The Feeling Theory of Emotion and the Object‐Directed Emotions

Abstract: The ‘feeling theory of emotion’ holds that emotions are to be identified with feelings. An objection commonly made to that theory of emotion has it that emotions cannot be feelings only, as emotions have intentional objects. Jack does not just feel fear, but he feels fear‐of‐something. To explain this property of emotion we will have to ascribe to emotion a representational structure, and feelings do not have the sought after representational structure. In this paper I seek to defend the feeling theory of emotion against the challenge from the object‐directed emotions.     

How is Recalcitrant Emotion Possible?

A recalcitrant emotion is an emotion that we experience despite a judgment that seems to conflict with it. Having been bitten by a dog in her childhood, Jane cannot shake her fear of dogs, including Fido, the cute little puppy that she knows to be in no way dangerous. There is something puzzling about recalcitrant emotions, which appear to defy the putatively robust connection between emotions and judgments. If Jane really believes that Fido cannot harm her, what is she afraid of? This article seeks to show how recalcitrant emotion is possible. I argue that reductive theories that identify emotions with judgments, desires, or some combination thereof, cannot explain the possibility of emotional irrationality without contradiction. I then show that the appeal to sui generis attitudes also fails to solve the puzzle of recalcitrant emotions, and diagnose this failure as stemming from a misleading analogy between emotions and perceptions, and in particular, between recalcitrant emotions and perceptual illusions. The solution can be found in a different analogy: between emotions and actions; more specifically, between recalcitrant emotions and weakness of the will, akrasia. Like akratic actions, recalcitrant emotions entail responding to reasons, but to inferior reasons. Irrational but non-contradictory emotions are possible just as weakness of will is possible.     

Emotional clich��s and authentic passions: A phenomenological revision of a cognitive theory of emotion

This paper argues for an understanding of emotion based upon Merleau-Ponty's conceptions of embodiment and passivity. Through a critical assessment of cognitive theories of emotion, and in particular Solomon's theory, it argues (1) that there is a sense in which emotions may be judgments, so long as we understand such judgments as bodily enactments of meaning, but (2) that even understood in this way, the notion of judgment (or construal) can only account for a subset of emotions which I call "emotional clichés," and not for authentic passions. In contrast with Solomon's account which conceives the subject as constituting, this account of emotion requires us to understand subjectivity as moved by meanings in the world, and as sometimes, in an authentic passion, dispossessed by those meanings.     

The Role of Bodily Perception in Emotion: In Defense of an Impure Somatic Theory

In this paper, we develop an impure somatic theory of emotion, according to which emotions are constituted by the integration of bodily perceptions with representations of external objects, events, or states of affairs. We put forward our theory by contrasting it with Prinz's (2004) pure somatic theory, according to which emotions are entirely constituted by bodily perceptions. After illustrating Prinz's theory and discussing the evidence in its favor, we show that it is beset by serious problems—i.e., it gets the neural correlates of emotion wrong, it isn't able to distinguish emotions from bodily perceptions that aren't emotions, it cannot account for emotions being directed towards particular objects, and it mischaracterizes emotion phenomenology. We argue that our theory accounts for the empirical evidence considered by Prinz and solves the problems faced by his theory. In particular, we maintain that our theory gives a unified and principled account of the relation between emotions and bodily perceptions, the intentionality of emotions, and emotion phenomenology.     

Conjunction in the Language of Emotions

Abstract

Oatley and Johnson-Laird (1987) have proposed a cognitive theory of emotion. According to this theory, there are five basic emotions. A major prediction of the theory is that it should permit satisfactory definitions for all the emotion words in a language, and this was essayed for the English language by Johnson-Laird and Oatley (1989). The theory proposes that only one emotional state can be operative at a time, and therefore words referring to mixed emotions were defined by Johnson-Laird and Oatley as disjunctions of basic emotions. Two experiments are reported which com pared these disjunctive definitions with conjunctive definitions (i.e. definitions inconsistent with the theory). For a number of words, conjunctive definitions tended to be preferred. This tendency was increased when the disjunctions and conjunctions were made more explicit. This finding sug gests that Oatley and Johnson-Laird's theory should be modified so as to embrace the conjunction of emotion. That is, it should allow that two or more emotions can be exnerienced in parallel.     

Situation selection is a particularly effective emotion regulation strategy for people who need help regulating their emotions

Situation selection involves choosing situations based on their likely emotional impact and may be less cognitively taxing or challenging to implement compared to other strategies for regulating emotion, which require people to regulate their emotions “in the moment”; we thus predicted that individuals who chronically experience intense emotions or who are not particularly competent at employing other emotion regulation strategies would be especially likely to benefit from situation selection. Consistent with this idea, we found that the use of situation selection interacted with individual differences in emotional reactivity and competence at emotion regulation to predict emotional outcomes in both a correlational (Study 1; N?=?301) and an experimental field study (Study 2; N?=?125). Taken together, the findings suggest that situation selection is an effective strategy for regulating emotions, especially for individuals who otherwise struggle to do so.     

背景表情对目标表情知觉的影响：中美跨文化比较

随机选取中美大学生各30名,探讨在中西方文化背景下,背景表情对个体知觉目标表情是否会产生影响。结果:（1）当有背景表情时,中国被试对目标表情强度评定的时间比无背景表情时的评定时间长;且背景表情与目标表情一致时,中国被试判断目标表情的强度最强;不一致时,则最弱;而美国被试对目标表情强度的评分及反应时不受背景表情的影响。（2）当背景表情发生变化时,中国被试对于图片的再认正确率显著高于美国被试。结论：美国被试会将注意力放在目标表情上,不易受背景表情的影响,而中国被试对目标表情的判断会受到背景表情的影响。     

学前儿童朴素情绪理论的发展

对情绪的心理层面的理解是幼儿心理理论发展中出现得相对较迟的能力, 他们如何通过愿望和信念等不同的心理状态对人们的情绪做出判断？随着年龄的增长, 他们采用不同策略推测情绪的能力又发生了什么变化？本研究结合主人公愿望是否得到满足的状态, 通过利用图片故事个别测查的方法探查了90名3~5岁学前儿童在“内容错误信念”任务中对他人情绪的推测。结果显示, 年幼儿童、尤其是3岁幼儿的高兴情绪理解受其对情境是否满足愿望的认知的影响, 呈现出显著的“积极情绪偏差效应”; 学前儿童对情绪的认知表现出从不能采用信念—愿望策略到错误地采用信念—愿望策略、到正确采用信念—愿望策略的发展模式, 且其基于信念的情绪理解在一定程度上呈现出落后于其错误信念理解的“滞后效应”。结果还显示幼儿的惊奇情绪判断不仅由信念成分决定, 也受愿望理解的影响。这些结果突显出心理状态在儿童情绪理解中的重要作用, 揭示出学前儿童相对完整的朴素情绪理论发展模式。     

More Than Happy to Help? Customer‐Focused Emotion Management Strategies

This paper investigates the impact of customer service representative (CSR) customer‐focused emotion management strategies on expressed customer emotions, beyond the influences of emotional contagion. We propose that problem‐focused strategies (situation modification and cognitive change) are likely to reduce the intensity of negative customer emotions and increase the intensity of positive customer emotions, whereas emotion‐focused strategies (attentional deployment and modulating the emotional response) will have the opposite impact. Further, we propose that customer negative emotions will affect the choice of strategies CSRs employ. Based on evaluator ratings of recorded customer service calls (N= 228), our findings confirmed the positive effects of problem‐focused strategies and the negative effects of emotion‐focused strategies on customer‐expressed emotions. In addition, we found that initial customer emotions affected the strategy used by the CSR, whereby negative emotions expressed by the customer reduced the use of the most effective strategy and increased the use of the least effective strategy.     

Reason and emotion,not reason or emotion in moral judgment

One of the central questions in both metaethics and empirical moral psychology is whether moral judgments are the products of reason or emotions. This way of putting the question assumes that reason and emotion are two fully independent cognitive faculties, whose causal contributions to moral judgment can be cleanly separated. However, there is a significant body of evidence in the cognitive sciences that seriously undercuts this conception of reason and emotion, and supports the view that moral judgments are caused by a complex interplay of psychological mechanisms that are both cognitive and affective, but in a way that is not simply a function of the independent causal contributions of reason and emotion. The paper concludes by considering the implications of this view for metaethics.     

Cognition and emotion from the ret viewpoint

This article discusses the considerable overlap between my own (R. S. Lazarus) and Albert Ellis' cognitive view of emotions. In discussing Ellis' approach, the hallmarks of a cognitive theory of emotion are identified. My own theory concerning the role of cognitive appraisal and coping in emotions is discussed as well as the crucial metatheoretical concepts of transaction and process. It is stretching things to say that Albert Ellis has presented a fully elaborated theory of emotion. Rather, he has achieved the beginnings of a good theory especially as applied to the pathology of emotional life and how to correct it. Most lacking is how the emotion process works from encounter to encounter, moment to moment. Irrational beliefs as structural, static variables do not adequately account for emotional flux nor adequately explain the content and intensities of the full range of positive and negative emotions. The present article is a condensed and updated version of a previously published chapter: Lazarus, R. S. Cognition and emotion from the RET viewpoint. In M.E. Bernard & R. DiGiuseppe (Eds.),Inside rational-emotive therapy (pp. 47–68). San Diego, CA: Academic Press.     

Longitudinal associations between children's understanding of emotions and theory of mind

Theory of mind competence and knowledge of emotions were studied longitudinally in a sample of preschoolers aged 3 (n=263) and 4 (n=244) years. Children were assessed using standard measures of theory of mind and emotion knowledge. Three competing hypotheses were tested regarding the developmental associations between children's theory of mind abilities and their knowledge of emotions. First, that an understanding of emotion develops early and informs children's understanding of others’ thinking. Alternatively, having a basic theory of mind may help children learn about emotions. Third, that the two domains are separate aspects of children's social cognitive skills such that each area develops independently. Results of hierarchical regressions supported the first hypothesis that early emotion understanding predicts later theory-of-mind performance, and not the reverse.     

情绪作为道德判断的“催化剂”：道德判断中的评价倾向与特异性效应

在不同领域的道德判断中,情绪可能起着“催化剂”的作用。一种特定情绪对应一种核心评价;一种情绪只影响某一道德领域的判断,不同情绪的影响是特异性的;进化心理学和具身认知对道德判断中存在的评价倾向和特异性效应进行了解释。未来研究需要探索评价倾向与特异性效应的内在心理机制。以及进一步探讨文化等第三变量对不同情绪与特定领域道德判断的影响。     

The past thirty years of emotion research: appraisal and beyond

ABSTRACT

For this Special Issue, I highlight the past and present importance of appraisal theory as well as the challenges to its status as a total theory of emotions from the other functions of emotions: associative learning, self-regulation and social communication. This theoretical view applies both to emotion research in general and the specific fields of my interest in the emotions of moral judgment and intergroup processes. Methodologically, developments in analyses of large and more naturally occurring data sets will give an opportunity to square psychology’s structural models of discrete emotions with the more complicated reality that exists. Both for the field and for individual researchers picking up the study of emotions, my advice is to pay special attention to measures, their assumptions and their context.     

情绪对延迟折扣的影响：现状、机制与展望

延迟折扣研究领域日益重视情绪的影响作用。本文基于三类研究取向对情绪与延迟折扣关系研究进行了回顾。情绪效价和唤醒度均影响延迟折扣,但是研究结果并不一致;具体情绪类型不同,其对延迟折扣影响也存在差异。除此之外,本文就情绪信息理论、情绪动机维度理论和评估倾向理论如何解释延迟折扣进行了详细阐述。未来的研究需要进一步深入考察情绪影响延迟折扣的认知神经机制,从而为延迟折扣的负性情绪效应的干预提供可靠的科学依据。     

Performance and learning goals for emotion regulation

Goal orientation theory is concerned with performance and learning goals in academic, athletic, and other ability areas. Here we examine performance and learning goals for emotion regulation. We define performance goals for emotion regulation as seeking to prove one’s ability to manage emotions; learning goals for emotion regulation are defined as seeking to improve one’s ability to manage emotions. In two studies, we tested the hypothesis that performance goals for emotion regulation would be associated with greater use of defensive emotion regulation strategies and depressive symptoms. Results from both studies showed that individuals with greater performance goals for emotion regulation reported higher levels of rumination and thought suppression and greater depressive symptoms, while individuals with greater learning goals reported greater use of cognitive reappraisal. The findings suggest that goals for emotion regulation may help explain individual differences in use of defensive versus constructive emotion regulation strategies.     

Towards a New Feeling Theory of Emotion

According to the old feeling theory of emotion, an emotion is just a feeling: a conscious experience with a characteristic phenomenal character. This theory is widely dismissed in contemporary discussions of emotion as hopelessly naïve. In particular, it is thought to suffer from two fatal drawbacks: its inability to account for the cognitive dimension of emotion (which is thought to go beyond the phenomenal dimension), and its inability to accommodate unconscious emotions (which, of course, lack any phenomenal character). In this paper, I argue that the old feeling theory is in reality only a pair of modifications removed from a highly plausible account of the nature of emotion that retains the essential connection between emotion and feeling. These modifications are, moreover, motivated by recent developments in work on phenomenal consciousness. The first development is the rising recognition of a phenomenal character proper to cognition—so‐called cognitive phenomenology. The second is the gathering momentum behind various ‘connection principles’ that specify some connection that a given state must bear to phenomenally conscious states in order to qualify as mental. These developments make it possible to formulate a new feeling theory of emotion, which would overcome the two fatal drawbacks of the old feeling theory. According to the new feeling theory, an emotion is a mental state that bears the right connection to conscious experiences with the right phenomenal character (involving, among other elements, a cognitive phenomenology).     

EMOTION IN SIKH MUSICOLOGY

Recent studies in Sikh musicology have focused on its history and theory. However, there is an absence of theoretical research which focuses on the role of emotions in Sikh music. In this paper, we contribute to this research by investigating key issues relating to emotions in Sikh musicology. We explore theories which propose that a rāga will evoke a particular emotion/mood in the listener and that there are a number of factors which influence this process. In particular, we focus on two parallel theories which we term the ‘one rāga one emotion’ and the ‘one rāga multiple emotions’ theories. We consider these theories within the context of the shabads (We are adding an ‘s’ for Punjabi plural words such as shabads and rāgas although the plural in Punjabi in this case would be Shabad or rāga. By Anglicising the words in this way we hope that it makes the paper easier to read), in particular rāgas of the Guru Granth Sahib which convey a number of emotions/moods. In this paper, we explore the problem of how to approach the interpretation of rāgas within the context of the emotions/moods presented in the shabads of those rāgas whilst adhering to the musical structure of the rāga. We use rāga Sirī to exemplify and focus the discussion. We challenge the ‘one rāga one emotion’ theory and propose that a rāga can be performed to evoke a number of emotions/moods but that certain considerations have to be taken into account by the performer during the rendition of the rāga.     

Less is more? Effects of exhaustive vs. minimal emotion labelling on emotion regulation strategy planning

Previous research suggests that labelling emotions, or describing affective states using emotion words, facilitates emotion regulation. But how much labelling promotes emotion regulation? And which emotion regulation strategies does emotion labelling promote? Drawing on cognitive theories of emotion, we predicted that labelling emotions using fewer words would be less confusing and would facilitate forms of emotion regulation requiring more cognitively demanding processing of context. Participants (N?=?82) mentally immersed themselves in an emotional vignette, were randomly assigned to an exhaustive or minimal emotion labelling manipulation, and then completed an emotion regulation strategy planning task. Minimal (vs. exhaustive) emotion labelling promoted higher subjective emotional clarity. Furthermore, in terms of specific emotion regulation strategies, minimal emotion labelling prompted more plans for problem solving and marginally more plans for reappraisal, but did not affect plans for behavioural activation or social support seeking. We discuss implications for the cognitive mechanisms supporting the generation of emotion regulation strategies.     

基本情绪的神经基础：来自fMRI与机器视觉技术研究的证据

基本情绪理论(basic emotion theory)是情绪科学领域最具代表性的理论, 该理论认为人类情绪是由有限的几种基本情绪组成的, 如恐惧、愤怒、喜悦、悲伤等。基本情绪是为了完成基本生命任务(fundamental life task)进化而来的, 每一种基本情绪都有独特的神经结构和生理基础。尽管基本情绪理论被广泛接受, 但是对于基本情绪的种类却莫衷一是。近几十年来, 许多fMRI研究试图确定各种基本情绪的独特神经结构基础, 而且取得了许多重要发现, 比如厌恶和脑岛有关, 悲伤和前扣带回有关, 杏仁核是与恐惧有关的重要边缘结构等。但是, 最近有人进行了元分析研究, 发现许多基本情绪存在混淆的大脑区域, 因此对基本情绪的特定脑区理论提出质疑, 甚至否定基本情绪理论。通过对基本情绪及其神经基础的探讨, 以及对基本情绪理论的最新功能性磁共振成像研究进行梳理分析, 提出有关基本情绪理论的争论来源于基本情绪种类的确定, 因为许多所谓的不同基本情绪实际上是同一种基本情绪, 提出人类可能只有3种基本情绪。未来研究可以利用机器视觉技术进一步推动基本情绪脑影像研究。