The View from the Driver's Seat: What Good Is Salience?

A set of experiments gauged the value of salient and non‐salient visual information to drivers' decision making. Stimuli were images of traffic scenes viewed from a drivers' approximate perspective, and the subjects' task was to make stop‐or‐go driving judgments. Under some experimental conditions (Experiment 1), subjects viewed only the salient information from within each scene. Under other conditions (Experiments 2–3), they viewed only the non‐salient information. A signal detection measure of sensitivity served as the primary dependent measure. Data indicated that an above‐chance amount of the information needed for accurate judgments was contained within salient image regions and that some information was available only from the salient regions. Other critical information, however, was contained exclusively within non‐salient regions. Results suggest that an attentional bias toward visual salience would serve as an economical information‐seeking strategy for drivers but by itself would overlook many task‐critical cues. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Is It Real or Is It Fiction? Children's Bias Toward Reality

Children aged 3 to 8 years old and adults were tested on a reality–fantasy distinction task. They had to judge whether particular entities were real or fantastical, and response times were collected. We further manipulated whether the entity is a specific character or a generic fantastical entity. The results indicate that children, unlike adults, show a tendency to err by judging fantastical entities as real (response bias toward reality). All children were significantly slower when categorizing fantastical stimuli compared with real stimuli. We conclude that the process of classifying items into real versus fantastical categories develops at least until children are 7 to 8 years old.     

What Is ‘Real’ in Probabilism?

This paper defends two related claims about belief: first, the claim that, unlike numerical degrees of belief, comparative beliefs are primitive and psychologically real; and, second, the claim that the fundamental norm of Probabilism is not that numerical degrees of belief should satisfy the probability axioms, but rather that comparative beliefs should satisfy certain constraints.     

The American Dream Revisited: Is It What You Want or Why You Want It That Matters?

Previous research found that aspirations to financial success related inversely to self-actualization and that aspirations to community involvement related positively to self-actualization. We argue that diverse reasons can underlie both of these aspirations, leading to more complex predictions. In a sample of 246 participants, we assessed both self-determining and controlling reasons for each class of aspiration, along with endorsements of the aspirations themselves. Initial regression analyses replicated the earlier findings. Subsequent analyses found that endorsement of self-determining reasons for either class of aspiration related positively to self-actualization and that endorsement of controlling reasons for either class of aspiration related inversely to self-actualization. In the analysis involving community involvement, the aspiration itself no longer retained predictive power after the other variables were taken into account. In the analysis involving financial success, however, the aspiration retained an independent predictive role.     

Different Realities: What Is Reality and What Difference Does It Make?

Consciousness does not exist apart from psyche; it reflects it. Different realities are not interchangeable with other manifestations of psychic reality. “Borderland consciousness” is the term I have conceived for people who, in one way or another, have a living dynamic connection to and relationship with nature. Given this understanding, the oral traditional and Native American cultures manifest a reciprocity psyche, and are today the closest manifestation of the psychic reality in Genesis, pre-expulsion from Eden. Navajo language contains no words for religion, guilt, human, inanimate, psyche, or ego. The Western psyche manifests a dominion psyche; that is, a binary consciousness borne as a result of the expulsion in Genesis, and wedded to logic as an uncompromising characteristic of sanity and health. This kind of consciousness too often crushes the spirit dimension, which is transrational. An awareness of borderland consciousness is entering into the Western cultural collective. This is the telos of the Garden of Eden expulsion, and itself represents the dominion psyche and the reciprocity psyche in dialogue. This dialogue offers a critical counterbalance to the rogue behavior of the overspecialized Western ego of the dominion psyche. This article urges Jungians to develop new methods of connecting with borderland consciousness since the dominion psyche and its technology alone cannot save our species in the face of the threat of a global climate change disaster.     

How Really Real Is Real?

This paper takes issue with a number of family therapists who appear to hold that reality is entirely constructed out of our beliefs and that different views of reality can only be discriminated between on the basis of their usefulness for a particular purpose. Rather this paper argues for a co-constructivist position, that is, that the knower's beliefs and constructs are in an interpenetrating relationship with reality and that different views of reality can be discriminated between on the basis of their adequacy in describing that reality and that it is this adequacy that will determine their usefulness. These issues are not just of theoretical interest but have important implications for the practice of therapy.     

Experiencing Things Together: What Is The Problem?

Suppose someone hears a loud noise and at the same time sees a yellow flash. It seems hard to deny that the person can experience loudness and yellowness together. However, since loudness is experienced by the auditory sense whereas yellowness is experienced by the visual sense it also seems hard to explain how – given the difference between the senses – loudness and yellowness could possibly be experienced together. What is the solution to this problem? I start with some short remarks about what is not the problem (Section 2) and continue to argue that, given one sense of “experiencing two qualities together”, there is no philosophical problem at all (Section 3). An objection against this (Section 4) says that all this only concerns one kind of consciousness, “access consciousness”, while what is relevant here is a different kind of consciousness, namely “phenomenal consciousness”. I answer this objection by presenting another aspect of the unity of consciousness (Section 5). This case raises puzzling further questions (Section 6) but it can help to answer the objection presented in Section 4. I will end with some brief general speculation in a Kantian spirit (Section 7). The main upshot of this paper is a deflationary one: Where we thought to be confronted with a serious philosophical problem there really is none. What will emerge through the argument is a graded and functional view of the unity of consciousness.     

Love: What Is It, Why Does It Matter, and How Does It Operate?

ABSTRACT— Love is a perennial topic of fascination for scholars and laypersons alike. Whereas psychological science was slow to develop active interest in love, the past few decades have seen considerable growth in research on the subject, to the point where a uniquely psychological perspective on love can be identified. This article describes some of the more central and well-established findings from psychologically informed research on love and its influence in adult human relationships. We discuss research on how love is defined, the significance of love for human activity and well-being, and evidence about the mechanisms by which love is believed to operate. We conclude by describing several key questions and potentially important new directions for the next wave of psychological science.     

Blaming Drunk Victims: Is It Just World or Sex Role Violation?

Richardson and Campbell (1980, 1982), in studying attributions of blame and responsibility for violent interactions, found that intoxicated victims were blamed more and held more responsible for their victimization than their sober counterparts. Two alternative explanations were proposed to account for this finding: the just world hypothesis and the effects of sex role violation. The present study was designed to test these explanations. One hundred twenty-nine males and 93 females read scenarios that varied the sex of the victim and the level of intoxication of the victim and the aggressor. Participants rated the responsibility of the aggressor, victim, and situation for the action and evaluated the aggressor and victim. Although strong support for neither of the hypotheses was demonstrated, more support was found for the effect of sex role violation than for the just world hypothesis.     

The Planned Obsolescence of the Humanities: Is It Unethical?

The humanities have not enjoyed preeminence in academe since the Scientific Revolution marginalized the old trivium. But they long continued to play a subordinate educational role by helping constitute the distinguishing culture of the elite. Now even this subordinate role is becoming expendable as devotees of the profit motive seek to reduce culture to technological delivery of cultural products (Noble, Digital diploma mills: The automation of higher education, New York: Monthly Review Press, 2003). The result is a deliberate downsizing of the humanities as traditionally understood. Personal preferences aside, is this planned obsolescence morally defensible? Arguably not, if one appeals to traditional ethical norms. But what if its legitimacy is assessed instead according to the quite different norms of capitalism that figure so prominently in university administrators’ rationales as they embrace corporatization? The corporatization of American universities has had multiple effects, and some of these have not been entirely positive. In particular, it has had an adverse effect on the professional status and values of faculty. But how faculty respond to these changes varies according to their institutional situation.     

What Is It Like to Be an Alien?

This brief article is concerned with an aspect of Jonathan Glover's book, Alien Landscapes?. After reflecting a little on the book as a whole, the question that is taken up is, ‘Why might a book that seeks to help those without mental disorders understand what they are like “from the inside” be of interest to laymen and practitioners in the criminal law?’. One answer lies in part in the way that ‘what it is like from the inside’ might interact with judgements of criminal responsibility. Taking its cue from examples used by Glover the article considers, and puts pressure on, the ‘dual view’ he proposes: that when dealing with those with mental disorders we should treat them as responsible agents in the sense of not withholding from them Strawson's ‘reactive attitudes’, while nevertheless accepting that their personalities and behaviours are the results of large doses of ‘bad luck’.     

The Zygote Argument Is Still Invalid: So What?

Philosophia - In “The Zygote Argument is Invalid: Now What?”, Kristin Mickelson argues that Alfred Mele’s original Zygote Argument is invalid: its two premises tell us merely that...     

The Automatic and Controlled Information-Processing Dissociation: Is It Still Relevant?

The purpose of this paper is to examine the dual-process information-processing model of Schneider and Shiffrin (Schneider, W., and Shiffrin, R. M., Psychol. Rev. 84: 1–66, 1977; see also Shiffrin, R. M., and Schneider, W. Psychol. Rev. 84: 127–190, 1977) in light of the research data that have accumulated since the model was introduced more than 20 years ago. First, a brief introduction of the basic model of automatic and controlled information processing will be given. Second, some alternatives to the basic model that were developed over the last two decades will be reviewed. Third, data from neuropsychology and cognitive neuroscience that have a bearing upon this framework will be considered. Finally, some comments on the current usefulness of the dual-process framework for neuropsychological research will be offered.     

What is Good Reasoning?

What makes the difference between good and bad reasoning? In this paper we defend a novel account of good reasoning—both theoretical and practical—according to which it preserves fittingness or correctness: good reasoning is reasoning which is such as to take you from fitting attitudes to further fitting attitudes, other things equal. This account, we argue, is preferable to two others that feature in the recent literature. The first, which has been made prominent by John Broome, holds that the standards of good reasoning derive from rational requirements. The second holds that these standards derive from reasons. We argue that these accounts face serious difficulties in correctly distinguishing good from bad reasoning, and in explaining what's worthwhile about good reasoning. We then propose our alternative account and argue that it performs better on these counts. In the final section, we develop certain elements of the account in response to some possible objections.