CULTURE AND HISTORY: ESSENTIAL PARTNERS IN THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN RELIGION AND SCIENCE

Abstract. In this essay I respond to John Caiazza's claim for the primacy of what he calls techno‐secularism for understanding twentieth‐century history. Using the examples of the Taiping Rebellion in nineteenth‐century China and Zionism in twentieth‐century Europe, I argue that the range of Caiazza's schema is confined solely to the Protestant West with little applicability to other national histories. I argue further for the lack of clarity and therefore the uselessness of the dichotomy of the secular and the religious for understanding human history. I claim instead that, while the category of technology and the institutions of religion are important determiners in human history, they need to be subsumed, without special status, within a broader set of interrelated factors called “culture.” I appeal for the academic study of science and religion to give primacy for the near future to the history of science and religion over both theology and science.     

A brilliant jewel: sex,celibacy, and the Roman Catholic Church

As clerical sexual abuse scandals hit the news and the crisis of vocations worsens each year, debate about the merits of mandatory clerical celibacy continues to grow. The fact remains, however, that supposedly celibate priests have been sexually active in significant numbers throughout history and that their sexual activity has barely affected the power of the Church. In this article, I focus on the ‘everyday’ nature of sexual ‘incontinence’ among a group of Northeast Brazilian priests and analyse the relative systematicity with which vow-breaking is accommodated. Such systematicity, I suggest, reveals an ongoing stable-instability at the heart of the Church as an institution; a dynamic which, if better understood, can help to explain the most characteristic (but often overlooked) feature of institutions more generally: their impressive longevity.     

Structural Injustice and Massively Shared Obligations

It is often argued that our obligations to address structural injustice are collective in character. But what exactly does it mean for ‘ordinary citizens’ to have collective obligations vis‐à‐vis large‐scale injustice? In this article, I propose to pay closer attention to the different kinds of collective action needed in addressing some of these structural injustices and the extent to which these are available to large, unorganised groups of people. I argue that large, dispersed, and unorganised groups of people are often in a position to perform distributive collective actions. As such, ordinary citizens can have massively shared obligations to address structural injustice through distributive action, but, ultimately, such obligations are ‘collective’ only in a fairly weak sense.     

Computation,hypercomputation, and physical science

Copeland and others have argued that the Church–Turing thesis (CTT) has been widely misunderstood by philosophers and cognitive scientists. In particular, they have claimed that CTT is in principle compatible with the existence of machines that compute functions above the “Turing limit,” and that empirical investigation is needed to determine the “exact membership” of the set of functions that are physically computable. I argue for the following points: (a) It is highly doubtful that philosophers and cognitive scientists have widely misunderstood CTT as alleged.¹ In fact, by and large, computability theorists and mathematical logicians understand CTT in the exact same way. (b) That understanding most likely coincides with what Turing and Church had in mind. Even if it does not, an accurate exegesis of Turing and Church need not dictate how today's working scientists understand the thesis. (c) Even if we grant Copeland's reading of CTT, an orthodox stronger version of it which he rejects (Gandy's thesis) follows readily if we only accept a highly plausible necessary condition for what constitutes a deterministic digital computer. Finally, (d) regardless of whether we accept this condition, the prospects for a scientific theory of hypercomputation are exceedingly poor because physical science does not have the wherewithal to investigate computability or to discover its ultimate “limit.”     

Three Orthodox Models of Christian Unity: Traditionalist,Mainstream, Prophetic

The assumption is often made that the Orthodox Church has a unified approach to ecumenical engagement with other churches. This paper argues that while there is a ‘mainstream’ model (reflected especially in the thought of Georges Florovsky), there is also a minority ‘traditionalist’ model. While having radically different attitudes towards the modern ecumenical movement (traditionalists are vehemently opposed), both of these accept the premise that the historical Orthodox Church alone is the fullness of the Christian Church and that doctrinal agreement and incorporation into the Orthodox Church must precede sacramental communion. A more open alternative model (‘prophetic’) reflects proposals made in the twentieth century by theologians such as Sergius Bulgakov, Nicholas Afanasiev, Anton Kartashev and Nicholas Zernov. These were not taken up at the time but it is argued that they deserve to be studied again by Orthodox bishops and ecumenical leaders as possibilities for bold prophetic action toward Christian unity.     

PANENTHEISM AND THE UNDOING OF DISENCHANTMENT

In this article, I draw on historical and conceptual arguments to show, first, that disenchantment and the influential view of the relationship between science and religion to which disenchantment gives rise are rooted in the metaphysics of theism. I then introduce the alternative metaphysical position of panentheism and identify Jungian psychology as an important, if implicit, mid‐twentieth‐century instance of panentheistic thought. Using the example of Jungian psychology, I demonstrate how the viewpoint of panentheism undoes the implications of disenchantment for the relationship between science and religion, promoting greater opportunities for dialogue and reconciliation between science and religion. I note, however, that these closer relations may depend on understanding science and religion differently from how they are understood under disenchantment. While the original tension between science and religion is eased, another tension—between panentheistic and disenchanted understandings of science and religion—is exposed. I conclude by reflecting on some implications of this discussion for sociology.     

The Rhetoric of Homosexual Practice

Many Protestant denominations have or recently had policies that prohibit “self‐avowed practicing homosexuals” from being ordained. By only prohibiting “practicing” homosexuals, proponents of these policies claim that they do not discriminate against homosexuals as a group since, technically, a homosexual can still be ordained as long as she is “non‐practicing.” In other words, a condemnation of homosexual practice is not the same as a condemnation of homosexual persons. I argue that this is not the case; the rhetoric of homosexual practice does, in fact, amount to a condemnation of gays and lesbians. It does so by conflating the two things it claims to keep separate—homosexual conduct and homosexual identity. I demonstrate this conflation by analyzing the history of this rhetoric and how it has been adjudicated in church court decisions from the United Methodist Church and the Presbyterian Church (USA).     

GALILEO STILL GOES TO JAIL: CONFLICT MODEL PERSISTENCE WITHIN INTRODUCTORY ANTHROPOLOGY MATERIALS

Historians have long since rejected the dubious assertions of the conflict model, with its narratives of perennial religion versus science combat. Nonetheless, this theory persists in various academic disciplines, and it is still presented to university students as the authoritative historical account of religion–science interactions. Cases of this can be identified within modern anthropology textbooks and reference materials, which often recapitulate claims once made by John W. Draper and Andrew D. White. This article examines 21st‐century introductory anthropology publications, demonstrating how such works perpetuate religion–science myths and the notion that history has been replete with inevitable religion versus science warfare. In particular, this study reveals how such introductory materials propagate discord narratives associated with the Scientific Revolution and the Enlightenment. Affiliated with these anecdotes are oversimplified accounts of religious responses to heliocentrism and evolutionary theory, as well as claims that science has invariably led to the usurpation of religious belief and secularization from Galileo onwards.     

FROM DIVINE ORACLES TO THE HIGHER CRITICISM: ANDREW D. WHITE AND THE WARFARE OF SCIENCE WITH THEOLOGY IN CHRISTENDOM

Historians of science and religion have given little attention to how historical‐critical scholarship influenced perceptions of the relationship between science and religion in the nineteenth century. However, the so‐called “cofounders” of the “conflict thesis,” the idea that science and religion are fundamentally and irrevocable at odds, were greatly affected by this literature. Indeed, in his two‐volume magnum opus, A History of the Warfare of Science with Theology in Christendom (1896), Andrew D. White, in his longest and final chapter of his masterpiece, traced the development of the “scientific interpretation” of the Bible. In this article, I argue that developments in biblical criticism had a direct impact on how White constructed his historical understanding of the relationship between science and religion. By examining more carefully how biblical criticism played a significant role in the thought of White and other alleged cofounders of the conflict thesis, this article hopes to relocate the origins, development, and meaning of the science–religion debate at the end of the nineteenth century.     

‘Between Rome and Constantinople’: the Italian-Albanian Church: a study in Eastern Catholic history and ecclesiology

This article examines the Eastern Christian presence on the Italian Peninsula and the Island of Sicily; the settlement of Albanian Christians after the Ottoman conquest of the Balkans, the emergence of a distinct Italo-Albanian Church and the jurisdictional arrangements made to accomodate this. Concentrating on the period from the 15th century onwards, from the arrival of large numbers of Eastern Christian Albanians in southern Italy and Sicily, the article examines the unique arrangement between Rome and Constantinople, from the Council of Florence (1439) to the Council of Trent (1545–1563), when the Orthodox Bishop of Ohrid provided ecclesial jurisdiction, an arrangement which has no direct historical parallel. The article highlights the work of the eighteenth-century historian Pietro Pompilio Rodotà (who related the two distinct phases of Eastern Christian presence, for historical, cultural, ethnic and linguistic reasons, to the development of the general category of the ‘Greek Rite’) and more contemporary attempts by some Italo-Albanians to establish a metropolitanate (posing questions for the relationship of the Italo-Greek Monastery of Grottaferrata to any future Italo-Albanian ecclesial body). The history and tradition of the Italian-Albanian Church and of the Monastery of Grottaferrata, present a unique and significant Eastern Christian–Eastern Catholic presence in Italy, raising important questions for ecumenism and ecclesiolgy in Europe today.     

The Turing Test: the first 50 years

The Turing Test, originally proposed as a simple operational definition of intelligence, has now been with us for exactly half a century. It is safe to say that no other single article in computer science, and few other articles in science in general, have generated so much discussion. The present article chronicles the comments and controversy surrounding Turing's classic article from its publication to the present. The changing perception of the Turing Test over the last 50 years has paralleled the changing attitudes in the scientific community towards artificial intelligence: from the unbridled optimism of 1960s to the current realization of the immense difficulties that still lie ahead. I conclude with the prediction that the Turing Test will remain important, not only as a landmark in the history of the development of intelligent machines, but also with real relevance to future generations of people living in a world in which the cognitive capacities of machines will be vastly greater than they are now.     

Consciousness and Self in Animals: Some Reflections

In this essay I argue that many nonhuman animal beings are conscious and have some sense of self. Rather than ask whether they are conscious, I adopt an evolutionary perspective and ask why consciousness and a sense of self evolved—what are they good for? Comparative studies of animal cognition, ethological investigations that explore what it is like to be a certain animal, are useful for answering this question. Charles Darwin argued that the differences in cognitive abilities and emotions among animals are differences in degree rather than differences in kind, and his view cautions against the unyielding claim that humans, and perhaps other great apes and cetaceans, are the only species in which a sense of self‐awareness has evolved. I conclude that there are degrees of consciousness and self among animals and that it is likely that no animal has the same highly developed sense of self as that displayed by most humans. Many animals have a sense of “body‐ness” or “mine‐ness” but not a sense of “I‐ness.” Darwin's ideas about evolutionary continuity, together with empirical data (“science sense”) and common sense, will help us learn more about consciousness and self in animals. Answers to challenging questions about animal self‐awareness have wide‐ranging significance, because they are often used as the litmus test for determining and defending the sorts of treatments to which animals can be morally subjected.     

Married with children: the experience of women ministers of word and sacrament in the United Reformed Church

The experience of women being admitted to full ministry has a much longer history within the Free Churches than in the Anglican Church, although from the way in which the Church of England debate on women priests and bishops has been reported this is often not acknowledged. The United Reformed Church (URC) has given equal access for men and women to ministry from the date of the union in 1972 between the Congregational Church and the Presbyterian Church. Both denominations have a long history of women in ministry. This paper examines the experience of 50 URC clergywomen who combine marriage, children and ministry to explore their experience of ministry, marriage and motherhood. The findings demonstrate that, overall, the women’s experience is mixed, although the general expectation among congregations and moderators is that women are the primary care‐givers within the family. The implications of these findings are discussed.     

SIGNALING STATIC: ARTISTIC,RELIGIOUS, AND SCIENTIFIC TRUTHS IN A RELATIONAL ONTOLOGY

Abstract. In this essay I point toward the difficulties inherent in ontological objectivity and seek to restore our truth claims to validity through a relational ontology and the dynamic of coimplication in signals and noise. Theological examination of art and science points toward similarities between art, religion, and science. All three have often focused upon a “metaphysics of presence,” the desire for absolute presence of the object (the signified, the divine, the natural object). If we accept a relational ontology, however, we must accept that the revelation of presence is always simultaneously a concealment. This helps explain technoscientific achievement without recourse to a philosophically flawed objectivity. Twentieth‐century information theory shows the impossibility of a “pure signal.” By accepting that signal and noise are permanently interconnected, we begin to see how noise makes signal possible and even how noise becomes signal (allowing the discovery of novel facts). Information theory thus underscores important similarities and leads toward new approaches in aesthetics, Christian theology, and scientific research. By comparing art, religion, and science, I argue that rejecting a metaphysics of presence without rejecting presence itself allows human beings to know the world. Although religion, science, and art often seek the absolute presence of their objects, they function better without.     

The Pessimistic Meta-induction: Obsolete Through Scientific Progress?

Recently, Fahrbach and Park have argued that the pessimistic meta-induction (PMI) about scientific theories is unsound. They claim that this very argument does not properly take into account scientific progress, particularly during the twentieth century. They also propose amended arguments in favour of scientific realism, which are supposed to properly reflect the history of science. I try to show that what I call the argument from scientific progress cannot explain satisfactorily why the current (best) theories should have reached a degree of success that excludes their future refutations and allows the inference to their truth. I further argue that this line of argumentation dismisses the burden of proof in a rather unfair manner by using a delaying tactic to postpone the question about the validity of the PMI in the future.     

On disagreement about perception

In this article I have tried to rebut certain types of arguments which purport to show not merely that God does not exist but that the notion of necessary existence is itself either self‐contradictory or senseless. In showing that it is not self‐contradictory I have allowed myself the luxury of a negative and a positive approach. Negatively, I have had to show that when the accusation of self‐contradiction is made, it is often accompanied, not by an argument but by a sheer assertion. On the rare occasions when an argument is forthcoming, the arguments, I have tried to show, have been invalid, not even, inconclusive. And to the extent that Kant may be said to have argued not simply the impossibility of a genuine proof of the existence of God, but indeed the impossibility of the concept of necessary existence, I have argued out the weakness of Kant's arguments, the most notable of which I have discussed in some detail. Finally, to establish the genuineness of the concept of necessary existence, positively, I have paradoxically made use of a notion from Russell's logic.     

The Creation of a Distinct Subcultural Identity and Denominational Growth

Scholars have long been concerned with the causes of differential growth in the membership of religious traditions and denominations. In this article I use data from three surveys, matched with census and membership data from U.S. states, to test Smith's recent theory of denominational growth and decline. I find that in the one denomination under study, the Presbyterian Church (USA), the states where membership has declined the least are those states where the members of the denomination are both the most theologically orthodox and have the strongest identity as theological liberals. Although seemingly paradoxical, it fits Smith's theory well. Liberal Protestants do not thrive where they are the most conservative, but rather where they have created a unique identity—a unique social niche—somewhere between evangelicalism and secularism.     

Reflections on Change in Science and Religion

Science and the Catholic Church are both conservative, slow-to-change institutions. However, science has institutionalized procedures that ensure that ample amounts of criticism of currently accepted theories and methodologies will always be present. This arrangement of continuous conjectures and refutation in science ensures often slow but steady change. Because supporters often think of religions as trafficking in timeless truths, criticism of church beliefs and practices (even when intended to stimulate reflection and improvement) is frequently seen as being disloyal to the institution. Because of the growing crises caused by world overpopulation, I argue that the Catholic Church's opposition to all artificial methods of birth control now lacks whatever moral force it might have had when originally promulgated. By highlighting theological perspectives that might be appropriate for the ecological realities of the 21st century, I hope the church will see the wisdom of reevaluating many of its positions in the light of rapidly approaching ecological imperatives.     

"Thy People Are My People": Emma Lazarus,Daniel Deronda,and the Ambivalence of Jewish Modernity

This essay examines the role of Jews in Britain’s imperial strategy and asks whether Britain could have built its empire without them. Recent scholarship concerning Jews and the British Empire places Jews in the “informal empire”, in economic and other activities outside political rule. This was the case in nineteenth‐century Malta, where Jews established themselves in commercial activities in support of Britain’s military ambitions in the Mediterranean. They received some political recognition, though this was short‐lived. Despite the efforts of Moses Montefiore, the British government refused to yield space for building a synagogue. The success of Malta’s leading Jews, in the early and mid‐century, meant that they were never above suspicion. In the late nineteenth century, the British government shielded the Jewish community from an accusation of ritual murder, but this had more to do with promoting British interests vis‐à‐vis the Catholic Church in Malta than advancing Jewish interests. Colonial policy concerning Jews did not result from a coherent rationale concerning Jewish interests nor consistent Jewish influence.     

Commands as Divine Attributes

Theories of ethics that attempt to incorporate divine speech or commands as necessary elements in the construction of moral obligations are often viewed as vulnerable to a challenge based on the so‐called Euthyphro dilemma. According to this challenge, opponents of theistic ethics suppose that divine speech either informs one of a preexisting set of values and obligations, which makes it inconsequential, or is entirely arbitrary, which makes it irrational. This essay analyzes some of the debates on the nature of divine commands in eleventh‐century works of Islamic jurisprudence (u?ūl al‐fiqh). I show that Mu?tazilī jurisprudents advanced the view that divine commands were actions performed in time that had concrete manifestations, while Ash?arīs argued that divine speech in general, and commands in particular, were eternal divine attributes. After exposing certain weaknesses in the Euthyphro‐inspired objections to theistic ethics, I argue that the Ash?arī idea of commands as divine attributes is a promising move for scholars interested in defending a divine command view of moral obligation.