constructed such that in some cases it was easy to form an image of the sentence, and in other cases forming an image was difficult. Ss' ratings were employed to select low- and high-imagery sentences. It was found that high-imagery sentences could be verified more rapidly than low-imagery sentences. Instructions which did not mention imagery were given to some Ss while others were specifically asked to employ imagery, but the reaction times of these two groups of Ss did not differ. It was concluded that imagery facilitates the process of sentence verification and that models of this process which restrict themselves to purely semantic operations are incomplete.     

The comparative judgements of generally and specifically gifted children

Different groups of children were compared on sentence verification tasks. The children were either academically, musically or artistically gifted, and there were two forms of the task. In one, a picture was followed by a sentence, and in another, one sentence was followed by another. Subjects had to decide as quickly as possible whether or not the second proposition logically confirmed the first. In the picture-sentence condition results from all groups could be fitted to the constituent comparison model for sentence verification proposed by Carpenter and Just (1975). For the sentence-sentence condition, however, the observed results diverged from those predicted by the model. The results are explained in terms of different degrees of linguistic processing capacities of the subjects, and they demonstrate the importance which verbal-logical congruence has for children. Artistically able children had difficulties in processing subject/object incongruence in sentence pairs whereas musically able children had more problems in processing above/below incongruence.