Should reason be fragmented?

Cognitive relativists‐pragmatists (Stich, Churchland) claim that human cognitive strategies, lacking a common goal, are in addition divergent to the point of incommensurability. They appeal to the study of reasoning heuristics for evidence on cognitive diversity and incorrigibility. It is here argued that no such evidence is offered by the research, which, on the contrary (1) presents heuristics as uniform across great variations; (2) offers advice for correcting and improving human reasoning; and (3) very often postulates a uniformity of core logical strategies, built into reasoning competence. Cognitive research thus supports a moderate rationalism rather than relativism‐pragmatism.     

When Should we Regret?

In this paper, I develop and defend the ‘Justified Decision Perspective’ (JDP) in answer to the question of when we should regret the things we have done. I claim that one should not regret a past decision one has made so long as it was justified in relation to the kind of person one was at the time of acting. On this time-indexing account, judging a decision to be justified – at least for the purposes of assessing one’s regrets – is a matter of identifying the practical reasons that were epistemically available to the agent when she was deliberating about what to do. Accordingly, when responding to her regrets, an agent should not invoke (a) reasons that existed but were epistemically unavailable to her when she was deliberating; or (b) reasons that only came into existence after she acted. The JDP has important implications for prospective regret. In particular, it implies we should worry less about experiencing regret in the future than many of us do. Thus, my overall aim is to show that we often have reason to reject our regrets, which means that regret should play a less prominent and painful role in our lives than it does currently.     

Should knowledge entail belief?

The appropriateness of S5 as a logic of knowledge has been attacked at some length in the philosophical literature. Here one particular attack based on the interplay between knowledge and belief is considered: Suppose that knowledge satisfies S5, belief satisfies KD45, and both the entailment property (knowledge implies belief) and positive certainty (if the agent believes something, she believes she knows it) hold. Then it can be shown that belief reduces to knowledge: it is impossible to have false beliefs. While the entialment property has typically been viewed as perhaps the least controversial of these assumptions, an argument is presented that it can plausibly be viewed as the culprit. More precisely, it is shown that this attack fails if we weaken the entailment property so that it applies only to objective (nonmodal) formulas, rather than to arbitrary formulas. Since the standard arguments in favor of the entailment property are typically given only for objective formulas, this observation suggests that care must be taken in applying intuitions that seem reasonable in the case of objective formulas to arbitrary formulas.Research sponsored in part by the Air Force office of Scientific Research (AFSC), under Contract F49620-91-C-0080. The United States Government is authorized to reproduce and distribute reprints for governmental purposes.     

Should the probabilities count?

When facing a choice between saving one person and saving many, some people have argued that fairness requires us to decide without aggregating numbers; rather we should decide by coin toss or some form of lottery, or alternatively we should straightforwardly save the greater number but justify this in a non-aggregating contractualist way. This paper expands the debate beyond well-known number cases to previously under-considered probability cases, in which not (only) the numbers of people, but (also) the probabilities of success for saving people vary. It is shown that, in these latter cases, both the coin toss and the lottery lead to what is called an awkward conclusion, which makes probabilities count in a problematic way. Attempts to avoid this conclusion are shown to lead into difficulties as well. Finally, it is shown that while the greater number method cannot be justified on contractualist grounds for probability cases, it may be replaced by another decision method which is so justified. This decision method is extensionally equivalent to maximising expected value and seems to be the least problematic way of dealing with probability cases in a non-aggregating manner.     

What Should we Hope?

Philosophia - In this paper I propose an interpretation of Kant’s notion of the highest good which bears political, ethical, and religious layers simultaneously. I argue that a proper...     

Should Student-Athletes be Paid?

Abstract:

The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) currently prohibits student-athletes from receiving compensation from many non-school-affiliated sources, including sports agents, advertising agencies, and merchandizers. Moreover, student-athletes are prohibited from receiving compensation for media appearances, endorsing products, and autographs. Athletes and schools that violate these rules are subject to various punishments, such as fines, suspensions, and forfeiture of games. This paper challenges this NCAA policy. Accordingly, although colleges and universities often compensate student-athletes with free tuition, room, board, and other expenses, I argue that some prohibitions against athletes receiving compensation from non-school-affiliated sources are: (1) arbitrary and unfair to student-athletes; (2) such policies moreover are non-beneficial to student-athletes since we lack good reason to think the reception or pursuit of outside compensations will harm the student-athlete; (3) no foreseeable detrimental effects to higher education arise if student-athletes are allowed to pursue or receive various compensations; and (4) the integrity of college sports will not be compromised if certain forms of compensation are permitted. I take (1)–(4) as good reasons for doing away with the NCAA’s current policies. Ultimately, while I do not think colleges or universities should compensate student-athletes beyond what they already provide (e.g. free tuition, room, and board), I think student-athletes should be allowed to pursue an assortment of economic-related activities currently prohibited by the NCAA.     

Should Philosophers become Playwrights?

This note is in part a response to Alastair Hannay's review discussion, ‘A Kind of Philosopher: Comments in Connection with Some Recent Books on Kierkegaard’ (Inquiry, Vol. 18 [1975], No. 3). In his review, Hannay states that Kierkegaard and philosophy appear to be on the road to a reconciliation, and asks What is behind this get‐together if it is one?’. I suggest that in some remarks touching on Kierkegaard's theory of Truth, Hannay has touched on the ground for that ‘get‐together’, a Pyrrhonian scepticism.     

Should We Teach Patriotism?

This article examines a particular debate between Eamonn Callan and William Galston concerning the need for a civic education which counters the divisive pull of pluralism by uniting the citizenry in patriotic allegiance to a single national identity.The article offers a preliminary understanding of nationalism and patriotism before setting out the terms of the debate. It then critically evaluates the central idea of Callan that one might be under an obligation morally to improve one's own patriotic inheritance, pointing to the ineliminable tension between the valuation of one's own patria by its own terms and a detached critical reason.It concludes by suggesting that we are, in advance of our education, members of a particular patria and that any education must be particularistic. Finally, the danger is noted of presuming that, in each case, there is a single, determinate national tradition.     

Should Communitarians be Nationalists?

ABSTRACT It is widely supposed by both its proponents and critics that communitarianism is committed to the defence of lies of nationhood: the nation forms a surviving communal attachment in a world in which the individual is otherwise denuded of ties of community. I argue in this paper that this assumption is mistaken. It depends on a romantic image of the nation which was constructed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. That image hides the recent historical origins of the nation and its foundation in the suppression of older allegiances or their later privatisation; it continues to disguise the illusory nature of the national community. The nation is not a surviving pre-modern community to which individuals are attached as a bulwark against the impersonality of public life in modern society. Rather the nation is one of the main vehicles for the construction of the modern unencumbered self. Communitarians need not be committed to the defence of the specifically modem forms of public irrationality and immorality that nationalism embodies.     

Who Should Do Faculty Development and What Should It Be?

In the face of widespread public dissatisfaction with higher education, faculty development programs—especially semester- and year-long leaves—have become more important than ever before as a means of helping faculty broaden their scholarship and enhance their teaching. Department chairs should play an important hand in decisions on faculty development assignments. Given that they also have other important responsibilities, however, ways must be found to entice department chairs to become as involved in faculty development as they are in promotion and tenure, curriculum review, and decisions on merit salary increments. The particular value of faculty development programs for women and members of minority groups must also be recognized. These two groups of faculty may experience special problems in adjusting to faculty life, which make faculty development opportunities even more valuable to them than to others.     

Should we ration health care?

Journal of Medical Humanities - The paper begins by drawing a distinction between “allocation” — the distribution of resources between different categories, and...     

Should We Write Off Graphology?

The scientific study of graphology (handwriting analysis) has had a long history. Many practitioners believe that graphology is a valuable selection aid and use this technique in a selection context, and in some European countries it is quite well thought of. While a few articles have proposed that graphology is a valid and useful selection technique, the overwhelming results of well-controlled empirical studies have been that the technique has not demonstrated acceptable validity. A review of relevant literature regarding both theory and research indicates that, while the procedure may have an intuitive appeal, graphology should not be used in a selection context.     

Should technological imperatives be obeyed?

This paper argues that both technological determinism (the development of technology is uniquely determined by internal laws) and technological voluntarism (technological change can be externally directed and regulated by the wants and free choice of human beings) are one‐sided and partly mistaken. The determinists are right in the sense that technology has a power to influence our values and behaviour, and thereby appear to direct ‘technological imperatives’ to us. However, such commands are always conditional on some value premises; the voluntarists are thus right in pointing out that we need not obey such imperatives. The principle ‘Can implies Ought’ (all technological possibilities should be realized) is therefore invalid.     

Should Marxists care about alienation?

Conclusion We have found that a sparse version of the claim that alienated labor is a bad thing can inform a political morality without turning that morality into one which makes more comment on people's ends than the liberal can accept. We have also seen that a modification of the ideas of alienation from our species being can play a limited role in a liberal political morality, but that the rational kernel of the critique from species alienation is already a familiar part of the liberal tradition. However, the substantive view of the good life - as one which essentially involves engagement in communal ties and satisfying labor - cannot play the role which certainly many Marxists would like it to play in their critique of capitalism, at least if their critique is to be recognizably liberal.Why should it matter so much that Marxists be able to accommodate central liberal insights? It is not because a political morality has to be liberal in order to be successful in the real world: history and the contemporary world are full of examples of political views which command wide assent despite (or because of) their illiberality. But the foreseeable stages of a socialist society will be plagued by the circumstances of justice as they have been classically conceived. A socialism which is sufficiently better than capitalism to be worth the significant risk and sacrifice it is likely to require must be liberal in the sense that it can be regarded as defensible to each person who is actually subject to it. This does not require that it accommodate the greed of the greedy or the injustice of the unjust. But it does require that it not presume the unworthiness of the moral commitments of its reasonable citizens.⁴⁷