African philosophy and global epistemic injustice

In this paper, I consider how the discourse on global epistemic justice might be approached differently if some contributions from the African philosophical place are taken seriously. To be specific, I argue that the debate on global justice broadly has not been global. I cite as an example, the exclusion or marginalisation of African philosophy, what it has contributed and what it may yet contribute to the global epistemic edifice. I point out that this exclusion is a case of epistemic injustice. I observe that the absence of a philosophical technique that prevails on philosophers to engage with others from other traditions might be responsible for this epistemic lopsidedness and marginalisation. I go beyond the re-statement of this problem of marginalisation of African philosophy to point out relevant doctrines from the African place. I show how they are united under the methodological and ideological disposition of conversationalism. I argue that this ideology might be a better model for realising the goal of global epistemic justice which is the overcoming of all forms of exclusions and lopsidedness in global epistemic discourses through fair allocation of intellectual spaces.     

Reply to Noordhof on Mental Causation

In my paper 'The Properties of Mental Causation', PQ , 47 (1997), pp. 178–94. I proposed (as others have) a trope-based solution to a problem of mental causation. Noordhof in PQ , 48 (1998), pp. 221–6, has objected that the solution raises new problems just as intractable as the original. Some of his criticisms are based on misunderstandings of the role of tropes in the theory and of my general aim. He does, however, usefully develop an objection I addressed briefly in my paper: even if the trope solution explains how mental properties are causally relevant, does it explain how they are relevant qua mental? That is, does the problem appear again at the level of tropes? This kind of objection can be raised against any proposed solution to the problem, but it depends on the questionable assumption that properties themselves have properties. Noordhof also insists that the trope solution must provide a criterion of trope identity, but this is, I argue, a red herring in this context.     

Two Types of Features: An Aristotelian Approach

A certain theory of substance, one that grows out of Aristotelian philosophy but which has adherents today as well, draws a distinction between the features a substance has by instantiating a universal and the features it has by possessing a trope. An adherent of this theory might say that a certain cat is red because it possesses a redness‐trope, but that it is a cat because it instantiates the universal CAT. A problem that must be faced by philosophers who hold this sort of view is the following: Which features are which? In other words, which features are the ones had in virtue of trope‐possession, and which are the ones had in virtue of instantiation? In this paper I discuss this problem, consider and reject a competing view, and propose my own Aristotelian solution. I also raise and answer an objection.     

Inaugural lecture: Philosophy enough

Abstract

This inaugural lecture was delivered at the Howard College Campus of UKZN on 2 April 2008. In it I do three things. First I sketch some arguments in favour of a naturalist conception of philosophy. The conclusions that I’m after are that philosophy is not an autonomous enterprise, so that it had better be continuous with scientific enquiry if it is to get anywhere. A supplementary claim I defend briefly is that the natural and social sciences should be viewed as more integrated than they usually are. Second, I offer some reasons for rejecting all identifiable forms of social constructivism about knowledge. Finally, I say something about what ‘African Scholarship’ might mean, given the preceding considerations. There I briefly defend the claim that there is no epistemically interesting sense in which there is such a thing as African knowledge.     

Interpreting Ecofeminist Environmentalism in African Communitarian Philosophy and Ubuntu: An Alternative to Anthropocentrism

Abstract

The question of what an African ecofeminist environmental ethical view ought to look like remains unanswered in much of philosophical writing on African environmental ethics. I consider what an African ecofeminist environmental ethics ought to look like if values salient in African communitarian philosophy and ubuntu are seriously considered. After considering how African communitarian philosophy and ubuntu foster communitarian living, relational living, harmonious living, interrelatedness and interdependence between human beings and various aspects of nature, I reveal how African communitarian philosophy and ubuntu could be interpreted from an ecofeminist environmental perspective. I suggest that this underexplored ecofeminist environmental ethical view in African philosophical thinking might be reasonably taken as an alternative to anthropocentric environmentalism. I urge other ethical theorists on African environmentalism not to neglect this non-anthropocentric African environmentalism that is salient in African ecofeminist environmentalism.     

Teaching ancient African philosophy

In this article, I critically examine the pedagogical problems in the teaching of ancient history of African philosophy in continental and diaspora Africa. I argue that the teaching of ancient history of African philosophy poses ab initio some peculiar problems arising from a number of factors: scepticism about the existence of such a classical philosophy; the problem of language and the controversy in the historiography of African philosophy. An examination of these issues as well as a discussion of their possible resolutions constitutes serious challenges both at the pedagogical and philosophical levels. I establish the particularistic, mythological, comparative, historical, and philosophical dimensions of ancient African philosophy which are instructive in the teaching of the course in tertiary institutions in continental and diaspora Africa. I provide advice on some common issues that are sensible to acquaint learners with in the teaching of the course in the homeland and diasporas, regardless of the variations in topics, emphasis, contents and texts. Consequently, I suggest a course scheme in ancient history of African philosophy that may be minimally adopted at the tertiary level.     

Population thinking as trope nominalism

The concept of population thinking was introduced by Ernst Mayr as the right way of thinking about the biological domain, but it is difficult to find an interpretation of this notion that is both unproblematic and does the theoretical work it was intended to do. I argue that, properly conceived, Mayr’s population thinking is a version of trope nominalism: the view that biological property-types do not exist or at least they play no explanatory role. Further, although population thinking has been traditionally used to argue against essentialism about biological kinds, recently it has been suggested that it may be consistent with at least some forms of essentialism—ones that construe essential properties as relational. I argue that if population thinking is a version of trope nominalism, then, as Mayr originally claimed, it rules out any version of essentialism about biological kinds.     

Gleaning the social contract theory from African communitarian philosophy

The social contract is one of the most influential political theories in Western philosophy. Although the social contract theory is mainly associated with a number of thinkers in the broad history of social and political philosophy, I am particularly focused on the social contract theory proffered by two British philosophers, Thomas Hobbes and John Locke. While the social contract theory has mainly been influenced by these British philosophers, little has been done in terms of appraising its key normative ideas from non-Western philosophical traditions. In this article, I examine how the social contract theory might be understood differently from a non-Western perspective, if values salient in African communitarian philosophy are properly understood. As I attempt to establish how the African social contract theory can be gleaned from African communitarian philosophy, I make comparisons and contrasts between the social contract theory in the African tradition and the traditional social contract theory in Western philosophy. I intend to make a novel interpretation of the ideals of the former that are implicit in the African communitarian structure. I seek to provide reasons why the African communitarian structure could be taken as the normative basis for a plausible social contract theory in the African social and political context.     

THE SUPERNATURAL AS LANGUAGE GAME

Abstract. For many in the Anglo‐American tradition of language analysis, Ludwig Wittgenstein, the great progenitor of twentieth‐century philosophy of language, showed conclusively that theological terms lack any referent in reality and therefore represent a discourse that can do no more than manifest the existential attitudes that speakers take toward reality as a whole. To think that such terms represent more is to be bewitched by the use of language. Is it possible, however, that theological language references a fundamental human drive? In this article I reexamine the dyad of nature and supernature from the perspective of Wittgenstein's philosophy. Perhaps surprisingly, Wittgenstein's thought on the subject offers much more than his famous, terse aphorism at the conclusion of his first masterwork, the Tractatus Logico‐Philosophicus ([1921] 1961, 74, §7): “What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence.” Furthermore, the basic Tractarian drive to determine the relationship between language and reality, which is redirected but not extinguished in Wittgenstein's second, divergent, opus, the Philosophical Investigations ([1953] 1967), may be the place for a renewed examination of what the supernatural means in human discourse. Does talk of God give expression to the fundamental transcendence of human knowledge? Is it a language game we can eschew?     

Reclamation from Absence? Luce Irigaray and Women in the History of Philosophy

Luce Irigaray's work does not present an obvious resource for projects seeking to reclaim women in the history of philosophy. Indeed, many authors introduce their reclamation project with an argument against conceptions, attributed to Irigaray or “French feminists” more generally, that the feminine is the excluded other of discourse. These authors claim that if the feminine is the excluded other of discourse, then we must conclude that even if women have written philosophy they have not given voice to feminine subjectivity; therefore, reclamation is a futile project. In this essay, I argue against such conclusions. Rather, I argue, Irigaray's work requires that philosophy be transformed through the reclamation of women's writing. She gives us a method of reclamation for the most difficult cases: those in which we have no record of women's writing. Irigaray offers this method through an engagement with the character of Diotima in Plato's Symposium. The method Irigaray demonstrates is reclamation as love.     

Folk Platitudes as the Explananda of Philosophical Metaethics: Are They Accurate? And Do They Help or Hinder Inquiry?

The field of metaethics, the branch of moral philosophy that examines the nature and status of morality, is rich in theoretical diversity. Nonetheless, a majority of professional philosophers embrace a subset of theories that affirm the existence of objective moral facts. I suggest that this may be related to the very method that philosophers use to construct metaethical theories. This method involves analyzing how ordinary people think and argue about morality. Analysis of ordinary moral discourse is meant to reveal common platitudes (or truisms) about the nature of morality itself, including the platitude that morality trades in objective moral facts. But do philosophers investigate ordinary moral discourse in any systematic way? How do they arrive at such platitudes? On what grounds are they justified? In this paper, I critically examine these questions and argue that a) any such platitudes need to be investigated systematically through empirical research and b) philosophers ought to be engaged in this research themselves.

     

Race,Sex and Class in Psychology: Vision of Hope for a Fair and Just South Africa

This opinion piece analyzes the current state of affairs in South African psychology from a philosophical point of view and suggests that the profession is in need of reformative thinking. It also gives a historical background to the current situation in society and the profession. Firstly, I argue that psychology in South Africa is currently in a moral dilemma. Secondly, I suggest that an attempt should be made to sketch a preferred scenario by presenting a moral point of view aimed at developing a post-conventional consciousness. Finally, I provide a broad outline of the steps that could be taken in developing a theory of implementation to achieve the preferred scenario in South African psychology. I argue that a feasible theory of implementation should include a discourse of justification as well as a discourse of application.     

Descartes as critic of Galileo's scientific methodology

Some philosophers of science suggest that philosophical assumptions must influence historical scholarship, because history (like science) has no neutral data and because the treatment of any particular historical episode is going to be influenced to some degree by one's prior philosophical conceptions of what is important in science. However, if the history of science must be laden with philosophical assumptions, then how can the history of science be evidence for the philosophy of science? Would not an inductivist history of science confirm an inductivist philosophy of science and a conventionalist history of science confirm a conventionalist philosophy of science? I attempt to resolve this problem; essentially, I deny the claim that the history of science must be influenced by one's conception of what is important in science — one's general philosophy of science. To accomplish the task I look at a specific historical episode, together with its history, and draw some metamethodological conclusions from it. The specific historical episode I examine is Descartes' critique of Galileo's scientific methodology.     

Space Contestations and the Teaching of African Philosophy in African Universities

Abstract

The central issue addressed in this paper is the demand for improvements in the space granted to African philosophy in African universities. I offer and elaborate on the most basic reasons for this demand, which includes amongst others: 1) the obsoleteness of the reasons given for the current trend of focusing on Western philosophy 2) the fact that very few teachers of philosophy in Africa are focused mainly or only on Western philosophy in their academic productivity and 3) the disparity between the premises and the conclusion of the arguments in favour of the current pride of place accorded to Western philosophy. These, and some other reasons of practical and strategic nature, make the maintenance of the current status quo of philosophy education in African universities either hypocritical or unjustified in their unwillingness to face the challenge that the evidence on the ground points to.     

Meaning and beauty

What place do experiences of beauty have in a meaningful life? A marginal one, at best, it would seem, if one looks at the current literature in analytic philosophy. Treatments of beauty within so-called “analytic existentialism” tend to suffer from four limitations: beauty is neglected, reduced to artistic production, saddled to theology, or taken as a mere application of a broader theoretical framework. These discussions fail to engage with the rich tradition of philosophical aesthetics. In this essay, I begin by responding to the contention that experiences of beauty cannot lend life meaning because they are passive. Drawing on work in philosophical aesthetics, I then argue that encounters with the beautiful count as genuinely meaning-conferring because they have features commonly taken as marks of meaningfulness.     

Rethinking the metaphysical questions of mind,matter, freedom,determinism, purpose and the mind-body problem within the panpsychist framework of consolationism

Consolationism is an emergent intellectual current in 21st century African philosophy that presents itself as an alternative constructive framework for metaphysics, with an epistemic foundation in the African thought-world and being universally applicable. In this paper, I trace the influences of consolationism within African philosophy, and argue that this original philosophical system is the product of the African complementary perspective of the universe understood as an interconnected whole of diverse entities. I submit that the doctrine of mood which lies at the heart of the consolationist system introduces new concepts into African metaphysics and recasts the question of being. I show how the consolationist perspective sheds light on the persistent mind-body problem and establishes consciousness as a necessary feature of the universe. Deploying the method of exposition and analysis, I assert that the panpsychist framework of consolationism facilitates a novel way of conceptualising such metaphysical questions as mind, matter, the mind-body problem, purpose, freedom, and determinism.     

Old wives’ tales and philosophical delusions: on ‘the problem of women and African philosophy’

abstract

This article represents a response to ‘the problem of women and African philosophy’, which refers mainly to the absence of sRong women’s and feminist voices within the discipline of African philosophy. I investigate the possibility that African women are not so much excluded from the institutionalized discipline of philosophy, as preferring fiction as a genre for intellectual expression. This hypothesis can be supported by some feminists who read the absolute prioritisation of abstraction and generalization over the concrete and the particular as a masculine and western oppressive sRategy. Attention to the concrete and the unique which is made possible by literature more readily than by philosophy, could thus operate as a form of political resistance in certain contexts. If fiction is currently the preferred form of intellectual expression of African women, it is crucial that the community of professional philosophers in a context like South Africa should come to terms with the relevance of such a preference for philosophy’s self-conception, and it should work to make these intellectual contributions philosophically fruitful. In the process, we may entertain the hope that philosophy itself will move closer to its root or source as ‘love of wisdom’.     

On truth and reference in postmodern science

Abstract:

If the defenders of typical postmodem accounts of science (and their less extreme social-constructivist partners) are at one end of the scale in current philosophy of science, who shall we place at the other end? Old-style metaphysical realists? Neo-neo-positivists? … Are the choices concerning realist issues as simple as being centered around either, on the one hand, whether it is the way reality is “constructed” in accordance with some contingent language game that determines scientific “truth”; or, on the other hand, whether it is the way things are in an independent reality that makes our theories true or false? If, in terms of realism, “strong” implies “metaphysical” in the traditional sense, and “weak” implies “non-absolutist” or “non-unique”, what - if anything - could realism after Rorty’s shattering of the mirror of nature still entail? In accordance with my position as a model-theoretic realist, I shall show in this article the relevance of the assumption of an independent reality for postmodern (philosophy of) science - against Lyotard’s dismissal of the necessity of this assumption for science which he interprets as a non-privileged game among many others. I shall imply that science is neither the “child” of positivist philosophy who has outgrown her mother, freeing herself from metaphysics and epistemology, nor is science, at the other end of the scale, foundationless and up for grabs.     

No logic of cogency: Reply to Oakley

Despite the fact that the nature of the properties of causation is rarely discussed within the mental causation debate, the implicit assumption is that they are universals as opposed to tropes. However, in recent literature on the problem of mental causation, a new solution has emerged which aims to address the problem by appealing to tropes. It is argued that if the properties of causation are tropes rather than universals, then a psychophysical reductionism can be advanced which does not face the problem of multiple realizability. However, the 'trope solution' rests upon the assumption that one can combine a trope monism with a type dualism. I argue that such a combination cannot be allowed. Given a plausible interpretation of types within a trope ontology, trope monism in fact entails type monism. Consequently, if one identifies mental tropes with physical tropes, one must also identify mental and physical types and in doing so face a modified version of the multiple realizability argument.     

The question of happiness in African philosophy

This article articulates some of the problems inherent in the attempt to determine the meaning of happiness in African philosophy and proposes a solution. I begin by outlining the conceptual arguments in contemporary African philosophy. Thereafter, I discuss the difficulties with defining happiness, especially in its psycho-moral implications. Finally, I provide an African philosophical response to the difficulties identified in the first two sections by relating the notion of happiness to an African theory of meaningful life as it is inscribed in a particular form of action. I argue that, while happiness and meaningful life are not equivalent, there is an African conception of happiness that is grounded in an African psycho-social and cultural worldview, which in turn involves a particular conception of the meaning of human existence. This work is exploratory in nature: many of the claims, especially as they relate to African philosophy, are based on analytical deduction from the available literature on African philosophy and intuitive deductions from the African worldview.