The Incompleat Projectivist: How to be an Objectivist and an Attitudinist

What is at stake in the dispute between moral objectivism and subjectivism is how we are to give a rational grounding to ethical first principles or basic commitments. The search is for an explanation of what if anything makes any commitments good . Subjectivisms such as Blackburn's quasi -realism can give any set of commitments no 'rational grounding' in this sense except in considerations about internal consistency. But this is inadequate. Internal consistency is not sufficient for ethical rationality, since a set of obviously bad commitments could be internally consistent. Nor is it necessary, since a set of obviously good commitments could be internally inconsistent. I therefore argue for an objectivist view of the grounding of commitments, taking them to be attitudes which get their rationality, or lack of it, from their responsiveness to natural human needs and well-being. Since this view is objectivist, it avoids the problems which face subjectivism.     

Moral life as the obstacle to the development of ethical theory

It is often taken for granted that there is a crucial dichotomy between positive science, with its interest in what is the case, and morality, with its supposed interest in what ought to be the case. This assumption takes its departure from a belief in the notion of unconditional or categorical obligation or ‘the moral’ as ‘that whose nature it is to be required or demanded’. The notion of unconditional or categorical obligation, together with the assumption that there is a dichotomy between considerations of what is the case and what ought to be the case, however widespread and entrenched this notion and assumption might be, are logically confused. But to demonstrate this logical confusion is not the only task confronting ethical theory. Another, and often neglected task, is to draw attention to the ethical origins of this confusion in a particular way of life. Hegel's distinction between Moralität (Moral Life) and Sittlichkeit (Ethical Life) is of critical importance here. The obstacle to the development of ethical theory, then, is not some abstract ’logical confusion’, but is, rather, the way of life (Moral Life) of which this confusion is a natural expression.     

Ethical Instrumentalism

The present essay offers a sketch of a philosophy of value, what I shall here refer to as ‘ethical instrumentalism.’ My primary aim is to say just what this view involves and what its commitments are. In the course of doing so, I find it necessary to distinguish this view from another with which it shares a common basis and which, in reference to its most influential proponent, I refer to as ‘Humeanism.’ A second, more general, aim is to make plausible the idea that, given the common basis, ethical instrumentalism provides a more compelling picture of the philosophy of value than Humeanism does.     

Playing God and the Intrinsic Value of Life: Moral Problems for Synthetic Biology?

Most of the reports on synthetic biology include not only familiar topics like biosafety and biosecurity but also a chapter on ‘ethical concerns’; a variety of diffuse topics that are interrelated in some way or another. This article deals with these ‘ethical concerns’. In particular it addresses issues such as the intrinsic value of life and how to deal with ‘artificial life’, and the fear that synthetic biologists are tampering with nature or playing God. Its aim is to analyse what exactly is the nature of the concerns and what rationale may lie behind them. The analysis concludes that the above-mentioned worries do not give genuine cause for serious concern. In the best possible way they are interpreted as slippery slope arguments, yet arguments of this type need to be handled with care. It is argued that although we are urged to be especially vigilant we do not have sufficiently cogent reasons to assume that synthetic biology will cause such fundamental hazards as to warrant restricting or refraining from research in this field.     

What Makes for a Good Life? A Four-Nation Study

How do we assess the value of our lives? What makes the life we live a good or worthy one in our own eyes? What are its aims? The answers to these questions are implicit in the often unarticulated commitments by which people define their selves, purposes, and actions. These commitments structure the moral framework that guides our everyday qualitative distinctions and positions us within a unified narrative of continuity and change. The substantive conception of a good life, we argue, presupposes but is not reducible to a set of basic values. As an initial exploration of cultural variation, Canadian, Chinese, Indian, and Japanese university students were compared on what they held to be most important for assessing the worth of their lives. The results revealed considerable commonality of content with notable differences consistent with the cultural ethos of each group.     

The invisible made visible?

With the starting point in a story about a dancer with a profound disability, the topic for critical discussion in this article is prenatal diagnosis in the Nordic countries in light of concepts of what it means to be human and human fulfilment. More specifically, the focus is on human life with limited capabilities and how a widened view of such a life is crucial in the task of creating a society where all human beings can be perceived as desirable and of equal worth. In the first part of this article the practice of prenatal diagnosis is showed to be filled with narrow conceptions of what it means to be human and perspectives are brought to light that can be argued to have been made invisible in the introduction and implementation of prenatal diagnosis in the Nordic countries as well as in the ethical debate. In the second part, the vision and actualization of L'Arche is discussed as an example of how befriending people with disabilities can challenge mainstream ethical narratives and widen a narrow view of morality and what it means to be human.     

What's Aristotelian about neo‐Aristotelian Virtue Ethics?

It is commonly assumed that Aristotle's ethical theory shares deep structural similarities with neo‐Aristotelian virtue ethics. I argue that this assumption is a mistake, and that Aristotle's ethical theory is both importantly distinct from the theories his work has inspired, and independently compelling. I take neo‐Aristotelian virtue ethics to be characterized by two central commitments: (i) virtues of character are defined as traits that reliably promote an agent's own flourishing, and (ii) virtuous actions are defined as the sorts of actions a virtuous agent reliably performs under the relevant circumstances. I argue that neither of these commitments are features of Aristotle's own view, and I sketch an alternative explanation for the relationship between virtue and happiness in the Nicomachean Ethics. Although, on the interpretation I defend, we do not find in Aristotle a distinctive normative theory alongside deontology and consequentialism, what we do find is a way of thinking about how prudential and moral reasons can come to be aligned through a certain conception of practical agency.     

Institutional culture and individual behavior: Creating an ethical environment

Much of the work in professional ethics sees ethical problems as resulting from ethical ignorance, ethical failure or evil intent. While this approach gets at real and valid concerns, it does not capture the whole story because it does not take into account the underlying professional or institutional culture in which moral decision making is imbedded. My argument in this paper is that this culture plays a powerful and sometimes determinant role in establishing the nature of the ethical debate; i.e., it helps to define what are viable action options, what is the organization’s genuine mission, and what behaviors will be rewarded or criticized. Given these conclusions, I also argue that consulting ethicists need more than an understanding of ethics theory, concepts and principles; they also need a sufficiently rich understanding of organizational culture and a willingness and an ability to critique that culture. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the “Ethics and Social Responsibility in Engineering and Technology” meeting, New Orleans, 2003.     

MORAL INJURY*

The devastating effect on the self of moral injury, often a core component of trauma, occurring when one’s actions have profoundly violated one’s code of ethics, when one has been a victim of such violation, or when one has been a passive witness, has been extensively explored as it has occurred in veterans of the wars in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan. Two examples illustrate its prevalence in civilian life. The literature shows violation of expected empathy from and for others, inherent in our nature, is more devastating than violation of the ethical code of our culture or sub-culture, adherence to which becomes urgent as our need emerges to belong to the culture or subculture of which we are a part, values which often contradict our innate sense of “what is right.”     

Metametaphysics and Substance: Two Case Studies

This paper examines an often-ignored aspect of the evaluation of metaphysical analyses, namely, their ontological commitments. Such evaluations are part of metaphysical methodology, and reflection on this methodology is itself part of metametaphysics. I will develop a theory for assessing what these commitments are, and then I will apply it to an important historical and an important contemporary metaphysical analysis of the concept of an individual substance (i.e., an object, or thing). I claim that in evaluating metaphysical analyses, we should not only rule out counterexamples, but also compare them with respect to their ontological commitments, and we should hold that if they are comparable in other respects, then an analysis with fewer such commitments is preferable to one with more (There is, of course, a connection between counterexamples and ontological commitments. If the existence or possible existence of something one is committed to the existence or possible existence of is incompatible with an analysis, then one should reject that analysis as inadequate to the data. On the other hand, if one is uncertain about the existence or possible existence of something that is incompatible with an analysis, then while this does not refute the analysis for one, it raises doubts about it. The fewer such doubts are raised by an analysis, the better it is.).     

The Situated but Directionless Self: The Postmetaphysical World of Benhabib's Discourse Ethics

Drawing on the work of Jurgen Habermas, Seyla Benhabib has developed a system of communicative or discourse ethics. Her approach is said to respect differences and to count context as important but she also claims that it is postmetaphysical. I dispute this claim on two grounds. First, I argue that any system of ethics must be grounded by metaphysical commitments. Second, I show that in using elements of both Kantian and Aristotelian theory, Benhabib has imported metaphysical underpinnings into her theory and that these implicit understandings of what the moral enterprise is about, ought to be made explicit. Finally, a brief exploration of some contemporary ethical reflection and problem solving suggests that a shared metaphysical foundation is essential to ethical discourse.     

Caring about patients and caring about money: the American Psychiatric Association code of ethics meets managed care

Although the medical profession's codes of ethics have rightly been criticized for having claimed authority to decide questions of medical ethics for society, codes continue to provide crucial guidance to the individual clinician in matters of ethics. Examination of the code of the American Psychiatric Association (APA) shows that while it emphasizes the psychiatrist's fiduciary responsibility to individual patients, it ignores the crucial dimension of stewardship responsibilities to society. As a result, the ethical pronouncements of the APA have thus far been of little use to clinicians with regard to the major issues posed by managed care. In contrast, the code of the National Association of Social Workers considers the ethics of social institutions as well as those of individual practitioners, and advises clinicians on how to manage the inevitable and legitimate tensions between fiduciary and stewardship commitments. Until the APA extends the scope of its ethical vision, it will not be able to help clinicians struggle constructively with the question of how it is possible to "care about patients" and "care about money."     

The Animal that Aspires to be an Angel: The Challenge of Transhumanism

Abstract :  In what is called its 'upper case' form, transhumanism (TH) projects a fantastical posthuman existence akin to science fiction, but in its 'lower case' form it permeates our American culture. TH is expressed in the conviction that we need not settle for our birth-nature; we can alter that nature in ways that we deem desirable. As such, TH represents a fundamental challenge to our understanding of human nature, and in particular what God has created us to become. The encounter with TH is more than an ethical challenge; it is an encounter with the numinous.     

Ontology and ethics at the intersection of phenomenology and environmental philosophy

The idea inspiring the eco‐phenomenological movement is that phenomenology can help remedy our environmental crisis by uprooting and replacing environmentally‐destructive ethical and metaphysical presuppositions inherited from modern philosophy. Eco‐phenomenology's critiques of subject/object dualism and the fact/value divide are sketched and its positive alternatives examined. Two competing approaches are discerned within the eco‐phenomenological movement: Nietzscheans and Husserlians propose a naturalistic ethical realism in which good and bad are ultimately matters of fact, and values should be grounded in these proto‐ethical facts; Heideggerians and Levinasians articulate a transcendental ethical realism according to which we discover what really matters when we are appropriately open to the environment, but what we thereby discover is a transcendental source of meaning that cannot be reduced to facts, values, or entities of any kind. These two species of ethical realism generate different kinds of ethical perfectionism: naturalistic ethical realism yields an eco‐centric perfectionism which stresses the flourishing of life in general; transcendental ethical realism leads to a more ‘humanistic’ perfectionism which emphasizes the cultivation of distinctive traits of Dasein. Both approaches are examined, and the Heideggerian strand of the humanistic approach defended, since it approaches the best elements of the eco‐centric view while avoiding its problematic ontological assumptions and anti‐humanistic implications.     

What harm can it do?: A discussion of the potential for harm inherent in psychodynamic work

Abstract

This paper examines some of the ethical issues raised by the nature of psychodynamic work. It suggests that both the aims and the process of psychodynamic therapy raise ethical issues which we cannot responsibly ignore, but that if the work is to be effective it cannot be made wholly safe. That, however, does not absolve us from the requirement for taking care, and for thinking about what we are doing and what we are risking.     

Clarifying Ethical Intuitionism

In recent years there has been a resurgence of interest in Ethical Intuitionism, whose core claim is that normal ethical agents can and do have non‐inferentially justified first‐order ethical beliefs. Although this is the standard formulation, there are two senses in which it is importantly incomplete. Firstly, ethical intuitionism claims that there are non‐inferentially justified ethical beliefs, but there is a worrying lack of consensus in the ethical literature as to what non‐inferentially justified belief is. Secondly, it has been overlooked that there are plausibly different types of non‐inferential justification, and that accounting for the existence of a specific sort of non‐inferential justification is crucial for any adequate ethical intuitionist epistemology. In this context, it is the purpose of this paper to provide an account of non‐inferentially justified belief which is superior to extant accounts, and, to give a refined statement of the core claim of ethical intuitionism which focuses on the type of non‐inferential justification vital for a plausible intuitionist epistemology. Finally, it will be shown that the clarifications made in this paper make it far from obvious that two intuitionist accounts, which have received much recent attention, make good on intuitionism's core claim.     

Out of the consulting room and into the world: hermeneutic dialogue, phronesis, and psychoanalytic theory as practice

One of the relics of positivism has been an underappreciation of the moral and ethical dimensions of psychoanalytic theory and practice. In a positivist metapsychology, cure and therapeutic gain were often defined instrumentally, with relatively little consideration given to aspects of human experience (e.g., moral, cultural, spiritual) that did not fit within a positivist framework. Conceptual and paradigmatic shifts in psychoanalysis have occurred, in part, because of the inability of the classical model to provide a language that adequately captures deeply felt human values and beliefs. Aided by hermeneutic and postmodern influences, many contemporary psychoanalytic theories are beginning to focus greater attention on the notion that analytic therapy is empowered by a set of ethical convictions, beliefs, and commitments, which are tied to a certain understanding of the good life. Along these lines, the author argues that developing a fresh understanding of the moral and ethical dimensions of psychoanalysis requires elaborating a new ontology of human subjectivity and social life. The author offers a sketch of how this gargantuan task might be started by integrating psychoanalysis within a hermeneutic perspective on dialogue, by suggesting that it would be helpful to view psychoanalysis as promoting Aristotelian practical wisdom or phronesis, and by rethinking psychoanalytic theory and interpretation as a form of practice.     

Morality,choice and inwardness

The present paper tries to analyse the way in which Judge William, in Sören Kierkegaard's work Either/Or, distinguishes between the aesthetic and the ethical way of life. Basically his distinctions seem to be that the ethicist is a seriously committed person (has inwardness) whereas the aestheticist is indifferent, and that the former accepts universal rules whereas the latter makes an exception for himself. — In order to come from the aesthetic to the ethical stage one must, according to Judge William, make a choice of oneself. We try to show that such a choice is only one among several factors implicit in his reasoning and that he does not at all consider it as a ‘leap’, but as based upon reasons, though his reasons are mostly of an aesthetic nature. Far from seeing the Judge as a champion of choice, we maintain that the book primarily contains a plea for a certain personality ideal. This probably has to do with the fact that he does not seem to be in doubt as to what one ought to do, only as to how to become a person who does what he ought to do. We shall also argue that a choice of oneself, as a matter of fact, is neither necessary nor sufficient in order to bring a person within the ethical stage, as described by the Judge. — A person who lives ethically does not, according to Judge William, necessarily act rightly, but his actions are either right or wrong, as opposed to the actions of the aestheticist which fall outside the domain of the ethical. In order to obtain a tenable distinction within his philosophy between ‘being within the ethical stage’ and ‘acting ethically rightly’ the first concept should be defined in terms of inwardness (serious commitment), the latter as inward conformity with certain universal rules. — This idea of inwardness, probably the most original and fruitful contribution of ‘Equilibrium’, seems to be based, however, like most of his ethical reasoning, on certain controversial assumptions about human nature.