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1.
Rajesh Kasturirangan Nirmalya Guha Chakravarthi Ram-Prasad 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2011,10(2):277-296
We perform conceptual acts throughout our daily lives; we are always judging others, guessing their intentions, agreeing or
opposing their views and so on. These conceptual acts have phenomenological as well as formal richness. This paper attempts
to correct the imbalance between the phenomenal and formal approaches to conceptualization by claiming that we need to shift
from the usual dichotomies of cognitive science and epistemology such as the formal/empirical and the rationalist/empiricist
divides—to a view of conceptualization grounded in the Indian philosophical notion of “valid cognition”. Methodologically,
our paper is an attempt at cross-cultural philosophy and cognitive science; ontologically, it is an attempt at marrying the
phenomenal and the formal. 相似文献
2.
Patrick Allo 《Philosophical Studies》2011,153(3):417-434
The logic of ‘being informed’ gives a formal analysis of a cognitive state that does not coincide with either belief, or knowledge.
To Floridi, who first proposed the formal analysis, the latter is supported by the fact that unlike knowledge or belief, being
informed is a factive, but not a reflective state. This paper takes a closer look at the formal analysis itself, provides
a pure and an applied semantics for the logic of being informed, and tries to find out to what extent the formal analysis
can contribute to an information-based epistemology. 相似文献
3.
The standard way of representing an epistemic state in formal philosophy is in terms of a set of sentences, corresponding to the agent’s beliefs, and an ordering of those sentences, reflecting how well entrenched they are in the agent’s epistemic state. We argue that this wide-spread representational view – a view that we identify as a “Quinean dogma” – is incapable of making certain crucial distinctions. We propose, as a remedy, that any adequate representation of epistemic states must also include the agent’s research agenda, i.e., the list of question that are open or closed at any given point in time. If the argument of the paper is sound, a person’s questions and practical interests, on the one hand, and her beliefs and theoretical values, on the other, are more tightly interwoven than has previously been assumed to be the case in formal epistemology. 相似文献
4.
There has been considerable work on practical reasoning in artificial intelligence and also in philosophy. Typically, such
reasoning includes premises regarding means–end relations. A clear semantics for such relations is needed in order to evaluate
proposed syllogisms. In this paper, we provide a formal semantics for means–end relations, in particular for necessary and
sufficient means–end relations. Our semantics includes a non-monotonic conditional operator, so that related practical reasoning
is naturally defeasible. This work is primarily an exercise in conceptual analysis, aimed at clarifying and eventually evaluating
existing theories of practical reasoning (pending a similar analysis regarding desires, intentions and other relevant concepts).
“They were in conversation without speaking. They didn’t need to speak. They just changed reality so that they had spoken.”
Terry Pratchett, Reaper Man 相似文献
5.
Jake Chandler 《Synthese》2010,176(3):333-343
Crispin Wright’s discussion of the notion of ‘transmission-failure’ promises to have important philosophical ramifications,
both in epistemology and beyond. This paper offers a precise, formal characterisation of the concept within a Bayesian framework.
The interpretation given avoids the serious shortcomings of a recent alternative proposal due to Samir Okasha. 相似文献
6.
Summary Following Mr. Bixby and some other 19th century scientist– philosophers such as Claude Bernard, relevant scientific actions
should, as a matter of primary importance, be explained with reference to the competence and not to the intentions of those
involved. The background is a reliabilist virtue approach – a widespread tendency in 19th century epistemology and philosophy
of science. Bixby’s approach includes a critique of some constructivist arguments and establishes a mutually supportive connection
to conceptions of scientific progress. 相似文献
7.
8.
Henning Peucker 《Axiomathes》2012,22(1):135-146
This article is composed of three sections that investigate the epistemological foundations of Husserl’s idea of logic from
the Logical Investigations. First, it shows the general structure of this logic. Husserl conceives of logic as a comprehensive, multi-layered theory
of possible theories that has its most fundamental level in a doctrine of meaning. This doctrine aims to determine the elementary
categories that constitute every possible meaning (meaning-categories). The second section presents the main idea of Husserl’s
search for an epistemological foundation for knowledge, science and logic. Their epistemological clarification can only be
reached through a detailed analysis of the structure of those intentions that give us what is meant in our intentions. To
reveal the intuitive giveness of logical forms is the ultimate aim of Husserl’s epistemology of logic. Logical forms and meaning-categories
can only be given in a certain higher-order intuition that Husserl calls categorical intuition. The third section of this
article distinguishes different kinds of categorical intuition and shows how the most basic logical categories and concepts
are given to us in a categorical abstraction. 相似文献
9.
Theory change is a central concern in contemporary epistemology and philosophy of science. In this paper, we investigate the
relationships between two ongoing research programs providing formal treatments of theory change: the (post-Popperian) approach
to verisimilitude and the AGM theory of belief change. We show that appropriately construed accounts emerging from those two
lines of epistemological research do yield convergences relative to a specified kind of theories, here labeled “conjunctive”.
In this domain, a set of plausible conditions are identified which demonstrably capture the verisimilitudinarian effectiveness
of AGM belief change, i.e., its effectiveness in tracking truth approximation. We conclude by indicating some further developments
and open issues arising from our results. 相似文献
10.
Luca Moretti 《Synthese》2007,157(3):309-319
Recent works in epistemology show that the claim that coherence is truth conducive – in the sense that, given suitable ceteris paribus conditions, more coherent sets of statements are always more
probable – is dubious and possibly false. From this, it does not follows that coherence is a useless notion in epistemology
and philosophy of science. Dietrich and Moretti (Philosophy of science 72(3): 403–424, 2005) have proposed a formal of account of how coherence is confirmation conducive—that is, of how the coherence of a set of statements facilitates the confirmation of such statements. This account
is grounded in two confirmation transmission properties that are satisfied by some of the measures of coherence recently proposed in the literature. These properties
explicate everyday and scientific uses of coherence. In his paper, I review the main findings of Dietrich and Moretti (2005)
and define two evidence-gathering properties that are satisfied by the same measures of coherence and constitute further ways in which coherence is confirmation
conducive. At least one of these properties vindicates important applications of the notion of coherence in everyday life
and in science. 相似文献
11.
James Kennedy Chase 《Synthese》2012,184(3):357-373
W.V. Quine is committed to the claim that all beliefs are rationally revisable; Jerrold Katz has argued that this commitment
is unstable on grounds of self-application. The subsequent discussion of this issue has largely proceeded in terms of the
logic of belief revision, but there is also an issue here for the treatment of Quine’s views in a doxastic modal system. In
this paper I explore the treatment of Quinean epistemology in modal terms. I argue that a set of formal revisability desiderata
can be distilled from Quine’s epistemic writings, and that there are demonstrably coherent and non-trivial systems that meet
these conditions. 相似文献
12.
13.
Alan W. Richardson 《Topoi》2003,22(1):55-67
It is often claimed that epistemological thought divides around the issue of the place of experience in knowledge: While empiricists
argue that experience is the only legitimate source of knowledge, rationalists find other such sources. The trouble with such
accounts is not that they are wrong, but that they are incomplete. On occasion, epistemological differences run deeper, raising
the very notion of experience as an issue for epistemology. This paper looks at two epistemological debates which concerned
not simply the place of experience in knowledge but also the appropriate account of experience itself. The first episode is
the rise of Marburg Neo-Kantianism in the 1870s – in particular the seminal work of Hermann Cohen in his Kants Theorie der Erfahrung (1871). Cohen's principal point was that Kant's significance as an epistemologist was in providing a new theory of experience,
one that tied experience to exact science and led to a new stress on the formal conditions of exact knowledge. The second
episode is Carnap's rejection of epistemology in the 1930s in favour of a program of the logic of science. My focus in each
case will be the interplay between an epistemology focused on exact science as the locus of knowledge and a concomitant call
for logical methods in epistemology.
This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献
14.
In this article we strive to provide a detailed and principled analysis of the role of beliefs in goal processing—that is,
the cognitive transition that leads from a mere desire to a proper intention. The resulting model of belief-based goal processing has also relevant consequences for the analysis of intentions, and constitutes the necessary core of a constructive theory of intentions, i.e. a framework that not only analyzes what an intention is, but also explains how it becomes what it is. We discuss similarities
and differences between our approach and other standard accounts of intention, in particular Bratman’s planning theory. The
aim here is to question and refine the conceptual foundations of many theories of intentional action: as a consequence, although
our analysis is not formal in itself, it is ultimately meant to have deep consequences for formal models of intentional agency. 相似文献
15.
Roswitha Lehmann-Rommel 《Studies in Philosophy and Education》2000,19(1-2):187-218
This article proposes that the ‘renewal’ of Dewey might contribute to filling the gap between the pedagogical commitment to
contingency and plurality and the fact that the pedagogical tradition, until now, has neutralized contingency and denied its
systematic meaning for education. Therefore, the main traits of the ‘renewal of Dewey’ are shown in the work of some Dewey
scholars who, critically and creatively, reconstruct Dewey in the mirror of poststructural, communicational and constructive
theory developments. Following Dewey, these researches balance the objective evaluation of Dewey’s work by a deliberate and
overt pursuit of their own intentions and (pre-)selections by the scholars. Intersubjectivity and communication are key concepts
in this renewal of pragmatism rejecting the subject-centered philosophy of consciousness, the traditional western epistemology
and metaphysics. The turn to the philosophical priority of the unforeseeable also leads to an understanding of action as an
essential focus. In this context Dewey’s pragmatistic view of radical democracy is received as a non-foundational theory and
the concept of consensus is criticized. The scholars clarify that the boundaries of the subject are broadened by communicative
destabilization. At the end of the article it is asked what the renewal-dimensions mean for education located in the public
sphere. 相似文献
16.
Contemporary process metaphysics has achieved a number of important results, most significantly in accounting for emergence,
a problem on which substance metaphysics has foundered since Plato. It also faces trenchant problems of its own, among them
the related problems of boundaries and individuation. Historically, the quest for ontology may thus have been largely responsible
for the persistence of substance metaphysics. But as Plato was well aware, an ontology of substantial things raises serious,
perhaps insurmountable problems for any account of our epistemic access to such things. Physical things are subject to change,
and as such, they are poor objects of knowledge—if knowledge is to be more reliable than mere opinion. There is a reading
of Plato’s Theaetetus on which knowledge may be understood as a relation between an epistemic subject and a logos, where logoi
are intrinsically dialectical, and where dialectic is a kind of intersubjective activity. Insofar as this epistemology may
be attributed to Plato, the project of this paper is Platonic in spirit. It is also, in a sense, Kantian, in that it divorces
ontology from the search for things-in-themselves, redirecting our attention from things to objects: epistemic objects. Such
objects can be understood, as Maurice Merleau-Ponty proposed, as shared by multiple subjects by virtue of their participation
in an intersubjective world, constituted by what Shaun Gallagher calls “participatory sense-making.” On an epistemology constructed
in this way, the fact that both epistemic objects and their subject are mutable is no obstacle to knowledge. Far-from-equilibrium
systems are forever mutable; at thermodynamic equilibrium, there would be neither subject, nor object. Epistemic objects,
on this picture, are metastable loci of interactive potential. 相似文献
17.
Christopher W. Tindale 《Argumentation》2011,25(3):341-353
This paper discusses the ways in which a person’s character (ethos) and a hearer’s emotional response (pathos) are part of the complex judgments made about experts’ claims, along with an actual assessment of those claims (logos). The analysis is rooted in the work of Aristotle, but expands to consider work on emotion and cognition conducted by Thagard
and Gigerenzer. It also draws on some conclusions of the general epistemology of testimony (of which expert testimony is a
special subset), where it is argued that we learn not just from the transmission of another’s beliefs, but from the words
they speak. This shifts the onus in testimony away from the intentions of a speaker onto the judgments of an audience, capturing
better its social character and reflecting our experience of receiving testimony. I conclude, however, that accepting the
arguments of experts involves much more than simply believing what they say. 相似文献
18.
Fredriksen S 《Theoretical medicine and bioethics》2005,26(5):379-395
Supported by Ian Hacking’s concept of “intervention,” and Charles Taylor’s concept of “intentionality,” this article argues
that doubting is acting, and that doubting is therefore subject to the same demands of responsibility as any other action.
The argument is developed by using medical practice as a test-case. The central suggestion is that the demand of acting responsibly
limits doubt in medicine. The article focuses on two such limitations to doubt. Firstly, the article argues that it is irresponsible
to doubt that our actions can harm other people. Secondly, the article argues that it is irresponsible not to strive for coherence
between our utterances of doubt and our other actions. Incoherence here can cause “cultural impoverishment.” In a larger context
this article also argues that medicine can enrich our epistemology, because medical knowledge displays important traits of
knowledge that are downplayed in traditional epistemology derived from mathematics and physics. In particular, medicine makes
it possible to get the relation between ethics and epistemology into sharper focus. The endpoint in medical epistemology is
“responsible action,” and not certainty in and of itself. 相似文献
19.
Rebecca Roman Hanrahan 《Philosophia》2009,37(2):281-306
David Chalmers supports his contention that there is a possible world populated by our zombie twins by arguing for the assumption
that conceivability entails possibility. But, I argue, the modal epistemology he sets forth, ‘modal rationalism,’ ignores
the problem of incompleteness and relies on an idealized notion of conceivability. As a consequence, this epistemology can’t
justify our quotidian judgments of possibility, let alone those judgments that concern the mind/body connection. Working from
the analogy that the imagination is to the possible as perception is to the actual, I set forth a competing epistemology,
‘modal empiricism.’ This epistemology survives the incompleteness objection and allows some of our everyday modal judgments
to be justified. But this epistemology can’t justify the claim that Zombie World is possible, which leaves Chalmers’s property
dualism without the support it needs.
相似文献
Rebecca Roman HanrahanEmail: |
20.
Robert Lockie 《Philosophical Studies》2008,138(2):169-191
This paper identifies and criticizes certain fundamental commitments of virtue theories in epistemology. A basic question
for virtues approaches is whether they represent a ‘third force’––a different source of normativity to internalism and externalism.
Virtues approaches so-conceived are opposed. It is argued that virtues theories offer us nothing that can unify the internalist
and externalist sub-components of their preferred success-state. Claims that character can unify a virtues-based axiology
are overturned. Problems with the pluralism of virtues theories are identified––problems with pluralism and the nature of
the self; and problems with pluralism and the goals of epistemology. Moral objections to virtue theory are identified––specifically,
both the idea that there can be a radical axiological priority to character and the anti-enlightenment tendencies in virtues
approaches. Finally, some strengths to virtue theory are conceded, while the role of epistemic luck is identified as an important
topic for future work. 相似文献